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
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
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THE MUSICAL SETTING OF EURIPIDES' *ORESTES*.

It will always be a matter of profound regret to classical scholars that all but a few scraps of ancient Greek music have been lost to us, and that most of those which have survived are from unknown or insignificant composers of Hellenistic or Roman times. Only two fragments (or perhaps three) exist which make any claim to antedate the Hellenistic period, and the authenticity of one of these, an alleged setting of Pindar's First Pythian Ode, is so dubious that no inferences can be safely drawn from it.¹ Only the fragment we are about to examine, a papyrus containing fragments of the text with musical notation of portions of the antistrophe of a chorus from Euripides' *Orestes*, can be relied on to give us any conception

¹ About sixteen fragments, few of them complete, are all that survive of ancient pieces of music. Those surviving in the manuscripts can be consulted in Jan, *Musici Scriptores Graeci, Supplementum* (Leipzig, 1899); those coming from papyri and inscriptions are conveniently discussed by Mountford in Powell and Barber, *New Chapters in the History of Greek Literature* (Oxford, 1929), Second Series, pp. 146-82, and Third Series, pp. 260-1. To this should be added: P. Oslo., 1413, published by Eitrem, Arundsen, and Winnington-Ingram, *Symbolae Osloenses*, XXXI (1955), pp. 1-87. Another papyrus containing musical notation, Michigan 2958, is to be published shortly by O. M. Pearl. For a general bibliography see Winnington-Ingram, *Lustrum*, III (1958). On the theory Mountford and Winnington-Ingram in the *O. C. D.* (*s. v. Music*) provide the sanest, most lucid, and most convenient introduction to a very complicated and controversial subject. On the alleged Pindar fragment, see Mountford, *C. P.*, XXXI (1936), pp. 120 ff. *con.*, and K. Schlesinger, *The Greek Anælos* (Oxford, 1939), pp. 353-60, *pro.*

of the kind of melody set to a Greek tragedy of the Fifth Century.²

It is not merely antiquarian curiosity about the daily life and amusements of an ancient Athenian which makes a knowledge of this music a *desideratum* for classical scholarship. Students of classical philosophy, for example, are constantly confronted with references in ancient authorities to the importance of music in education and culture, and, in particular, to the alleged "ethical" qualities and powers of certain scales; these references will remain fundamentally incomprehensible until we hear the kind of music which called them forth.³

Likewise, students of ancient poetry, and of dramatic poetry in particular, must constantly regret the loss of the melodies which were integral parts of the works of art they are attempting to interpret. We know that Greek drama made use of music, but it is very difficult to determine how far an analogy with modern opera is appropriate. It is likely, no doubt, that the relative importance of the music and the libretto is not the same for ancient drama as for modern opera; we are not in the position of one attempting to evaluate Mozart's *Don Giovanni* from the words alone. In the Greek texts we have the better part. Nevertheless, the music was an integral part of the artistic whole; without it (and without the dance and the spectacle) something of value has been lost.

The *editio princeps* of the "Orestes" fragment was by

² K. Wessely, *Mitteilungen aus der Sammlung der Papyrus Erzherzog Rainer*, V (Vindobonae, 1892), pp. 65-73 with photographs. Sedgwick, *Class. et Med.*, XI (1950), p. 222, thinks that the briefer and more mutilated scrap of a tragedy from Cairo is also classical.

³ The most famous instances are those of Plato, *Republic*, 398C-399D, and *Laws*, 653D-673A, 795-812E; Aristotle, *Politics* (VIII, 1339a-1342b). The problem most classicists are interested in, namely, the nature of the "ethos" ascribed to the various scales, has not been elucidated to anyone's complete satisfaction. See Winnington-Ingram, *Mode in Ancient Greek Music* (Cambridge, 1936), who gives a brilliant survey of all the literary evidence. Only the "aulos scales" of Schlesinger, *op. cit.* (n. 1), *passim*, of all the reconstructions of the scholars, give any audible effect which throws any light on what the philosophers mean by "ethos,"—at least, so it seems to me from tape recordings I have made of how the various theoretical reconstructions of scales actually sound when played on *auloi* and *kitharai*.

Wessely. Crusius and Wagner have made subsequent contributions to the readings of the papyrus, and since I have not had an opportunity to examine the papyrus itself, I shall confine myself in this paper to matters unaffected by problems of restoration.⁴ The text, of course, can be restored from the manuscript tradition, although, as we shall see, a very knotty problem with respect to the order of the lines is involved.

Mountford provides us with the following restoration of the fragment:⁵

$\begin{array}{c} \dot{\Pi} \\ \Pi \end{array} \text{ P } \text{ C } \quad \text{ P } \cdot \Phi \Pi$
 (κατολοφ)ΥΡΟΜΑΙ Ζ ΜΑΤΕΡΟΣ (αἷμα σᾶς
 $\text{Z } ? \text{ } \text{ } \text{I} \cdot \text{Z } \text{E}$
 ὁς σ' ἀναβ)ΑΚΧΕΥΕΙ Ζ Ο ΜΕΓΑΣ (ὄλβος οὐ
 $\begin{array}{c} \dot{\Pi} \\ \Pi \end{array} \text{ P } \text{ C } \quad \text{I} \cdot \text{Z}$
 μόνιμο)Σ ΕΜ ΒΡΕΤΟΙΣ Ζ ΑΝΑ (δὲ λαίφος ὥς
 $\text{C} \cdot \text{P } \begin{array}{c} \dot{\Pi} \\ \Pi \end{array} \text{ C } \text{P } \quad \Phi \cdot \text{C}$
 τας) ΑΚΑΤΟΥ ΘΩΑΣ Ζ ΤΙΝΑ (ξας δαίμων)
 $? \Pi \text{P } \begin{array}{c} \dot{\Pi} \\ \Pi \end{array}$ $\text{ZI} \cdot \text{Z}$
 ΚΑΤΕΚΛΥΣΕΝ ΤΩ Δ (εινῶν πόνων) ΤΩ ΩΩΣ ΠΟΝΤ (ου
 $\text{C} \cdot \text{P } \text{I}$
 λάβροις ὀλεθρίοις)ΙΝ (ἐν κύμασιν.)

Because this fragment of Euripides provides us with our only opportunity to hear an ancient dramatic text set to its original melody it assumes great importance for our understanding of

*The *editio princeps* was cited above, n. 2; Crusius, *Philologus*, LII (1893), p. 147; Wagner, *Philologus*, LXXVII (1921), p. 293. Of the many comments on this music the following are most representative: besides the *editio princeps*, Monro, *Modes of Ancient Greek Music* (Oxford, 1894), p. 93; Winnington-Ingram, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-6; E. Martin, *Trois Documents de Musique Grecque* (Paris, 1953), pp. 14-24; G. Reese, *Music in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1940), pp. 48 ff.; Mountford, *New Chapters in the History of Greek Literature*, Second Series, pp. 146-82; K. Schlesinger, *op. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 363 ff.

⁵ Mountford, *loc. cit.* (above, n. 4), p. 146. In this paper we shall not be concerned with the rhythmic signs, nor the notes which are written on the line of the text. It seems probable to me that the Z between ΘΟΑΣ and ΤΙΝΑ(ξας) is identical to the Z in the preceding lines. The instrumental notes are congruent with the scale of the vocal notes.

Greek drama as a whole. It is regrettable, therefore, that it is in such a mutilated condition, that its compass is so brief, and that confusion as to the order of the lines should impair its usefulness. But to count our blessings, let us enumerate several fortunate features of this fragment. First of all, its authenticity is fairly certain.⁶ Then, it not only comes from a tragedy of one of the great authors, Euripides, but also from one which is otherwise extant as a whole, so the fragment can be placed in context. Moreover, this very play, though not this particular passage, was used by Dionysius of Halicarnassus to illustrate some of his assertions concerning the relationship between melody and pitch accent.⁷ It seems possible that the text and "score" of this drama, or selections from it, were preserved because of some special excellence it had in the minds of ancient critics.⁸ Finally, although the loss of the edges of the papyrus fragment is regrettable and exasperating, it is fortunate that the text is so written on the papyrus that the beginnings and the ends of the lines as they are usually divided fall in the preserved centre portion. Thus we are able to examine opening phrases and closing musical cadences—a matter of some importance, as we shall see.

An attempted interpretation of the music in actual intervals would plunge us immediately into a tangled jungle of controversy, ancient and modern. Attempts to determine the "scale" and the "key" of the fragment have resulted in the following identifications: Hypolydian *tonos* (key), Hypophrygian species by Schlesinger; Mixolydian *tonos*, Mixolydian mode, by Sachs; Lydian *tonos*, Lydian mode, by Gombosi; Dorian mode by Jan and Monro, Lydian *tonos* and Phrygian mode by Montford.⁹

⁶ This is confirmed by the archaic nature of the scale used. See, below, n. 13; Winnington-Ingram, *op. cit.*, p. 31, n. 3.

⁷ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De Compositione Verborum* (ed. Usener and Radermacher, 1904-29), XI, 63-4.

⁸ Or so I interpret the coincidence that Dionysius should be discussing the music of this very play, and that at three places, lines 174, 343, and 1384, there are scholia commenting on musical matters. It is not necessary to insist that a complete "score" was available in Roman times. See on this question, F. Marx, *Rh. Mus.*, LXXXII (1933), p. 233; Turner, *J. H. S.*, LXXVI (1956), pp. 95 ff.

⁹ K. Schlesinger, *The Greek Aulos*, p. 363; K. Sachs, *The Rise of Music in the Ancient World, East and West* (New York, 1943), pp. 243 ff.;

This complete lack of agreement should serve to warn the unwary that scholars have by no means arrived at a satisfactory agreement about the application of terms of ancient music. At the present time there are roughly three schools of thought; a traditional school, working from the theories of Aristoxenus, the successor of Aristotle, and other ancient theorists; a school which works from an analysis of the (assumed) tunings and fingerings of the ancient lyre and cithara; and theories of Schlesinger, arising from her analysis of the scales produced by surviving relics of Greek *auloi*.¹⁰ The ancient controversy between Apollo with the lyre and Marsyas with the *aulos* still rages! None of these theories does full justice to facts adduced by the others, and it may be that an attempt at a comprehensive theory of Greek music is doomed from the start. I suspect that, in fact, Greek music was not homogeneous and that music for the lyre and the *aulos* arose on quite different acoustical principles and that in ancient, as in modern, Greece several fundamentally different musical systems lay side by side in more or less uneasy co-existence in the culture of the people.

This being the case, I shall not attempt in this paper to discuss matters which involve controversial questions of the actual values to be assigned to the musical notation.¹¹ It will

O. Gombosi, *Tonarten und Stimmungen in Antiken Musik*, p. 110; Jan, *Musici Scriptores Graeci, Supplementum*, pp. 4-5; Monro, *Modes of Ancient Greek Music*, pp. 93-4 (he also considers Mixolydian as possible); Mountford, *loc. cit.* (n. 1), pp. 168 ff.

¹⁰ The literature on the subject of Greek music is complex, contradictory, and confusing. No footnote can do justice to even one theory. Those who wish to pursue the matter will find the traditional approach best represented in Mountford and Winnington-Ingram's article in the *O. C. D.*, s. v. *Musio*; the theories based on assumed tunings of the *kithara* are best approached through G. Reese, *Music in the Middle Ages*, pp. 11-53, with its references to articles by Sachs and Gombosi. The basic assumptions of this school have been submitted to very cogent criticisms by Winnington-Ingram, *O. Q.*, L (1956), pp. 169-86; theories based on *aulos* scales are to be found in K. Schlesinger, *op. cit.* (n. 1), *passim*. Though many of her deductions and theoretical reconstructions (particularly of the history of notation) are suspect, nonetheless the existence of these *aulos* scales, with proportionately increasing intervals, is incontrovertible, and must be accounted for in any system.

¹¹ The notes used in the fragment are (1) in the vocal notation: ϕΣΠΗΙΖ Ε; (2) in the instrumental notation: ΟΓΘ. I take the note at

be sufficient for our present purposes to know the direction the musical line is taking and the contours of the melodic phrase. Readers who are not familiar with Greek musical notation need only keep in mind that, roughly speaking, every third letter of the alphabet is a step of the diatonic scale apart, and that notes arranged in alphabetical order are descending, whereas an ascending phrase will show the opposite order.¹² The only point which is of importance to my present enquiry is the fact that the scale used in this fragment does not correspond to the canons of Aristoxenus, but is identical with an ancient scale quoted by Aristides in a commentary on the musical section of Plato's *Republic*.¹³ This seems to me to be ample support for an assumption that this music is genuinely pre-Aristoxenian, and hence probably Euripidean. The fact that Aristides names this scale "Phrygian," when Mixolydian and Dorian were the usual scales used in tragedy, need not concern us. Sophocles, we know, occasionally used the "Phrygian" in his tragedies, and there is no reason to doubt that Euripides did so as well.¹⁴

Examining first the melody itself, I should like to point out evidences of melodic formality. There are repetitions of the cadences and of opening phrases.¹⁵ There is evidence of inversion and (more doubtfully) a kind of sequence.¹⁶ The melodic idea of the passage seems to be a ringing of the changes on the

the level of the text between the lines of verse to be a Z, but see Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

¹² I am aware, of course, that this distorts the actual picture of the intervals, particularly if Schlesinger is right, as I believe she is, that the intervals in question are of gradually increasing size as one ascends the scale. It is true that Aristoxenos and his followers imply equal and commensurable intervals, but he is demonstrably wrong in the second point, and may be wrong in the first.

¹³ Aristides Quintilianus, *De Musica* (ed. Jan, 1882), I, 22. This "Phrygian" scale is: ΦΣΠΠΙΖΕΔΩ. This is the same sequence as used in the fragment (see n. 11), although Δ and Ω are not utilized, in the extant parts at least.

¹⁴ See Mountford, *loc. cit.*, p. 168.

¹⁵ Closing cadences: (. φ) ὑπομαί and ἐμ βροτοῖς

I Z E I Z

Opening phrases: ὁ μέγας and ἀνὰ.

¹⁶ Inversion: ΠΣΠ with ΠΠΣ

Sequence: (I)ΣΠ, ΠΣΠ, and ()ΣΠ.

enharmonic *pukna* ΗΡΣ. This feature of the music is of some importance inasmuch as none of the other pieces of Greek music extant (which come, as we said above, from Hellenistic and Roman times) show anything like this degree of balance and formality.¹⁷ It would be impossible to generalize from this little scrap, but this is intriguing evidence that, in the fifth century at least, music shared some of the love of her sister arts for form, balance, and subtle variation.

Next let us examine the relationship of the melody to the words, and in particular, the problem raised by Dionysius' assertions on the relationship of the melody and the pitch accent. Dionysius states that the words are subordinate to the tune and illustrates his remarks by quoting from another chorus from this very play, claiming that the melodic line contradicts the pitch accent.¹⁸ I shall not attempt here to examine this other chorus, or to untangle the difficulties involved, but it is interesting to test his assertions in the present instance, since in varying degrees his thesis is contradicted by almost all of the other fragments of Greek music we possess, in which acute and circumflex accents are usually higher in pitch (or, at least, not lower) than other syllables in the word, and in addition, circumflexes are frequently set to a pair of descending notes.¹⁹

Although Mountford in his discussion of the problem implies that there was a degree of conformity illustrated in this fragment, a careful tally of the accents with the musical phrases

¹⁷ In the *Ajax* fragment (see Mountford, p. 176) there is a tendency to repeat certain note patterns, but the repetitions do not appear to be formally organized. The idea (expressed by Pickard-Cambridge in *O. C. D.*, s. v. *Euripides*, section 14) that he aimed at expressing intensity of feeling without observance of any formal rule or symmetry does not seem to be supported by this piece.

¹⁸ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De Compositione Verborum*, XI, 63-4. The force of Dionysius' arguments is considerably weakened by the unreliability of the text he quotes. In the text as traditionally received, the implied melody conforms in several instances to the pitch accent where Dionysius marks a violation.

¹⁹ See Winnington-Ingram, *Symbolae Osloenses*, XXXI (1955), p. 64, where the rules are more fully explained; see also R. L. Turner, *C. R.* (1915), pp. 195-6; Mountford, *loc. cit.*, pp. 164 ff. In this discussion I am ignoring the grave accent which plays a very minor role in this chorus, and whose effect is not very marked in any case.

leaves the matter at best ambiguous. In five cases, acute accents (so far as the papyrus goes) are not violated by the music, in three, there are violations. There are two circumflexes, neither set to two descending notes, one on the higher, the other on the lower note of the music set to the word.²⁰ Other cases are for various reasons uncertain. It cannot be said, then, that this fragment proves the point one way or the other, although there is a slight preponderance of evidence in favor of a correspondence between music and accent. When the further evidence of strophic responsion is considered below, however, it will become clear, I hope, that the melodic line did in fact keep the contours of the melody in mind to a considerable extent. Sedgwick, however, has decided that this fragment indicates that only post-classical music observed the pitch accent in melody, and suggests that this was due to Hellenistic pedantry.²¹ On *a priori* grounds this seems to me most improbable, and, even as it stands, this fragment does show a degree of conformity. However a more important line of evidence has not yet, to my knowledge, been considered: that is, the relationship of the melodic line to the strophe, or the *first* verse.

It is, of course, only an assumption that the music for both strophe and antistrophe was the same. But as my discussion will show, we have in fact evidence which can control this assumption, and make it possible to guess with some assurance whether or not this was the case in any piece of strophic verse before us.

Before we can proceed to the task of setting the melody to the strophe, one disturbing difficulty must be considered, that is, the uncertainty of the order of some of the lines of the antistrophe, and hence of the exact responsion of words between the strophe and the antistrophe. Here, as it happens, the metre is of no help, inasmuch as all the possibilities are equally possible metrically.²²

Π Ρ Σ Ζ Φ Σ () () Π Ρ Π Ζ Σ Ρ
²⁰ Non-violations: -φύρομαι, βακχεύει, τινάξας, κατέκλυσεν, πόντ(ου), (θοῶς).

Ρ Φ Π Ζ Ε Σ Ρ Π

Violations: (1) Acutes: ματέρος, μέγας, ἀκάτων

Ρ Σ

(2) Circumflexes: βροτοῖς

See below, n. 32.

²¹ Sedgwick, *Olass. et Med.*, XI (1950), pp. 222 ff.

²² The manuscripts are dislocated at this point, and the traditional

Kirchoff, followed by Murray in the OCT, placed line 339 after 340, in order to bring the repeated verbs *καθικετεύομαι* and *κατολοφύρομαι* parallel in the responsion. Our papyrus, however, gives the order as follows: 339, 338, 340. In my original investigations, I had not only accepted this order, but altered the strophe likewise, again in order to preserve the parallelism between *καθικετεύομαι* and *κατολοφύρομαι*. In so far as my total statistics are concerned there is no difference between this arrangement and that of the OCT. On pondering the matter further, I have become dissatisfied with either solution, though both are possible, for the following reasons: Kirchoff's arrangement involves a reshuffling of the melodic phrases, which seems to me unlikely,²³ and my original arrangement makes an awkward, if not impossible, break in the sentence structure of the strophe.

Thus I was led to set the antistrophe, following the order given in the papyrus, against the strophe, following the traditional order (which, by the way, is not disturbed in the manuscripts). Although this involves abandoning the parallelism of *καθικετεύομαι* and *κατολοφύρομαι*, in every other respect much more consistent results are obtained.²⁴ Let us see how the accents of the strophe correspond to the melodic contours, first of all employing this latter arrangement of lines.

In seven cases, six of them involving acute accents and one a circumflex, the melodic line does not contradict the accent.²⁵

order of the lines, 338, 339, 340 of the antistrophe has been rejected by Kirchoff and Murray, though retained in the Loeb text. There does not seem to be any manuscript authority for changing the corresponding lines of the strophe. I hope to show in the course of the discussion another reason why the traditional order is probably wrong. See below, pp. 14 f.

²³ Winnington-Ingram, in *Symbolae Osloenses*, XXXI (1955), pp. 67-8, n. 3, dismisses as inconceivable that Greek melody could be "chopped arbitrarily into lengths."

²⁴ In any case the phrase, *τινύμεναι . . . τινύμεναι* had no parallel in the antistrophe. To keep the record straight, I shall give the results obtained with all three arrangements, and base my arguments on non-disputed lines first of all.

Π Π Σ Ζ () Π Π Σ Π Π Σ Φ Σ () Ζ

²⁵ Acutes: *αἵματος*, *φόρον*, *καθικετεύομαι*, *έάσατ'*, *-λαθέσθαι*, *μόχθων*,

ΖΙ

Circumflex: *φεῦ*.

The circumflex accent, which occurs at the only point where two notes are set to a syllable, is the most striking confirmation of the fact that the melodic line was written with the first stanza's accentual pattern in mind, and explains the puzzling duplication of the omega in the papyrus of *ῶος*. Moreover, the phrase itself is an aesthetically appropriate quaver on the word "alas!"²⁶

In two cases the melodic line is contradicted: in one, *τινύμεναι*, at the same point as that of the antistrophe, at the other, the antistrophe's accent follows the music (*μανιάδος*). In all the other cases, not enough of the melodic line is extant to decide. It is interesting, however, to see that a violation in the antistrophe (at *μέγας*) may have been avoided in the strophe inasmuch as the acute accent of *καθικετεύομαι* falls in the same position as that of *ἄλβος*, and must have been the dominant accent of the phrase.

To complete the record let us see how matters stand if we follow the order of lines given in the OCT. Here there are again seven cases of correspondence between music and word accent and two violations.²⁷ Whichever order is accepted, then, it is quite clear that there is a marked degree of conformity between the accents and the melodic line in the strophe. It is also interesting to note that at one of the points at which a violation is tolerated in the strophe, the antistrophe has bowed, as it were, to the pressure of the melody and conformed.²⁸

Having reached this point in our discussion, let us consider another factor which will lead us far afield from the limitations of our papyrus fragment. Inasmuch as the accentual patterns of both the strophe and the antistrophe correspond, though in varying degrees, to the melodic line, it follows inevitably that they must be related to each other. Now it seems to be a

²⁶ Particularly, if the scholiast (*ad* line 343) is right in asserting that the words, *δεινῶν πόνων* were declaimed, not sung, and this was true of *φοιταλέου* in the strophe as well.

Z Φ Σ Π Ρ Σ Ρ Π Σ Φ Σ () Ζ Ζ Ι
²⁷ Correspondences: *αἵματος*, *φόνον*, *-τεύομαι*, *έάσατ'*, *-λαθέσθαι*, *μόχθων*, *φει*.

Ι Ζ Ε () () Π Ρ Π

Violations: *τινύμεναι*, *μανιάδος*. The reason why the two arrangements of lines make so little difference in the total figures is largely because of the repetition of key melodic phrases at key places.

Ο Π Ρ Π Ο Π Ρ Π

²⁸ *μανιάδος* has become *κατέκλυσεν*.

generally accepted doctrine that responsion in Greek strophic verse took no heed of accents.²⁹ I have not been able to discover on what research this impression is based, nor am I prepared at the moment to challenge the statement *in toto*, having had the opportunity only to do a series of spot checks in various authors. It is quite clear from these spot checks, however, that in these matters there is considerable variation from author to author.³⁰ We will not be able to generalize, then, from Euripides' practice, but a careful examination of this chorus will show that in his case strophic responsion played a considerable, though by no means a rigid role.

It will be necessary to set the strophe and the antistrophe together in order to see the responsion of the corresponding lines more clearly. In the following example I have also added the musical notes, where extant, at the points they would occur in the strophe, on the assumption that the music for both verses was the same. The asterisks mark the three dislocated lines, which are given here in the order of the papyrus.

Syllables in which a strong accent (acute or circumflex) in the strophe is not contradicted in the antistrophe are marked by a line. If the correspondence is to a monosyllable or of an acute to a circumflex the line is bracketed. Contradictions are marked with a dot. The possibility that some of these contradictions may be resolved by the music needs to be kept in mind, but is not indicated. The text is that of Murray in the OCT.

The Musical Notation does not include the three instrumental notes occurring at the level of the text between the words in line 343, nor the Z which is written between each line.

*The Chorus from Euripides' Orestes, lines 314-47, with
corresponding lines from strophe and antistrophe
set together, and music set to strophe.*

1st (316) αἰαῖ
(332) ἰὼ Ζεῦ,

²⁹ The comment of Dale in *Lyric Metres of Greek Drama* (Cambridge, 1948), p. 194, seems to be typical.

³⁰ I am proceeding with studies along this line, and invite others to do so as well with the assurance that there is something real to discover in many authors, although with Pindar the results have been disappointing.

- 2nd (317) δρομάδες ὃ πτεροφόροι
(333) τίς ἐλεος, τίς ὃδ' ἀγών
- 3rd (318) ποτνιαδες θαί
(334) φόνης ἔρχεται
- 4th (319) ἀβάκχεντον αἶ θίασον ἐλάχετ' ἐν
(335) θαάζων σε τὸν μέλεον, ᾧ δάκρυα
- 5th (320) δάκρυσι καὶ γόοις,
(336) δάκρυσι συμβάλλει,
- 6th (321) μελάγχρωτες εὐμενίδες, αἵτε τὸν
(337) πορεύων τις ἐς δόμον ἀλαστόρων.
() Π Ρ Ξ
- 7th (332) ταναὸν αἰθέρ' ἀμπάλλεσθ', αἵματος
*(339) κατολοφύρμαι, κατολοφύρμαι,
ΡΦΠ()Ζ
- 8th (323) τινύμεναι δίκαν, τινύμεναι φόνον,
*(338) ματέρως αἶμα σᾶς, ὃ σ' ἀναβακχεύει;
Ι Ζ Ε () Π Ρ Ξ
- 9th (324) καθικετεύομαι, καθικετεύομαι,
*(340) ὁ μέγας ὄλβος οὐ μόνιμος ἐμ βροτοῖς.
Ι Ζ ()
- 10th (325) τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονος
(341) ἀνὰ δὲ λαῖφος ὤς
() Ξ Ρ Π Ξ Ρ Φ Ξ ()
- 11th (326) γόνον ἐάσατ' ἐκλαθέσθαι λύσσας
(342) τις ἀκάτου θαῶς τινάξας δαίμων
() Π Ρ Π () Ζ Ι Ζ
- 12th (327) μανιάδος φοιταλέον. φεῦ μόχθων,
(343) κατέκλυσεν δεινῶν πόνων ὥς πόντου
() Ξ Ρ Ι ()
- 13th (328) οἶων, ᾧ τάλας, ὄρεχθεις ἔρρεις,
(344) λάβροις ὀλεθρίοισιν ἐν κύμασιν.
()
- 14th (329) τρίποδος ἄπο φάτιν, ἂν ὁ φοῖβος ἔλακε, δε-
(345) τίνα γὰρ ἔτι πάρος οἶκον ἕτερον ἢ τὸν ἀπὸ
()
- 15th (330) ξάμενος ἀνὰ δάπεδον
(346) θεογόνων γάμων
()
- 16th (331) ἵνα μεσόμφαλοι λέγονται μυχοί.
(347) τὸν ἀπὸ Ταντάλου, σέβεσθαί με χρή;
()

First line: The circumflex coincides (*αἰαῖ* and *Ζεῦ*).

Second line: The acutes on *δρομάδες* and *ἔλεος* coincide, but the acute on *περοφόροι* is contradicted by *ἄγων*. Only the monosyllabic circumflex is not repeated in the antistrophe. (The monosyllables *τίς* and *ᾔδε* in the antistrophe are neutral.)

Third line: Here we have two absolute contradictions.⁸¹

Fourth line: Here the three acute accents and even the grave are exactly repeated.

Fifth line: The two acute accents correspond exactly.

Sixth line: The first acute corresponds, but the other two do not.

Tenth line: The acute corresponds to a circumflex.⁸²

Eleventh line: The first acute corresponds to a monosyllable, the second does not correspond, but the last two do.⁸³

Twelfth line: The first acute does not correspond.⁸⁴ The acutes on *πόνων* and *φοιταλέου* correspond.⁸⁵ The circumflex corresponds to a virtual circumflex,⁸⁶ and the acute corresponds.

Thirteenth line: This line offers problems in syllabic respon-

⁸¹ In the case of the *θεαί* note that, provided the next to last syllable were lower than the last, there would be no conflict of accent since the acute of *ἔρχεται* corresponds to the previous word. This indicates that absolute respension of accent was not always necessary in order to have the music fit both verses.

⁸² For the moment I am passing over the lines whose order is in dispute. There is good reason to suppose that the substitution of a circumflex at the position of an acute in the primary stanza was a common practice.

⁸³ The music for the first syllable is not certain, but the music fits the acute accent of *ἔδσατ'* while the *ἀκάρου* of the antistrophe is wrong. The music, so far as it goes, is right for both strophe and antistrophe at *-λαθέσθαι*. This is good indication that testing the musical line against the antistrophe alone may be misleading.

⁸⁴ As we have noted above, at this point the strophe violates the music, while the antistrophe corresponds to it. Here the pressure of the melodic line has asserted itself in the second stanza. See n. 28.

⁸⁵ If the scholiast (*ad* line 343) is right about *δεινῶν πόνων* the word *φοιταλέου* must have been declaimed, not sung. Nonetheless, the accents correspond. See above, n. 26.

⁸⁶ By a virtual circumflex I mean that the way in which the *ὦς* would be performed amounts to a circumflex, that is, a high followed by a low. This kind of correspondence would not appear in the ordinary manuscript tradition, and may reduce the number of apparent contradictions. See also nn. 37, 38, 19.

sion, but the first two acute accents probably correspond, the others probably do not.³⁷

Fourteenth line: The four acutes correspond (three exactly, one to a monosyllable) with a virtual circumflex on two short syllables, making a line of five (and possibly six) accentual agreements.³⁸

Fifteenth line: Here the two acutes do not correspond.

Sixteenth line: The first acute corresponds to a monosyllable, the second does not, but the final two of the whole strophe do so. It is interesting to note here, as elsewhere, a high degree of consonance and assonance in this responsion which brings the strophe to a close.³⁹

In the whole strophe then, apart from the dislocated lines (7th, 8th, 9th) we have a total of eighteen exact correspondences of acute accents, three of circumflexes, one case of an acute with a circumflex, four cases of an acute corresponding to a monosyllable. On the other hand there are only ten cases of acute accents not agreeing. Actually, more impressive than the mere statistics is the fact that there are important patterns of agreement and non-agreement, and that at strong points in the line or phrase agreement is more likely, and that accentual violations tend to be grouped together.⁴⁰

As for the three lines whose order is a problem, if we accept my suggestion as to the order we discover that the pattern of correspondence continues.⁴¹ Even if Murray's order is accepted it is not very different.⁴² Only if the traditional order is

³⁷ The circumflex of $\tilde{\omega}$ may well have a virtual circumflex in the two short syllables of $\delta\lambda\epsilon$ -. Note variant readings here and following.

³⁸ For the virtual circumflex of $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ see n. 36.

³⁹ Compare: $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\iota\ \mu\upsilon\chi\omicron\iota$
 $\sigma\acute{\epsilon}\beta\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota\ \mu\epsilon\ \chi\rho\acute{\eta}$.

⁴⁰ To say nothing of the possible reconciliations of non-correspondences by the music as discussed above, n. 31.

⁴¹ Correspondences: $\alpha\iota\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$, $\tau\iota\nu\acute{\iota}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota$, $\phi\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\nu$, $-\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, $-\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$
 $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\rho\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, $\mu\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma$, $-\chi\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\epsilon\iota$, $\delta\lambda\beta\omicron\varsigma$, $\acute{\epsilon}\mu\ \beta\rho\omicron\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$
(ϵ)

Non-correspondences: $\alpha\lambda\theta\acute{\epsilon}\rho'$ $\acute{\alpha}\mu\pi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\epsilon\sigma\theta'$, $\delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha\nu$,
 $\phi\acute{\upsilon}\rho\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, $\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\phi\acute{\upsilon}\rho\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, $\alpha\iota\mu\alpha$.

Note that in the last two examples both could conform to a common melody and no real violation would exist (e.g. if note on $-\alpha\nu$ was low).

⁴² Correspondences: $\tau\iota\nu\acute{\iota}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota$, $\kappa\alpha\theta\iota\kappa\epsilon\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, $\tau\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\delta\nu$, $-\pi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\epsilon\sigma\theta'$
 $\delta\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\alpha\varsigma$, $\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\phi\acute{\upsilon}\rho\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, $\mu\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma$, $\delta\ \sigma'\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha$ -
(ϵ)

Non-correspondences: $\alpha\lambda\theta\acute{\epsilon}\rho'$ $\acute{\alpha}\mu$ -, $-\alpha\iota\ \delta\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha\nu$, $\tau\iota\nu\acute{\iota}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota$, $\phi\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\nu$
 $\alpha\iota\mu\alpha$ $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$, $\delta\lambda\beta\omicron\varsigma$ $\omicron\acute{\upsilon}$, $\mu\omicron\nu\acute{\iota}\mu\alpha\varsigma$, $\beta\rho\omicron\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$.

retained do we find a strong tendency to disagreement between the strophic and antistrophic accents. This seems to me to be important evidence that the traditional order is wrong.⁴³

All in all, the evidence clearly shows that the melodic contours, created by the strophic accents and extended by the melodic line, were definitely controlling factors in the poet's mind, along with metre and vocabulary, as he created the second verse.

Our conclusions may be conveniently summarized as follows:

(1) This fragment shows that there is a tendency for the melodic line to conform to the pitch accent.

(2) This tendency is more marked in the strophe than the antistrophe, although even here some violations are tolerated (in some instances where the antistrophe reverts to conformity).

(3) It follows that strophic responsion also took the pitch accents into account, and examination of the rest of the chorus shows that there is in fact a marked degree of conformity of accent between strophe and antistrophe, probably implying a common relationship to a common melody.

It would be hazardous to generalize from this one example to all Greek strophic verse; but at least it offers hope that similar investigations carried out in other authors will demonstrate analogous phenomena.

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⁴³ Correspondences: *ταναδν, -πάλλεσθ', -τεύομαι, τεύομαι*
ματέρος ὁ σ' ἀνα-, ὀλβος, ἐμ βροτοῖς.
 () () ()

Non-correspondences: *αἰθέρ' ἀμ-, αἵματος, τινύμεναι*
αἶμα σᾶς, βακχεύει, κατολοφύρομαι
δίκαν, τινύμεναι, φόνον
-ομαι, κατολοφύρομαι, -ομαι.

THE OSCAN *CIPPUS ABELLANUS*: A NEW INTERPRETATION.

The *Cippus Abellanus*, a limestone tablet ($1.92 \times 0.51 \times 0.27$ m.), bears on both sides an inscription in the Oscan language. It is of about the middle of the second century B. C. and codifies an agreement between the ancient towns of Nola and Abella, now Nola and Castel d'Avella (the latter on an elevation near the modern Avella), about six miles distant from one another, northeast of Vesuvius, situated on either side of the modern road from Naples to Avellino. The stone was found in 1745 at Avella, where it had served as a doorstep, and is now deposited in the Episcopal Seminary of Nola.

The ordinance concerns the legal status of a sanctuary of Hercules, consisting of the temple and sacred precinct proper, and some land around it, located between the two villages and straddling (I shall explain this in detail) the boundary dividing the two townships from one another. This peculiar situation of the sanctuary, which both Nolans and Abellans visited and which stood on ground belonging to both towns, raised special questions of ownership, of responsibility for maintenance, and of division of income and of the temple treasure. It was therefore resolved, reasonably enough, to declare the sanctuary extra-territorial since by its nature and location it was neither divisible nor unilaterally ownable.

For various reasons, there have remained some uncertainties in the translation and understanding of the inscription. To begin with, the provisions, apart from being composed in an imperfectly known tongue, are not stated as clearly and unambiguously as a modern legal instrument would require, which is scarcely surprising in a document coming from two small country towns of a region but rudimentarily literate at the time. In addition, the damage done to the stone, causing the obliteration of several lines and ends of lines, further increases the difficulties of interpretation. But translations have been made, and they are, for the most part, good enough. The words, at least, seem to make sense. Yet when I attempted to illustrate graphically, by means of a drawing, the situation of the sanctuary and take account of the stipulations of the *Cippus*, I found that in a

number of passages crucial to the comprehension of the document as a whole, it was impossible to make topographic sense out of the verbal statement. By revising the translation and interpretation of a number of key words and passages, without of course doing violence to the text where the reading is firmly established, I arrived at a version which, I believe, does justice to both the wording and the real-estate problems involved.¹

I shall now cite the text (after Vetter) and a Latin translation of the *Cippus*, followed by my own English translation and a brief commentary. The letters between slanted lines in the English translation refer to the sketch in Fig. 1.²

¹ Since various editions are easily accessible I shall not compare in detail my translation with that of other students, nor shall I give a complete linguistic and philological exegesis of the text. I shall merely discuss the passages where my own contributions change earlier work in a significant manner and degree. The following are the most recent and most trustworthy sources: Carl D. Buck, *A Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian* (2nd ed., Boston, 1928); Vittore Pisani, *Le lingue dell'Italia antica oltre il latino* (Turin, 1953); Emil Vetter, *Handbuch der italischen Dialekte* (Heidelberg, 1953); Gino Bottigioni, *Manuale dei dialetti italici* (Bologna, 1954).

² In the transliteration of the original text I shall employ the customary typographic devices. Black face indicates that the inscription is in the native Oscan alphabet; letters or words in parentheses are supplied by the editor, filling gaps left by the scribe or the stonemason (the latter may have been illiterate or ignorant of the Oscan language) either erroneously or intentionally (abbreviations); letters or words in brackets are emendations by the editor where the stone is broken or has a damaged surface; uncertain readings are marked by a dot under the letter in question, except that doubtful reading of dots in the original (which indicate, sometimes, word division) is marked by a small horizontal bracket underneath the dot; ligatures of letters are transcribed by means of semi-circles above the letters; no orthographic aids (majuscules, punctuation, etc.) are provided except where the original has them; superfluous letters or words due to an obvious error of the scribe or stonemason are put inside broken parentheses; the number of letters missing within the original is indicated by figures (above dash lines).

Words and phrases in brackets in the English translation are my own additions, emendations, or explanations.

This particular inscription has, within the text, five unusually wide spaces (in Part A, line 23, in Part B, lines 11, 18, 22, and 28), representing something like paragraph boundaries. These I render by means of a double slanted line in the transliteration and the Latin translation, by numbered paragraphs in the English translation. One other para-

I. TEXT AND LATIN TRANSLATION.

A—obverse

maiúf. vestirikiúf. mai(ieis). str
Maio Vestricio Mai (filio) ?
 prupukid. sverrunef. kvaistu
designato ? quaesto-
 reí. abellanúf. ínim. maiúf
ri Abellano et Maio
 lúvkifúf. mai(ieis). pukalatúf
Lucio Mai (filio) ?
 medíkeí. deketasiúf. núvla
medici decentario(?) Nolan-
 n[ú]f. ínim. ligatús. abella[nús]
no et legatis Abellanis
 ínim. ligatús. núvlanús
et legatis Nolanis
 pús. senateís. tanginúd
qui senatus sententia
 suveís. pútúrúspíd. ligat[ús]
sui utrique legati
 fufans. ekss. kúmbened.
erant, ita convenit:
 sakaraklúm. herekleís. [úp]
Sacrarium Herculis, apud
 slaagid. púd. íst. ínim. teer[úm]
confinium quod est, et territorium
 púd. úp. eísúd. sakaraklúd. [íst]
quod apud id sacrarium est,
 púd. anter. teremníss. eh ⁵—
quod inter termina extrema(?)
 íst. paí. teremenniú. mú[ínikad]
est, quae termina communi
 tanginúd. prúftúset. r[—⁴—(³—)]
sententia probata sunt ?
 amnúd. puz. ídík. sakára[klúm]
? , ut id sacrarium
 ínim. ídík. terúm. múínfk[úm]
et id territorium commune
 múínfkeí. tereí. fusíd. [ínim]
in communi territorio esset et
 eiseís. sakarakleís. í[ním]
eius sacrarii et
 tereís. fruktatiuf. fr[—⁰—]

B—converse

ekku[m]. [svai —¹¹—]
Item [si alterutri]
 trífbarakav[úm hereset(?)]
aedificare uolent
 límitú[m.] pernú[m.] [puf(?)]
limitum tenus, ubi
 herekleís. físnú. mef[ú]
Herculis fanum medium
 5 íst. ehtrað. feíhúss. pú[s]
est, extra muros, qui
 herekleís. físnam. amfr
Herculis fanum circum-
 etpervíam. pússtí[s]
dant, ad uiam qui stant,
 paí. íp. íst. púst. in slagím
quae ibi est secundum confinium,
 senateís. suveís. tangi
senatus sui sentent-
 10 núd. trífbarakavúm. lí
ia aedificare li-
 kítud. // ínim. fúk. trífba
ceto. // Et haec aedi-
 rakkiuf. pam. núvlánús
ficatio, quam Nolan
 trífbarakat. tuset. ínim
aedificauerint, et
 úfttiuf. núvlánúm. estud
usus Nolanorum esto.
 15 ekkum. svai. píð. ábellánús
Item si quid Abellani
 trífbarakat. tuset. fúk. trí
aedificauerint, ea aedi-
 barakkiuf. ínim. úfttiuf
ficatio et usus
 ábellánúm. estud. // avt
Abellanorum esto. // Sed
 púst. feíhúús. pús. físnám. am
post muros, qui fanum circum-
 20 fret. eiseí. tereí. nep. ábel
dant, in eo territorio neque Abel-
 lánús. nep. núvlánús. píðum

graph, beginning with a new line hence not otherwise marked, may be surmised (in part A, line 11). Adding the beginning of Parts A and B, one gets a total of eight paragraphs.

A—obverse

territorii fructuscipio ?
 [—(1).] *múfníkú. pútúrú[mpíd]*
 ? *communis utrorumque*
[fus]íd. // avt. núvlanú[s. 7]
esset. // Sed Nolani ?
[— . herekleís. fíisnú [3]
 ? *Herculis fanium* ?
[25] píspíd. núvlan [9]
 ? *quisquam Nolanorum* ?

(Of line 26 only traces visible;
 then five, at the most ten lines
 completely destroyed.)

B—converse


lani neque Nolani quidquam
tríbarakat. tins. // avt. the
aedificauerint. // Sed the-
sávrúm. púd. e(f)seí. tereí. íst
saurum, qui in eo territorio est,
pún. pátensíns. múfníkád. ta[n]
cum aperirent, communi sent-
 25 *ginúd. pátensíns. íním. píđ. e[íseí]*
entia aperirent, et quid in eo
thesávref. púkkapíd. ee[stít]
thesauro cumque exstat
[a]íttífúm. álttrám. álttr[ús]
portionum alteram alteri
[f]erríns. // avt. ánter. slagím
auferrent. // Sed secundum confinium
[a]bellanám. íním. núvlanám
Abellanum et Nolanum,
 30 *[s]úllád. vífú. uruvú. íst. pedú X*
ubique via uruata est pedum X,
[e]ísaí. víaí. meísaí. teremén
in ea via media termi-
[n]íú. staíet.
na stant.

II. ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

1: "Maius Vestricius, (son of) Maius ? , designated (?) ? quaestor of Abella, and Maius Lucius, (son of) Maius ? , meddix of Nola, and the deputies of Abella, and the deputies of Nola, who by the decision of their senate [i. e., of their respective senates] were deputies of either side, thus agreed [literally: To Maius Vestricius . . . it was thus suitable]:

2: The sanctuary of Hercules which lies by [i. e., amidst, athwart] the dividing line [separating the townships of Nola and Abella] /d/, and the land /f/ which lies by [i. e., amidst, inside] this sanctuary and which lies between [i. e., within] the external (?) boundaries /e/, which boundaries are approved by common decision, ? so that this sanctuary and this common land /b/ should lie within land /f/, and that the usufruct of this sanctuary and the usufruct of this land /f/ ? should be common of [i. e., belong to] both sides.

3: But the Nolans . . . the temple of Hercules . . . whatever Nolan . . .



- a fílsnú 'temple'
- b terúm púst feihúss 'land inside walls'
- c feihúss 'walls'
- d slagi- 'township boundary'
- e teremenniú '(external) boundaries'
- f terúm múíníkú 'common land'
- g víú 'path'

Fig. 1.

4: Likewise, if either party shall wish to build up to the boundaries /e/ where the temple of Hercules /a/ stands in the center, [albeit] outside the walls /c/ which surround the temple of Hercules /a/ [and] which stand up to the path /g/, which there is according to [i. e., follows] the dividing line /d/, then let it be permitted to build [there] according to the decision of the senate of either concerned party.

5: And this building which the Nolans will have built shall also be [for] the use of the Nolans. Likewise, if the Abellans will have built anything, this building shall also be [for] the use of the Abellans.

6: But beyond [i. e., inside] the walls /c/ which surround the temple /a/, on that land /b/ let neither the Abellans nor the Nolans build anything.

7: But the treasure, which is on this land /b/, when they open it, let them open it by common decision, and whatever is contained in this treasure, let one side receive the other of the shares [i. e., let each side receive a share].

§ 8: But along the dividing line /d/, wherever the path /g/, ploughed, [i. e., the path bearing or continuing the plough-marked township boundary; or: . . . wherever the path /g/, the boundary . . .] is ten feet [wide], in the center of the path /g/ lie the township boundaries /d/.

III. SYNOPSIS BY PARAGRAPHS.

§ 1: This is the praescript, listing the participants in the deliberations concerning the ordinance, and their offices and credentials.

§ 2: The temple and the land around it, that is, the sanctuary as a whole, bounded by the external boundaries /e/, is the joint property of both Nola and Abella, as is the income derived from it.

§ 3: (Destroyed)

§ 4: Permission may be granted by the senate of either Nola or Abella to build on the jointly owned land albeit only on the lot /f/ outside the walls /c/, and not on the plot /b/ inside the walls, which is reserved for the temple /a/.

§ 5: Proprietorship and the use of any building that is erected,

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remain with that community, either Nola or Abella, which constructed the building.

§ 6: It is not permitted to either Nolans or Abellans to build on the land /b/ that lies immediately around the temple proper, inside the walls /c/.

§ 7: The treasure which is deposited on the inner lot /b/ (most likely inside the temple itself), may be opened only by common consent of the two parties, and having been opened must be divided equitably.

§ 8: Where the path /g/ leading to the opening in the walls /c/, the entrance into the sanctum /b/, coincides, upon the common land /f/, with the course of /d/, the boundary marker between the two townships, there the boundary shall lie in the middle of the path.

IV. COMMENT, EXPLICATION.

Part A—obverse.

Lines 1-10 (§ 1): This paragraph is simple enough, apart from (for the present purpose irrelevant) difficulties concerning the names and the official titles of the participants.

Line 11 and passim: I translate consistently *sakaraklúm* as 'sanctuary' and *ffísnú* (*fanum*) as 'temple.' This distinction is essential since the provisions attaching to the sanctuary as a whole are different from those concerning the temple alone. I do think, however, that *ffísnú* includes not only the temple building itself but also the plot /b/ inside the walls /c/, forming something like a sacred precinct. (This usage agrees, incidentally, with the etymological meaning of *templum* as 'a section,' that is, a piece of land carved out and set aside for special, ritual purposes; cf. *τέμνω* 'I cut').

Line 11: I translate the (in any event supplied) word *úp* as 'amidst,' or here better 'athwart,' rather than as 'by, along.' Other occurrences of it, on the *Tabula Bantina* line 14 (*op toutad*) and line 23 (*op eizois*), while commonly rendered as '*apud populum*' and '*apud eos*,' can properly be translated as 'amidst (in the presence of) the people' and 'amidst (in the presence of) them.'

Line 13: For my translation of **úp eísúd sakaraklúd** as 'amidst (inside) the sanctuary' rather than 'by the sanctuary,' see the preceding note. I understand **úp**, then, as expressing a relation of inclusiveness, or local congruence, or insideness, and not just nearness or vicinity. The Latin cognate is, of course, *ob* and not *apud*.

Lines 11-23 (§ 2): It is important to note here that the text provides, however awkwardly, that the extraterritorial or jointly owned common land around the temple, forming the **sakaraklúm** or sanctuary in its entirety, consist of two carefully separated portions: that between the external boundaries /e/ and the walls /c/, which corresponds to /f/ on the sketch, and that inside the walls, the temple lot or sacred precinct proper /b/. §§ 4 and 6 show that these two lots are destined for different, clearly circumscribed uses.

For none of the boundaries and pieces of land, however, do we have any indication of size, excepting possibly the width of the path /g/ in § 8. But this need not disturb us. The boundaries were surely marked somehow in situ, and since no professional lawyer, or even a good stylist, seems to have had a hand in drafting the ordinance, legal accuracy and unambiguity do not characterize this text.

Note also that the syntax of § 2 is not altogether clear: the relative clause **úp slaagid púd íst**, referring to **sakaraklúm**, is never concluded—except possibly (one may hope) at the end of line 16, where four to seven letters are missing. Filling this gap might also explain **amnúd**, at the beginning of line 17, by some translated as '*causa*' (preposition, 'owing to') but without being fitted into the context. The style of the inscription is a bit involved and lacking in elegance at various other places also.

Line 24-? (§ 3): This portion is destroyed. Since the number of missing lines is not certain, I prefer, like Vetter and unlike Buck, to resume with line 1 on the reverse side.

Part B—reverse.

Line 7: I read, with Vetter, **pussti<s>t** '*qui stant*,' and, also with Vetter, I translate **pert** as '*usque ad*' rather than '*trans*.' (See also **perñum** '*tenus*' in line 3.) The walls, then, surround

the sacred precinct /b/ and extend on either side up to the path, where there is left an aperture permitting entrance. The path itself actually coincides with the line dividing the two townships. In other words, the boundary line /d/ traverses the entire sanctuary. (On the course and the nature of the boundary within the sanctuary see below.)

Lines 1-11 (§ 4): Note again the important distinction between land within and without the walls /c/.

Line 19: I translate *púst*, generally rendered as 'post,' as 'beyond, inside.' A location 'beyond the walls,' if one approaches the walls from the outside (as does this inscription, so to speak) is equivalent to 'inside the walls.'

Lines 18-22 (§ 5): Now the repeatedly emphasized distinction between the plots /f/ and /b/ is finally implemented. On /f/, outside the walls of the sanctum /b/ and inside the outer boundaries /e/, both Nolans and Abellans may build, with permission of the respective senates; but on the lot /b/, which is more stringently protected against profanation owing to its vicinity to the temple itself, no one may build.

Unfortunately, no clue is given anywhere in the text as to what types of buildings are involved here, and what purposes they may have served. Since also the true dimensions of the areas and of the temple are nowhere stated, it is difficult if not impossible to guess even at the possible size of the structures. Nor has archaeological exploration concerned itself with discovering the site, and no remains of temple or buildings have been uncovered.

Lines 22-28 (§ 6): This section is simple enough, and editors largely agree on reading and translation.

Line 28: *anter slagím* is generally translated as '*inter confinium*' or the like. It is difficult to picture just what 'between the boundary' could mean, or what it would represent at the site of the sanctuary. Buck translates the phrase as 'between the boundaries of Nola and Abella.' This is not helpful because, the territories of Nola and Abella being contiguous and the boundaries, at least along the stretch here involved, being continuous, nothing can lie between them. Moreover, by trans-

lating the singular *anter slagím* with the plural '*inter finis*,' one really alters the original without sufficient cause. And even though '*inter finis*' means 'between the boundaries,' that is, 'in the territory,' it can scarcely signify something like 'between the territories.' (See Buck's note on p. 229, comment on line 12.)

I therefore translate *anter* by 'within, along,' which gives sense to the passage, and is also linguistically defensible. True, *anter teremníss* (line 14 above) was properly rendered as 'between the boundaries' (cf. *inter finis*); and similarly on two of the so-called *eituns* inscriptions, the phrase *anter tiurrí íní ver* (or *verú*) was correctly translated as '*inter turrim et portam*.'³ Also on two other *eituns* inscriptions⁴ *anter* can be translated as '*inter*' even though the noun following it is, grammatically, in the singular: *anter tiurrí X íní XI* 'between tower no. 10 and (tower) no. 11,' and *an[ter tr]íibu Ma. Kas-tríkíeís íní Mr. Spuríeís L.* 'between the house of M. K. and (that) of M. S. son of L.' But it should be noted that in the last two examples *anter* goes, if not with an object in the grammatical plural, then at least with a plurality of objects according to meaning, whereas *slagím* on the *Cippus* is unmistakably a grammatical singular and a single item, namely, the boundary line separating the townships of Nola and Abella, with nothing to put 'in between.'

When we turn to the cognate Umbrian *ander-*, we find unfortunately no occurrence of it as a preposition. As part of a compound it is used several times in the *Tabulae Iguvinae* (VIa6, VIa7, Ib8, VIb41, IIa16). But it is significant that the translation and the understanding of all these passages are far from certain precisely because of the prefix *ander-* or *anter-*: editors operate with asterisked Latin compounds of *inter-* or simply leave lacunae with question marks. A reexamination of these words in Umbrian is also indicated.

Line 30: uruvú, a hapax legomenon in Oscan, is a crucial word in my interpretation. Buck glosses it as '*curua, flexa* (?),' as do most others, unless, like Vetter, they do not translate it at all. My translation 'ploughed' relates the word to Latin *uruare* 'to plough' or 'to mark a boundary by means of a furrow,' and

³ See Buck, nos. 14 and 15, pp. 242-3; Vetter, nos. 23 and 24, pp. 54-5.

⁴ See Buck, nos. 16 and 17, p. 243; Vetter, nos. 26 and 25, pp. 55-6.

has to do with the well-known custom of defining the boundaries of towns through a ploughed furrow. See Festus 514, 22 (ed. Lindsay): *uruat: Ennius in Andromeda significat circumdat ab eo sulco qui fit in urbe condenda uruo aratri, quae fit forma simillima uncini curuatione buris et dentis, cui praefigitur uomer.* In addition to confirming the custom of marking boundaries by ploughing, Festus adds here a definition of *uruus* which connects this part of the plough with *buris* or *bura*, the curved part of the plough handles, described by Ernout-Meillet as '*mancheron de la charrue*,'⁵ perhaps translatable as 'plough tail,' the piece below the handle gripped by the farmer. Since this piece is, as Festus says, curved, some translate *viú uruvú* as 'curved road' or the like. I prefer, instead, to take *uruvú* as a feminine verbal adjective related to *uruare* (*uruvú* 'ploughed' from **uru-uos*, like Oscan *sipus* 'knowing' from **sep-uos*, cf. Latin *sapere*; or like Oscan *facus* 'made' from **fac-uos*, cf. Latin *facere*; or like Latin *mortuus* 'dead' from *mrt-uos*); but one could also conceive of it simply as a feminine noun meaning 'furrow.' That is to say, I emphasize in the etymology and translation of *uruvú* the fact that it has to do with the plough and ploughing, and in particular, like Latin *uruare*, the ploughing of a single furrow to define a land boundary, while I ignore the allusion by Festus, pursued by others, that it has to do with the notion of curve or, primarily or secondarily, with any specific curved part of the plough, be it the share, the beam, or the tail.⁶

And finally, all things considered, it is by no means impossible that *uruvú* means simply 'boundary,' and I have allowed for this, the simplest of all possibilities, in my translation. Certainly both etymology and context encourage this view.

⁵ A. Ernout-A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine* (3rd ed., Paris, 1951). In the 4th ed. (1959): "*dicatur pars aratri posterior decuruata*, Non. 80, 16."

⁶ Derivatives of Latin *uruare* still exist in Sardinia, according to Wilhelm Meyer-Lübke, *Romanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (3rd ed., Heidelberg, 1933), no. 9092: Campidanian *orbada*, North Sardinian *alvada*, both meaning 'plough-share.' Again one notes the emphasis on the more functional and more characteristic part of the plough, if not the whole plough, than on the handle bars. (It is strange that *alvada* is not listed in Max Leopold Wagner, *Dizionario etimologico sardo* [Heidelberg, 1957 ff.]; I cannot check on *orbada* because the work has not so far [November 1958] progressed beyond the third letter of the alphabet.)

Lines 31-32: I realize that *teremenniú* (and *teremníss*) had referred, on previous occurrences (Part A, lines 14 and 15), to the external boundaries /e/ of the sanctuary, whereas here the word denotes another boundary altogether, that between the townships, generally called *slagi*-. It would not really be odd to find several synonyms in use for the term boundary. (Also *liímitúm* occurs, Part B, line 3. And *uruvú*, too, as I just suggested, may be so classified.) Yet there may be another explanation which would allow, at least, for some synonyms to have specialized functions. And those linguists who hold that no two so-called synonyms are ever *wholly* synonymous may find themselves on familiar ground.

The particular piece of *slagi*- which is here termed *teremenniú* lies inside the sanctuary, on jointly owned ground, and most likely was not marked in the same way as the rest of /d/. Perhaps the etymology of *slagi*- can be used in determining the character of the line, and possibly Buck's suggestion (p. 75 § 114) concerning this difficult and intransparent word, comparing it with the Old Irish *slicht* 'track' or *slige* 'street,' has merit. If so, then *slagi*- contains, like French *route* 'road' from Latin *rupta* (*scil. uia*), the notion of digging or ploughing up the ground. But *teremenniú* is devoid of such a connotation and is therefore fittingly used for this special stretch of *slagi*- on neutralized ground.

But if *teremenniú* excludes the notion of ploughing, how can we combine this view with a text that says, in fact, that the *teremenniú* lie in the middle of a *viú uruvú*, a path that is ploughed, and ploughed, no doubt, for the very purpose of marking a boundary?

I should suggest that the word *uruvú* signifies specifically the mark left by a ploughshare. And since ancient ploughs, which merely stirred the earth but did not turn over a broad slice of soil, actually left but a narrow trace on the ground, a path could be so marked without becoming unusable. But *slagi*-, on the other hand, was a more powerfully marked boundary, a ditch—perhaps traditionally related to the mere symbolic track of the ploughshare circumscribing the territory of a town, but here deepened and strengthened, possibly because, as the present controversy shows, Nola and Abella had a history of boundary quarrels.

Whether the adjective **uruvú** could be applied to the track of the dividing line /d/ only so far as it coincided with the path, or to its entire course within the sanctuary between points A and B, or to the pieces on the territory /f/, it is impossible to say: the text gives no sure information.

There is even a possibility, as I indicated in my English translation, that the **viú uruvú** does not mean that the path is actually ploughed, but merely that it coincides with, or continues, the plough-marked boundary /d/. If it is true that the **slagi-** is considerably more than the traditional plough-trace, then it may seem odd that in this interpretation it is referred to merely as **uruvú**. But there is no need to worry about this because, as I said, the **slagi-** also has its origin in the traditional ploughed line, no matter how, for some reason, it is reinforced in the present instance.

My translation of the final section of the *Cippus Abellanus* establishes, then, the following situation. There was the traditional ploughed boundary line /d/, a deep furrow, or a ditch called **slagi-**, separating the townships of Nola and Abella from each other. The sanctuary of Hercules, circumscribed by the limits /e/, straddled it. We do not know whether the sanctuary was there first and the township boundary later run through it, or whether the sanctuary was so placed as to be bisected by the already existing boundary—but the result is, in any event, that the sanctuary came to be declared extraterritorial, or a joint possession of both towns, with responsibility and privilege equally divided. As a consequence, the boundary line /d/, to the extent that it lay within the limits /e/ of the sanctuary, was neutralized. What part of it, if any, was marked by a token scratch on the ground it is impossible to say, although the text seems to indicate that at least the piece coinciding with the path bore a plough-mark. (I have indicated this condition by drawing the portion of /d/ between points A and B as a dotted line on my sketch. I should not necessarily insist on the kind of symmetry my sketch shows, though it would not be unreasonable to presume such an arrangement, regardless of what existed first, the boundary or the sanctuary.) Nola and Abella, then, having surrendered proprietary claims, could not but forego the marking, within the sanctuary, of the township boundary by means of the **slagi-**, a ditch or furrow which was not only

unnecessary but would also have been defacing. There was, in any event, the path. If *uruvú*, once one has accepted it as meaning 'ploughed,' is understood literally, either for the extent of the path or throughout the sanctuary, then a line was actually drawn, however perfunctorily. But if *uruvú* means just 'boundary,' then the inscription says no more than that path and boundary coincided. Whatever one's preference on this detail (and I do not for the moment see how to convert preference into certainty), in essence my interpretation of the ordinance remains, I believe, acceptable.

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TACITUS' TECHNIQUE OF CHARACTER PORTRAYAL.

It has been sometimes said that Tacitus was the individual who introduced man's personality into history. On the basis of what has survived of the ancient historians, this statement would appear to be well justified. Of his predecessors whose works have come down to us, Thucydides' interest in his characters as individuals is certainly subordinate to his great pattern of historical causation; the characters are the pawns of historical forces rather than the movers. In the history of Livy, the characters are mainly a continuous stream of splendid heroes who have helped make Rome the brilliant star of the world, and who bask in reflected glory. It is true that in the *Bellum Catilinae* and the *Iugurtha* of Sallust, the chief characters are given full and individualized treatment. Syme has recently shown how a number of Tacitus' character sketches "advertise a Sallustian parentage or at least affinity,"¹ but it must be remembered that the above works are monographs, giving the account of a single event, and do not purport to cover the history of an extended period of time. Unfortunately the *Historiae* of Sallust are too fragmentary for us to form any judgment.² On the basis of the extant historical writings, then, the study of extensive character portrayal must begin with Tacitus.

Explanations as to why Tacitus so greatly emphasized character portrayal are several. Undoubtedly the influence of Sallust may be assumed, as it is generally assumed in matters of style. Another major influence upon Tacitus was the literary atmosphere of the times, which, among other things, was thoroughly permeated with satire. Persius, Martial, Petronius, and Juvenal all may be considered representatives of this spirit which tended to focus the attention of the writers upon personalities, and, more especially, upon their faults. Tacitus' strong oratorical training, according to Miss Walker,³ supplied him with certain

¹ R. Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 196 ff., pp. 353 ff.

² For this reason it is difficult to evaluate objectively Syme's statement (*op. cit.*, p. 354) that Tacitus "aims at a general and pervasive adaptation of Sallust. . . ."

³ B. Walker, *The Annals of Tacitus* (Manchester Univ. Press, 1952), pp. 204 ff.

rhetorical stereotypes, e. g., the tyrant, the informer, the victim, who were frequently used as models for the historical characters, but not always with complete success. Mendell, on the other hand, sees in Tacitus' character portrayal primarily a treatment derived from the drama in which there is "one figure around whom action centers and minor characters who contribute to it in greater or less degree."⁴ The extent to which these various literary genres individually or collectively influenced Tacitus cannot of course be precisely determined, but the fact that they all in some way dealt with human character is of undoubted significance.

Furthermore, the trend in Roman historiography itself (culminating with Suetonius) was shifting more and more towards biography, a fact which would make it only natural that the greatest attention be paid to the portrayal of those personalities who, in the historian's judgment, were the prime movers of events. This brings us to the edge of deep water, namely, Tacitus' philosophy of history, or, more specifically, his interpretation of the causative relationship between the events described and the human beings therein involved. Marsh, in his defense of Tiberius,⁵ and more recently, von Fritz,⁶ have cogently maintained that Tacitus was little aware of the impersonal forces of history such as the economic, political, and sociological factors which produced such radical changes on the Roman scene during the first centuries B. C. and A. D. Consequently Tacitus felt

⁴ C. Mendell, *Tacitus* (New Haven, 1957), p. 142. Cf. also the statement of Syme (*op. cit.*, p. 308): "How soon a character shall enter the action or how long he can with advantage be kept off stage is an important problem of dramatic design." Could not the same description and comment apply equally to most epic poems and novels? And is there not the danger, with respect to the various literary influences, of confusing the literary genre with the use of certain techniques taken from that genre? Aristophanes, in writing the *Clouds*, was satirical, but was not writing Satire (the literary genre). Thus Tacitus, while certainly exhibiting characteristics which may be termed satirical, rhetorical, and dramatic, was neither a satirist, nor a rhetorician, nor a dramatist, but an historian, exceptionally well equipped with the literary techniques of his day. Mendell does wisely remind us (*loc. cit.*) "that while dramatic, the story is definitely not drama but history."

⁵ F. B. Marsh, *The Reign of Tiberius* (Oxford, 1931), p. 12.

⁶ K. von Fritz, "Tacitus, Agricola, Domitian, and the Problem of the Principate," *C. P.*, LII (1957), pp. 94 ff.

compelled to explain events in terms of personal forces, i. e., the traits of human personality. Since so many of the events were of a grim and unpleasant nature, it followed that the characters of those causing these events were bound to be equally grim and unpleasant.

Marsh further holds,⁷ and in this is supported by Alexander,⁸ that Tacitus "conceived of character as a wholly static and immutable thing" which might be compared to an indelible stamp with which one is born and with which one dies, without any basic change taking place. Thus, once the dominant personality trait of a human being is discovered, one (i. e., Tacitus) could understand and explain that person's actions throughout his life, and if the person involved were the dominant member of the society (the emperor), the actions governing the whole society, in the form of historical events, could, by extension, be understood and explained on the basis of the emperor's bent of character.⁹

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁸ W. H. Alexander, "The Tacitean '*Non Liqueat*' on Seneca," *Calif. Stud. in Class. Phil.*, XIV, 8 (1952), pp. 357 ff.

⁹ Alexander gives an illuminating comparison of Strachey's method of character portrayal in *Eminent Victorians* with that of Tacitus. His description is the following: "The basic feature of the method is to establish early in the record an idea, designed to be firmly implanted in the reader's mind, of a certain fundamental point in the character of an individual who is to be biographized, which all that individual's choices and activities will be found (perhaps even forced) to illustrate." Alexander feels that this is essentially Tacitus' method too, and that it is a faulty one.

The above, strictly speaking, deals not so much with literary technique as with psychological approach to character and to human beings in general. This, too, has been explored of late. Cf. for example W. H. Alexander, "The Psychology of Tacitus," *C. J.*, XLVII (1952), pp. 326-8; J. Cousin, "Rhétorique et psychologie chez Tacite," *R. E. L.*, XXIX (1951), pp. 228-47; H. Bardon, "Sur Tacite psychologue," *Annales de Filologia Clasica*, Buenos Aires, VI (1953-54), pp. 19-35. (I have not yet been able to see the last article; none of the major libraries questioned possessed a copy of it.) Cousin fundamentally disagrees with the view expressed in the two articles of Alexander, i. e., that Tacitus tried to explain the actions of his characters on the basis of a definite pre-conceived pattern of personality. Cousin holds that the frequent use of alternatives (e. g., *sive . . . sive*) represents Tacitus' uncertainty of the correct psychological explanation of an action.

To return briefly to the comparison between Strachey and Tacitus, in

Support for this view concerning Tacitus' interpretation of history can be found, apart from the general biographical trend in Roman historiography, in the very life of the historian. It would seem logical, if the powerful, original style of Tacitus is to reflect more than a passive agglomeration of the various literary influences mentioned above, to seek the foundation of his concepts in the events which shaped and shook his own existence. Did he not witness and experience the remarkable difference between the tyrannical regime of Domitian and the moderate reigns of Nerva and Trajan? Would it not be understandable for Tacitus, enmeshed in the events of his day and unable to see them with perspective, to attribute this difference primarily or entirely to the difference of personality of the respective emperors, and from this explanation of contemporary events in terms of contemporary personalities, to make analogies of historical events in terms of historical personalities? One need not be psychiatrically oriented to understand much of Tacitus' historical bitterness against Tiberius and Nero to be derived from his contemporary bitterness against Domitian.

But now to return to our basic question, which is essentially stylistic. Even to casual readers of Tacitus, his characters give the impression of a portrayal at once bold and incisive, vigorous,

all fairness to the biographer, the different goals of biography and history should be emphasized. The biographer will use all available material, including historical events, to illuminate his reader's understanding of the subject, but obviously his ultimate goal is not the narration and explanation of historical events, but the most faithful possible portrayal of his subject. The historian also will use all available material, including biographical facts, to make his account as comprehensive as possible, but his ultimate aim is not the understanding of the individual but of the event. There exists between the biographer and historian a partial overlapping of paths but a distinct divergence of goals.

It seems justifiable for a biographer, in trying to comprehend the life of his subject, to seek a dominant motivation through which the subject's choices and actions may be understood. That Tacitus did likewise in his writing attests not to his confusion between biography and historiography, but to his interpretation of historical events principally as the result of the actions and decisions (and therefore the personalities) of the governing individuals. The biographer and the historian may, however, be reproached, as they are by Alexander and Marsh (*loc. cit.*), for assuming that if a dominant motivation be discovered behind one specific action or at one specific period, this motivation will necessarily and permanently remain unchanged.

yet probing. This impression is most forcefully confirmed upon closer examination of his writings. The question whether these descriptions are accurate and historically justified has long been hotly debated and conclusions vary according to the character under discussion.¹⁰ This study, however, will not deal with the accuracy of Tacitus' historical evaluations, but will be an attempt to outline and analyze the literary technique by which he portrayed historical personalities in the *Annals* and *Histories*. The technique is extremely complex and any attempt to unravel completely this intertwined ball of devices, many of which are undoubtedly instinctive, would be unfortunate. For in terms of any true artist's technique, the sum is always greater than the parts. There do seem to be, however, certain general patterns, and it is these that we shall attempt to identify.

The first and most easily identifiable aspect of Tacitus' method of character portrayal is that which we may call "direct description." This device almost defies a simple definition, but its meaning can perhaps be made clear by opposing it at once to the other main devices of character portrayal found in Tacitus: innuendo, character contrast, and character interplay. The device of direct description is, of course, common to most narrative writing, and yet, in his works, Tacitus employs it in certain ways which seem to be peculiar to himself. We may therefore begin our analysis with an examination of this device.

In direct description, most often the author himself gives certain information or views which he has upon the character under discussion. In the case of the major characters, there are certain things which Tacitus almost always describes. Tacitus, as did most ancients, attached great importance to the lineage of the character, and will usually mention it, often with an appropriate comment. Thus he speaks of Tiberius as *vetere atque insita Claudiae familiae superbia*.¹¹ He speaks of Germanicus as the son of Drusus upon whom hopes of liberty had been placed. *Unde in Germanicum favor et spes eadem*.¹² Again

¹⁰ The above cited works of Marsh, Walker, Mendell, and Syme all treat aspects of this subject at considerable length. Cf. also E. Paratore, *Tacito* (Milano, 1951); E. Paratore, "La figura di Agrippina minore in Tacito," *Maia*, V (1952), pp. 32-81; E. Koestermann, "Das Charakterbild Galbas bei Tacitus," *Navicula Ohlonsiensis* (Leiden, 1956).

¹¹ *Ann.*, I, 4.

¹² *Ann.*, I, 33.

of Germanicus, *ei, ut memoravi, avunculus Augustus, avus Antonius*.¹³ In mentioning Gaius Cassius, he describes him as living up to his famous ancestors,¹⁴ and of Gnaeus Piso he says *insita ferocia a patre Pisone*.¹⁵

The description of physical appearance plays a minor role in Tacitus.¹⁶ Mention of this is incidental and made only when there is some unusual quality. Thus Corbulo is described as *corpore ingens*,¹⁷ Vatinius as *corpore detorto*,¹⁸ Titus as *decor oris cum quadam maiestate*.¹⁹ One of the possible reasons given for Tiberius' retirement from Rome is his shame at his own physical appearance which Tacitus joyfully describes: *quippe illi prae-gracilis et incurva proceritas, nudus capillo vertex, ulcerosa facies ac plerumque medicaminibus interstincta*.²⁰

A far greater portion of the direct description given by the author is devoted to the personality of the character. Here Tacitus gives free rein to his interest in human beings and to his attempt to penetrate to their very essence. In many cases the description of personality given by Tacitus is in agreement with that found in other authors, such as Suetonius and Dio Cassius, which would imply a common source or tradition, especially for the reign of Tiberius. Yet, it is Tacitus' constant emphasis on personality which in large measure gives such vivacity to his characters. Let us look at some examples.

If any one impression remains of Claudius, it is certainly that

¹³ *Ann.*, II, 53.

¹⁴ *Ann.*, XII, 12.

¹⁵ *Ann.*, II, 43. Alexander, "The Tacitean 'Non Liquet'" (cf. n. 8), sees in Tacitus a prejudice against foreigners.

¹⁶ Cf. P. Wuilleumier and P. Fabia, *Tacite* (Paris, 1949), p. 137: "Les qualités ou les défauts corporels ne l'intéressent guère; il les range parmi les avantages ou les désavantages vains et fortuits" (*Ann.*, XIII, 8: *specie inanum validus*; *Ann.*, XV, 48: *Aderant etiam fortuita, corpus procerum, decora facies*). Cousin (*op. cit.*, p. 235) feels that Tacitus emphasizes appearance because of his frequent use of words such as *facies*, *vultus*, and *species*.

¹⁷ *Ann.*, XIII, 8.

¹⁸ *Ann.*, XV, 34.

¹⁹ *Hist.*, II, 1.

²⁰ *Ann.*, IV, 57. For a full discussion of the relationship of personality and physiognomy cf. E. C. Evans, "Roman Descriptions of Personal Appearance in History and Biography," *H.S.C.P.*, XLVI (1935), pp. 43-84.

of an erudite fool. Of him Tacitus says: *nihil arduum videbatur in animo principis, cui non iudicium, non odium erat nisi indita et iussa*.²¹ A little earlier, after the death of Messalina, he is shown to be wavering in the choice of a wife: *ipse huc modo, modo illuc, ut quemque suadentium audierat, promptus*. . . .²² Another example can be seen in Drusus, who, being faced with the alternatives of clemency or harshness toward the rebellious troops, chose the latter; for, *promptum ad asperiora ingenium Druso erat*.²³ Poppaea, after due respect is paid to her lineage and physical qualities, is given the dubious tribute: *Huic mulieri cuncta alia fuere praeter honestum animum*.²⁴ Nor did Tacitus leave any doubt about his feelings towards Seianus, of whom he says:

Corpus illi laborum tolerans, animus audax, sui obtegens, in alios criminator, iuxta adulatio et superbia, palam compositus pudor, intus summa apiscendi libido, eiusque causa modo largitio et luxus, saepius industria ac vigilantia, haud minus noxiae, quotiens parando regno finguntur.²⁵

Here also can be seen one of Tacitus' favorite stylistic traits, the play of verbal antithesis to achieve emphasis.

Tiberius, of course, receives his full share, and if any one trait of his may be singled out which Tacitus seemed to detest more than the rest, it was his alleged shrewd hypocrisy. The whole account of his reign is filled with allusions to this and with such descriptions as *proprium id Tiberio fuit scelera nuper reperta priscis verbis obtegere*²⁶ or *ambiguus an urbem intraret seu, quia contra destinaverat, speciem venturi simulans*.²⁷ Agrippina, the wife of Germanicus, aroused Tacitus' admiration by her independence in the early books. He does, nevertheless, recognize her impetuosity later by saying: *Agrippina aequi inpatiens, domnandi avida, virilibus curis feminarum vitia exuerat*.²⁸ Vitellius,

²¹ *Ann.*, XII, 3.

²² *Ann.*, XII, 1.

²³ *Ann.*, I, 29.

²⁴ *Ann.*, XIII, 45.

²⁵ *Ann.*, IV, 1. The parallels between these descriptions of Poppaea and Seianus and Sallust's Sempronia and Catilina are obvious, perhaps as Syme suggests (*op. cit.*, p. 353), made "openly and avowedly."

²⁶ *Ann.*, IV, 19.

²⁷ *Ann.*, VI, 1.

²⁸ *Ann.*, VI, 25.

that embodiment of the cardinal sins of sloth and gluttony, is spoken of as *luxu et saginae mancipatus emptusque*²⁹ and *contemptior in dies segniorque*.³⁰

An important variation in the process of direct description is found in the author's recounting some of the actions of the characters. These actions, in addition to their historical significance, are often highly indicative of personality and are inevitably one of the prime bases on which the reader formulates his opinion of the character. The actions of Germanicus, for example, are very closely followed, especially in his capacity as a general. His kindness towards his soldiers, his assisting them financially after a flood disaster, his visiting them personally, are all fully related;³¹ sometimes he is even so concerned with their feelings about himself as to go amongst them in disguise in order to sound them out freely.³² His unselfish generalship is epitomized by the description *quod arduum sibi, cetera legatis permisit*.³³ And finally, Germanicus may be said to reach the height of his idealization in the account of his visit to the marvels of Egypt.³⁴ For just as in Homer, where a large part of the admiration the reader has for Odysseus is due to the wonderful and amazing sights which he has seen, and which the reader himself would like to have seen, so also in this description does the reader unconsciously associate himself with Germanicus in beholding these marvels. This self-association on the part of the reader with Germanicus, the man who has seen the wonders of Egypt, seems strongly to reinforce the previous favorable description, rendering Germanicus a hero of almost epic quality. Certainly, according to the later descriptions of Tacitus, no mythical hero could have been more universally mourned upon his death than was Germanicus.³⁵

Among the descriptions of actions which reveal character, there must be cited the frenzied Bacchic scene in which Messalina and Silius partake, showing the full extent to which their madness had carried them.

²⁹ *Hist.*, II, 71.

³² *Ann.*, II, 13.

³⁰ *Hist.*, II, 87.

³³ *Ann.*, II, 20.

³¹ *Ann.*, I, 71.

³⁴ *Ann.*, II, 60 ff.

³⁵ *Ann.*, II, 69 ff. There is in this description almost an echo of *Iliad*, XXIV, particularly the mourning for Hector after his body was brought back.

At Messalina non alias solutior luxu, adulto autumnno simulacrum vindemiae per domum celebrabat. Urgeri prela, fluere lacus; et feminae pellibus accinctae adsultabant ut sacrificantes vel insanientes Bacchae; ipsa crine fluxo thyrsus quatiens, iuxtaque Silius hedera vinctus, gerere cothurnos, iacere caput, strepente circum procaci choro.³⁶

The actions of Tiberius are given somewhat special treatment. It so happens that many of his actions, as described by Tacitus, are of a praiseworthy nature, but either their good effect is blunted by some insinuating remark on the part of the author, or they are at best passed over without comment. An example of the latter treatment can be seen when his generous aid to cities which were victims of an earthquake is described, along with his fair distribution of inheritances, and his dedication of temples.³⁷ But far more often are his apparently good actions negated by the accompanying remark of the author. After Tiberius had vigorously refused the title of *Pater Patriae* and had denied that he was engaging in *divinae occupationes*, along with other such flattery offered by the senate, the comment is: *Unde angusta et lubrica oratio sub principe qui libertatem metuebat adulationem oderat*.³⁸ When he rejects similar flattery in the form of Dolabella's proposal that he be given the power of debarring men whom he considered unfit for public office, the author remarks, *quanto rarius apud Tiberium popularitas, tanto laetioribus animis accepta*.³⁹ Even the apparently innocent action of giving the senate jurisdiction over certain questions of asylum rights in various eastern provinces is besmirched by the preceding statement: *Sed Tiberius, vim principatus sibi firmans, imaginem antiquitatis senatui praebebat postulata provinciarum ad disquisitionem patrum mittendo*.⁴⁰ Descriptions such as these are obvious fuel to the fiery debate as to whether Tacitus actually achieved his goal of writing *sine ira et studio*.⁴¹

Not content merely to describe the personalities and the actions of his characters in a purely external fashion, Tacitus often

³⁶ *Ann.*, XI, 31.

³⁷ *Ann.*, II, 47 ff.

³⁸ *Ann.*, II, 87.

³⁹ *Ann.*, III, 69.

⁴⁰ *Ann.*, III, 60.

⁴¹ Cf. Walker (*op. cit.*, pp. 235 ff.) who sees in the discrepancies between character description and the stated action a failure in Tacitus' use of rhetorical type characters.

attempts to delve into their reasoning and to give his readers some explanation of their psychological state. Thus Messalina, near her death, is spoken of as *animo per libidines corrupto*.⁴² We are given an inkling of what Domitian was probably like in the lost portions of the *Histories*, from the account given of his motives while still a youth.

Domitianus sperni a senioribus iuventam suam cernens, modica quoque et usurpata antea munia imperii omittebat, simplicitatis ac modestiae imagine in altitudinem conditus studiumque litterarum et amorem carminum simulans, quo velaret animum et fratris se aemulationi subduceret, cuius disparem mitioremque naturam contra interpretabatur.⁴³

The shrewd caution of Tiberius, so often cited as a motive for his actions, is always called to task, so that when he decides to save Gaetulicus from death resulting from a false accusation, the explanation is: *reputante Tiberio publicum sibi odium, extremam aetatem magisque fama quam vi stare suas res*.⁴⁴ Even minor characters are sometimes given the benefit of Tacitus' psychological penetration. Of the prefect Aufidienus Rufus he says:

Quippe Rufus diu manipularis, dein centurio, mox castris prefectus, antiquam duramque militiam revocabat, vetus operis ac laboris et eo inmitior quia toleraverat.⁴⁵

Tigellinus' motives in saving Vinius' daughter are thus revealed:

Haud dubie servaverat, non clementia, quippe tot interfectis, sed effugium in futurum, quia pessimus quisque diffidentia praesentium mutationem pavens, adversus publicum odium privatam gratiam praeparat.⁴⁶

Likewise, Mucianus is said to have written frequently to the forces supporting Vespasian, saying that they should not carry their offensive beyond Aquila, *incruentam et sine luctu victoriam et alia huiusce modi praetexendo, sed gloriae avidus atque omne belli decus sibi retinens*. . . .⁴⁷ It need hardly be mentioned that the Tacitean characters given a creditable motive for an action are in a distinct minority.

All the above-mentioned methods of direct description are

⁴² *Ann.*, XI, 37.

⁴³ *Hist.*, IV, 86.

⁴⁴ *Ann.*, VI, 30.

⁴⁵ *Ann.*, I, 20.

⁴⁶ *Hist.*, I, 72.

⁴⁷ *Hist.*, III, 8.

naturally not mutually exclusive. In fact, more often than not, they are found linked together: lineage described with personality, personality with acts, acts with motives, and so on. Thus we have the action-personality description of Vitellius, when the forces of Vespasian are closing in upon him: *brevi auditu quamvis magna transibat, impar curis gravioribus*.⁴⁸ Caligula is presented to us as *nihil abnuentem, dum dominationis apisceretur, nam etsi commotus ingenio simulationum tamen falsa in sinu avi perdidicerat*.⁴⁹ The brave but confused Galba is shown in a somewhat favorable light in the face of a revolt.

Obvius in Palatio Iulius Atticus speculator, cruentum gladium ostentans, occisum a se Othonem exclamavit; et Galba "Commilito" inquit, "quis iussit?"—insigni animo ad coercendam militarem licentiam, minantibus intrepidus, adversus blandientis incorruptus.⁵⁰

Although Tacitus is not the kind of man given to humor, there are a number of instances where his character portrayal does assume a certain wittiness, although always with a bite or a sneer. Asinius Marcellus is spoken of as *Asinio Pollione proavo clarus neque morum spernendus habebatur nisi quod paupertatem precipuum malorum credebat*.⁵¹ Vitellius is probably the most frequent victim of Tacitus' satirical humor. He seemed to be governed solely by his sensual pleasures for *numquam ita ad curas intento Vitellio ut voluptatum oblivisceretur*.⁵² With his end imminent, as disaster upon disaster overcame his forces, Vitellius could simply not be moved into taking any action. *Tanta torpedio invaserat animum ut, si principem eum fuisse ceteri non meminissent, ipse oblivisceretur*.⁵³

There seem to be certain points of the narrative which are particularly favored by the author for presenting his descriptions. The death of a major character is one of those most frequently used, furnishing the author with an opportunity for a final summary and evaluation in the form of an obituary. Upon Galba's death, we have the following summary: aged 73 years at his death, he had lived through the reigns of five emperors, *alieno imperio felicius quam suo*; ⁵⁴ he was of a noble, wealthy

⁴⁸ *Hist.*, II, 59.

⁴⁹ *Ann.*, VI, 45.

⁵⁰ *Hist.*, I, 35.

⁵¹ *Ann.*, XIV, 40.

⁵² *Hist.*, II, 67.

⁵³ *Hist.*, III, 63.

⁵⁴ *Hist.*, I, 49.

family. His own character and ability, however, were not outstanding, for *ipsi medium ingenium, magis extra vitia quam cum virtutibus*.⁵⁵ As a person, he was neither jealous nor greedy, was kind to his friends and freedmen, and honest in his provincial administration. His reputation had nevertheless become overrated: *Maior privato visus dum privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii nisi imperasset*.⁵⁶

The treatment accorded Tiberius upon his death is, as would be expected, quite elaborate. After stating once more his lineage and outlining the main events of his life, the author proceeds to divide his character into successive stages of wickedness, depending upon the restraining influence at hand. At first, as a private citizen under Augustus, he is said to have behaved in creditable fashion, but when he once came to the supreme power, at first he was *occultum ac subdolum fingendis virtutibus donec Germanicus ac Drusus superfuere*; ⁵⁷ then, stepping downward, he became *inter bona malaque mixtus incolumi matre*.⁵⁸ The next stage in the decline is seen as *intestabilis saevitia, sed obtectis libidinibus dum Seianum dilexit timuitve*,⁵⁹ but when Seianus, the last obstacle, is removed, our sinner descends to the lowest depths: *in scelera simul ac dedecora prorupit, postquam remoto pudore et metu suo tantum ingenio utebatur*.⁶⁰

Minor characters will often be given their only description upon their death. This is in accordance with Tacitus' adherence to the annalistic tradition of recording all the important events of a particular year. Such is the memorable account of Memmius Regulus.

Eo anno mortem obiit Memmius Regulus, auctoritate constantia fama, in quantum praeumbrante imperatoris fastigio datur, clarus adeo ut Nero, aeger valetudine et adulantibus circum, qui finem imperio adesse dicebant, si quid fato pateretur, responderit habere subsidium rem publicam. Rogantibus dehinc, in quo potissimum, addiderat in Memmio Regulo. Vixit tamen post haec Regulus, quiete defensu et quia nova generis claritudine neque invidiosis opibus erat.⁶¹

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ann.*, VI, 51.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ann.*, XIV, 47.

In addition to the obituary technique, Tacitus often pauses for a description of personality the first time the character performs a significant action in the account. Sometimes the character does not even receive a second mention. The description, often of one sentence, is usually penetrating, revealing Tacitus' epigrammatic talent. We have seen above the treatment of the prefect Aufidienus Rufus, and that of Percennius might also be cited: *dux olim theatralium operarum, dein gregarius miles, procax lingua et miscere coetus histrionali studio doctus*.⁶² Helvidius Priscus, whom Tacitus greatly admired along with his father-in-law, Thrasea, for their staunch and constant refusal to partake in the universal grovelling before the emperor, is fully described when he takes part in a senatorial debate, his first important action in this account.⁶³

When Antonius Primus, that successful soldier-of-fortune, first comes to the foreground in aligning himself with Vespasian, he is described in what is certainly one of the most brilliant characterizations of Tacitus.

Is legibus nocens et tempore Neronis falsi damnatus inter alia belli mala senatorium ordinem reciperauerat. Praepositus a Galba septimae legioni scriptitasse Othoni credebatur, ducem se partibus offerens; a quo neglectus in nullo Othoniani belli usu fuit. Labantibus Vitelli rebus, Vespasianum secutus grande momentum addidit, strenuus manu, sermone promptus, serendae in alios invidiae artifex, discordiis et seditionibus potens, raptor, largitor, pace pessimus, bello non spernendus.⁶⁴

Here indeed we can see how Tacitus' character portrayal is heightened by his remarkable style. Starting with *strenuus manu, sermone promptus*, we have a series of perfectly parallel phrases with an initial chiasmus to avoid monotony, and a closing epigram to insure remembrance.

We have thus far in our analysis of the device of direct description dealt solely with that description coming from the author himself in the process of his narration. The author as the source of description, it is true, accounts for the great bulk of characterization, and yet other sources are also used which

⁶² *Ann.*, I, 16.

⁶³ *Hist.*, IV, 5. Cf., however, Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

⁶⁴ *Hist.*, II, 86.

furnish added vividness to the whole picture. Quite often we will find one person in the account described by another, a process which not only gives variety to the author's descriptions, but adds a ring of authenticity to whatever impressions the author would like to create. In this type of description, we refer only to specific people as sources, or at most to a specific body of people, such as the senate. Indefinite sources such as *quidam*, *erant qui* will be dealt with later under the classification of innuendo.

We are given a concise idea of what was thought of Caligula in the following: *Passieni oratoris dictum percrebuit neque meliorem umquam servum neque deteriozem dominum fuisse.*⁶⁵ When Corbulo was chosen to handle the disturbances in the East, it is the senate which reveals their reaction to him: *Laeti quod Domitium Corbulonem retinendae Armeniae praeposuerat, videbaturque locus virtutibus patefactus.*⁶⁶ By far the most effective accusation of Nero comes from the conspirator Subrius Flavus, when he is asked by Nero why he had broken his oath to him.

"Oderam te," inquit, "nec quisquam tibi fidelior militum fuit, dum amari meruisti; odisse coepi postquam parricida matris et uxoris, auriga et histrio et incendiarius extitisti."⁶⁷

This blunt and violent condemnation is so powerful because it is given, not as the author's opinion, but as that of an eyewitness to the atrocities committed by Nero. Hence there is created the impression that the feelings of disgust and hatred voiced by Flavus were undoubtedly shared by many others of that day.

Tiberius had the unenviable fortune of being spoken about by many people in Tacitus' account, but the most searing condemnation comes from his grandnephew, Drusus, as he lay on his deathbed, an event which was reported to the senate by the centurion Attius.

vocesque deficientis adiecerat, quis primo quasi per dementiam, funesta Tiberio, mox, ubi exspes vitae fuit, meditatae compositasque diras imprecabatur, ut, quem ad modum nurum filiumque fratris et nepotes domumque omnem caedibus complevisset, ita poenas nomini generique maiorum et posteris exsolveret.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ *Ann.*, VI, 20.

⁶⁷ *Ann.*, XV, 67.

⁶⁶ *Ann.*, XIII, 8.

⁶⁸ *Ann.*, VI, 24.

The senate became violently upset at this and made a pretence of protesting. Their real feelings about Tiberius, however, are reported.

penetrabat pavor et admiratio, callidum olim et tegendis sceleribus obscurum huc confidentiae venisse, ut tamquam dimotis parietibus ostenderet nepotem sub verbere centurionis inter servorum ictus extrema vitae alimenta frustra orantem.⁶⁹

In addition to the method of having the direct description of a character come from the author himself or from another character, we frequently find the device of having the character in question reveal himself. This is mostly done in the form of a speech which the character is purported to have delivered, although in one case we have a quoted portion of a letter written by Tiberius. The words of the speeches are of course written by Tacitus, but claim to contain the sense of what actually was said (*in hunc modum locutus fertur*⁷⁰), a procedure used by several previous historians.

With Tacitus, we have the good fortune, in one instance, to be able to compare the historian's version of a speech of Claudius with the original. It is the excellent speech in which Claudius urges that citizens from Gaul, as well as all other citizens, be eligible to hold public office, pointing out very cogently the originally alien quality of most of those at present eligible.⁷¹ The comparison of Tacitus' version with the original, shows, if anything, an improvement upon the original. It condenses much of the longwindedness of Claudius, and eliminates many of the pedantic qualities. In the Tacitean version, one gets the impression that a liberal and far-sighted administrator is speaking, one who had studied deeply into the history of his country, and who has learned many valuable lessons. One might almost conclude that Tacitus was in full accord with these views and in order to give them a more powerful effect, clothed them as nicely as possible.

The staunch and learned mind of Cremutius Cordus is revealed in his eloquent speech to the senate defending the history which he had written in which he had eulogized Brutus and had called Cassius the last of the Romans.⁷² His excellent defense is a

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *Hist.*, I, 15.

⁷¹ *Ann.*, XI, 24.

⁷² *Ann.*, IV, 34.

strong bid for the freedoms of speech and "press," and remembering Tacitus' bitter words in the *Agricola* against the suppression of these freedoms under Domitian, we can well presume that he himself was in sympathy with the sentiments expressed.

The speech of Galba,⁷³ on his adoption of Piso, is full of political wisdom, and as such, is somewhat incongruous with the overall picture given of Galba: a kind, honest man, good military leader, but extremely weak and incompetent as a statesman. The selection of Piso as the best man available to rule the state, the reflection that the Roman government has now reached a stage where it cannot revert to a republican form, but must be administered by one man, and the final warning that the Romans can endure neither total slavery nor total liberty, sound strange on the lips of the usually short-sighted Galba. It may be possible that Galba was one of the many men in power whose words far outshone his deeds. It may also be possible that Tacitus is here using Galba more or less as a mouthpiece for his own views, although if the speech of Claudius is to be used as a criterion, Tacitus did not alter the basic ideas of the speaker. The explanation most favorable to Tacitus' consistency as a literary artist would be that the excellent ideas expressed in the speech were Galba's revealing a political insight in the speaker which unfortunately was rarely manifested in his actions.⁷⁴

The speeches of Tiberius, like all his other actions, are accorded unfavorable treatment. Many of them are actually quite good in content, but are nevertheless generally derided in some way or other. When Tiberius spoke to the senate, wishing to put an end to the many flattering requests coming from the provinces for permission to erect temples dedicated to himself, saying that he wished to live in the hearts of men, if he so deserved, rather than in stone, the scoffing of Tacitus is reflected in the insinuation *quidam ut degeneris animi interpretabantur*.⁷⁵ Likewise in the portion of his letter which is given, in which he says "*perire me cotidie sentio*,"⁷⁶ Tacitus interprets it as if Tiberius were being eaten away by his own crimes.

We have seen then the three main aspects of the device of

⁷³ *Hist.*, I, 15.

⁷⁴ Cf. Koestermann, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

⁷⁵ *Ann.*, IV, 38.

⁷⁶ *Ann.*, VI, 6.

direct description which Tacitus uses in his portrayal of character: description by the author, description of one character by another, and description or revelation of the character through his own words. As previously shown, the greatest portion of the direct description is done in the first manner, by the author himself, but this is most effectively supplemented by frequent use of the other two.

Another principal device used by Tacitus in his character portrayal is that of innuendo, where the author reveals his feelings concerning the character through implication rather than direct statement. This is effected in a variety of ways. Rumors or hearsay about a character from indefinite sources are frequently reported (*constat, erant qui, quidam, populus, vulgus*), and undoubtedly reflect some choice, conscious or unconscious, on the part of Tacitus. Secondly, in explaining certain actions or events in which important characters are involved, alternative motives or causes are frequently given (*seu . . . seu*) with that alternative preferred by the author generally placed last, in the position of emphasis. And finally, the most pervasive type of innuendo is found in the choice, usage, and juxtaposition of words and ideas which permit the author to give a definite tone or coloring to a passage. A notable example of this is given by Professor Ryberg in her excellent study of Tacitean innuendo.

"Archelaus was hated by Tiberius because he had not shown him courtesy during his stay in Rhodes. When Tiberius had come into power he lured (*elicit*) Archelaus to Rome through letters of his mother, which made no secret of her son's enmity, but promised clemency if he would come to the capital. The king, unaware of treachery (*ignarus doli*) or fearing to show any suspicion, hastened at once to the city, where he was received harshly by the emperor (*immiti a principe*) and was accused in the senate. Not because of the charges which were invented (*non ob crimina quae fingeantur*) but because of worry and the weariness of old age, and because kings are not accustomed to being treated as equals, much less as inferiors, he ended his life *sponte an fato*. The impression of Tiberius' guilt is implicit in every line of the brief narrative, though nowhere can there be found any actual charge."⁷⁷

⁷⁷ I. S. Ryberg, "Tacitus' Art of Innuendo," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXIII (1942), p. 390. The reader is referred to this article for a full discussion with examples of the various forms of innuendo in Tacitus.

Although the various forms of innuendo are used separately by Tacitus, in many instances we find them combined with one another, making the total effect all the more powerful.

Professor Ryberg, in her aforementioned article, maintains the theory that innuendo was used by Tacitus, the literary artist, to create certain impressions in his readers' minds which Tacitus, the historian, could not give as certainties since his views were unsupported (or perhaps even contradicted) by recorded facts. Although this hypothesis does have a certain plausibility, it seems to place too great emphasis on a conscious effort by Tacitus to maintain his historiographical integrity by a scrupulous checking of references. It is extremely doubtful whether Tacitus followed the rigorous rules of scholarship set by modern historians, and whether he consciously and conscientiously distinguished recorded facts from what he sincerely believed to be facts, presenting the former by direct description, the latter by innuendo.

It would seem much more consonant with the artistry of Tacitus to look for the explanation of this essentially literary device in relation to its literary use. It should be first of all noticed that innuendo is used for the most part in the first six books of the *Annals*. It is occasionally employed for the court of Nero, but rarely in the *Histories* or minor works. The reason for this may seem somewhat obscure unless we realize that the device of innuendo is applied chiefly to Tiberius and to his times. And what could be more natural? In the case of Claudius, Nero, and the other emperors, it is open vices such as profligacy, slaughter, stupidity, and greed which are castigated. For these, vivid description, and not delicate finesse is needed. But in the case of Tiberius, where the chief vices exposed and inveighed against are carefully concealed hypocrisy and deceitfulness, something subtler and sharper, something more deeply penetrating and eventually more damning was found in the use of innuendo. Tacitus chose his weapons to suit the literary terrain. Innuendo then must be interpreted primarily as a literary, and not an historical device.

The last of the major devices which Tacitus utilizes in his portrayal of character is that of contrast. Contrast, in a sense the basis of all perception, is used by artists of every medium to attain a certain clarity or emphasis, coupled with a feeling

of balance or symmetry. Tacitus, with his literary gifts and his analytic absorption in people, fully sensed the effectiveness of the contrast of personality and made much use of it in his writings.

There are two general methods by which Tacitus achieves the effects of contrast: by direct comparison of characters, and by their dramatic interplay. The direct comparison is the simpler, and consists of describing, at appropriate points in the narrative, essential differences between the two characters under discussion. The actions and personalities of Tiberius and Germanicus, for example, are continually being contrasted. Thus in speaking of Germanicus, it is said, *Nam iuveni civile ingenium, mira comitas et diversa ab Tiberii sermone vultu, adrogantibus et obscuris*.⁷⁸ While Tiberius is described as being glad at the disturbances in the East so that he could have a pretext for transferring Germanicus there from Germany, Germanicus is shown as being all the more conscientious in his attempt to conquer Germany on behalf of Tiberius.⁷⁹ The colors here are certainly jet black and pure white. However, even in a contrast which is not so violent, Tiberius comes off on the wrong end. The luxury of young Drusus is spoken of by the people but as being preferable to the vices of Tiberius *solus et nullis voluptatibus avocatus maestam vigilantiam et malas curas exerceret*.⁸⁰ On one occasion we have the comparison of a leader to his men, in the description of Vitellius and his army.

*Mira inter exercitum imperatoremque diversitas, instare miles, arma poscere, dum Galliae trepident, dum Hispaniae cunctentur . . . Torpebat Vitellius et fortunam principatus inertis luxu ac prodigiis epulis praesumebat, medio die temulentus et sagina gravis. . .*⁸¹

On another occasion we have a contrast between two characters given by a third character. Mucianus, in encouraging Vespasian to make his bid for the imperial power, says, *nec mihi maior in tua vigilantia parsimonia sapientia fiducia est quam in Vitellii torpore inscitia saevitia*.⁸²

Sometimes the contrast is not made between virtue and vice, but simply between two types of virtue, or two types of vice.

⁷⁸ *Ann.*, I, 33.

⁷⁹ *Ann.*, II, 5.

⁸⁰ *Ann.*, III, 37.

⁸¹ *Hist.*, I, 62.

⁸² *Hist.*, II, 77.

When Vespasian and Mucianus are compared, Vespasian is described as energetic in war, a man who did things for himself, was constantly on the go, unfastidious in regard to food and dress, who shared the hardships of his soldiers, and if he had any fault, it was his tendency to be avaricious. Mucianus was known for his magnificence, his wealth, high style of living, was a readier speaker than Vespasian, and a more experienced administrator and statesman.⁸³ Both have their good and even doubtful qualities, but a more disparate pair could hardly be found. A fine distinction in vices is found in those of Otho and Vitellius.

minus Vitellii ignavae voluptates quam Othonis flagrantissimae libidines timebantur. . . . Vitellius ventre et gula sibi inhonestus, Otho luxu saevitia audacia rei publicae exitiosior ducebatur.⁸⁴

A phenomenon found with great frequency in Tacitus is the introduction of minor characters by pairs, with an ensuing comparison of their personalities. This is undoubtedly due in large part to Tacitus' general stylistic tendency toward contrast, but it may very well also be an attempt (conscious or unconscious) on the part of the author to help his readers keep track of the great stream of characters which flows through his account. Contrast, giving vividness and emphasis to any description, would be of great value to the reader's or listener's memory. The parade of these coupled character presentations is quite extensive and a few typical examples may be cited.

In the narration of German affairs, the characters of Segestes and Arminius, the two German leaders, are introduced. Their contrast is given mainly through the speeches which they deliver.⁸⁵ Segestes is shown to be an ally of Rome, who believes that the Germans' best interests lie in their acquiescence to that great power, since both countries shared common interests, and peace was better than war. Arminius, his son-in-law, violently opposing this attitude, reveals himself as a strong nationalist, determined to brook no Roman domination, and threatening to repeat the defeat of Varus. Arminius, on two other occasions, is put in opposition to Germans of views differing from his own, once to his brother Flavus,⁸⁶ and another time to Maroboduus.⁸⁷

⁸³ *Hist.*, II, 5.

⁸⁵ *Ann.*, I, 57.

⁸⁷ *Ann.*, II, 45.

⁸⁴ *Hist.*, II, 31.

⁸⁶ *Ann.*, II, 9.

Faenius Rufus and Sofonius Tigellinus, having been appointed praetorian prefects, are thus compared :

Quippe Caesar duos praetoriis cohortibus imposuerat, Faenium Rufum ex vulgi favore, quia rem frumentariam sine quaestu tractabat, Sofonium Tigellinum, veterem inpudicitiam atque infamiam in eo secutus. Atque illi pro cognitis moribus fuere, validior Tigellinus in animo principis et intimis libidinibus adsumptus, prospera populi et militum fama Rufus, quod apud Neronem adversum experiebatur.⁸⁸

Death too brings its comparison, as we see in the case of Domitius Afer and Marcus Servilius.

Sequuntur virorum inlustrium mortes Domitii Afri et M. Servilii, qui summis honoribus et multa eloquentia vigerant, ille orando causas, Servilius diu foro, mox tradendis rebus Romanis celebris et elegantia vitae, quam clariorem effecit, ut par ingenio, ita morum diversus.⁸⁹

Interplay of characters, the second manner used by Tacitus to achieve contrast, brings forth the full literary talent of the author. It is here that the scene is so presented that we feel the impact of the characters upon each other, the spotlight falling now upon one, now upon another, but the presence of each, whether in the brightness or in the shadows, is always sensed. In the *Annals* we have the continual interplay between Tiberius and Germanicus. Their relationship is marked by the constant jealousy of Tiberius towards Germanicus which the latter felt but could not dissipate. When he is ordered to withdraw from Germany, he does so, *quamquam fingi ea seque per invidiam parto iam decori abstrahi intellegebat*.⁹⁰ This still does not satisfy Tiberius and we later learn of his plotting against Germanicus after the latter's triumph in celebration of his German victory. The people, however, are observant of Tiberius' hostility toward their favorite, and *Germanico alienatio patrum amorem apud ceteros auxerat*.⁹¹ But even after the death of Germanicus, the former struggle manifested itself when Tiberius refused to allow a gold medallion to be made in honor of the hero.⁹²

⁸⁸ *Ann.*, XIV, 51.

⁸⁹ *Ann.*, XIV, 19.

⁹⁰ *Ann.*, II, 26.

⁹¹ *Ann.*, II, 43.

⁹² *Ann.*, II, 83.

The interplay of characters is especially evident with the later emperors, where intrigue and struggle for power played so prominent a part of the everyday life. The plight of Galba is shown as he was ruined by Vinius and Laco.

Invalidum senem (Galbam), Titus Vinius et Cornelius Laco alter deterrimus mortalium, alter ignavissimus, odio flagitiorum oneratum contemptu inertiae destruebant.⁹³

A scene which is full of psychological insight and dramatic sensitivity occurs upon the death of Messalina, whose execution had been entrusted to Euodus the freedman.

Isque (Euodus) raptim in hortos praegressus repperit fusam humi, adsidente matre Lepida, quae florenti filiae haud concors supremis eius necessitatibus ad miserationem evicta erat suadebatque ne percussorem opperiretur: transisse vitam neque aliud quam morti decus quaerendum. Sed animo per libidines corrupto nihil honestum inerat: lacrimaeque et questus inriti ducebantur, cum impetu venientium pulsae fores adstititque tribunus per silentium, at libertus increpans multis et servilibus probris. Tunc primum fortunam suam introspectit ferrumque accepit, quod frustra iugulo aut pectori per trepidationem admovens ictu tribuni transigitur.⁹⁴

Here the fine interplay between the sinful daughter and the forgiving mother, and between the two executioners, is to be especially noted.

The intrigue which abounded in the court of Nero provided perhaps the most extensive material for the interplay of characters. The whole atmosphere is most vividly described by Tacitus.

Certamen utrique (Senecae et Burro) unum erat contra ferociam Agrippinae, quae cunctis malae dominationis cupidinibus flagrans habebat in partibus Pallantem, quo auctore Claudius nuptiis incestis et adoptione exitiosa semet perverterat. Sed neque Neroni infra servos ingenium et Pallas tristi adrogantia modum liberti egressus taedium sui moverat. Propalam tamen omnes in eam honores cumulabantur, signumque more militiae petenti tribuno dedit optimae matris.⁹⁵

It is by such descriptions as these that one can gain some idea of the pulse of that strange world and of the people who moved

⁹³ *Hist.*, I, 6.

⁹⁴ *Ann.*, XI, 37-8.

⁹⁵ *Ann.*, XIII, 2.

in it. Contrast then, by direct comparison and by character interplay, takes its place among the most significant devices of character portrayal.

We have seen how Tacitus, in his inimitable and brilliant fashion, by means of richly-varied description, deadly innuendo, direct contrast and dramatic interplay, has contrived to give the reader a unique portrayal of historical characters as he himself conceived of them. The various devices may be thought of as a series of powerful beacons focused from different vantage points upon the character under scrutiny, presenting to the viewer a true stereoscopic image. It may be remarked with justice that the most convincing portrayals are generally those of villains, while the virtuous are pale by comparison.⁹⁶ The total effect, however, is undeniably that of a literary *tour de force* which modern historians would probably hasten to avoid and which novelists would most certainly be anxious to achieve.⁹⁷

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⁹⁶ Why this is so would be the subject of a complex literary-psychological inquiry. Is it, as some have claimed (cf. Alexander, "The Tacitean '*Non Liquet*,'" pp. 368 ff.), primarily a literary question of it being more difficult to create a convincing noble character than a villain? Or were most of the evil traits in Tacitus' villains already part of the common tradition before Tacitus came to them? Or finally, is the answer to be found chiefly in the moral temperament of Tacitus, made grim and embittered by his experience with the villainy of Domitian and consequently harsh and sceptical in his judgment of human motives? The portion that each of these factors plays in Tacitus' character portrayal still remains unknown. What is certain is that Tacitus evaluated his characters principally on the basis of moral criteria; hence the emphasis on virtue and vice.

⁹⁷ Indeed, if one were attempting to relate Tacitus' technique of character portrayal to techniques found in forms of writing other than historiography, it would seem to adhere most closely, not to satire or to oratory or drama, but to the novel. For it is the novelist who has most readily at hand the various devices through which a full-bodied portrayal can emerge to the reader. Had the historical novel existed in his day, Tacitus would undoubtedly have been a master of the genre. This is no denigration of his literary genius. After all, *War and Peace* is, formally speaking, an historical novel.

THE INTERPRETATION OF PLATO,
TIMAEUS 49 D-E.

In the course of a recent article on the relation of the *Timaeus* to Plato's later dialogues (*A.J.P.*, LXXVIII [1957], pp. 225-66) Professor Cherniss argued (p. 245) that *Timaeus* 49 D-E says nothing at variance with *Cratylus* 439 D8-9 and *Theaetetus* 182 C9-D7 on the question of the proper way of designating "what is perpetually becoming," and he appealed to his article in *A.J.P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 113-30, as a "proof" that any interpretation of the *Timaeus* passage as a proposal "to designate what is perpetually becoming as τοιοῦτον" is "self-refuting and incorrect." While agreeing with him that what the *Timaeus* passage says is far different from what the *Cratylus* and the *Theaetetus* say, I wish to argue that his own interpretation of it is self-refuting and incorrect, and that what the passage says is at variance with the assertions of the *Cratylus* and the *Theaetetus*. I will first give my own translation of the *Timaeus* passage and show in what respects it is at variance with assertions in the *Cratylus* and the *Theaetetus*; I will then examine Cherniss' translation.

Here is a bald translation of *Timaeus* 49 D-E:

Since thus never do any of these things¹ present the same appearance, of which of them can one confidently assert, without shame, that it is any definite "this" and not any other thing? It is not possible, but by far the safest course is to speak of them in the following way. Whenever we see a thing continually changing its appearance, fire for example, in every case we should not call fire "this," but "what is of such and such a kind," nor water "this," but always "what is of such and such a kind," nor anything else "this," as though it had some permanence, among the things which we point to with the use of the words "this" or "that," thinking that we are indicating something. For it slips away, not waiting to be called "that" or "this"² or any term which indicts them of being stable.³ We must not in fact apply

¹ Plato has just been speaking of the "elements" earth, air, fire, and water and of their apparent perpetual transformation into one another.

² Omitting, as Cherniss does, καὶ τῇν τῶδε.

³ The transition from singular to plural in this sentence suggests that Plato began the sentence with the subject "anything else" in mind, and

any of these terms; the description we must apply,⁴ in each and every case, is "the such and such which is perpetually recurring as similar"; thus we should call fire "what is always such and such," and so with everything that comes to be.

Translated in this way, the argument of the passage is, briefly, that since the visible world is one of perpetual change, it is necessary to distinguish between a right and a wrong way of describing it. "This" or "that" (τόδε καὶ τοῦτο) is always wrong, since these terms suggest a reference to something substantial and permanent, whereas in fact the sensible world is a world of transient, yet recurrent, qualities or groups of qualities (subsequently called "copies" or "likenesses" of the eternal realities—50C, 51A), which are properly described as "of such and such a kind" (τοιούτων). Thus the fact that the visible world is in continual flux does not entail that it is devoid of determinate and recognisable characteristics, but it does entail that there are no substantial and permanent "things" in it. Against this, both the *Theaetetus* and the *Cratylus* argue that the fact that the visible world is in continual flux *does* entail that it is devoid of determinate and recognisable characteristics, and make it clear that it is as illegitimate to apply the term "of such and such a kind" to any part of it as it is to apply the terms "this" or "that." Thus the *Theaetetus* argues that if everything in the sensible world is continually changing both in respect of place and character, then no description can meaningfully be applied to it, since it possesses no determinate characteristics whatsoever which can give any description significance (182C-183C). Not even the words "so" or "not-so" can be used to describe any aspect of it (183A), nor "this" nor "that" nor "any other word that brings things to a standstill" (157B; cf. 152D). Plato is, of course, here attempting to refute the thesis that knowledge is perception as based on the theory that *all things* are in change (he emphasises this point in 183C: κατὰ γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον), and no doubt means to imply that for knowledge to be possible its objects must be other than sensibles. Yet even if

completed it with "the things which we point to . . ." in mind. It is of no significance.

⁴ Cornford is right, I think, in taking οὕτω (before καλεῖν) as "resuming the long phrase that precedes."

objects of knowledge are postulated free from the objections brought against sensibles, this would not in itself affect the alleged implications of the flux doctrine. In other words the implication that a sensible world in flux in all respects is a world which precludes the possibility of any significant description being applied to it is, if valid, as valid if Forms are postulated as if they are not. And, as Cherniss acknowledges, it is clearly implied by the *Theaetetus* that both "this" and "of such and such a kind" are equally inapplicable as descriptions of sensibles. Much the same argument appears in the *Cratylus* (439C ff.). Here it is said that what is in perpetual flux cannot properly be referred to as "this" or as "of such and such a kind," for it is never in any determinate condition (439D).

It is clear from this comparison of the *Timaeus* with the *Theaetetus* and the *Cratylus* that in the *Timaeus* Plato is contradicting the assertions of the two other dialogues and is no longer willing to accept what he had earlier propounded and accepted as implications of the theory that the sensible world is in flux. This is a reflection of the greater consistency of doctrine about the status of sensible "images" of Forms which is found in the late dialogues. A major inconsistency in the middle dialogues is that side by side with a theory which gives the sensible image a fundamental part to play in the recovery of knowledge there is a theory of perception which condemns the sensible world as an aid to knowledge, a theory which, as Sir David Ross has put it, is "a false and dangerous disparagement of all particulars, in the supposed interest of Forms."⁵ It is this attitude of disparagement which is found in the assertions of the *Theaetetus* and the *Cratylus*, and which leads Plato to exaggeration in finding, in the flux doctrine of sensible things, implications radically inconsistent with his assumption of the "participation" of sensible things in Forms and of their "likeness" to Forms. What the *Timaeus* does is to explain, through its doctrine of soul, the efficient cause of the ability of sensible particulars to function as images of Forms, and in the section (48E-52D) in which our passage occurs an attempt is made to specify more exactly the nature of the sensible image in relation to the Forms and to space, the result being a doctrine which, unlike that of the middle dialogues, is consistent with the granting to sensible

⁵ *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, p. 39.

images of an important rôle in the recovery of knowledge and consistent too with the attitude of the late dialogues as a whole towards the cognitive value of sense perception.⁶ Thus the discrepancy between (i) *Timaeus* 49D-E and (ii) *Cratylus* 439 D8-9 and *Theaetetus* 182 C9-D7 is explicable as the result of a development towards greater consistency in Plato's theory of knowledge. Professor Cherniss argues, however, that only by a mistranslation of *Timaeus* 49D-E can this discrepancy be found. For him Plato's doctrine with regard to sensibles is consistent not only within the middle dialogues, but also within the middle and late dialogues together. It is in defence of this view that he offers a new translation of the *Timaeus* passage.

Here is his translation of 49D-E:⁷

- 49 C7-D1 Since these thus never appear as severally identical, concerning which of them could one without shame firmly assert that this is any particular thing and not another? It is not possible, but by far the safest way
- 49 D5 is to speak of them on this basis: What we ever see coming to be at different times in different places, for example fire, not to say "this is fire," but "what on any occasion is such and such is fire" nor "this is water" but "what is always such and such is water" nor ever "(this)," as if it had some permanence, "is
- 49 E1 some other" of the things that we think we are designating as something when by way of pointing we use the term "this" or "that." For it slips away and does not abide the assertion of "that" and "this" or any assertion that indicts them of being stable. But (it is safest) not to speak of these as severally distinct
- 49 E5 but so to call the such and such that always recurs alike in each and all cases together, for example to call that which is always such and such fire and so with everything that comes to be.

In this translation the distinction between "this" (*τοῦτο*) and

⁶ For a more detailed discussion, with references, of the developments in Plato's views on sensible imagery, see my remarks in *C. Q.*, N. S., IV (1954), pp. 197-209.

⁷ *A. J. P.*, LXXV, p. 114. The translation here extends as far as 50A4, and on p. 125 is continued as far as 50 B5. But the crucial passage, as Cherniss recognises in his later article (*A. J. P.*, LXXVIII, p. 254), is 49 D-E and it is this which I shall principally consider. To determine the correct translation of 49 D-E is to determine the correct translation of the rest, as far as the discrepancy in question is affected.

"such" (τὸ τοιοῦτον) does not mark a distinction between two modes of description, incorrect and correct respectively, of a common object, but a distinction between two objects of description, "this" referring to what Cherniss calls "phases of the phenomenal flux" or "transient phenomena," "such" referring to the "distinct and self-identical characteristics" which "enter and leave" the Receptacle, the "likenesses" of the Forms. To give the passage this significance Cherniss' first step is to take "this" in 49 D2, 5 and 6 and "such" in 49 D5, 6, as subjects, and not, as in my translation, predicatively. The question whether "this" and "such" in D5 and D6 refer to different objects is not, however, simply the question whether "this" and "such" are subjects or predicates. To take them predicatively does, certainly, entail that they are different ways of describing the same object, but to take them as subjects does not entail that they refer to different objects. For it may be argued that the "this," as subject, in the assertions "this is fire" and "this is water" is intended by Plato to have an emphasis which will make his criticism of it a criticism *as a mode of description*. Cherniss assumes that no such emphasis is intended. For him "this" in D5 and D6 is merely taking up the antecedent relative clause ὁ καθορώμεν . . . γινόμενον, and refers to a "transient phenomenon," while "such" is quite independent of that clause and different in its reference. I can see no grammatical impossibility about this. Granting this, the question now is whether or not the rest of the passage supports Cherniss' view of the emphasis and significance to be given to "this" and "such" in his translation. For the rest (D7-E2: μηδὲ ἄλλο . . . ἡγούμεθα τι) of the sentence being discussed, and for the following sentence (E2-4: φεύγει γὰρ . . . φάσις), the only significant difference between Cherniss' translation and my own is at the beginning, where while we each assume that τοῦτο προσαγορεύειν is implied as supplement to μηδὲ ἄλλο ποτὲ μηδέν in D7, I take the τοῦτο predicatively and take the phrase "as though it had some permanence" with ἄλλο μηδέν, Cherniss takes the τοῦτο as the subject of ἄλλο μηδέν and takes the phrase "as though it had some permanence" with τοῦτο. From this point up to E4 (. . . ἐνδείκνυται φάσις) our translations are substantially the same. Yet what Plato says here is fatal to Cherniss' thesis.

His first difficulty is the clause "the things which we point to

with the use of the words 'this' or 'that,' thinking that we are indicating something." A very special emphasis is given here (as it is in the next sentence) to the terms 'this' or 'that' (τόδε καὶ τοῦτο), and the seemingly obvious implication of the clause is that, since the use of the terms 'this' or 'that' carries with it the assumption that a definite "something" is thereby being indicated, it is wrong to apply these terms to what is *not* a definite "something." If this is Plato's point here, consistency seemingly demands that his point in the examples in the previous part of the sentence is that it is wrong to apply the terms 'this' or 'that' to what is not a definite "something," to fire or to water (D5, 6), which are continually changing their appearance (C7-D1, D4-5). These are "the things which we point to by the use of the words 'this' or 'that'." The antecedent to ὅσα in the clause ὅσα δεικνύντες . . . is ἄλλο μὴδὲν (τούτων), which means any other of the things such as fire or water—the examples already given—which are said (in C7-D1) never to present the same appearance. Thus the sentence D4-E2 is saying that the terms 'this' or 'that' should not be applied to γιγνόμενα. Before substantiating, however, the apparently obvious implications of the clause ὅσα . . . ἡγούμεθα τι, Cherniss' attempt to deny these implications must be considered. Having argued that in the previous part of the sentence τοῦτο is not being criticised as a term illegitimately applied to γιγνόμενα, it is essential for him to maintain this point for the τόδε καὶ τοῦτο at the end of the sentence. His first step is to argue that "the clause ὅσα . . . ἡγούμεθα τι does not itself mean 'phenomena'" (n. 5, p. 117). "It means simply," he says, "X, where X is what we mean to designate as something when by using the deictic pronoun we say 'this is X'." This, according to Cherniss, makes the reference of the clause the *predicates* 'fire,' 'water,' 'earth,' etc., which are applied to 'this'

* It is difficult to say whether or not Cherniss intends any shift in his position about the significance of 'this' when he talks about "using the deictic pronoun." His point about the contrast between τοῦτο and τοιοῦτον strictly depends on taking the τοῦτο in D5 simply as a *grammatical* pointer to its antecedent δ καθορώμεν . . . γιγνόμενον. Its function as a "deictic pronoun" in Cherniss' example here is an additional function. To ascribe this additional function to the τοῦτο in E1 goes a little way, perhaps, towards easing the transition to the significance of τοῦτο in the τόδε καὶ τοῦτο of 49 E2-3 and 50 A1-2. But this transition is, as we shall see, still fatal to Cherniss' thesis.

or 'that' "phase of phenomenal process," and makes the clause mean "not that you should not designate a phenomenon 'this' or 'that,' . . . but that you should not call the phenomenon anything (like 'fire' or 'water,' the examples already given) that is designated in such statements as 'this is X'" (p. 118). In other words, preserving the interpretation given to the previous part of the sentence, the meaning is that these predicates should not be applied to what "this" refers to ("a transient phenomenon") but to something else. This is an extremely ingenious attempt to avoid the apparently obvious implication of the clause—that 'this' or 'that' should not be applied to "phenomena." It is true of course, as we have seen, that the antecedent to *ὅσα* is *ἄλλο μὴδὲν (τούτων)*, and that this means "anything other" than 'fire' or 'water,' the previous examples. This makes it strictly true to say that the clause *ὅσα . . . ἡγούμεθά τι* does not itself mean "phenomena" (my italics). But this is not to say that Plato does not intend the clause to be a reference to "phenomena." In fact, as we have also seen, Plato has previously made it clear that the 'elements' fire, water, air, and earth *are* constantly changing phenomena, and this in itself makes it implausible to read into what follows an injunction not to apply these terms (fire, water, etc.) to constantly changing phenomena, quite apart from what I consider to be the implausibility of ascribing to Plato here the subtlety of the distinction between phenomena and "X, where X is what we mean to designate when by using the deictic pronoun we say 'this is X'." There is, however, further and more decisive evidence in the rest of the passage to show that Cherniss' interpretation of the clause *ὅσα . . . ἡγούμεθά τι* and of the sentence D4-E2 as a whole is incorrect. In the first place there is the fact that Plato repeats the phrase "by the use of the words 'this' or 'that'" (*τῶ ῥήματι τῷ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο προσχρώμενοι*) a little later on (50 A1-2)⁹ in a context which leaves no doubt of the significance which he is giving to the 'this' and 'that,' and it seems inconceivable to me that Plato should repeat the phrase so exactly within the space of a few lines, and yet give an entirely different significance in it to the "this" and "that." The phrase is repeated in the sentence immediately following the translated passage 49 D-E. Contrasting phenomena and the Receptacle itself, Plato says

* In 50 A1-2 there is *ὀνόματι* for the *ῥήματι* in 49 E1.

(49 E7-50 A2) that "that and that only in which all of them¹⁰ appear as they come to be in it and again vanish out of it should be designated by the use of the words 'this' or 'that'." Cherniss does not dispute that this means that we should "designate the receptacle alone when we employ the words 'this' or 'that'" (p. 124). And this certainly implies that we should not designate anything else by the words 'this' or 'that.' Cherniss, however, apparently considers that he has done enough to save his thesis here if he is able to show that what immediately follows (50 A2-4) is not an explicit statement of what has just been implied. Continuing his argument that the Receptacle alone should be designated by the use of the words 'this' or 'that,' Plato says: "but that which is of any quality—hot or cold or any of the opposites or anything composed of these—we should not call that any of these." This is ambiguous. It may mean that we should not apply to the Receptacle qualitative terms such as those here specified (so Cherniss, aptly comparing 51 A5-6). Alternatively it may mean that we should not apply to "what is of any quality" the terms just mentioned as applicable only to the the Receptacle—"this" and "that." Cherniss simply condemns this, unjustifiably, as "perverse" (p. 124). But to adopt the other interpretation does not save Cherniss' thesis, for it does not affect the implication of what immediately precedes. And once we compare the *τοῦτο καὶ τόδε* in 50 A1-2 with the *τόδε καὶ τοῦτο* within the same phrase in 49 E1, we have confirmation that in the sentence 49 D4-E2 it is the legitimacy of the application of these terms to *γινόμενα* which is in question, and this makes clear that the reference of the clause *ὅσα . . . ἡγούμεθά τι* is the same as the reference of the clause *ἀεὶ ὁ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ γινόμενον* at the beginning of the sentence. Thus Cherniss' argument that Plato's point in 49 D4-E2 "is not that you should not designate a phenomenon 'this' or 'that'" falls down. Moreover, the sentence which immediately follows (49 E2-4: *φεύγει . . . φάσις*) says explicitly that one cannot legitimately apply the

¹⁰ I. e. "transient phenomena." For similar language to describe the world of "becoming" (*ἐγγιγνόμενα* *δεῖ ἕκαστα αὐτῶν φαντάζεται καὶ πάλιν ἐκείθεν ἀπόλλυται*) cf. 28A, 49 C7-D1, and *Theaetetus* 157 B. Cherniss takes *ἕκαστα αὐτῶν* to indicate "the perpetually identical characteristics which are severally distinct," and not "phases of the flux" (he takes *ἕκαστα* in the same way in 49 D1 and 49 E4). But to do so will not save his thesis here.

terms 'this' or 'that' to transient phenomena, and thus, apparently, explicitly refutes Cherniss' interpretation of the previous sentence. There can be no question that 49 E2-4 means what it says. For a passage with which it immediately invites comparison, see *Theaetetus* 157 B (οὐτε τόδε οὐτ' ἐκείνο οὐτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα ὅτι ἂν ἴσῃ). Nor can there be any question that what it says is very closely linked with the point made by the previous sentence. It is, in the first place, intended to be an explanation of that point (φεύγει γὰρ . . .). Further, its phraseology matches that at the end of the previous sentence—the μόνιμα ὡς ὄντα in E3 balances the ὡς τινα ἔχον βεβαιότητα in D7, and the τόδε καὶ τοῦτο in E2-3 repeats the τόδε καὶ τοῦτο in the preceding line. It is, finally, a perfectly reasonable and consistent explanation of what precedes it, taking what precedes it as an injunction not to apply the terms "this" or "that" to "transient phenomena." To preserve his thesis, Cherniss must *either* (i) maintain that τόδε καὶ τοῦτο are used by Plato in the same way in E2-3 as they are, according to him, in E1—which the meaning of E2-4 makes impossible: *or* (ii) maintain that τόδε καὶ τοῦτο are not used in the same way in E2-3—which ascribes to Plato a quite incredible perversity. It is (ii) which he adopts. He does not consider, or even mention, the sudden switch in significance of τόδε καὶ τοῦτο which this entails. Indeed it seems that he does not consider that the fact that E2-4 is pointing out that it is wrong to apply "this" or "that" to "transient phenomena" raises any problems for his thesis, for the only indication of his acceptance of this fact is a remark in brackets in the course of note 5 and brief references to it at the end of note 6 (p. 118) and in note 8 (p. 119) when dealing with other parts of the passage. In note 5 (interpreting the clause ὅσα . . . ἡγούμεθά τι), after saying that "the point is not that you should not designate a phenomenon 'this' or 'that'," he adds, in brackets: "the fact that you cannot do so is in the next sentence given as the reason why you *should not* do what this sentence enjoins" (p. 118). Thus, accepting that E2-4 says that "this" and "that" are inapplicable to transient phenomena, he argues that it is thereby giving reasons for what he takes to be the injunction of the previous sentence—that terms such as "fire" and "water" should not be used to describe transient phenomena. In other words, if even "this" and "that" are inapplicable, then "fire" and "water" and so on

are inapplicable. Cherniss assumes, of course, that the subject of *φεύγει* in the sentence E2-4 is *τοῦτο* (the *τοῦτο* to be understood, together with *προσαγορεύειν*, in 49 D7) in the "innocent" sense he has given to it in his interpretation of the sentence D4-E2 (if D4-E2 is interpreted as an injunction not to apply "this" or "that" to *γινόμενα*, then *ἄλλο μηδέν* is to be taken as the subject of *φεύγει*). Thus the sentence E2-4 is now a statement that the "innocent" *τοῦτο* (the subject) cannot be called *τοῦτο* or *τόδε*. And the fact that you cannot apply *τόδε* or *τοῦτο* to *τοῦτο* explains, says Cherniss, why you should not predicate fire, water, and so on, of *τοῦτο*. This is awkward, and involves obvious difficulties—the difficulty of a remarkable juxtaposition of an "innocent" and a "guilty" *τοῦτο* in E2-3, and the difficulty of a sudden change in significance from the *τόδε καὶ τοῦτο* of E1 to the *τόδε καὶ τοῦτο* of E2-3. There are none of these difficulties once the sentence D4-E2 is interpreted as an injunction not to apply "this" or "that" to *γινόμενα* (which is, as we have seen, the seemingly obvious implication of the last part of the sentence); the sentence E2-4 is now a clear and straightforward explanation of what precedes it. Thus, having said that it is safest "not to call anything else 'this,' as though it had some permanence, among the things which we point to with the use of the words 'this' or 'that,' thinking we are indicating something" (D7-E2) Plato adds, as explanation, that "it (i.e. any other of the things, etc.) slips away, not waiting to be called 'this' or 'that' or any term which indicts them (*αὐτά*) of being stable." It is perhaps worth noting also that this allows a much more natural explanation of the transition from singular to plural in this sentence. There is no difficulty in assuming that, after beginning the sentence with the indefinite *ἄλλο μηδέν* as subject, Plato should refer to 'them' (*αὐτά*), where *αὐτά* refers back to (*τούτων*) *ὅσα . . .* in D7 of which *ἄλλο μηδέν* is the antecedent. Cherniss, however, cannot refer *αὐτά* back to *ὅσα . . .*, a clause which he assumes not to mean phenomena. He suggests therefore, unconvincingly in my opinion, that "apparently Plato, just because he has said that "it," the phenomenon, does not abide, immediately and without further explanation refers not to "it" as a single thing but to "them," the multiple and transient phases of the phenomenal flux that cannot be identified as distinct objects" (pp. 118-19).

My conclusion is that the sentence D4-E2 is contrasting τοῦτο and τὸ τοιοῦτον as terms, incorrect and correct respectively, to apply to γιγνόμενα, and is using them predicatively. The sentence E2-4 presents no difficulty once D4-E2 is interpreted in this way, and is itself strong confirmation that this interpretation of D4-E2 is correct. In the next sentence (E4-7) there are ambiguities and difficulties, all of which Cherniss clearly brings out,¹¹ but what precedes and what follows this sentence make clear that there is no warrant for trying to import into its meaning a distinction between "this" and "such" as references to different objects. It seems clear to me¹² that Plato is here reiterating what he said in the previous two sentences, before passing on to the point that to the Receptacle alone are the terms "this" or "that" applicable (49 E7 ff.). There is one final point to be made. If Plato was trying to make a distinction in 49 D-50 B, not only between the Receptacle and the sensible characteristics or qualities which "come to be and pass away" in it, but also between "distinct and self-identical (sensible) characteristics" and "phases of the flux," would not this additional distinction find some clear reflection in the *Timaeus* outside this one difficult passage? In both his discussions of the passage, Cherniss appeals to only one other passage to support this distinction. He says that "the distinct and self-identical characteristics," the "images" of the Forms, "are not the same as the transient phenomena, for the latter are the *apparent* alterations of the receptacle induced by their continual entrance into it and exit from it (50 C3-4)."¹³ But 50 C3-4 neither says nor implies that "transient phenomena" are apparent alterations of the Receptacle induced by the entrance and exit of copies of Forms. Plato has just stressed that the Receptacle is "always the same" and never itself possesses any of the characters which "come to be and pass away" within it; it is subsequently described as "a nature invisible and characterless" (51 A). And in 50 C3-4 he says that the diversities brought "by the things that enter into it," i. e. the sensible characteristics which are "images" of Forms, make the Receptacle itself *appear* to have different qualities at

¹¹ Pp. 119-24. See also Taylor, *Commentary*, pp. 318-19.

¹² See my translation.

¹³ A. J. P., LXXV, p. 129, and LXXVIII, p. 246. "Their" refers to the "images" of the Forms. The italics are Cherniss'.

different times (though *in fact*, as he has just said, it has not). In other words, if anyone ascribes to the Receptacle itself the diversity and change which belong to the sensible qualities continually "coming into it and going out of it," he is wrong. Thus the force of "appears" in saying that the Receptacle *appears* to be so-and-so is not in any way to imply a distinction between "phenomena" and "self-identical characteristics," but to imply the falsity of any inference from the diversity and change of sensible qualities to the diversity and change of the Receptacle itself. The only sensibles which figure in this passage, or in any other part of Plato's discussion, are, quite obviously, the "images" of the Forms. Indeed, Plato makes perfectly explicit, both at the beginning and at the end of his discussion of the Receptacle in 48 E-52 D, that throughout the discussion he is dealing with three factors, and three only—(i) the Forms, the eternally unchanging model; (ii) "that which becomes," a copy (*μίμημα*) of this model, sensible and perpetually in motion; (iii) space, the Receptacle of "all that becomes" (48 E-49 A, 50 C7-D2, 52 A-D1). The distinction within (ii) which Cherniss tries to find in 49 D-50 B is neither mentioned nor implied here; there is no room for it.

If my interpretation of 49 D-E is substantially correct, it follows, as Cherniss would agree (*A. J. P.*, LXXVIII, p. 245), that the *Timaeus* is here at variance with *Cratylus* 439 D8-9 and *Theaetetus* 182 C9-D7. And it is important that this discrepancy should be recognised, for it is, as I noted earlier, one of the important indications in the late dialogues of a development towards greater consistency in Plato's theory of knowledge. Cherniss, in his attempt to remove the discrepancy, shows himself once more as a vigorous and scholarly champion of the tradition in American Platonic scholarship of the unity of Plato's thought. It is a tradition which has contributed much to the understanding of Plato. But to push it to the point of assuming that no inconsistencies are to be found within Plato's work is, I think, to push it too far.

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EARLY ROMAN URBANITY.*

Many scholars, among them J. Marouzeau,¹ seem to be of the opinion that the Roman concept of *urbanitas* did not reveal itself until the time of Cicero, or about the middle of the first century B. C. It does not seem likely, however, that such a feeling would suddenly spring into being in the last century of the Republic.² Rather, we should expect it to manifest itself earlier.

Before searching for its earlier traces, we must have some idea of what we are seeking. Cicero, who gives us the clearest picture of the developed *urbanitas*, shows that it involves three basic interrelated ideas. In the first place, it is a general urban refinement. In a letter to Trebatius Cicero advises him to lay aside his *desideria urbis et urbanitatis*,³ and a few months later chides him for showing in his correspondence that he is *levis in urbis et urbanitatis desiderio*.⁴ In these two instances there is a contrast between the city in the physical sense (*urbis*) and the ways or, more specifically, the refinements (*urbanitatis*) of the city.⁵

Secondly, basic to this concept was a careful, refined wit. The *sal et urbanitas* of the *De Oratore* (II, 231) surely implies a contrast between humor in general (*sal*) and citified or cultured

* This paper was presented in a slightly different form at the University of Kentucky Foreign Language Conference in Lexington on April 24, 1959.

¹ "Notes sur la fixation du Latin classique," *Memoires de la Société Linguistique de Paris*, XVII (1911-12), p. 269. He states here that it is only in the first century B. C. that the opposition between country and city in ways and language seems to begin.

² F. Egermann, in his review of Karl Lammermann: *Von der attischen Urbanität und ihrer Auswirkung in der Sprache*, *Gnomon*, XIII (1937), p. 644, voices this objection also, although he does not attempt to remedy the situation.

³ *Ad Fam.*, VII, 6, 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 17, 1.

⁵ *Urbanitas* is used in other Ciceronian contexts to refer to politeness (*Ad Fam.*, III, 9, 1) and culture (*Brut.*, 177, *De Or.*, I, 17). In the *Pro Rosc. Amer.* (120 f.) first *litterae* and *urbanitas* and then *litterae* and *humanitas* appear together. It would seem that here Cicero considers *urbanitas* and *humanitas* as almost synonymous.

wit (*urbanitas*). From the *De Officiis* (I, 29, 104) we learn that in Cicero's eyes there are two kinds of humor, a low type which he describes as *inliberale*, *petulans*, *flagitiosum*, *obscenum* and its antithesis which is *elegans*, *urbanum*, *ingeniosum*, and *facetum*. There can be little doubt that Cicero's second type is the refined wit of the urbanite.

Finally, *urbanitas* is a certain quality found only in the city people's way of speaking. Although this speech characteristic even for Cicero is all but impossible to define, it would seem to involve a certain tone of voice and a careful urban pronunciation.⁶

Along with this developed concept, involving manners, wit, and language, we should expect to find a certain contempt on the part of those who have it for those who lack it. Cicero does not disappoint us. For in the *De Oratore* Crassus mentions Antonius' contemptuous allegation that an orator, like a rower or a day laborer, is *inopem . . . humanitatis et inurbanum*.⁷ Elsewhere he laments that a certain *peregrinitas* is making itself felt in the city.⁸ In a letter to Atticus (II, 15, 3), when he asserts that he would rather talk with rustics than with the overly sophisticated (*perurbani*) Arrius and Sebosus, he is in essence saying of the rustic that, while he is superior to the city dweller who has carried sophistication to extremes, he nevertheless is inferior to the true gentleman.

This city-country contrast was felt long before Cicero's time. Plautus from time to time in his plays depicts the opposition between urban and rustic ways. In the *Trinummus* (199-202) we find a criticism on the part of the country dweller Megaronides of the *urbani assidui cives, quos scurras vocant*. Again in the *Mostellaria* (15 f.) Grumio accosts Tranio with the words:

Tu urbanus vero scurra, deliciae popli,
rus mihi tu obiectas?

In both of these instances, of course, we have a Greek context. But, inasmuch as *urbs* and *urbanus* at an early date came to be

⁶ Cicero himself admits (*Brut.*, 170 ff.) that he is unable to define this quality with any precision. For a full discussion of this and related passages see my unpublished dissertation "Urbanitas, Rusticitas, Peregrinitas: The Roman View of Proper Latin" (University of Cincinnati, 1957), pp. 44-51.

⁷ *De Or.*, II, 40.

⁸ *Ad Fam.*, IX, 15, 2.

synonymous with *Roma*, and *scurra* had a peculiarly Roman connotation,⁹ these words in the minds of the audience and, I am sure, in the mind of Plautus as well, would be applied, if not consciously, then unconsciously to Rome as well as to Athens. Again, in the *Persa* (169), *rustica* seems to have the same connotations as *barda*: dullness and stupidity. Thus here it is implied that *rusticus* is to dullness and stupidity what *urbanus* would be to cleverness and learning.

In other words, the city-country contrast with Rome as the city is in evidence in these early plays. And this is not surprising. For by Plautus' time the city, whether it be Athens or Rome, was the cultural center distinguished from the country with its simple way of life.

This opposition is discussed at greater length by the old man Dinia and the youth Nicodemus in the *Vidularia* (31-5). Here we have the softness and leisure of the city (*mollitia et umbra*) opposed to the toilsome life of the rustics.

Again, in Terence's *Adelphoe* (42-6), this antithetical relationship is brought out. City life is described here as peaceful and easy-going (*clemens*), while the man in the country has to live a life of thrift (*parce*) and toil (*duriter*). Later in the play (860 f.), Demea, after deciding in a soliloquy to give up his country life, says:

...re ipsa repperi
facilitate nihil esse homini melius neque clementia.

That is, the life of the city is characterized by affability (*facilitate*) and ease (*clementia*),¹⁰ and the urbanite lives his life (863 f.)

...in otio, in conviviis
clemens, placidus, nulli laedere os, adridere omnibus: . . .

Demea describes himself, on the other hand, as *agrestis saevos*

⁹ *Scurra* is found a number of times elsewhere in Plautus' plays and is used also by Cicero and Horace. Phaedrus' fable on the *scurra* and rustic (V, 5) is well known.

¹⁰ S. G. Ashmore, *The Adelphoe of Terence* (London, 1896), n. ad loc., translates *clementia* as "moderation." In his later *P. Terenti Afri Comoediae: The Comedies of Terence* (New York, 1910), n. ad loc., he translates it "forbearance." The Thesaurus equates it with *lenitas* and *temperantia*.

tristis parcus truculentus tenax (866).¹¹ There is a certain irony in each of these statements of Demea, but the importance of the city-country opposition cannot be denied. Once again, as was the case with Plautus' views, all of this is in a Greek setting. But I think it is safe to say here, as before, that the playwright was thinking as much of contemporary conditions in and around Rome as he was of Athens, and that it would be a Roman picture as much as a Greek one that the audience would get from these lines.

Do the attitudes, then, that go along with such an opposition reveal themselves in the early Latin literature? The answer to this question, as I hope to show, must be in the affirmative.

We may see from the passages of the *Trinummus* and *Mostellaria* cited above that the rustic resented the city-dweller. But this dislike does not appear often in extant Latin literature because there is no writer who looks at life from the point of view of the country man, except to describe procedure in a technical treatise or to idealize country life in poetry.

It is, however, the counterpart of this rustic attitude for which we are searching, the urban feeling of superiority and exclusiveness which later went under the name of *urbanitas* and which would logically arise from such a contrast as that outlined above.

We may infer, I believe, from a fragment of Naevius' *Ariolus* that this feeling of urbanity had taken hold at Rome as early as the middle of the third century B. C. Here two characters are discussing the eating habits of the Praenestines and Lanuvians:¹²

(A) Quis heri
apud te? (B) Praenestini et Lanuvini hospites.
(A) Suopte utrosque decuit acceptos cibo,
alteris inanem volvulam madidam dari,
alteris nuces in proclivi profundier.

These habits under criticism are no doubt rustic, for sow's belly and nuts sound like simple country fare. The critic is saying that it is a pity to waste good urban cooking on these unfortunate rustics who are accustomed to simple, rather uncouth food.

¹¹ This line is an almost literal translation of a line of Menander's 'Ἀδελφοί (fr. 11, ed. Koerte [II, p. 19]).

¹² O. Ribbeck, *C. R. F.*, II, pp. 9 f.

This attitude towards what is non-urban appears also a number of times in Plautus' plays. In the *Trinummus* (608 f.) Callicles, in a heated discussion with the slave Stasimus, asks him when a certain betrothal took place. Stasimus replies: "Right here in front of the house; *tammodo*, as the man from Praeneste puts it" (*tammodo inquit Praenestinus*). There can be little doubt that the dramatist is pointing to *tammodo* as peculiar to the Praenestine dialect. C. E. Freeman and E. Sloman in their edition of the *Trinummus* call it a provincialism.¹³ Festus says (p. 543, ed. Lindsay) that the ancients (*antiqui*) used *tammodo* for *modo*. I take this statement to mean that *tammodo* was an early combination that gradually disappeared and was replaced by *modo*. If this is the case, then Plautus in the line under discussion must be criticizing the Praenestines for continuing to use the archaic form which had been superseded by *modo* in Roman Latin. We have here an indication, I believe, that the Roman thought his dialect superior to that of at least one neighboring town in this early period.

The Praenestine dialect is the butt of Plautus' criticism once again, this time in the *Truculentus* (687-91). Here Truculentus, defending his use of *rabo* for *arrabo*, compares it with the Praenestine use of *conia* for *ciconia*.¹⁴ Plautus appears to be poking fun at the Praenestines for using a variant of the word *ciconia*. Theodor Bergk believes that these people were prone to leaving out vowels when speaking.¹⁵ He suggests that the word *ciconia* was pronounced *c'conia* by them, being written *conia* since it was virtually impossible to hear the double consonant at the beginning of the word. He goes on to call this shortened pronunciation rustic. If he is right, then I suggest that once again

¹³ T. Macci Plauti *Trinummus* (Oxford, 1885), n. ad loc.

¹⁴ Leo's text. Probus (*G. L. K.*, IV, p. 263) reads *conea* and *ciconea*, while the MSS read *conea* and *ciconia*.

¹⁵ Th. Bergk, *Kleine philologische Schriften*, ed. R. Peppmüller (Halle, 1884), I, pp. 187 f. Cf. F. Ritschl, "Vokalunterdrückung in der Schrift: Pränestinisches Latein," *Rh. Mus.*, XVI (1861), pp. 601-14. Ritschl points to numerous Praenestine inscriptions in which vowels are omitted, but does not attempt to relate the shortened forms like *conia* or *rabo* to the omission of vowels in the inscriptions. Possibly these two phenomena, the one from Praenestine speech, the other from Praenestine writing, together indicate considerable vowel syncope in Praenestine Latin.

in the *Truculentus* we have evidence for an early *urbanitas*. For in this case Plautus is criticizing a pronunciation which appeared rustic and incorrect to a Roman.

Another strong indication of an early *urbanitas* is to be found in the elder Cato's definition of an *urbanus homo*. This has been preserved by Quintilian who quotes it from a work of Domitius Marsus:¹⁶ *Urbanus homo erit, cuius multa bene dicta responsaque erunt, et qui in sermonibus, circulis, conviviiis, item in contionibus, omni denique loco ridicule commodeque dicet. Risus erunt, quicunque haec faciet orator.*

In discussing the wit of the city gentleman, Cato emphasizes good expression and clever reply (*bene dicta responsaque*), and insists that humor be suited to the occasion which it is to serve. Here it would seem that we have the first hint of an extension in the meaning of *urbanus*. Before this time it had been used with topographical connotations only, but here the word seems to be working towards one of its Ciceronian meanings, "refinedly humorous."

It may be seen at a glance how important this definition is in the development of the Roman *urbanitas*, for it shows that by the middle of the second century B. C. the Roman consciousness of this phenomenon had reached the point where some attempt was being made to define it in at least one of its various aspects.

Lucilius, too, in his *Satires* at times reveals a certain contempt for what is not of the city. Whether his jab at the Lydians and their dress¹⁷ or his heavy criticism of the Samnite gladiator Aeserninus¹⁸ derives from this, it is hard to say. However, there is one fragment in which this feeling is clearly present. Varro in his *De Lingua Latina* (VII, 96) quotes part of a line of

¹⁶ *Inst. Or.*, VI, 3, 105. G. L. Hendrickson, "Horace and Valerius Cato," *C. P.*, XII (1917), pp. 90 ff., asserts that this is Valerius Cato, although he admits that even Quintilian thought it to be Cato the Censor. Until a more cogent argument is put forward for identifying him with the later Cato, I think we are on safer ground in assuming this Cato to be the Censor. Such a statement as this could easily find a place in his *Carmen de Moribus* mentioned by Aulus Gellius (*N. A.*, XI, 2, 2) or in his *Ἀποθέγματα* in which, says Cicero (*De Of.*, I, 29, 104), are collected *multa multorum facete dicta*.

¹⁷ F. Marx, *C. Lucilii Carminum Reliquiae* (Leipzig, 1904), I, p. 4, line 12.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, I, p. 12, lines 149-52.

Lucilius: *Cecilius ne rusticus fiat*. In Diomedes' fourth century work on Latin grammar there appears a line from Lucilius closely resembling the one above: *pretor ne rusticus fiat*.¹⁹ There can be little doubt that Marx is correct in assuming that the same line is referred to in both cases and that it should read *Cecilius pretor ne rusticus fiat*.²⁰ As Marx says in a note on this line,²¹ Lucilius is criticizing pronunciation. He is pointing to the fact that he regarded the flat pronunciation of *ae*, that is, long *e* as rustic. It is perhaps significant in this connection that the Caecilii were linked with Praeneste by at least one tradition,²² and that a certain Vettius was criticized elsewhere by Lucilius for using the dialects of the Praenestines, Etruscans, and Sabines.²³ Therefore, I think we may say that at least until Lucilius' time the Praenestines and possibly the other people nearby were speaking a Latin that was already considered by the urbanites to be rustic and so worthy of criticism.²⁴

From the foregoing I think we must conclude that there was early in Rome a certain feeling of exclusiveness. That this was essentially the same as the phenomenon to which Cicero gives the name *urbanitas* is, I believe, clear from the fact that it appears in the same three areas: language, humor, and general deportment.

Perhaps the instances above are not numerous enough to reveal

¹⁹ *G. L. K.*, I, p. 452.

²⁰ Marx, *op. cit.*, I, p. 76, line 1130.

²¹ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 358 f.

²² Festus, p. 31, ed. Lindsay.

²³ Quint., *op. cit.*, I, 5, 56; Marx, *op. cit.*, I, p. 91, lines 1322 ff.

²⁴ From Book XXII is preserved a fragment which may or may not constitute a show of *urbanitas*. The line in question reads: *primum Pacilius tesorophylax pater abzet* (Marx, *op. cit.*, I, p. 40, line 581). The last word, according to E. H. Warmington, *Remains of Old Latin* (Cambridge, 1938), III, p. 197, note *a*, and Marx (see above, n. 17), II, pp. 216 f., is either Oscan or Paelignian. Why was it brought in by Lucilius? If Pacilius was Oscan for Paakul (Warmington, Marx, *loc. cit.*), then we may have here a subtle attempt by Lucilius to point to a peculiarity of his speech; that is, a propensity to mix native words into the Latin he speaks. However, the whole tone of this line, as Marx points out, is one of respect. Therefore, although the use of the word may indicate a consciousness on the part of Lucilius that Pacilius' speech was not good Roman speech, there probably is no heavy criticism implied.

any development in this concept in the early period. But, as I have already suggested, Cato's attempt at a definition of the *urbanus homo* may be an indication that Roman consciousness of this *urbanitas* had progressed to where definition was necessary. A broader view, however, is probably required as far as its early development is concerned. For I believe that this urbanity had its origins at a time much earlier than the beginnings of literary endeavor at Rome, and that it rose gradually as Rome became more and more the center of the Mediterranean world. Such a process would account for the positive tone of the earliest literary manifestation of this feeling in the *Ariolus*.

If this hypothesis is correct, we need not look to any foreign influence for the origin of this *urbanitas*. It is true that there was a parallel feeling at Athens, as perhaps the funeral speech of Pericles best shows.²⁵ It is also true that *urbanus* for the most part parallels *ἀστέιος* in its various meanings. Once again, however, I think it enough to say that the feeling is a natural one and would logically have grown from early times as Rome gradually rose above her neighbors. The examples above all have a peculiarly Roman flavor, and in no case do they appear to be mere reflections of a Greek feeling.

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²⁵ Thuc., *Hist.*, II, 35-46.

NEC MORTI ESSE LOCUM.

I was much interested in Professor George E. Duckworth's article on "Vergil's *Georgics* and the *Laudes Galli*" (*A. J. P.*, LXXX [1959], pp. 225-37), and was especially impressed by his fresh, and to my mind cogent, arguments (pp. 235-6) in support of the view, reached independently and almost simultaneously by Anderson¹ and Norden,² that the Aristaeus episode is the original conclusion of *Georgics* IV—a view that I have long shared.³ But I should like to raise a question about one minor point in the article, the comment (p. 228) that Vergil stated "that *even for bees* [*italics mine*] 'there is no place for death' (IV, 226: *nec morti esse locum*)."

I think that *nec morti esse locum* has much wider application than just to the bees. It is true that the whole passage (219-27) might be paraphrased or summarized as follows: "Because of this behavior (their self-sacrificing loyalty to their monarch) the bees have been thought to share in the divine spirit that permeates the universe, from which men and beasts (223: *hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum*) have their being; hence we may conclude (225: *scilicet*) that they (the bees as well as men and beasts) return ultimately to this realm of spirit, and do not die." However, I do not think this is truly the march of the thought. I believe that after *dixere* in 221 Vergil has ceased momentarily to stress what happens specifically to the bees; his thought runs rather as follows: "Because of this behavior bees have been thought to share in the divine spirit that permeates the universe; from this all living creatures have their being, and it is evident (*scilicet*) that they (all living creatures⁴) all ultimately return to it, and do not die." Indeed, that immortality is being posited not specifically for the bees but generically for all living creatures seems to be indicated by the use of the neuter plurals in 225-7:

¹ W. B. Anderson, "Gallus and the Fourth *Georgic*," *C. Q.*, XXVII (1933), pp. 36-45 and 73.

² E. Norden, "Orpheus und Eurydice. Ein nachträgliches Gedenkblatt für Vergil," *Berl. Sitzb.*, phil.-hist. Kl., XXII (1934), pp. 627-31.

³ Cf. *C. W.*, XXX (1937), p. 258.

⁴ Of course these creatures include bees; but that in my opinion is not significant or even relevant.

scilicet huc reddi deinde ac *resoluta* referri
omnia, nec morti esse locum, sed *viva* volare
 sideris in numerum atque alto succedere caelo.

I cannot believe that line 223 is meant to specify various types of life excluding, and contrasting with, the bees; it rather stands, I think, for all life, just as does the more detailed list in the parallel passage *Aen.*, VI, 728-9:

inde hominum pecudumque genus vitaeque volantum
 et quae marmoreo fert monstra sub aequore pontus.

Poetry not being science, both lists are suggestive rather than exhaustive; the fact that in *Aen.* VI birds⁵ and fishes are *included* as well as men and beasts does not mean that bees are *excluded* in either case. Both passages are simply expansions of Lucretius' *genus omne animantium* (I, 4).⁶

⁵ The reader naturally takes *volantum* of birds; I think no one would suggest that it includes insects as well.

⁶ Lucretius then proceeds under this general head to enumerate different classes: *aeriae primum volucres* (12), *inde ferae pecudes* (14), finally as a general summary *denique . . . omnibus* (17, 19). Vergil's *pecudes* and *genus omne ferarum* seem to echo Lucretius' *ferae pecudes* (and, incidentally, to indicate that to Vergil *ferae* is a noun coordinated asyndetically with *pecudes* and not an adjective modifying it); but Lucretius' mention of birds (12 *volucres*, 18 *avium*) does not find a parallel in Vergil until VI, 728 (cf. note 5). Lucretius too has longer lists elsewhere; cf. e.g. two passages where, as in *Aen.*, VI, 729, fish are included: II, 343-5:

praeterea genus humanum mutaeque natantes
 squamigerum pecudes et laeta armenta feraeque
 et variae volucres,

and 1081-3:

invenies sic montivagum genus esse ferarum,
 sic hominum genitam prolem, sic denique mutas
 squamigerum pecudes et corpora cuncta volantum.

In these passages also, the listing of a few individual species as examples doubtless represents the entire sum of living creatures, though Lucretius does not here summarize the latter as he does in his more elaborately constructed prooemion by the all-inclusive *genus omne* (I, 4) at the beginning and *omnibus* (19) at the end. (It may be worth while to note in passing that this presentation of a generalization, followed by specific instances, and finally by a return to the generalization, is a device of particular frequency in Horace. As examples we may cite *Carm.*, I, 3, 25-37; 28, 15-20; II, 13, 13-20; *Serm.*, I, 1, 1-119; 3, 41-54 and 55-67;

Professor Duckworth reverts to his idea about *nec morti esse locum* a little later (p. 232): "IV has two conclusions: immortality for the bees (219-27) and the happy ending for Aristaeus of the regeneration of the bees (548-58)." I question whether 219-27 can really be thought of as a "conclusion"; further details, and fairly trivial ones, about bee-keeping follow it (228-50, the method of removing honey from the hive, and 251-80, symptoms and treatment of disease among the bees, which of course leads up excellently to the Aristaeus narrative). But if the earlier passage is to be viewed as a "conclusion," my interpretation of it as referring primarily to immortality not just for bees but for all living creatures cannot weaken in any way the general theses that Professor Duckworth maintains so admirably.

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SAPPHO, 98 a 7.

Professor George Melville Bolling, in his "Restoration of Sappho, 98 a 1-7," *A. J. P.*, LXXX (1959), pp. 276-87, takes τὰς κόμας δάιδος (line 7) as a genitive of comparison with ξανθοτέρας 'more yellow than the κόμα of a torch' (p. 284). He quite rightly refuses to be discouraged by the fact that "*hair of a torch* is nonsense in English" (*ibid.*). But he might well be encouraged by the fact that it is by no means "nonsense" in Latin, as we have testimony from the Roman poet who furnishes us the best evidence to be had in Latin as to Sappho's Greek, namely, Catullus. He speaks of the *hair of a torch* in 61, the first of his two wedding-hymns, poems in which we may expect Sappho's influence to be particularly strong.¹ The phrase occurs

4, 22-33 and 105-21. I discussed this in some detail in *C. W.*, XXXIX [1946], pp. 92-3.)

¹ It is true that 61, unlike 62, is distinctly Roman in its setting and atmosphere; but none the less it has Greek features. Cf. Robinson Ellis, *A Commentary on Catullus* (Oxford, 1889), p. 209: "The refrain *O Hymen Hymenaeae* and the exordium (1-30) are . . . Greek, and if we had Sappho's Epithalamia entire we should probably find that Catullus drew from these man, of the ideas which give such a charm to his work; the metre too is Greek." Of course I am not suggesting that 98 is an

twice: *viden ut faces/ splendoras quatiunt comas?* (78-9)² and *vide ut faces/ aureas quatiunt comas* (98-9).

It is true that Catullus uses the plural *comas*. For the singular, we have to wait till Seneca, *Oed.*, 309-11: *utrumne clarus ignis et nitidus stetit/ rectusque purum verticem caelo tulit/ et summam in auras fusus explicuit comam?*—a reasonably close parallel, referring not to a torch but to the flame on the altar.³ However, the Roman poets in talking about hair do not distinguish precisely between the singular and plural. Strictly speaking, of course, *coma* (like Greek *πλόκαμος* and French *cheveu*) is a single hair, as in Catullus' poem (66) known as the *Coma Berenices*, in imitation of Callimachus' *Βερενίκης Πλόκαμος*; note 93: *utinam coma regia fiam*,⁴ and, of the bereft sister-locks, 51: *abiunctae paulo ante comae . . . sorores*. But elsewhere the singular *coma* (like English *hair*) is used as a collective,⁵ and in sense, as I have said, seems synonymous with the plural *comae*. Thus Vergil in speaking of Venus' hair in two contiguous passages uses first the singular, *Aen.*, I, 319: *dederatque comam diffundere ventis*, and then the plural, 403-4: *comae divinum vertice odorem/ spiravere*. Cf. too Horace, *Carm.*, I, 5, 4: *religas comam* with II, 11, 24: *comas religata*; and *Carm.*, III, 30, 16: *lauro cinge . . . comam* with *Epist.*, II, 1, 110: *fronde comas vincti*.

If it was not unnatural for the Greek (and Roman) poets to speak of 'the hair of a torch,'⁶ Sappho's comparison of a

Epithalamion; Catullus in his Epithalamia need not have confined his borrowings from Sappho to poems of this special *genre*.

² Ellis, *ad loc.* (p. 222), offers several Greek parallels: Aeschylus, *Ag.*, 306: *φλογὸς μέγαν πύργονα*, and *Prom.*, 1044: *πυρὸς ἀμφήκης βόστρυχος*; Euripides, fr. 833 (Nauck): *πύργονα πυρὸς*.

³ We seem to find a fairly similar use of *comam* in regard to the blazing garment of Nessus, *Herc. Oet.*, 727: *abiectus horret villus et perdit comam*. But here the difficulty of the reading of adjacent lines renders the sense not quite certain.

⁴ Cf. 8, *e Bereniceo vertice caesariem*. But see also note 5.

⁵ So, too, *caesaries*, which, indeed, lacks a plural. Note e.g. Vergil, *Georg.*, IV, 337: *caesariem effusae nitidam per candida colla*; Horace, *Carm.*, I, 15, 14: *pectes caesariem*.

⁶ Or at least of fire or lightning, as in the passages from the Greek tragic poets quoted in note 2, and in the one from Seneca quoted in the second paragraph.

maiden's *τρίχες* with the *κόμα δάιδος* becomes all the lovelier. In order to satisfy our sense of English idiom, we may feel we have to translate, as Professor Bolling does (p. 286), 'the top of a torch'; yet I think in Sappho and in Catullus 61 I should rather talk about 'the tresses of a torch.'

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF *ἀμφιμάχεσθαι*.

Manu Leumann has in his *Homerische Wörter*, pp. 92-5, a most interesting section headed: *Postposition wird Praeverb*. I am suggesting the addition of another example.

Hector's slaying of Patroclus—the fateful climax of his life—is told with a simile, II 822-8, that tells of a lion slaying a boar when *μάχεσθον/ πίδακος ἀμφ' ὀλίγης· ἐθέλουσι δὲ πύμεν ἄμφω*. In addition to the postposition of *ἀμφί*, I would note that the axis, *πίδακος*, of the prepositional phrase names the bone of contention, the prize that goes to the winner of the fight.

Next to this I would place: 'as long as the Achaeans and the Trojans' *τείχεος ἀμφ' ἐμάχοντο* O 391; the dying Sarpedon's call to Glaucus to rouse the Lycian leaders to fight for his corpse *Σαρπηδόνης ἀμφὶ μάχεσθαι* II 496; Glaucus' compliance with this wish (same phrase is used) II 533; Antilochus' report to Achilles of the disaster *κείται Πάτροκλος, νέκνος δὲ δὴ ἀμφὶ μάχονται* Σ 20.

When *μάχεσθαι* stands in an environment in which *ἀμφί* with an accusative is used, the meaning is of course different. The axis then, if there is talk about topography, names a city (chiefly) near which fighting was going on. This prepositional phrase is also used when the talk is of some activity other than fighting. In all these situations *ἀμφί* may precede or follow the noun it governs.

Examples with verbs other than *μάχεσθαι* are: *ἀμφί τε ἄστυ/ ἔρδομεν ἱρὰ θεοῖσι* Λ 706, *ὅσα δὴ πάθομεν κακὰ Ἴλιον ἀμφί* Φ 442, *τὴν δ' ἐτέρην πόλιν ἀμφὶ δῶν στρατοὶ ἦατο* Σ [509]. I could have quoted also I 573, X 381.

The examples with *μάχεσθαι* in the environment are: *μάχοντο . . ./ ἀμφὶ πόλιν Καλυδῶνα* I 530, *ὅτε Ἴλιον ἀμφὶ μάχοντο* Z 461, *Τρώων πόλιν ἀμφὶ μάχωμαι* I 412, *στρατὸν ἀμφὶ μάχονται* II 73, *τὴν*

δῆλοι ἀμφὶ μάχωνται Σ 208. In all except the first ἀμφὶ stands before a form of μάχεσθαι and in postpositive position.

With a dative ἀμφὶ is used more than 70 times, and in not one of these examples is it a postposition. That must seem odd when compared with the far fewer examples of the other cases cited above. Unexpected things do occur, and for another I may refer to Wackernagel's discussion (*Syntax*, II, pp. 163 f.) of Latin *tenus*. This preposition is construed with either the genitive or the ablative. But, until we get to Ovid and Livy, the genitives are always plural, the ablatives always singular.

Among the uses of ἀμφὶ with the dative I shall mention only that in which its axis names the bone of contention. With μάχομαι as the verb of the environment: ἀμφ' Ἑλένη καὶ κτήμασι πᾶσι μάχεσθαι Γ 70, 91, μαχήσονται ἀμφὶ γυναικί Γ 254, ἀμφὶ νέκνυ κατατεθνηῶτι μάχομαι Π 526, cf. Π 565, εἰς ὃ κεν ἀμφὶ πύλῃσ' εὖ ποιητῆσι μάχωνται Ε 466, ἀμφ' ἄλλῃσι μάχην ἐμάχοντο νέεσσιν Ο 414, cf. Μ [175], θηρὶ μαχήσασθαι ἔλικος βοὸς ἀμφὶ φονῆσιν Ο 633. None of these could, of course, lead on to ἀμφιμάχεσθαι.

Here we are shown ἀμφὶ with dative and ἀμφὶ with genitive in competition. The dative prevailed. We must so judge not merely from the number of passages involved, but from the fact that ἀμφὶ + dative spreads to passages that contained not μάχομαι but some other expression suggestive of contention. Over a score of examples—some more or less debatable—could be adduced; but quotation of two seems sufficient. 'Αμφ' οὐροισι δὺ' ἄνερε δηριάσθων Μ 421; the Trojan elders say οὐ νέμεσις that Trojans and Achaeans τοιῷδ' ἀμφὶ γυναικὶ πολλὸν χρόνον ἄλγεα πάσχειν Γ 157.

The mere juxtaposition of these passages suffices, in my opinion, to show the development of ἀμφιμάχεσθαι provided that the correctness of my analysis—indicated by word-division—be granted for the earliest period, *ca.* 550 B.C., of our written tradition. Our texts divide (and hence analyze) differently, treating ἀμφιμάχεσθαι as one word. This is based on the practice of the minuscule manuscripts. Granting that they are reflecting Alexandrian views, we are taken back to the 2d century B.C. Our texts are content to show the Homeric poems in the form they had reached by that time. In the earlier period there could be nothing but a *scriptio continua*, one that tells nothing about word-division (except at the verse end), nor about stress, nor about pitch. This imposes upon us the duty to try to determine,

in spite of this handicap, the form reached by the poems when our written tradition began. My analysis is an attempt to fulfill that duty.

I must add that one of the passages τὴν δῆλοι ἀμφὶ μάχωνται Σ 208 is on the borderline because of the interruption of the phrase τὴν ἀμφί by a 'heavy' word, not by particles as in νέκυος δὲ δὴ ἀμφί Σ 20.

Ἀμφιμάχεσθαι is not found in the *Odyssey*; and from later times *LSJ* cites only one inscription of the 3d century B. C.

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NOTE ON THE TEXT OF THUCYDIDES.

Thuc., IV, 9, 2: "... ἐχώρει ἔξω τοῦ τείχους ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, ἣ μάλιστα ἐκείνους προσεδέχετο πειράσειν ἀποβαίνειν, ἐς χωρία μὲν χαλεπὰ καὶ πετρώδη πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος τετραμμένα, σφίσι δὲ τοῦ τείχους ταύτῃ ἀσθενεστάτου ὄντος ἐπισπάσασθαι αὐτοὺς ἡγείτο προθυμήσεσθαι . . ."

The Oxford text notes that in the manuscript tradition προθυμήσεσθαι is read as κρατηθήσεσθαι in ABEFM, and it prints Van Leeuwen's conjecture ἐσβιάσασθαι in place of the universal manuscript reading ἐπισπάσασθαι. There is general agreement that the reading προθυμήσεσθαι is correct, although the scholiast describes it as superfluous: περιττὸν δὲ τὸ προθυμήσεσθαι. Arnold Gomme inclined toward this view of the scholiast,¹ when he questioned the Oxford text and suggested: "Perhaps the older suggestion to read ἐπισπάσασθαι, with passive meaning, and to bracket προθυμήσεσθαι, is preferable." Reiske and Poppo had favored the future, to be taken as passive in meaning, but had hesitated to bracket προθυμήσεσθαι.²

It is not my purpose to follow through successive editions the varying comments on and interpretations of this passage. My suggestion is that the manuscript reading ἐπισπάσασθαι (aorist middle) is correct, and that it must be understood in the light

¹ A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, III, p. 445.

² Ernst F. Poppo, *Thucydidis de bello Peloponnesiaco libri octo* (Leipzig, 1827), Part III, Vol. III, p. 34.

of another passage, where the same verb is used, in Thuc., III, 89, 5:

αἴτιον δ' ἔγωγε νομίζω τοῦ τοιούτου, ἧ ἰσχυρότατος ὁ σεισμὸς ἐγένετο, κατὰ τοῦτο ἀποστέλλειν τε τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐξαπίνης πάλιν ἐπισπωμένην βιαίωτερον τὴν ἐπὶ κλυσιν ποιεῖν· ἄνευ δὲ σεισμοῦ οὐκ ἂν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτο ξυμβῆναι γενέσθαι.

This passage too has suffered at the hands of editors. Meineke wished to emend ἐπισπωμένην to read ἐπισπωμένης.³ The Oxford text keeps the manuscript reading. But opinions have differed about the subject of the infinitives ἀποστέλλειν and ποιεῖν. Classen thought τὸν σεισμόν to have been the subject of both verbs;⁴ Gomme took τὴν θάλασσαν as subject of both.⁵ I prefer to quote (with complete approval) the sensible judgment of Herbert Fox, in his school edition of 1901: "The subject of ἀποστέλλειν is τὸν σεισμόν which has been drawn into the relative clause. With ποιεῖν the subject changes to θάλασσαν. There is no reason to conjecture ἐπισπωμένης, or to adopt ἐπισπώμενον from the scholiast."

Thucydides has been reporting the earthquake and tidal wave at Orobiai in Euboea, the similar phenomenon at Atalante, and the earthquake (without inundating tidal wave) at Peparethos. His geophysical commentary on these incidents may be translated as follows:

"I think the cause of such a phenomenon to be that where the earthquake is most severe there it pushes back the sea, and then suddenly surging back it (i. e., the sea) makes its inundation with greater violence; and without an earthquake it does not seem to me that such a phenomenon could possibly take place."

Here the participle ἐπισπωμένην has its fundamental meaning of "drawing itself toward." The Liddell and Scott *Lexicon* treats the participle as passive. I believe rather that it is middle, and intransitive, in so far as a true middle may be called intransitive. The sea was "drawing itself back (πάλιν) toward" the original shore-line, and, as appropriate to water, one may translate πάλιν ἐπισπωμένην as "surging back." The ἐπί in composition does not mean, as it would in a transitive usage, "toward it-

³ Classen, in his edition of 1875, attributed the emendation to Van Herwerden.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, note on III, 89.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, II, p. 392.

self,"⁶ but rather "toward some outside object." In the middle infinitive, ἐπισπάσασθαι means "to surge toward shore," just as ἐπιθέσθαι, as a *comparandum*, means "to attack."

The figure and the translation of ἐπισπάσασθαι in Thuc., IV, 9, 2, thus become clear. The Spartan troops were to come ashore like a tidal wave. At least, one may conceive that this is the image which Thucydides had in mind: an image even today natural to the idiom of amphibious warfare.

"... He went outside the wall to the sea, where he expected especially that they would try to land, into terrain which was rough and rocky facing the open sea, and where, since their own wall was weakest there, he thought they would try to surge ashore."

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⁶ Examples of transitive usage are numerous in the philosophers, including Plutarch, and in other historians than Thucydides (e.g., Herodotus, Xenophon, Polybius, Appian).

REVIEWS.

N. I. HERESCU, ed. *Ovidiana, Recherches sur Ovide, publiées à l'occasion du bimillénaire de la naissance du poète.* (Études, mémoires et notes inédits dus à MM. Adamesteanu, Alfonsi, Arnaldi, Axelson, Bardon, Bruère, Crahay, D'Elia, Della Corte, Enk, Farrarino, Grimal, Mlle. Guillemin, Herescu, Herrmann, Herter, Higham, Hubaux, Knight, Kenney, Ker, Lambrino, Lee, Lenz, Lozovan, Marache, Marin, Marouzeau, Munari, Paratore, Peeters, Richmond, Saint-Denis, Salmon, Seel, Skutsch, Stephens, Mlle. Thomas, Wilkinson.) Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1958. Pp. xv + 567 + indices.

This book is a very special kind of *Festschrift*, the tribute of classical scholars to Ovid on his two-thousandth birthday. As the principal official expression of the learned world on this author in his bi-millennial year, it merits peculiar consideration and raises inevitably the queries: how do we today feel about Ovid? What does he mean to us? In the following pages, I want to "review" the book not so much for what it is in itself as for the clue it gives us to Ovid and to a few problems which are today connected with Ovid and Ovidian criticism and scholarship.

Professor Herescu has done good service as editor: to him it fell to gather contributions from all over the learned world and in five languages (French, German, English, Italian, Latin) with due attention to the range of topics and of contributors. Inevitably there are omissions both of persons and subjects (great living Ovidians such as Hans Diller and Hermann Fränkel are absent; the treatment of the *Fasti* is scant indeed) but this is doubtless due to various special circumstances such as always beset books like these. More important a deficiency is the relative lack of true literary criticism. F. Peeters' query in the final article: "Ou sont, je vous prie, les études qui envisagent Ovide en poète . . . ?" is not answered here; instead Ovid remains, for the majority of the contributors, an object of strenuous scholarship, his work a proper subject of technical metrical analysis, *Quellenforschung*, influence-tracing by lists of parallel passages, etc. Even the articles that examine his style and personality (e.g. Arnaldi on his *rhetoric*, Bardon on his *baroque* quality, Saint-Denis on his *malice*, Alfonsi on his *philosophy*) never really envisage more than single aspects of his poetry. But as an Ovidian *Festschrift*—a garland woven by scholars—it is of high quality and together comprises articles which in erudition and scope stand up well beside most of the articles actually written over the last two decades before its appearance. To choose amid such a plenty is invidious but I found the studies of Arnaldi, Saint-Denis, P. J. Enk, Paratore, and Bruère especially noteworthy.

The collection is divided into six major parts: (1) General Studies (rhetoric, metre, Ovid's relation to painting); (2) The Poet of Love; (3) Poet of the Gods (mostly on the *Metamorphoses*); (4) The Poet

of Exile (The Exilic poems, his Gothic *libellus*, and the causes of his *relegatio*); (5) *Minora et Incerta* (*Halieutica*, *Nux*); and (6) Influence, Survival, and 'Actuality' (Peeter's concluding remarks on Ovid in relation to actual Ovidian studies).

1. E. T. Salmon (pp. 3-20) writes interestingly of Ovid's relation to Sulmo. His contention that Ovid owed his senatorial opportunities (not taken advantage of) to Sulmo's support of Caesar in 49 B. C. seems eminently reasonable. Arnaldi's study of Ovid's rhetoric holds that Ovid liberated himself from the exhaustiveness and abstractness of the contemporary rhetorical schools by the process of maturation and his study of classical and Alexandrine Greek models; hence the difference between the *Heroides* and the *Metamorphoses*. T. F. Higham (pp. 32-48) emphasizes the 'rhetorical' caste of all writings of Ovid's time and stresses both how much rhetoric did for him and how "he gave to rhetoric as much or more than he got." Both these articles are suggestive but would, I believe, have been improved by some careful examination of texts. Just what does Ovid do with rhetorical *topoi*? Just how far can any one poem be broken—successfully—into mere *topoi*? And just how *original* or *poetic* is Ovid's use of any given *topos*? Hans Herter's article (pp. 49-74) on Ovid's relation to the art of painting is mainly negative but not, for that reason, less valuable: the point he makes, mainly by a rather lengthy discussion of the Phaethon episode in the *Met.*, is that Ovid's pictorial style, especially in descriptions of imaginary works of art, is a matter of literary inspiration and imagination, not of imitation of actual ancient paintings or sculptures. He quite proves his point, as I see it. Nor does H. Bardon's article (pp. 75-100) on 'Ovid and the Baroque' deny Herter's point since he takes *baroque* in a quite extended sense as a kind of post- and anticlassical dynamism, a development of details at the expense of the ensemble, the systematic search for variety. All this he finds in Ovid but I do not think he makes it clear how much of this is Ovidian and how much is simply Hellenistic. Actually the Ovidian style which he characterizes as baroque seems to me much more Ovidian than e.g. Callimachean, Apollonian, or Theocritean and far indeed from Virgilian. But these distinctions need to be made clear: we feel, for example, a kinship between Bernini's famous Daphne and Ovid's, but to what is this really due? I think that Bardon would have gained great insight into the matter had he read Hans Diller's admirable essay on Ovid (an article,¹ I might remark, which is ignored by all writers in this collection). To the articles of Marouzeau and of Jackson Knight and Axelson (both on metrics) I cannot do justice here: Knight well describes the effect of Ovid's avoidance of elision, plenitude of dactyls, etc.; Axelson, that of his monotonous pentameter endings. I think all reasonable critics will admit that Ovid paid a great price for the facility and fluidity of his verse but, as Knight remarks, this fitted his humorous and satirical spirit even if it excluded him from the 'inner shrine' of poetry. All in all, this section on 'Ovid in general' has a great deal to say but there is, alas, no truly critical estimate of Ovid—the *whole* Ovid—in it.

¹ "Die dichterische Eigenart von Ovids Metamorphosen," *Hum. Gymn.*, XLV (1934), pp. 25-37.

2. The section on Ovid as 'poet of love' commences with a long article (pp. 139-83) by Otto Seel on Ovid's use in *Am.*, III, 14 of Herodotus, I, 8, 3 (the relation of exposed female nakedness to female reputation). Seel, unlike other critics, especially Harder, sees in both Herodotus and Ovid a common element—an objective statement about the way women are reputed chaste—though an extraordinary refinement and subtlety in Ovid's version of the theme. I cannot discuss the point here but I am inclined to think that Ovid is more 'malicious' or 'sophisticated' (thus un-Herodotean) than Seel thinks. This malicious quality of Ovid is excellently brought out in the admirable contribution of Saint-Denis. I cannot agree with his defense of Corinna's actuality as a person, nor his view that Ovid is basically antifeminist and I think he underrates the element of burlesque—even burlesque of Ovid's amatory predecessors in the *Amores*. I can hardly see that the Silenus mosaic from Pompeii (which he reproduces opposite p. 198) was suggested by Ovid's description (cf. Hans Herter's article mentioned above). But Saint-Denis writes with verve and correctly assails the romantic conception of love which would read Ovid out of court. I cannot see that E. J. Kenney has added too much to our understanding of Ovid's *nequitia* though some of his parallels with Virgil's *Georgics* are interesting: he is apparently unaware that Ovid's burlesque (at least of Virgil and the elegiac poets) has been treated in some detail by E. K. Rand, R. Reitzenstein, and myself.² Salvatore D'Elia's article on the chronology of the amatory poems is an extremely sober and well-reasoned argument. His results, listed on p. 221, seem to me both modest and convincing; his most important point is that the second edition of the *Amores* did *not* introduce any new elegies. Alan Ker's textual comments on certain passages in the amatory poems are interesting but, to me, doubtful: specifically I cannot agree with his treatment of *Her.*, 4, 135-8 and *Her.*, 5, 81-4 though he is possibly right as to *Ars*, I, 191-2 (*annis* rather than Heinsius' *animis*).

3. The section on the 'Poet of the Gods' contains articles on the *Metamorphoses* by L. P. Wilkinson, Pierre Grimal, F. della Corte, L. Alfonsi, W. C. Stephens, R. Crahay and J. Hubaux (jointly), Mlle. Guillemin, P. J. Enk, and F. Munari and one (by F. Ferrarino) on the 'Praise of Venus' in *Fasti*, IV, 91-114. Wilkinson makes some good observations on the plan of the *Metamorphoses*: he sees its *novelty* in the systematic combination of linked narratives with a chronological arrangement (neither being new in itself). This is probably true though it is suggested at least in the Silenus song of the sixth *Eclogue* or Clymene's narrations a *Chao* of *densi amores* (*Georgics*, IV, 345-7). I also like Wilkinson's accent on the spaciousness of Ovid's world,—on his 'panoramic imagination' (p. 236). But it is to me disappointing that Wilkinson fails to see any plan or principle of arrangement beyond the sketchy chronological succession of myths. In this respect Grimal's essay on the poem's 'legendary chronology' also adds little. His observation that those myths with mortals for heroes demand a probable order of succession (unlike the 'timeless' stories of gods) is true and suggestive but his attempt to

² Cf. my article in *T. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), pp. 188-229 which cites both Rand and Reitzenstein and discusses their work.

establish a 'legendary chronology' misses, I think, the real relation of the legends and concentrates only on the superficial links. I also think that Alfonsi, Stephens, and Crahay-Hubaux on the whole miss the basic continuity or unity of the poem: it is true, as Alfonsi argues, that there is a connection between the philosophic exordium and the Pythagorean philosophy of the last book which is, in a sense, a philosophic explanation of metamorphoses and Rome (so have I argued myself),³ though I cannot accept the rather labored thesis of Crahay-Hubaux as to the identity of Numa and Augustus and the latter's Pythagorean immortality. Again I am not convinced by Stephens' attempt to see in the figures of Hercules and Ulysses a reflection of Stoic doctrine in Books I (Exordium) and XV (Pythagoras). The facts surely are that the philosophy of Books I and XV is not really an essential part of the poem and that the narrative links are quite superficial. Yet the placing of the myths is, for all that, very deliberate: partly it is an artistic or aesthetic succession (a matter of balance, variety, contrast, emphasis) and partly (I think) a development in depth,—the solemn opening (creation, four ages, flood) leading into the richly comic eroticism of the gods (the contrast of *maiestas et amor*) that in turn is displaced by the theme of divine vengeance which fades imperceptibly into the theme of human perversion (where Ovid for once ceases to be frivolous and sees, in his own way, 'the pity of it') with a somewhat unfortunate revival of chronology in the concluding sections on Troy and Roman history. The real order is from god to man and from rich satire to subtle pathos. To Ovid the gods are, essentially, either humorous or cruel (his attempts at true theodicy are half-hearted) but there is, for all this, a depth of sympathy in that nature of his where metamorphosis replaces theodicy since passion is after all unaccountable to authoritarian morality, be it human or divine. At bottom there is nothing Stoic about his system except perhaps his belief in cosmic sympathy. Its Augustanism, I cannot but think, is quite superficial (Ovid is always on the side of *amor*, not *maiestas*). I state these ideas (which will be developed at some length in my forthcoming book) merely to suggest what is lacking in these essays,—incidentally learned and brilliant as they so often are. In my view, to search for the poetical meaning of the *Metamorphoses* in such wholly adventitious elements as their chronology, narrative linkage, or formal philosophy is to miss the main point, the source of their charm, the reality of their humor and their pathos.

Of the other essays of this section, I will not pause to discuss those of Ferrarino and Mlle. Guillemin—the former cleverly analyzes the combination of elegiac and Lucretian elements in Ovid's *Laus Veneris*; the latter expertly compares the 'vie paysanne' of Ovid and Virgil—, but concern myself only with P. J. Enk's exciting treatment of the 'double-recension' of the *Metamorphoses*. Enk reviews the question especially in the light of Medner's attack on Dursteler's defense of Ovidian authorship of the two 'recensions.' He concludes (p. 346) that the doublets at VII, 145, I, 544 f., VI, 280 f., VIII, 597 f., 652 f., and 693 f. are Ovidian but that the doublets at VIII, 285 f., 697 f., XI, 57 f., and XII, 192 are later

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 225-9. I have now greatly modified the view I held in this article.

interpolations. By and large his arguments seem to me sound though I would stress, myself, the eminently Ovidian quality of the 'long' version of VIII, 598-611. However, the point I want to make here is the light his discussion throws on the entire text of the poem, a point which he himself apparently does not see or else deliberately excludes from his discussion.

Richard T. Bruère and myself were interested in this problem in connection with our work some twenty years ago in Prof. E. K. Rand's Harvard 'Seminary' in Ovid. In an article in the *H. S. C. P.*, (L [1939], p. 96) Bruère announced an 'article in preparation' by himself and me on 'the much-disputed point of the double-recension.' This article never, in fact, appeared since it, along with the 'critical edition' of the poem we were then planning, was postponed in the interest of other matters by us both. So far at least as I myself am concerned, I do not now expect to write such an article. I therefore take this opportunity to indicate my own views (based on a good deal of work with the MSS) in bare summary here, since Enk's article greatly strengthens them at several points. (It is to be hoped Bruère will give us his.) The matter is I think of crucial importance for anyone who will hereafter edit or work with the text of the poem.

Magnus in his *editio maior* (Berlin, Weidmann, 1914) divided the MSS into two classes (O and X): the former (O) represented a revised 5th or 6th century codex with summaries or *argumenta* of the narrative and included the MSS M and N and the fragments β , π , κ ; the latter (X) represented a quite different 'unrevised' tradition (which lacked the *argumenta*) to which belonged the MSS F, l, h, e and the bulk of the Heinsian MSS (cf. Munari's new identification of many of these Heinsian MSS in this volume under review, pp. 347-9) and the fragments ϵ , τ , μ , ν . To this list Slater⁴ added several MSS (especially the O MS, U or Urbinas 341) and corrected Magnus at several points (notably he was aware that ϵ contained some of the *argumenta* though not in the first hand, and was thus possibly also an O MS). Rand and his pupils (notably W. F. Smith, Bruère, and myself) attempted to supplant Magnus' dual archetype theory (O and X) by a single archetype theory (the X MSS being grouped under two headings: $Z^2 = \epsilon, \tau$ and $Z^4 = F l k d e g h o p$ Planudes, etc., a group derived from a Z^2 MS but also containing many good readings from a quite different tradition). Rand himself was exceedingly reluctant to abandon the theory of a common archetype for all MSS (making even the special Z^4 readings depend on another branch of the stemma, Y, to which he attributed the fragments α and λ). But it is impossible to prove the dependence of Z^4 on Y (cf. Bruère, *op. cit.*, p. 114) and the reading *Met.*, I, 503 *aventi/fugit* proves the substantial independence of the Z^4 MSS ϵ , l, h^2 , U² from all the rest in a capital error almost certainly attributable to the archetype of O or of all MSS, having, or derived from MSS having, the *argumenta*.⁵ Now if we examine the 'double recension' passages it seems clear that the 'fuller' or 'emended' version in each case goes back to a Z^2 or Z^4 MS as the following table makes evident:

⁴ *Towards a Text of the Metamorphosis of Ovid* (Oxford, 1927). The sigla here used are explained in Bruère, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-8 (cf. also the stemmas on pp. 101 and 113).

⁵ Cf. Bruère, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

- (1) I, 544 f. Both versions are contaminated in all MS except MN (=Magnus' O)
- (2) VI, 280 f. contaminated in all MSS or possibly not double recension at all.
- (3) VII, 284 f. The excellent and far more poetical 286 (of which 285 is an inferior doublet) is omitted by O and Slater's U.
- (4) VIII, 595 f. Here lines 597-602 are omitted by e¹ IMU (597-601a by N). MN also omit lines 603-5.
- (5) VIII, 651 f. Here 651-656a are omitted by MN (first hand) though found in τ (Z²) and the Z⁴ MS (e F U 1) and the Urbinas (Slater's U).

Now if we accept Enk's argument that the 'doublets' are Ovidian, then it seems to me to follow that the longer versions at least in the passages I, 544, VIII, 595 f., and VIII, 651 f. (as well as the single line VIII, 286) are the products of a later revision by Ovid himself. It is inconceivable to me that he would have 'condensed' the passages in question, entirely probable that he would have expanded them. To hold, on the other hand, that an interpolator could have condensed the longer versions seems to me even more difficult: What could possibly have been his motive? I spare the elaborate stylistic analysis necessary to prove that the longer versions are Ovidian (unfortunately Enk does not really supply it) but it should surely be no great task for anyone familiar with Ovid's style. In this case we are driven to the conclusion that the 'final' version of the *Metamorphoses* is to be found in the X or Z⁴ MS, secondarily in the Z² MS (cf. cases 1 and 5 above).⁶ This probably means also that a great number of other Z⁴ or X readings must be accepted in lieu of O readings (cf. the short list in Bruère, *op. cit.*, p. 119). There is of course much contamination of both O and X MSS (cf. the case of U in VIII, 651 f.) and no one X or Z⁴ MS seems completely reliable. It seems, we can say, that not only Magnus' reliance on O but Rand's insistence on a common archetype were mistaken, while Medner's refusal to see anything but a wholly interpolated text is quite unfounded. There is of course interpolation (especially in the *aetas Ovidiana*) but it is relatively minor: the great fact for future editors to take

⁶ There is no doubt that ϵ is descended from an archetype common also to O. Cf. Bruère, *passim* and my article *H.S.C.P.*, XLVII (1936), pp. 131-63. I am not certain, however, that the 'good' readings (e.g. VIII, 651 f. found in τ , a MS closely related to ϵ) of Z² (ϵ , τ) are descended from this archetype. It is more probable that Z² itself either contained many X variants or had been conflated with an X MS. Unfortunately we possess no complete Z² MS but only the very small portion of the poem preserved in the fragments ϵ and τ . In any event the Z⁴ tradition is quite distinct from Magnus' O or Rand's Z¹. e (Erfurt: Cod. Ampolitanus prior) and l (Laur. XXXVI 12) are probably the 'best' (or least corrupted) Z⁴ MSS. Cf. again Bruère, p. 116. It seems clear that a new edition of the text should take far more careful account of these MSS as well as the Heinsian MSS. As things now stand, by far the best existing text of the poem is that of Heinsius' Elzevir edition (Amsterdam, 1659). I am inclined to believe that a new text based primarily on the Z⁴ MSS (as for the reasons given I think it should be) would approximate very closely to that of Heinsius.

into account is that *two* versions of the *Met.* (one revised by Ovid himself) circulated throughout late antiquity and the middle ages and that, unfortunately, it is the annotated archetype of the O MS (given priority by all recent editors) which represents the 'unrevised' version of Ovid while it is the so-called *deteriores* or X MSS which actually give us Ovid's final judgment. In short: the basic and important variants in the text go back to antiquity and it is the carefully edited fifth or sixth century archetype containing the *argumenta* which is in fact the least Ovidian of the two traditions which have come down to us from antiquity.

4. The section on 'The Poet of the Exile' can be treated very briefly. Paratore's article (pp. 353-78) on the 'Autobiography' of *Tristia*, IV, 10 is a remarkable piece of detailed analysis and criticism. He makes especially the point that the lines which refer to Ovid's deceased parents (79-90) lack the metrical monotony (i. e. the rhymes within the pentameter and the cola ending with each couplet) of the rest of the poem. In general Paratore is hard on Ovid: he compares him unfavorably with the other elegists in respect of his uniform, mechanical structure and abstract diction and sees in his intellectualistic striving for effect an "assenza totale di un sincero slancio poetico." Much of this is true but I think also that Paratore misses the very Ovidian personality of the 'Autobiographer' though this is, after all, *not* one of his best poems. Lambrino's sketch of Tomis and its graeco-gothic population, Adamesteanu's brief essay on Ovid's *gothicus libellus*, Lozovan's on his bilingualism are interesting explanations of subjects about which we after all can know little. D. Marin and R. Marache speculate on the cause of his exile and his exile itself. Marin makes the point that he displeased by his amatory poems both Augustus and his principal opponents (straight-laced Stoic republicans). "The true *crimen carminis* is to be found in the *concordia discors* of the governmental authorities on the one hand, the opposition on the other." Marache sees, especially in *Tristia* III, a concealed but mounting hostility to the emperor: this only makes Ovid's flattery all the more impossible. Most interesting is Herescu's analysis of Ovid's epitaph, which he interprets as the poet's protest against his arbitrary condemnation and as an affirmation of his liberty as an artist. I am not sure that much new light has been shed here on the exile. The essential point which stands out is that Ovid's relatively frivolous conception of the poet's role displeased the Emperor. Would this have sufficed without the *error*? I think the answer is probably negative. Cf. Mason Hammond's treatment of the question is *H. S. G. P.*, LXIII (1958), pp. 345-61.

5. I shall not linger on the J. A. Richmond-Skutsch discussion of the *Halieutica* which is an excellent textual study quite unresponsive to brief analysis or discussion: much the same must be said of A. L. Lee's treatment of the authorship of the *Nux* (it is Ovidian in spirit, not authorship). The articles of Bruère on *Color Ovidianus* in Silius' *Punica*, Herrmann on Ovid's influence on the *Octavia*, Elizabeth Thomas on 'Ovidian Echoes in Juvenal' are real contributions to our knowledge,—Bruère especially has made us see how Ovid served to redeem Silius from the dreariness of historical epic: his best lines are those which owe something to Ovid. Would that he

had owed more, for Virgil certainly did him no good! W. F. Lenz has contributed much to our understanding of Ovid's vogue in the Middle Ages by explaining the nature and the MS setting of the *De Medicamine Aurium*. Finally Peeters calls for a new appraisal: in his view Ovid was after all a *complete* poet whose work was cut short only by his exile.

All in all, this is a worthy tribute to Ovid. I cannot but feel that the atomic age is not well suited to his mood and genius: it is all the more praiseworthy that M. Herescu and his collaborators have done him such honor.

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E. LOBEL, C. H. ROBERTS, E. G. TURNER and J. W. B. BARNS. The *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Part XXIV. Edited with Translations and Notes. London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1957. Pp. xiii + 216; 16 pls. £6. (*Graeco-Roman Memoirs*, No. 35.)

For generally laudatory reviews of the volumes of this series see almost any review. For the present reviewer's opinion of Volume XXIII see *A. J. P.*, LXXIX (1958), pp. 294-8. Volume XXIV maintains the high standards of excellence of editing and interpretation which we have come to expect. What is noteworthy about it is the great variety of the material it contains: biblical texts, new fragments of Aleman with commentary and lexicon, a book label, fragments of a commentary on the *Iliad*, of Callimachus' *Hecale*, of a history of Sicily and of subjects for declamations, two leaves from a codex of Terence's *Andria*, some Aristotle and Aeschines, a Homeric glossary, the ground plan of a house and a considerable miscellany of memoranda, letters, petitions, accounts, deeds, and the like. This variety called for four editors: Roberts for the Terence; Turner for the history and the declamations plus Aeschines, Aristotle, and the house plan; Barns for the glossary and the documents; and Lobel for the remainder. The reviewer is inclined to believe that he should himself be similarly multiplied.

The biblical fragments are from *Psalms*, *Matthew*, and *Luke*. That from the *Psalms* has been assigned Rahlfs's number 2070 while the other three are given papyrus numbers 69-71. The small fragment from *Matthew* XIX (No. 2385) is noteworthy for its similarity in text and handwriting to the *Vaticanus*.

Most important of all, as representing additions to the very scant remains we have, are the fragments from Aleman and the related texts of fragments 2387-2394.

2387 consists of 33 fragments, all of which, except 1 and 3, are minute, containing hardly a certainly identifiable word. Fragments 1-3 are apparently all from one and the same piece of the *Parthenia*. Lobel calculates that the poem preserved by 1 and 3 contained not less than 126 lines. This calculation is based, one would guess, on the fact that there are at least four columns each containing at least 30 lines, as can be seen by comparing col. ii and iii of Fr. 3. Since the strophe is nine lines long, four columns would allow for fourteen

and a fraction strophes. As Lobel observes, the Louvre *Parthenion* contains not less than 112 lines.

The poem opened with an invocation to the Muses (Ὀλ]υμπίδες) but beyond this almost everything is in uncertainty as to subject. This is not surprising when one considers the elusiveness of the much better preserved Louvre *Parthenion*. Lobel observes that the speaker appears to be a female member of the chorus. Snatches are intelligible here and there, as in Fr. 3: "with unnerving desire, more melting than sleep and than death in (her) glance" (1-2), "like some star winging its way across the glittering heaven or a golden bough or delicate down" (6-8).

The meter of the nine-line strophe is in descending rhythms, dactylic in 1, 7, and 8, trochaic in 2-4 and mixed in 5 and 9, while 6 is uncertain but presumably trochaic. A note at the top of the first column testifies to the critical attention of Aristonicus and a Ptolemy, and the presence of marginal and interlinear comments in as many perhaps as five different hands indicates the scholarly character of this first century text.

Number 2388 is composed of 22 very small fragments of a second century text also ascribed to Aleman largely on the basis of the language. Fragment 1 preserves the beginning of twelve lines in which only a few words are recognizable including Κλησίμβ[ροτα.

2389 comprises thirty-five fragments from a first century commentary on Aleman. The contents are tantalizing. Fragment 1, within the brief scope of seventeen incomplete lines, mentions Menelaus, the Dioscuri, Helen, Therapnae, the Bacchae, Cadmus, and Hades. We know from Harpocration that Therapnae was mentioned by Aleman in the first book of his poems. We know that Menelaus and Helen were worshipped at Therapnae and it was the place where, according to Pindar, the Dioscuri were supposed to be buried on alternate days. Fragment 3 also deals with the Dioscuri and their temple (σ]όδματο[ν στ]έγος]. The lemma includes words identifiable with Diehl's fragment 89 followed immediately by the first words of Diehl's fragment 2. All this clearly belongs to the commentary on book one. The same is presumably true of fragment 4 which refers to the Leucippid Phoebe. Line 6 of this fragment is followed by a coronis indicating the end of the commentary on a poem. What follows refers to the Tyndarids and includes a lemma beginning Μῶσαι Μ[ν]αμοσύνα.

Fragments 6 and 7 of number 2389 deal with the Louvre *Parthenion* and give lemmatic quotations from lines 59-63 and 73-7. The lemmata confirm the text of the Louvre papyrus in every case but unfortunately add nothing new. The commentary is disappointing. Column i of fragment 6 discusses Colaxaeon and Ibenian horses and quotes Aristarchus on the subject. Column ii contains parts of 32 lines but adds nothing to our understanding of lines 60-3 of the poem. The same may be said of fragment 8.

Fragment 9 contains in its last line the words ἀνὴρ ἄγριος ου.[] corresponding to part of the first line of Diehl's fragment 13 from which it is probable that we are here in the commentary on the second book of Aleman. The gist of the comment is that Aleman is a Laconian as is evidenced by a quotation including the words ἀντίφωρον Λάκωνι τέ[κτονα πα]ρθενίων σοφῶν Ἀλκμά[νι, etc. We are

also told that Aristotle was of the opinion that Aleman was a Lydian because of his misunderstanding of the words of our fragment 13 (D): ἀλλὰ Σαρδίων ἀπ' ἀκράν.

Fragment 35, the only other of any considerable size, deals with Πιτάνη and Δύμαιναι at one point, with Χαλκίς and Χαλκιδεῖς at another. It refers to Homer, Theopompus, and perhaps Pratinas. But nothing intelligible can be made out.

Number 2390 is composed of fifty fragments of a manuscript dated to the second century. In so far as these fragments are properly identified as belonging to one manuscript the work contained is a commentary on Aleman, as is clear from fragment 2 which preserves the major portion of two columns of commentary on two poems of Aleman. Lines 1-22 of column ii of this fragment have to do with Spartan kings. Leotychidas appears in a lemma, Polydorus is mentioned in the commentary, and a Timasimbrotia is mentioned as the daughter of one or the other. From the commentary which begins on line 23 and continues through the next column it appears that the next poem dealt with began with reference to the Muses. It soon progressed to a cosmogonical statement the details of which cannot be made out with clarity. From the trend of the comments it would appear that Aleman pictured the beginning as chaotic and undifferentiated matter (τετα]ραγμένην καὶ ἀπόητον). Then came Thetis whose role is compared to that of the smith in relation to bronze. After Thetis comes πόρος, which was apparently described by Aleman as πρέσγ[υς and said by the scholiast to be οἶον ἀρχή, and this was followed by τέκμων (οἶον τέλος). Next in the succession appeared ἄμαρ τε καὶ σέλανα καὶ τρίτον σκότος. Πόρος was already known for Aleman, since the scholiast on line 13 of the Louvre *Parthenion* links it with αἶσα, and it is evident from the text there that Aleman referred to the pair as eldest (γεραίτατοι) of the gods.

2391 is made up of 36 minute scraps of commentary on a poetical text in the Doric dialect which is naturally taken to be Aleman.

2392 is a fragmentary colophon of a commentary on book four of Aleman's poems by a Dionysius.

The existence of a non-alphabetic Aleman lexicon or a lexicon-like commentary is proven by 2393.

Less than might be expected is added by these fragments to our knowledge of the dialect of Aleman. Following Page's analysis of the evidence in his edition of the *Parthenion* we see that syllables containing a naturally short vowel followed by mute and liquid are consistently treated as long (IIa) and that this is true even when the vowel and the consonants are not in the same word (μῆ φρένας,]πῶ γλεφάρων) on which Page (IIc) had inadequate evidence. In χαίταισιν ἴσδει (2387, 3 ii 12) we have an example of ν movable appended to a noun to avoid hiatus which we may add to Page's examples of verbs so treated (III). There are still no cases of ν movable making position. An example of compensatory lengthening in κᾶλόν (2387, 1, 5) is contrary to the rule (Xa). In χηρός (2387, 3 ii 20) we have a book-text example of this form of compensation in Aleman in addition to Herodian's quotation (Xb). New in Aleman is the equivalence of γ to β in πρέσγ[υς (2390, 2 iii 20. Cf. Page, XII 3). Further examples of initial σ for θ are found in σαλαμ[, σανάτω and ριοῖσι; of medial σ for θ in ασανατας, μαλσακα[, παρσεν[,

π]αρσενικᾶν, πόσῳ (XII 3, ii). At 2387, 3 ii 12 ἴσδει gives a book-text example of the spelling σδ which preponderates in the quotation (XII 3 iv).]πππων of 2388, 6, 9 is an example of the psilosis in synaloephe said by Apollonius Dyscolus to be common in Doric (XII 1 i). From 2391, 21c 2 we have in]γλυκη an apparent example of η for εἰ in a book-text (XII 2 ii).

2394 gives us 14 fragments of a second or third century manuscript which contained Dorian choral lyric not identifiable as Aleman with traces of comments in several hands, but the remnants are too slight to yield any sense. Lyric verses, with some Dorian features but certainly not Aleman, in 2395 have to do with a Centaur's request for someone's daughter in marriage. The tale of Dorian material is completed by 2396, a papyrus label from a scroll of the second century which reads Τρύφωνος τοῦ Ἀμμωνίου περὶ διαλέκτου Λακόνων τῶν εἰς β.

Scholastic literature is also represented by 15 scant fragments of a commentary on the seventeenth book of the *Iliad*.

2398 supplements lines 43-58 of Pfeiffer's fragment 260 of Callimachus' *Hecale*, which were based on two other papyri, and shows that Pfeiffer's fragment 346 belongs immediately before line 44 of his 260.

The most extensive new classical text of the volume is 2399 which represents substantial parts of four columns plus a few fragments of a first century B. C. manuscript containing an account of Sicilian affairs under Agathocles which is tentatively ascribed with strong probability to Duris of Samos. Whoever the author may have been, the account is clearly one of the sources of Diodorus Siculus.

2400 is a list of subjects for rhetorical exercises from a third century papyrus. The three subjects preserved involve Cleon, Euripides, and Alexander.

2401 is of the greatest interest both palaeographically and textually. It comprises two mutilated leaves from a possibly fourth century codex containing the text of Terence's *Andria* 602-33, 635-68, 924-50 and 957-79. The codex was of a rather tall format, about 22 × 31 cm. The hand of the scribe gives the impression of rustic capitals at first sight but is certainly not that. It contains many cursive and minuscule elements but really defies classification or comparison with examples from either papyrus or parchment. The text does not fall in clearly with either the Bembin or the Calliopian branch of the transmission. It is, on the whole, a poor witness, showing correspondences with both and divergences from both as well as both good and bad independent readings. It will probably be of greater interest palaeographically for it is a welcome addition to the still small number of early papyrus codices.

Evidence on extant texts is presented by 2402 Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, 2403 the *Categories*, 2404 Aeschines' *In Ctesiphontem*.

2405 is a rather routine piece of a second or third century Homeric glossary in which the glosses follow the order of the text for *Iliad* I, 58-128.

Of the documents of the Roman and Byzantine periods I single out only the first two for comment. 2406 is a unique house plan from the second century. One can only agree with Turner that it could not have served as an architect's plan on the basis of which

building would have been carried out. Although it is drawn with obvious skill and facility it is very sketchy. Interestingly enough the central portion is labeled ἀρπείων.

No brief mention can do justice to the document numbered 2407. Without trying to take cognizance of its significance as a public document it would be unfair to any reader who has had the patience to follow through this inventory of classical texts not to draw attention to this minor classic. It is described by the editor as *Memoranda of Proceedings of a Public Meeting*. It is evidently an attempt to give something like a stenographic report of such a meeting, a sort of *Congressional Record*. For any who enjoy reading the *Congressional Record* or have attended a faculty meeting or the meeting of any such deliberative body it will have an immediate appeal and a special savor. The discussion is complicated and obscure but not without spirit. I quote the editor's translation from near the beginning of the document (p. 152):

As he continued, the assembly cried: 'Noble syndie! You have administered well! Hurrah for the patriot! Hurrah for the man of initiative! One who is worthy of the Prefect by a unique discharge of the syndicate! Just such men as this are needed!' Apollodorus, ex-magistrate: 'I am certifying in the minutes that in the number of twelve my brother Euhemerus, by order of the present syndie, has already performed liturgy, and we request a copy to be laid before us.'

Robert's *Rules of Order* were clearly not being followed and it is not altogether our lack of understanding of the matters under discussion which prevents following the thread of the remarks. Any lack of light from the discussion is fully made up for by the heat which is generated further on (p. 153):

Pactumenicus Nemesianus, former hypomnematographus: 'If my credit is good, it is no thanks to you.' Menelaus, syndie: 'And it is no thanks to you if mine is. For the most estimable assembly knows how I have administered the syndicate.' Heron, son of Euhemerus: 'I have certified that nothing has been paid in to the assembly in which I was posted up.' Menelaus, syndie: 'Do not confuse the assembly on a pretext of twenty . . . Pay the fine!' Heron, son of Euhemerus: 'You are the one who confuses everything.' Menelaus, syndie: 'The beginning of conspiracy and confusion (is) already (here). Have we already stopped . . . ? Pay the fine!' Heron, son of Euhemerus: 'I owe nothing!' Menelaus, syndie: 'I am demanding from you; the Prefect is demanding from you; don't try to humbug me.'

Unhappily the text soon breaks off after this and we shall probably never know the outcome of the meeting.

In general it must be said that this volume will probably be more notable for what may be learned from its contents about the transmission of ancient literature than for what we learn about the literature itself. The editors have done their excellent best and made the most of even chaff, but the gleanings were poor.

LLOYD W. DALY.

MICHEL RUCH. *L'Hortensius de Cicéron: Histoire et reconstitution.* Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1958. Pp. 186. (*Collection d'Études Anciennes*, publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé.)

Although the *Hortensius* of Cicero has survived only in fragments, the general character of the work is well known from the remarks that St. Augustine (*Conf.*, III, 7; VIII, 17) makes about the effect it had on him when he read it as a student at Carthage. The standard critical edition of the fragments is that edited by Mueller in part IV, vol. III of the Teubner edition of Cicero (Leipzig, 1890; reprinted 1898). In 1892 Otto Plasberg published these fragments in what he judged to be the order they occupied in the original work, and with them he supplied a Latin introduction and commentary. This study by Plasberg has been highly esteemed, and rightly so, and has remained the standard work on the *Hortensius* to this day. But in the intervening years, scholars have continued to study the fragments, and considerable pains have been taken in an effort to determine the relation of the *Hortensius* to Aristotle and Iamblichus, its influence on such writers as Augustine and Boethius, and its fate during the Middle Ages.

Michael Ruch, then, has undertaken a work that has long been needed; and it is not only Ciceronian scholars but also students of Greek Philosophy and patristic thought who will be grateful to him for the quantity of learned material he has assembled in this volume. The introductory matter, which occupies fifty-three pages, covers such topics as the relation of the *Hortensius* to the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle, the structure of the *Hortensius*, its date of composition, its influence on later writers, and its final disappearance. The rest of the volume is given to the text and commentary, the fragments being arranged in what Ruch considers their original sequence. Each fragment is numbered (with no reference, unfortunately, to either Plasberg or Mueller), and immediately after each Latin text there follow a French translation and commentary.

In his preface (p. 9) Ruch points out that there are three problems to be faced: the establishment and translation of the text, the restoration of the context, and the discovery of the order of the fragments. But all these three problems, he reminds us, have to be worked on together; and he goes on to say that one must have an *a priori* idea of the structure of the work before one can put the fragments in a certain order. Then, as if to disarm criticism, he adds: "Dans l'état actuel des fragments, toutes les hypothèses semblent permises, lorsqu'on veut à tout prix arriver à un remembrement" (*ibid.*). But it must be said in all fairness that this is not a capricious undertaking. Ruch points out (p. 10) that three things can supply information for a commentary on the *Hortensius*: a knowledge of Cicero's other dialogues, a clear idea of Cicero's philosophical convictions at the date of the *Hortensius*, and an examination of the previous writers from whom Cicero borrowed as well as the later authors who imitated his work. Furthermore, our sources have not left us entirely in the dark as to the general structure of the *Hortensius*. We know, for instance, from a remark of Trebellius Pollio

that it was a *protrepticus* or exhortation to the study of philosophy: *nec ignota esse arbitror, quae dixit M. Tullius in Hortensio, quem ad exemplum protreptici scripsit* (Frag. 8 Mueller). Now it is generally conceded that a *protrepticus* (λόγος προτρεπτικός) among the Greeks was a speech rather than a dialogue; but even a cursory glance through the fragments of the *Hortensius* will reveal the fact that it contained statements made by more than one speaker. This apparent contradiction, however, is easily solved, for there is evidence to show that the first part was a dialogue carried on by Catulus, Lucullus, Hortensius, and Cicero, and that the second part, the *protrepticus* proper, was a continuous speech delivered by Cicero, praising philosophy and exhorting his hearers to the pursuit of wisdom. We even know the opening words of Cicero's exordium, for they have been preserved by Augustine, *De Trin.*, XIII, 7, *P. L. XLII*, col. 1019: *Cicero . . . cum vellet in Hortensio dialogo ab aliqua re certa, de qua nullus ambigeret, sumere suae disputationis exordium, Beati certe, inquit, omnes esse volumus* (Frag. 36 Mueller, 59 Ruch).

The phrase, therefore, cited from Trebellius Pollio, *ad exemplum protreptici*, would seem to refer more to the form in which the second part of the *Hortensius* is cast or to the hortatory nature of the work as a whole. But does Trebellius mean that Cicero used Aristotle's *Protrepticus* as a model (as Bernays and Bywater maintained), or that he modelled his work on the Greek literary genre known as *protrepticus*? Ruch (p. 21) thinks the second alternative more likely; but he seems to be inconsistent on this point, for he appears elsewhere (see comments on Frag. 96 Mueller, below) to accept the first alternative.

That Aristotle's *Protrepticus* was Cicero's model is rather generally held, and this view has behind it the authority of such eminent scholars as Bywater (*Journal of Philology*, II [1869], pp. 55-69) and Jaeger (*Aristoteles* [Berlin, 1923], chap. IV). The theory is that a large portion of the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus was borrowed from Aristotle. From this it would follow that if there should be a close resemblance between a passage in Cicero's *Hortensius* and one in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus*, and if the passage in Iamblichus seemed to be written in the manner of Aristotle, we should be able to assign the passage in Iamblichus to the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle. It was thus that a great portion of Aristotle's lost *Protrepticus* was reconstructed.

The bearing this has on the study of the *Hortensius* may be seen from the way in which the following fragment, for example, has been treated: *Vidit enim quod videndum fuit, adpendicem animi esse corpus, nihilque esse in eo magnum* (Frag. 96 Mueller, 86 Ruch). Plasberg (p. 77) says of this: *quae sententia repetita est a Platone vel Socrate*, and he refers to *Timaeus* 69D. Ruch (p. 156) comments thus: "L'idée provient du *Timée* 69D; mais la source de Cicéron est Aristote, d'après Jamblique, *Protr.* 8, p. 48, 7 Pist.: οὗτως εἰσκειν ἡ ψυχὴ διατετασθαι καὶ προσκεκολλησθαι πᾶσι τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς τοῦ σώματος μέλεσιν." This statement is indeed found in the fragments of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* as edited by Rose, and more recently by Ross; but an examination of the passage in which it occurs (Frag. 10b Ross, p. 41) reveals no evidence to show that Iamblichus took

it from the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle. The presumption that he did is apparently based on Bywater's theory concerning the general indebtedness of both the *Hortensius* of Cicero and the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus to the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle.

But Bywater's theory has been examined recently by W. Gerson Rabinowitz, *Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Sources of Its Reconstruction*, I (Univ. of Calif. Publ. in Class. Philol., XVI, no. 1 [Berkeley, 1957]), pp. 3-4, 93-4, and has been shown to be quite unsound. It is a pity that this monograph by Rabinowitz, which is a masterpiece of analysis and criticism, did not appear in time to influence Ruch's work. It should be read by anyone engaged in a serious study of either the *Hortensius* or the *Protrepticus*. It is interesting to note that Olof Gigon, "Cicero und Aristoteles," *Hermes*, LXXXVII (1959), pp. 143-62, without any apparent knowledge of the work of Rabinowitz, also questions the commonly accepted view. He admits that the *Hortensius* shows the influence of Aristotle but denies that Cicero's work as a whole and in its main arguments is based on the *Protrepticus*. He observes that the exchange between Hortensius and Cicero resembles more the *Gorgias* of Plato, and that even in Cicero's speech in the second part of the *Hortensius* there seems to be something of the scepticism of the Academy intermingled with Aristotelianism (pp. 154-5).

Much of Ruch's introductory matter may be passed over, but his treatment of the disappearance of the *Hortensius* calls for comment. This section (pp. 48-57) is, I believe, the least satisfactory in the whole book. It contains an impressive amount of citations from original sources and learned works, but the author does not seem to have examined this complicated material in a very critical manner.

Thus we are told (p. 48) that the *Hortensius* probably disappeared by reason of the efforts of pagans to destroy certain classical treatises that would seem to support Christian claims. This theory (proposed by an anonymous writer in *Rheinisches Museum* for 1842) is advanced with apparent approval in spite of the fact that it has just been stated that Martianus Capella (5th c.), Priscianus (6th c.), and Boethius (6th c.) knew the *Hortensius*; and it is difficult to understand how any pagans after the age of Boethius could have managed to get the book out of circulation. Ruch immediately recognizes a difficulty (p. 49) and even adduces another passage, this time from Maximus of Turin (5th c.), containing a quotation from the *Hortensius*; but he immediately throws doubt on the weight of this evidence by suggesting that Maximus was most probably quoting the *Hortensius* from Augustine. Yet even if we rule out the testimony of Maximus, what are we to say about the other three witnesses of the fifth and sixth centuries just referred to? Ruch does not consider the problem.

But as we move on we find that Ruch next (without any explicit rejection of the theory just proposed) puts forth a contradictory explanation. Here (p. 51) we are told that it was the Christians who destroyed (and deliberately destroyed) the *Hortensius*: orthodox believers considered such a pagan work, which had been given a very good press by St. Augustine, seductive and dangerous. This explanation is proposed *sans aucun doute*. Ruch has been led into this strange position by Mollweide, who published a series of six articles

(although Ruch refers to the first only) in *Wiener Studien*, XXXIII (1911) to XXXVII (1915). Mollweide there dealt with a Vatican manuscript of the ninth or tenth century containing a collection of Cicero's philosophical writings and other classical authors, compiled by the priest and scholar Hadoardus. This manuscript contains a passage from the *Hortensius*, the same passage that is cited by Augustine, *De Trin.*, XIV, 12. Did Hadoardus get the text from the original work of Cicero or from Augustine? He got it from Augustine, says Ruch. And to prove this he outlines the fantastic theory of Mollweide, according to which the sixth century saw the systematic destruction of many classical works (including the *Hortensius*). The monks of Bobbio, because of the shortage of parchment (and with no hostile purpose) are presumed to have helped in the work of the destruction of the Classics by producing many a palimpsest with a Christian work written over a pagan text. But the real enemy of classical literature is said to be Chilperic, king of the Franks, who by his "reforms" caused countless classical works to disappear throughout his realm. Ruch's acceptance of this story would lead one to believe that he has not seen the article by Charles H. Beeson, "The Collectaneum of Hadoard," *C. P.*, XL (1945), pp. 201-22, in which Mollweide's account is shown to be completely unreliable. We may well agree with Ruch in assuming that Hadoardus quoted from Augustine, but we had no need of such flimsy support for our opinion. *Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis tempus eget*. But it should be pointed out that in a footnote on p. 52 Ruch acknowledges certain objections against the theory he has adopted and expresses what appears to be regret over his acceptance of it. From this it would seem that the author changed his mind when it was too late to change the text of his work.

The difficulties in which Ruch got himself entangled here are due to the spirit of eclecticism that prompts him to take, if possible, something from nearly every opinion proposed on the problems that arise. With such a method it is only natural that he should on occasion be led unwittingly into inconsistencies and contradictions. Thus, for instance, we are told on p. 45 that the passage on the *summum bonum* in Book Three of the *Consolation* of Boethius seems to be inspired by the *Hortensius*, but on p. 135 we are given a statement from Jaeger (which is apparently accepted and approved) to the effect that this is not so.

In his arrangement of the fragments and his commentary on them, Ruch has made some noteworthy contributions. To this work he has brought an expert knowledge of the form and style of Cicero's dialogues, and he has been exceptionally diligent in searching out parallel passages in Cicero's works. He has thus been able to contribute many explanations (not always certain, but often probable) that escaped Plasberg. The arrangement and commentary are, to a large extent, based on Plasberg, but Ruch frequently goes beyond his predecessor, sometimes with happy results. He may be seen at his best in dealing with these three tantalizing fragments (pp. 63-7):

Nam quod vereris, ne non conveniat nostris aetatibus ista oratio, quae spectet ad hortandum (Frag. 57 Mueller, 1 Ruch).

Qui cum hodie bellum cum mortuo gerant (Frag. 47 Mueller, 2 Ruch).

Qui cum publicas iniurias lente tulisset, suam non tulit (Frag. 86 Mueller, 3 Ruch).

To the untrained eye these bits would seem to contain no clues as to where they belonged. Plasberg, however, had assigned them to the preface, and Ruch agrees. But Ruch goes far beyond Plasberg in explaining how these would most naturally fit into the preface; and he argues that we have in them an indication that the preface touched on three themes that are found in nearly all of the prefaces to the philosophical dialogues: a justification of the dialogue itself, a defense of the principal speaker, and an allusion to the circumstances in which the author finds himself (p. 67). This reviewer felt that in these pages, more than anywhere else, Ruch was a perfect master of his subject. The reason for this is not far to seek, for the volume under review is the author's *thèse complémentaire*, supplementing his principal thesis, *Le Préambule dans les œuvres philosophiques de Cicéron: Essai sur la genèse et l'art du dialogue* (Paris, 1958).

But there are some interpretations for which no very convincing reasons are advanced. Frequently we find not a careful weighing of evidence but simply a display of learned and ingenious guessing. The handling of the following fragment may serve as an example: *Nihil tamen inesse* [al. *esse*] *quo* [al. *in quo*] *se animus excellens tolleret* [al. *tollere*] (Frag. 62 Mueller, 78 Ruch). Plasberg put this among the fragments that he could not assign to any particular person or place. Ruch quotes Dienel's opinion, according to which Cicero is here talking about lyric poetry and saying that it has nothing in it to elevate the mind. But Ruch denies this explanation on the assumption that *tamen* supposes a previous *quamquam*; and he suggests that these words belong to Cicero's speech (the *protrepticus* proper), and that Cicero is saying that even a moderate pursuit of pleasure cannot elevate the mind. But I think a *quamquam* clause might be supplied just as readily with Dienel's reading of the text as with Ruch's. Both explanations are plausible, but each is only a guess. Perhaps Plasberg chose the better part when he decided not to busy himself about such matters when there is no evidence upon which to base an opinion. Among the other fragments for which Ruch bravely ventured an interpretation, though Plasberg could find none, these are noteworthy: 34 Mueller, 26 Ruch; 94 Mueller, 37 Ruch; 15 Mueller, 52 Ruch (see Plasberg, pp. 82-3).

Ruch's explanations are not always models of clarity; and he seems to be wide of the mark in his attempt to explain this statement: *Imbecillis autem est pudoris magister timor, qui si quando paululum aberravit, statim spe impunitatis exsultant* (Frag. 72 Mueller, 88 Ruch). Ruch's comment is: "L'idée est la suivante: la crainte ne suffit pas à détourner les hommes du mal: *timor non diuturnus magister officii* (Phil. 2, 90) . . ." Cicero, I believe, is merely saying that, in the case of those who are lacking in wisdom, fear is the thing that teaches them self-restraint, and that if fear withdraws but a step or two they become immediately irresponsible, confident that they will not be punished. In the case of the *imbecilli*, therefore, fear does suffice so long as it is present.

The bibliography, given on pp. 183-4, is extremely jejune. Many works used more than once in the course of the study are not listed.

This is the more regrettable because Ruch is sometimes exceptionally cryptic in his footnotes; as when, on p. 73, the reader is referred from the name of Helm in the text to the foot of the page where he finds this note: "1. Zwei Probleme . . .". Helm is not mentioned in the bibliography. On p. 41 there is a footnote giving what purports to be a brief bibliography on the early intellectual development of Augustine. This contains (besides an irrelevant mention of Jaeger's work on Aristotle) a number of older items that are of little importance today, and it fails to include the two most up-to-date and scholarly studies on the subject available at the time when Ruch was preparing his work for publication: Pierre Courcelle, *Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin* (Paris, 1950), and John J. O'Meara, *The Young Augustine* (London, 1954). Now, of course, one would have to add Maurice Testard, *Saint Augustin et Cicéron*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1958), which went to press about the same time as Ruch's work.

There is a considerable lack of care in the transcription of passages from the sources. On pp. 42-3, in three passages quoted from the *Confessions* of Augustine, there are five inaccuracies; and on p. 99 four errors appear in a very short passage quoted from Boethius, *Cons.*, IV, pr. 4. On p. 106, a passage from Aug., *Contra Iulianum Pelag.*, IV, 15, 76, P. L. XLIV, col. 777, is mutilated almost beyond recognition. But Ruch has, as it were, made amends, for he has recently published an article on this passage, "'Consulares philosophi' chez Cicéron et chez saint Augustin," *Revue des études augustiniennes*, V (1959), pp. 99-102, in which he not only straightens out the text but also throws considerable light on its meaning. It is unnecessary to list all such inaccuracies discovered (and they are many), but it is wise to warn the reader that he may have to be ready to check the sources quoted. In addition, there are many minor slips, due to hasty proof-reading no doubt, and these are far more numerous than one would expect in a scholarly work of this kind; but most of them will be readily detected.

It is a pity that the author did not include a table of concordances to enable the reader to refer from Mueller to Ruch and Ruch to Mueller. Not only is such a table lacking, but (as I have already pointed out) no such information is given in the body of the work with the individual fragments, nor are there references to the places where the fragments can be found in Plasberg. This reviewer can testify to the great inconvenience involved in any attempt to study this work with an eye on Mueller's text and Plasberg's commentary. One also misses an index. Such aids would have greatly enhanced the value of the book, especially since it is a work that will probably be more often consulted than read from cover to cover.

But on the whole, Ruch's book is praiseworthy and valuable. He would surely not expect his readers to agree with all the opinions he has proposed, but at least all scholars who are interested in this subject should be grateful for the abundance of source material he has gathered into the pages of this book and for the light he has so often shed on perplexing problems.

JOHN HAMMOND TAYLOR, S. J.

ST. FRANCIS XAVIER NOVITIATE,
SHERIDAN, OREGON.

G. S. KIRK and J. E. RAVEN. *The Presocratic Philosophers. A Critical History with a Selection of Texts.* Cambridge, University Press, 1957. Pp. xi + 487. \$9.50.

The task of writing the history of Presocratic philosophy is a difficult, quite often treacherous, and most of the time frustrating one. From Aristotle to Theophrastus to Burnet and Jaeger the story of such undertakings demonstrates the complex nature of this field. It is for their success in simplifying this problem rather than for solving it that Kirk and Raven should be congratulated and their work commended. Their book is unquestionably a valuable contribution to classical studies and no interpreter of early Greek philosophy can afford to ignore it. It is the only study that this reviewer knows where the distinguishable, though admittedly not always separable, questions, what are the *ipsissima verba*, how can they be meaningfully restated, and what critical labels may be reasonably hung on them, are kept distinct whenever this is historically desirable and correlated wherever this is logically required. The result is salutary. Philological questions and other related matters of textual criticism are economically presented and competently handled; historical issues regarding the essentials of each doctrine along with its conceptual setting are incisively and convincingly reconstructed; and, lastly, the logical problem concerning the significance and implications of the key notions of the period are suggestively reformulated if not always successfully solved. The authors, known from their earlier works on Heraclitus¹ and on the Pythagoreans and Eleatics,² respectively, have combined their talents to tackle a bigger problem, and their venture has proved fruitful and original.

Kirk and Raven divide their study into roughly four sections, presumably corresponding to the four crucial stages in the development of Presocratic thought. After the inevitable preliminaries on the scantiness and the deceptiveness of the available evidence (pp. 1-7), the subject is introduced with a long chapter on the forerunners of what is traditionally regarded as the beginning of Greek philosophy (pp. 8-72); there follows a section concerned with the Ionians (pp. 73-215), and one devoted to an examination of the doctrines of the Italian schools (pp. 216-318); the study concludes with a detailed account of the post-Parmenidean systems (pp. 320-445). Standard editions are used for all quotations, and even on controversial passages purely textual criticism is avoided or confined to footnotes. All fragments are translated, annotated, and illustrated with further references. Primary emphasis is given to a balanced exposition of the main tenets of the Presocratics, and all other arguments are subordinated to the attainment of this goal. In no place are the difficult problems of reconstruction and documentation despaired of or flippantly dismissed; however, although pedantry is shunned, undue confidence in the suggestive solutions is never displayed. The book is written in a pleasant style, and the continuity of the central argument is preserved without any distortion of facts.

The essentially novel feature of the work is this: Whereas most

¹ G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge 1954).

² J. E. Raven, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics* (Cambridge, 1948).

of the classical treatments of the subject (e.g. Burnet,³ Robin,⁴ Cornford,⁵ Tannery,⁶ Jaeger⁷) primarily pivot on philological and historical considerations, Kirk and Raven try to support many of their crucial arguments (e.g. their criticism of Theophrastus' account of Anaximander's ἀπειρον [pp. 105-7]) with logical observations. Whereas other commentators are preoccupied with matters of historical authenticity (e.g. Cherniss) and often ignore or pay lip-service to important conceptual distinctions, Kirk and Raven recognize the importance of such distinctions and ground many of their arguments on their implications.⁸ On account of this new approach, although the same old material is covered in the same old order, it is chiefly the continuity, development, and recurrence of certain ideas that are closely investigated rather than the cogency of any one particular system. This shifting of emphasis is welcome for, even though no startling discoveries have been made, a host of new questions is introduced that requires new conceptions and sharper analytical tools.

In the first chapter an attempt is made to show that a close examination of the pre-Ionian cosmogonies (e.g. Hesiod's or Pherecydes') reveals a kind of thinking about the world that challenges simple characterizations; for it is neither distinctly philosophical (in the later sense of this term) nor merely commonsensible. In so far as those doctrines "were . . . sometimes directed towards an explanation of the world as a whole, especially of how it came to be what it is; and they reveal on occasion a method not essentially different from that of Thales and the first Ionian philosophers" (p. 72), the problem of labeling them is a hard one. This was not adequately appreciated by the earlier historians; but soon after the pioneer work on the background of these ideas by such scholars as Rohde,⁹ Cornford,¹⁰ Guthrie,¹¹ Dodds,¹² and Nilsson,¹³ its implications became obvious. To be sure, a line can be drawn between the Ionians and their predecessors, but this must be done very carefully and with full knowledge of the consequences. As their contribution, Kirk and Raven seem to suggest that, in spite of all the apparently mythopoeic and anthropocentric features of the early cosmogonies, in so far as their stories were expressly intended as answers to the problem of the genesis, constitution, and ultimate fate of the world, they should not be regarded as mere plays of poetic imagination; for they have also a rational-explanatory value. Most of the earlier commentators overlooked the significance of the extended uses of some of the key terms of the cosmogonists and, as a result, they failed to explain the implications of many notable conceptual shifts re-

³ *Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th ed. (London, 1930).

⁴ *Greek Thought*, English trans. (London, 1928).

⁵ *Principium Sapientiae* (Cambridge, 1952).

⁶ *Pour l'Histoire de la Science Hellène*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1930).

⁷ *The Theology of Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947).

⁸ E.g. pp. 255, 292, 372.

⁹ *Psyche*, English trans. (London, 1925).

¹⁰ Above, n. 5.

¹¹ *The Greeks and their Gods* (London, 1950).

¹² *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, 1951).

¹³ *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, 2nd ed. (Munich, 1955).

fleeted in such thinking. Kirk and Raven rightly abandon this uncritical attitude; but, it must be said, this by itself does not constitute an adequate treatment of the historical problem. They seem to suggest that what is really missing in the early cosmologists is a consistently adhered to rational explanation; but nowhere do they explain the meaning and logical characteristics of this sort of approach. Undeniably they are searching for their answers in the right direction; but what kind of thing they hope to discover there, and on what grounds they could attribute it significantly to these thinkers, is something they never make clear. This can be seen in their ambiguous remarks on Hesiod's peculiar use of the concept of *χάσμα* (pp. 30 ff.); and also in their observations on Pherecydes' attitude toward the traditional stories of the gods (p. 71). Contrary to their hope, the impression left is that the concepts of "rational" and "rationalistic" cannot serve as ground for the distinction of the early cosmogonists from the Ionians because the meaning of these terms is as obscure as the historical periods they purport to delineate.

In their discussion of the Ionians, the suggestiveness as well as the limitations of this approach become much more evident. Kirk and Raven realize that, in a sense, anything that can be said about the Milesians, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus has been repeatedly stated and restated; and also most of the classical controversies regarding the reliability of Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition have already been exhaustively explored and questioned. The only thing that has not yet been done is to discover an explanation of the logical development of these doctrines. For it is undeniable that, although the *ἄσπερον* of Thales, the *ἄπειρον* of Anaximander, and the *ἀήρ* of Anaximenes are in many respects similar notions, the wide variety of purposes for which these notions are used indicates important differences in their respective "logics." Accordingly, what is the nature of the differences becomes the crucial question in these discussions. Kirk and Raven quite rightly observe that for all the Milesians these key concepts have primarily a designative use (i. e. they point to some primal concrete substance), but aside from this they also notice that these same concepts have other uses which cannot be easily described or characterized; they are closely related not only to concepts referring to the genesis of the world, but also to concepts connected with the explanation of the structure of the world, or our knowledge of it, or our predictions concerning its ultimate fate. Thus Thales' views, though apparently commonsensible, trade on hard-to-conceive extensions of common sense; similarly, Anaximander's concepts, though obviously technical, retain some contact with ordinary experience; and, likewise, Anaximenes' ideas, though undeniably ordinary, are used in an extra-ordinary ("scientific") fashion. What does all this mean? In what sense is there a logical advance traceable here? Kirk and Raven never answer these questions. Nonetheless, all along we are led to believe that we are witnessing here the birth and development of "rationality."

The difficulties inherent in clarifying this claim are as sharply felt when we turn to their discussion of Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans. Their treatment of the former's concepts, for example, of *πῦρ* and *μέτρον*, though quite incisive and historically sensible, sheds no new light on the "dynamic" conception of the relation between Change and Permanence. Similarly, it is correctly stressed that the Pytha-

gorean pluralism, though reminiscent of certain Ionian tendencies, must be distinguished from them because of its peculiar reliance on mathematical concepts; and again it is justly pointed out (p. 256) that the strange combination of mathematical with physical notions and of geometrical with empirical concepts derives from inevitable confusion of the *unit* in Arithmetic with the *point* in Geometry, with (what was later called by Aristotle) *τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων*. But, now, does that indicate adequately the admittedly novel way of looking at the world? To realize that *ἀριθμοί*, when associated with musical scales and "harmony," do one sort of thing, when related to the genesis of the world do another thing, and when identified with the structure of the world function in a distinctly different fashion—all these are extremely important observations and help to give us a clearer idea of the consequences of the "mathematization of Physics." But obviously this is not an account of the history of the Pythagoreans' conceptual troubles, nor a logical explanation of the respect in which they made an advance toward a "higher rationality."

In discussing the Eleatics, Kirk and Raven shrewdly observe that, aside from the novelty of the deductive method, Parmenides' force and originality indicate that an account of the world may not start with an *assumption* of its existence; for its existence is in need of proof too. This is a good point and proves especially valuable when the relation between the *Way of Truth* and the *Way of Opinion* is to be clarified. They quite aptly explain that the two poems are not incompatible with each other so long as the latter is never associated with existential propositions and the former with empirical ones. But having said all this, one wonders why they did not go a little further in their summing up of Parmenides and observe that the latter's "logicizing" of Physics and separation of ontology from experience caused a crisis in "rational thinking" that necessitated a radical conceptual overhaul. To be sure, their remarks on Zeno (pp. 290-7) show how his attacks on the notion of the indivisible unit and infinitely divisible extension aggravated the whole situation, thereby making any resort to experience pointless. But this was only a further complication. What is interesting about the Eleatic criticism is that no one after it, neither Empedocles nor Anaxagoras nor the Atomists, attempted to reinstate "rationality" in its old forms. They had to devise new conceptual schemes and re-allocate the facts of experience according to new rules. This, however, could not be described either as a movement toward "rationality" nor as one away from "rationality." For obviously it is nothing more than a re-examination of the critical consequences of "rationality." A closer look at Anaxagoras' *σπέρματα* and *μοῖραι* and Leucippus' *ἄτομα* further corroborates this point. Once physical questions have been distinguished from purely formal questions and the problem of the genesis and the structure of the world has been reformulated, it is not so important to know the *sources* of our knowledge as to know the exact *nature* of the objects of such knowledge. It is more because of this, I think, than because of any real desire to answer Zeno that such great care is shown by Anaxagoras and the Atomists in characterizing their key concepts and developing their theories without especial concern for consistency. But to acknowledge this is not like saying that "Anaxagoras . . . is striving . . . to imagine and describe a truly incorporeal entity" (p. 374).

The following minor slips may be a source of confusion: p. 250, line 18 for 'abstract' read 'concrete'; p. 266, line 11 for 'truthful validity' read 'truth or validity.'

The book is admirably indexed and beautifully produced on excellent paper.

PETER DIAMADOPOULOS.

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND.

Fritz M. Heichelheim. *An Ancient Economic History from the Palaeolithic Age to the Migrations of the Germanic, Slavic, and Arabic Nations*, Volume I. Revised and Complete English Edition. Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij N. V., 1958. Pp. xi + 542. 42.50 Dfl. (bound).

Twenty years ago this important book made its first appearance under the title *Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Altertums*. In the interval the author has made his home in Toronto, and the second edition appears, appropriately, in English. The translation is identified, both on the title page and in the Preface, as the work of the author's student, Mrs. Joyce Stevens. The five chapters contained in this first volume constitute one third of the whole book; an accompanying leaflet announces that the remaining two volumes are scheduled for appearance in 1958 and 1959, respectively.

The reader will want to know, first, where the two editions differ in content. This is quickly told. In the English edition the Introduction has been partly rewritten, and is a rather better statement in its new, somewhat shortened form. In Chapter V, which deals with the period *ca.* 1100-560 B. C., § 1 on "The Transition to Iron and its Economic Consequences" has been expanded by about two pages, with greater emphasis on the role of the Hittites in particular; and § 3.A.a, "Foreign Trade," has about a dozen small additions ranging in length from a clause to a whole paragraph, and totaling a page and a half. The greatest amount of rewriting is in the footnotes, which, recast and brought up to date bibliographically, are expanded from 164 to 248 pages. The rest, though interspersed with numerous small revisions or additions, remains essentially the same.

It is therefore unnecessary to restate here at length the views set forth in these chapters, especially as they are ably summarized by the late Allan Chester Johnson in his review of the German edition in this Journal (LXII [1941], pp. 361-3). Very briefly, then, Heichelheim stresses (Ch. III) man's advances in the neolithic age to the pattern of peasant economy which remained basic in western civilization till the technological revolution of the nineteenth century. Above all, it was in the neolithic food-producing culture that capital made its appearance, in the primitive form of cattle and surplus food-stocks. The use of exchangeable goods as money led to the city civilizations of the Ancient Orient (Ch. IV), with their planned state economy and their specialization of occupation and status. The coming of the iron age gave rise to "a higher standard of city civilization than had been possible for Ancient Oriental societies The time for a new and glorious age had come in which free indi-

vidualism and its creations had a fundamentally decisive role to play for millennia" (p. 194). Thus the Greeks were able to break away from the centralized collectivism of the preceding age, and with the introduction of coinage raised foreign and local trade above the level of commodity exchanges.

The reader of Heichelheim's work cannot fail to be impressed, first of all, by its scope, not only in time but in geographical extent as well: in addition to the lands traditionally dealt with in our ancient history, India and China are repeatedly brought into the picture, and the sections on prehistory include the findings of anthropologists in the far-flung reaches of the globe. Moreover, Heichelheim's constant concern is not simply to record the evidence but also to interpret it, with particular emphasis on connections, influences, and continuity; in other words, he offers us not merely a compendium, but also a synthesis. These virtues are, however, accompanied by certain shortcomings. Controversy attends many of the problems with which Heichelheim deals, and it is good that he does not hesitate to take a position, but he does not always make clear that other views exist. Moreover, the position taken is frequently extreme, the language frequently extravagant. This is especially noticeable in the case of what may be termed the author's guiding principle. To Heichelheim, a loyal disciple of Rostovtzeff, planned economy is a basic evil, *laissez faire* a basic good, in human civilization. The disinterested reader may regard this premise inspired by modern history as being of limited usefulness in illuminating the economic development of ancient societies. If guidance is to be found in modern history, it cannot be found in western capitalism alone; current events in what we call "underdeveloped areas" surely sound a warning against regarding individualism as providing the only avenue to economic advance.

The typography of this volume is handsome, the font large and easy to read. The translation has the merit of rejecting slavish adherence to the sentence structure and paragraphing of the German original. But the frequent awkwardness of the translation is exasperating to the reader, and when compounded by the woefully inadequate proofreading it produces confusion. Let us not be hypercritical in these matters. No one is really troubled (in a work which is, after all, not belletristic) by a literal translation of unidiomatic ring so long as the sense is clear. Thus, we readily comprehend that "Young Palaeolithic" (pp. 9 ff.) stands for what we normally term "Lower Palaeolithic." (But "Palaeolithicum" as a noun is a little more disconcerting.) And the literal rendering of the German phrase "in erster Linie" causes but a moment's pause when we read (p. 479): "Professor B. Laum . . . has propounded the revolutionary theory that early Greek money . . . served religious purposes in the first line." But how long will it take to figure out the meaning of "Collectivist, cum grano salis autarch, if not socialist states and societies developed too" (p. 2)? Or take the following example (p. 209): "We now know much, in addition to the Old Testament, about the royal court of Achab or a later king of Israel through Ostraka of Samaria, which reveal the part played by the strong Phoenician immigration of this time, and inform as about taxes in kind, particularly on wine and oil, which flowed to this royal court from all parts of the country and were often given away again in the

form of royal benefices." This, I take it, was meant to read as follows (I leave aside the question of stylistic inelegance): "We now know much, in addition to <what we learn from> the Old Testament, about the royal court of Ahab or a later king of Israel through ostraka from Samaria, which reveal the part played by the strong Phoenician immigration of this time, and inform us about taxes in kind, particularly in ¹ wine and oil," etc.

With sentences like this last the reading of the book becomes, it is apparent, a veritable obstacle course. Furthermore, the reader finds himself wondering whether he can rely on the English to give him an accurate rendering of the German text, or whether on points where it is crucial for him to know the author's meaning he must verify it in the original version. And if he finds a discrepancy between the two texts, how is he to decide whether the discrepant English represents the author's current intention or is merely the result of linguistic or mechanical error? For example, on p. 286, on the subject of Solon's legislation we read, "The price of land itself must have fallen as a result of the maximum limit on the sale of land." But what Solon limited (if the legislation was indeed Solonian, which many scholars doubt) was not the amount of land that might be sold, but the amount that an individual might acquire (cf. p. 283). Where the English translation has "sale," the German original correctly has "Erwerb." Since the English edition has the author's imprimatur, we must assume that he approved, if he did not initiate, the change; if so, his decision was as unfortunate as it was unnecessary.

It is pointless to multiply examples: misprints and infelicities strike the reader on almost every page. Final responsibility for the text and its proofreading rests with the author. By the same token, the publisher has the responsibility to provide the services of a copy editor adequate to the task. It is to be hoped that the erratic qualities that so impair the usefulness of the first volume will be called to the attention of the publisher in time to eliminate these defects in Volumes II and III.

NAPHTALI LEWIS.

BROOKLYN COLLEGE.

RICHARD L. BOWEN, JR. and FRANK P. ALBRIGHT. *Archaeological Discoveries in South Arabia, Volume II.* With contributions by Berta Segall, Joseph Ternbach, A. Jamme, W. F., Howard Comfort, Gus W. Van Beek. Foreword by Wendell Phillips. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. Pp. xvii + 315; 214 pls.; 1 map. \$10.00.

In 24 B. C. Augustus' legate, Aelius Gallus turned his route-worn legionaries back from the walls of Mârib, a thousand miles and six months south of his base at Leuce Come (Wejh). Sabaeen prisoners told him that he was then but two days' march from the country where incense grew. He may or may not have known that fellow

¹ Note the difference that this little word makes!

countrymen had already, in person or through middlemen, forestalled him and that the tables of Timna' in the land of myrrh just beyond his grasp were decked with products of the Empire. Whether or not Gallus knew that the precious gum had brought more than gold from the West to its producers, the labors of the American Foundation for the Study of Man have established the fact beyond cavil and have added another to the number of provinces of "Rome beyond the Imperial Frontiers."

The impact of the incense-hungry Graeco-Roman world on this remote and fabulous region has hitherto been conjecturally gauged from its coinages in imitation of Athenian new-style issues and from sporadic bronzes which have found their way out of Sana'a and Aden. It has now been unequivocally attested by field work, which has not only detected the traces of the plantations of "Gebbanitic" myrrh but has brought to light in the capital of ancient Qatabân western sigillata, glazed ware, and glass. We are now assured, moreover, that the Augustan Prefect of Egypt and the Augustan traffickers in aromatics were treading in the footsteps of Ptolemaic forerunners, who had brought to Arabia Felix new themes and new models for its art of sculpture in bronze. The art itself, as the finds from Mârib show, goes back at least to the example of Near Eastern sculptors of the early iron age. Near Eastern stone-masons of the same time inspired the masonry styles of Saba' and Qatabân.

These discoveries, touching the classical world and set forth or enlarged upon by the contributions of Comfort and Van Beek, Segall, Ternbach and Jamme, are not, however, the first concern of the volume at hand. They are incidental to the systematic description of the results of the Foundation's pioneering work in Aden Protectorate and Yemen from 1950 to 1952. This first installment is devoted chiefly to the surface exploration of Wadi Beihân and the study of its ancient ecology and to the excavations, begun but unseasonably interrupted, at Haram Bilqis, the 'Awwâm temple of Mârib. Volumes to come will deal with the sounding made at Hajar bin Humeid in Wadi Beihân, with the excavations there at Timna' and its necropolis, Heid bin Aqîl, with the inscriptions of Mârib and with the excavations at Khôr Rôri in Dhofâr. The journal of the expedition has already been made available by Wendell Phillips in his *Qataban and Sheba*.

Richard LeBaron Bowen's investigation of the ancient irrigation systems of Wadi Beihân is a striking achievement. He has recognized in the deeply dissected beds of silt and confirmed by the excavation of sluices, canal-embankments, and spillways the existence of a complex and studied method of utilizing the freshet-water in the dry valley. Unlike irrigation by dam-impounded water, by the canalization of perennial flows, or by the tapping of wells, it brought fertility by the even distribution of the fresh water and fresh silt of each periodic flash-flood over as wide an expanse as possible. Bowen is able to study the history of this unique and hitherto unidentified system from the late second millennium onward by the stratification of its deposits of silt. He shows that it represents a special adaptation to the peculiar climatic and geographic conditions of South Arabia, over which he finds it spread, making possible the agricultural base of its fabled "felicity." The prehistoric experi-

ences which may be presumed to lie back of it must henceforth be reckoned with in any account of the origins of settled life in the Near East.

The vast oval precinct of the moon-god near Mârib is probably the best known of the surviving buildings of the enigmatic architecture of South Arabia. Yet it had been briefly visited and sketchily described by only a handful of Europeans in the century and more before the arrival of the Foundation's party. In the few weeks at their disposal Frank P. Albright and his harassed band of assistants made a sampling of the secrets it might yield under more favorable circumstances. Their survey of the whole precinct and clearing of its entrance-court will be a landmark in the recovery of the past of Yemen. Albright's circumstantial account of what he was able to uncover and record is our first reliable description of a major monument of a powerful and sophisticated architecture, which still defies classification in conventional terms.

The American Foundation for the Study of Man has amply earned the support of those who are listed at the end of this volume and has deserved well of all students of the ancient world whether by enlarging our classical horizons or by putting flesh on the epigraphical skeleton that was ancient Arabia Felix.

FRANK E. BROWN.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH. *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*. Vols. VII and VIII: *Pagan Symbols in Judaism*. Pp. xviii + 239 and xii + 282. New York, Pantheon Books, 1958. (*Bollingen Series*, XXXVII.)

Again there have appeared two volumes of this monumental work, and again I have been asked by the editor of this Journal to review them. "Pagan Symbols in Judaism" is the collective title of these volumes, and it describes precisely what the editor wants to prove: the influence of pagan thought on the Jewish world and Jewish art of late antiquity. And the author, as in the earlier volumes, passes in review object after object, and asks continually: where is this object found in Jewish art, where in Egyptian art, where in Near Eastern art, and so on. What significance do these objects gain in the art of those pagan civilizations and, consequently, in Jewish art? He begins with the bull and the lion; the tree, Victory and her crown follow, to be succeeded by miscellaneous divine symbols, symbols primarily erotic, and finally psychopomps and astronomical symbols. All these are examined minutely, with complete mastery over the diverse materials and the expansive literature, and with an abundance of illustrations. The reader can only marvel at the display of such erudition.

As far as the explanation of Jewish works of art is concerned, one is, of course, free to doubt whether the author's method achieves the correct result in every single instance. Take, for example, the interpretation of the two lions which, on some Jewish gold glasses,

flank the Torah ark. Goodenough interprets them, by pagan analogy, as symbols of future life. The present writer would be inclined to see in them guardians of the sacred objects, successors of the Cherubim which, in Solomon's Temple, guarded the entrance to the ark of the covenant. The depicting of Cherubim was not permitted in later Judaism; therefore they were replaced by lions, with which the Jews were familiar from the throne of Solomon, where, too, they stood as guards. In this case, then, Jewish art sought its own past rather than a pagan present,—which is hardly astonishing, as the Jews had always had a profound reverence for the Bible.

Another doubt could be raised which, indeed, the present writer raised previously when reviewing the prior volumes: does Goodenough, at times, see too much in Jewish art? Moreover, could not what he interprets as symbol have arisen solely from a desire for decoration? Goodenough repeatedly argues this point in these two volumes. But he no more cedes his original position than the writer of this review would move from his. To take, once more, an example: the floor mosaic of the synagogue at Hamman-Lif (Africa). The synagogue is of the broadhouse type: there are three panels from left to right. The middle one is filled with objects which could certainly be interpreted by the symbolical method. The two side panels with garlands and numerous animals figured on them would seem to the reviewer to be of only decorative significance. The middle panel, mostly devoid of people, was to be viewed freely and awaken religious feelings. The two side panels were trodden by worshippers: the wider one by men, the narrower by women. And it would be unseemly to have religious pictures trampled on.

In the middle panel of this floor mosaic we see a wheel which Goodenough interprets, probably correctly, as a light symbol. But is the same or a similar interpretation in order when dealing with a rosette, simply because it, too, is round? Such rosettes abound on ossuaries, those caskets of wood or stone to house the bones of people who found their last repose in Jerusalem. The artisans who created these containers adhered strictly to the biblical prohibition against pictorial art, but wishing, on the other hand, to render the surfaces more pleasing, beset them with rosettes.

In the synagogue of Dura Europos there is, close to the floor, a mural frieze consisting of ever repeated animals, masks, and geometric designs. Goodenough interprets these objects as symbols, basing himself on similar symbols in pagan civilizations, whereas the present writer would ascribe to them merely decorative significance.

Accounting for this divergence of opinion in general, one has to note that the author of this work, one of the leading experts in the field of Hellenistic Judaism, approaches the subject from the standpoint of the philosophy and religion of that period, and is therefore inclined to view everything from this standpoint. The writer of this review, on the other hand, is an art historian who, with an insight into the history of art, above all of folk art, is aware how closely, at times, meaningful content and the purely decorative adjoin.

FRANZ LANDSBERGER.

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ATHENA'S DEVELOPMENT IN HOMERIC EPIC.

There are three stories of the birth of Athena preserved in the *Theogony*.

- (a) She was sprung directly from the head of Zeus; her office is war and she delights in it (924-6).
- (b) She was sprung from the head of Zeus, but only after he had eaten her proper mother *Metis*; if the last four lines properly belong to the passage, she came forth with the weapons of war about her (Chrysippus *ap.* Galen, III, 8, 318, printed in the Teubner text at 886, and in the Loeb at 929).
- (c) She came from the head of Zeus after he had eaten her mother *Metis*, and is stated to be equal to her father in μένος and in βουλή (886-96).

There can be no doubt that the chronological order of these versions is as I have listed them.¹ The provision of an allegorical mother must be subsequent to the simple story: and the trend of the second version is continued in the last, where the emphasis has shifted further from war to wisdom.

In Homeric epic Athena's character undergoes the same development. The *Iliad* knows her mainly as a warrior goddess: in the *Odyssey* she is predominantly a person of ideas, and the bond of sympathy between her and Odysseus is explicitly stated to be their common intelligence. The Homeric hymn in her honour (XXVIII) is later and therefore outside the scope of this

¹ The general view (Solmsen, Jacoby, Wilamowitz, Bergk, and others) is that the passages involving *Metis* are subsequent to the original *Theogony*.

article, but it is worth noticing that though it emphasises her more dramatic and pictorial warrior-like qualities it contains the only verse we have in the Homeric tradition to describe her as *πολύμητις*—an epithet which was almost certainly coined specifically to describe Odysseus.

The problem is an obvious one. At what date and by what process did a Warrior Goddess undergo the apparently unlikely transformation into a goddess associated with wisdom?

First, however, it is necessary to point out that this is the transformation which did in fact take place. The Stoic opinion which interpreted Athena's birth from the head of Zeus as signifying that from the beginning she was connected with intellect, is refuted by the long since observed fact that in Homer the head is not the seat of cogitation. Nevertheless the belief still persists in quarters where it should not,² and it is therefore worth drawing attention to the correct explanation of the myth which has only been put forward comparatively recently.³ Athena was born from Zeus' head (as Dionysus from his thigh) for the reason that according to bronze-age thought on the matter this part of the body contained the greatest quantity of the stuff of procreation. This stuff is the brain or the marrow. For is it not an easily observed fact that the greatest quantities of hair grow out of the parts of the body where there is the greatest concentration of grey matter? And there can be no question of the association between sex and hair. The emergence of Athena from the head is to be thus explained and can be seen to have no intellectual reference at all.

A more plausible alternative is to argue that Athena derived her reputation for general wisdom from her particular technical skills. In origin Athena had a dual function. She was a goddess of war; she was also a goddess of fertility and agriculture. In this domestic aspect she developed as patroness of many arts and crafts. Later, by a process of generalisation from her abilities in this respect, she came to be regarded as associated with wisdom in the broader conduct of life. "She passed from one sense of *σοφία* to the other."⁴ Now it is true that this aspect of

² E. g. Seltman, *The Twelve Olympians*, refers several times to her birth from the "brain" or "mind" of Zeus.

³ R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, etc., III, p. 233.

⁴ H. J. Rose in *O. C. D.*, s. v. Athena.

Athena is ancient,⁵ and that it was known to both the Homeric and the Hesiodic traditions. But it does not seem—at any rate as far as the minstrels were concerned—as if her reputation for wisdom was in any way derived from it. The only reason to suppose that the Greeks failed to distinguish such evidently disparate qualities as political wisdom and technical skill is the equivocal meaning of the word σοφία. But “skilfulness” is always the implication of the word in the earliest instances we have of its usage. It is not till the sixth century, till, that is to say, the Homeric and Hesiodic poets had long since associated Athena with μῆτις and βουλή, that we find it used in a generalised sense. And contemporaneously with the earliest occurrences of σοφός meaning “wise,” we find it also used *in malam partem* to imply “clever” and therefore dishonest. The word would not therefore have provided a very good *exemplar* for Athena to have followed. But the case does not rest on this somewhat negative and *a priori* evidence. The words which are employed in Homer and Hesiod in connection with Athena’s wisdom are μῆτις and βουλή.⁶ Neither of these implies technical skill. Moreover in the Homeric speech where Athena is most explicit about her wisdom (ν 298-9):

ἐγὼ δ’ ἐν πᾶσι θεοῖσι
μήτι τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσι

there is no mention at all of her connection with domestic arts. She speaks purely as a strategist. It is clear that as far as both epic traditions are concerned it is the Warrior Maid who developed brains, and not the Fertility Goddess.

I can now come to the process of the development. The first necessity of course is to establish the chronological framework

⁵ The name Athena is certainly pre-Greek. The two aspects of her character are neatly represented by her two sanctuaries on the Acropolis of Athens. Both appear ancient. The armed and standing Athena of the south side reminds one of the Minoan shield goddess; her cult in the Erechtheum looks to be of at least equal antiquity, being on the site of the Mycenaean palace and being associated with the olive, the snake, and a primitive (probably seated) *xoanon*, not to speak of the fertility ceremonies connected with the site. (See C. J. Herrington, *Athena Parthenos and Athena Polias* [Manchester, 1955].)

⁶ Though Hephaestus is called πολύμητις in the allegorical passage φ 355, and πολέφρων in φ 367 and in the lay of Demodocus (θ 297, 327), in both cases the point is his sagacity, not his dexterity as a craftsman.

into which the evidence for the changing attitude towards Athena can be fitted. But since this framework means the Homeric Question, and the Homeric Question means a library, I shall have to content myself with an unargued statement of my position.

(a) The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are of different authorship. The *Odyssey* is evidently the more recent on both literary and linguistic grounds, though these do not suffice to give any absolute measure of the interval between the two poems.⁷

(b) The *Doloneia* occupies an intermediate position. It is a self-contained lay with a constructional unity of its own. It is independent of the rest of the *Iliad* and is not referred to by it. In this double quality of independence and detachability it is unique among the suspected episodes of the *Iliad*. It is unique also in the possession of ancient testimony to its separate composition.⁸ This testimony receives confirmation from the fact that the book is full of late linguistic forms and usages. On the other hand it is certainly to be dated before the *Odyssey* (see Appendix).

(c) Nevertheless the researches of the last half century on the techniques of oral composition have proved that there is no impossibility in a poem the length of the *Iliad* being the creation of a single author.⁹ That it was so is strongly suggested by its evident unity of conception, and by the very great difficulties encountered in isolating the lays out of which it was once supposed to have been mechanically stitched together. To fix an

⁷ The discussion of *Διὶ φίλος* and *Διὶ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντος* in the Appendix offers what I believe to be a new proof of the chorizontist position.

⁸ The ancient authorities for the separate composition of the *Doloneia* are Schol. T; Eustathius, 785, 42; Schol. in Dionys. Thrax, 180, 1.

The "overwhelming" linguistic evidence for the lateness of the *Doloneia* has most recently been listed by G. P. Shipp (*Studies in the Language of the Iliad* [Cambridge, 1953]). His methods are not open to those criticisms of the analysts put forward *inter alios* by van Leeuwen in his prefatory remarks on K. The detachability of the book, which clearly makes the argument for its separate composition much stronger, has been queried by Shewan (*The Lay of Dolon*, p. 144), who attempts to see references to K in other books of the *Iliad*. To me these attempts seem unsuccessful.

⁹ Our knowledge of the technique of oral poetry as applied to Homer owes most to Milman Parry. See also Bowra, *Heroic Poetry*.

absolute date within narrow limits for the composition (i. e. first recitation) of the poem is not yet possible. Present evidence suggests a time near the middle of the eighth century.

(d) There was, however, a certain amount of rigidity before this, not only in the existence of formulaic lines and set passages, but in such matters as the geographical setting, the characters of the chief heroes, etc. And the boundary between recitation by heart and improvisation is not necessarily a clear-cut one. In traditional scenes the poet used traditional language without being bound to follow any predecessor verbatim. This seems to be the only assumption to account for the perplexing nature of the linguistic evidence. If you condemn all the books which have late forms, you will have nothing left: even if you restrain yourself to cutting out merely the episodes where they are found, you will keep only the veriest *disiecta membra*. The Quarrel will go, the scenes on Olympus, and so on

Paulatim vello et demo unum, et item unum,
Dum cadat elusus ratione ruentis acervi.

In particular the similes are both linguistically late and sophisticated in literary development.¹⁰ Yet they are essential to the plot. They set the scene, as at the beginning of Γ, they magnify climacterics, and serve in more subtle ways to show character or to pick up the thread of the narrative. The catalogue, whose present form—however genuine its historical information—is undoubtedly late, is introduced by an array of similes. Yet that our *Iliad* was never without it seems guaranteed—as Basset pointed out—by its insertion ὅσπερ πρότερον Ὀμηρικῶς (*Harvard Studies*, XXXI, p. 42). The only conclusion is that the poet of the *Iliad* was himself 'late.' Since he worked by improvisation it was always possible for him to drop into a modern colloquialism or to contrive a false archaism. The temptation would not be great in the well-worn paths of battle-narrative. But in the less traditional parts of the poem the audience might well have been more ready to tolerate neologisms, and the poet himself may have found it easier or more congenial to use modern language where his matter was also new.

¹⁰ For 'late' forms in similes and other non-narrative elements in the *Iliad* see, in addition to Shipp, Webster, *Eranos*, LIV, pp. 34-8.

(e) After its composition the *Iliad* was preserved by memory by minstrels belonging to Homer's guild or family—the Homeridae. Though their object was preservation, they had been brought up in an improvising tradition, and the desire to better their heritage must often have been too much for them.

Some such hypothesis as this seems necessary to explain apparently early accretions like © 37-8, I 382-4, I 404-5,¹¹ and in particular the 'compressed readings' where the sense of our *textus receptus* is represented in variants by a shorter number of lines.¹² It seems most likely that in these cases we have examples of modifications made by the Homeridae while the oral tradition of improvisation was still alive.

(f) The success of the *Iliad* precluded any major remodelling of the stories and characters which it had treated. As Horace says, the wise poet *quae desperat tractata nitescere posse relinquit*. (*A.P.*, 150, cf. Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1459b). But creativity—either by the Homeridae or by rival guilds—did not disappear. Hexameter poetry in fact continued to be made in the oral tradition down to a late date as the *Homeric Hymns* show, and it would be surprising if original poems were not composed in the period between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Their subjects could be anything not explicitly treated in the *Iliad*. They might be totally irrelevant to it, as the Lay of Ares and Aphrodite, or explanatory of it as the story of how Troy actually fell, or why Paris seduced Helen. Though the poems of the Trojan Cycle as we have them summarised must be subsequent to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* since they are so explicitly designed to fill up the gaps in the story left by the two great epics, it is clear that some of the Cyclic stories must have been in circulation before the composition of the *Odyssey*. The opening of the *Odyssey* could not refer as it does to the story of Aegisthus to point a moral unless its audience could be assumed to have heard Agamemnon's *nostos*. The account of Demodocus' entertainment (*θ* 74, *θ* 500), assumes familiarity with other stories of Troy.

¹¹ For the archaeological evidence that these accretions belong to the middle or end of the seventh century, see Lorimer, *Homer and the Monuments*, pp. 191, 98, 450 respectively. The first and last examples also contain linguistically 'late' forms—*ἐσπεφάρωτο* and *Πυθοί* (Shipp, pp. 44, 134).

¹² E. g. at A 219, I 14-16, M 184 ff., II 89-94, T 76.

Nestor's amazement at the closeness of the friendship between Odysseus and Athena (γ 211 ff.) is certainly not justified by anything in the *Iliad*, and would be vastly exaggerated if it referred to the *Doloneia*. If it is not just politeness, it must refer to later stories, for instance Athena's part in the *ὄπλων κρίσις*.

(g) The *Odyssey* was composed, perhaps commissioned for a festival or some other special occasion, with an eye on the *Iliad*, and possibly as a deliberate rival to it. The natural conclusion from its consistent avoidance of stories already told in the *Iliad* is not that it was ignorant of its predecessor, as Page suggests,¹³ but that it assumed its audience to know them. For the same reason it goes out of its way, particularly in Books I, III, IV, and XI, to satisfy the natural curiosity of those who knew their *Iliad* to discover what happened to the main characters in it. More subjectively one may feel that certain passages are in the nature of parody of its more militarist rival (see note 24) and that the last half of the *Odyssey* has been deliberately padded in an attempt to reach an equivalent length.

These historical assumptions about the growth of the body of Homeric poetry are, I hope, consistent with themselves and with the evidence. If they are correct they should enable us to follow the changes of fashion in thought, especially in the theology since the gods play so large a part in the poems. In particular we should be able to establish and give relative dates to the development of the conception of Athena.

In the *Iliad*, excluding the *Doloneia*, Athena has three principal functions:

1. As a warrior goddess, instilling μένος or giving actual assistance to Greek heroes.
2. As a counsellor giving advice.
3. As a patroness of craftsmanship.

The first fact to notice is that she gives a great deal more practical help than advice. Not counting the instillation of μένος which can be done by anybody or by any speech, she actively helps 21 times, and gives advice only 5 times. Secondly she distributes her favours remarkably evenly to those who receive

¹³ Page, *The Homeric Odyssey*, pp. 149 ff.

them at all. The different proportions seem due to the requirements of the narrative rather than to favouritism. Achilles receives aid 6 times, Diomedes 4 times, Odysseus 3 times, and others occasionally. She never helps Agamemnon, either of the two Ajaxes, Nestor (except as a young soldier at Pylos), Patroclus, Teucer, Idomeneus, Menestheus, or any Trojan.

Whatever the reason for these omissions may be, the pattern of her aid programme appears to rule out any special favouritism towards Odysseus. Nor in her advisory capacity does she give him any noticeably special treatment. Achilles, Tydeus, Diomedes, have one interview each, Odysseus only two. And Nestor's wisdom is quite unprompted by her advice.

As a patroness of craftsmanship she appears only 5 times—though with admirable impartiality (twice in connection with Trojans, twice abstractly in similes, once on Olympus).

If we still want to maintain that in the conception of the poet of the *Iliad* Athena was thought of as responsible for instances of human shrewdness, we must do so in defiance of these figures, and argue that the splendour of her manifestations as a prompter of thought compensates for their paucity. In particular we can point to her famous epiphany to Achilles in the first book. Here surely she personifies the prudence of his second thoughts? But it is Hera who sends her,¹⁴ and it would be a strange thing for a goddess of wisdom to need prompting to act in her own capacity. Similarly it is Hera who prompts Athena's other great manifestation to Odysseus in the assembly in the second book. It may, indeed, be argued that we cannot expect Homer to have no unresolved contradictions. He is not working out an allegory but telling a story. He sees her first as an Olympian, and then

¹⁴ The genuineness of Hera's initiative in the matter, which is put in doubt by the athetesis of one of the references to it (A 195-6), seems guaranteed by the dual *σφωτέρων* in line 216. Moreover it was Hera who originally suggested the assembly in line 55, and she may well be considered to have retained an interest in its outcome.

Zenodotus' omission of B 157-68, which excludes Hera's part in Athena's intervention in the flight to the ships, probably shows no more than that one of his texts disliked the long repetition of instructions. It is most unlikely that Hera's part was inserted later, when Athena was becoming famous in connection with Odysseus and Hera falling out of epic fashion (of her seven mentions in the *Odyssey*, none concern the central story).

through the eyes of Achilles. In the plot she is commanded by Hera, but to Achilles she appears as the externalisation of his own mind—his superego as Wade-Gery anachronistically phrases it.¹⁵ In neither aspect is she considered as the representation of wisdom. Athena equally appears to Hector to delude him into turning to face Achilles. One could just as fairly call this externalising the last hope of a desperate man. For the poet of the *Iliad*, who had no foreknowledge that Athena was going to develop into a goddess of wisdom, both appearances serve the same purpose—partly to magnify the event, partly to explain an otherwise bald and arbitrary change of mind on the part of the hero. It is as natural to use a god to explain a psychological event as a physical one. Homer can, if he likes, leave a happening unexplained. What he cannot do is to attribute it to accident. As is well known there is no such word as *τύχη* in his vocabulary. If explanation is wanted, it must be divine. And it is quite easy to see why it was Athena who intervened and came down to Achilles. There was no one else. Messengers, like Iris, take time and usually need a full council of the Gods to send them. But the crisis was urgent with Agamemnon about to be assassinated. The occasion, too, deserves a full deity. But Hera does not make these personal interventions any more than Zeus does. Poseidon is too elemental. The only really available Olympian on the Greek side is Athena. Her dignity is beyond question, but age and sex make it possible for her to persuade rather than order, and thus save what is most important in heroic poetry—the hero's own personal responsibility.

Let us now turn to the *Doloneia*. Here, it seems, is a night raid which calls for cunning rather than valour. Odysseus plays a major part, and so does Athena. Surely the poet is aware of a special relationship between the two based on their common intelligence? But this is to read the poem in the light of ideas derived from later literature, particularly the *Odyssey*.¹⁶ The poet of the *Doloneia* does not go so far. For him Diomedes has an equal share of honour and an equal share of Athena's favour, as we shall see if we examine what he says about each.

¹⁵ Wade-Gery, *The Poet of the Iliad*, p. 41.

¹⁶ That the *Doloneia* is later than the *Odyssey* is sometimes suggested, e. g. by Lorimer, *op. cit.*, p. 485.

The evidence in the Lay for a special relationship between Athena and Odysseus is:

(a) 242 ff.: Diomedes is asked to pick his man and chooses Odysseus:

οὐ πέρι μὲν πρόφρων κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀγῆνωρ
ἐν πάντεσσι πόνοισι, φιλεῖ δέ ἐ Πάλλας Ἀθήνη,
τούτου γὰρ ἔσπομένοιο καὶ ἐκ πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο
ἄμφω νοστήσασμεν, ἐπεὶ περίοιδε νοῆσαι.

The first two lines refer to courage and morale, the last two refer to mental quickness and survival capacity. The mention of Athena's love for Odysseus belongs firmly to the first couplet. There is no hint that she loves him specifically for his brains.

(b) 277 ff.: After Athena has sent them the heron as an omen they both offer her a prayer. Odysseus reminds Athena that she has always stood by him, and will she please do so now? Diomedes makes a corresponding claim that she has always stood by his father. Will she now protect him? We have no grounds for choosing to believe Odysseus' claim and denying Diomedes'. And if Tydeus was specially protected by Athena, her relationship with Odysseus was not unique, and she cannot be said to have selected her favourites on intellectual grounds.¹⁷

(c) 460: Odysseus vows to dedicate to Athena Dolon's armour, and swears that he loves her best of the Olympians. This is less significant than it appears out of context. Not only has Athena previously signalled her support of the expedition so that she is

¹⁷ Dümmler (*R. E.*, II, s. v. Athena, col. 1943) cites the stories told of Diomedes' father as evidence that Athena's habit of intervening in aid of warriors was earlier than the *Iliad*. But a tale which purports to deal with an earlier period is not necessarily itself older, as Wade-Gery showed in 1948 ("What happened in Pylos," *A. J. A.*, LII, pp. 15 ff.). Nestor's youthful exploits, so far from belonging to the earliest days, are to be referred to the dark age after the collapse of the Pylian kingdom. Nor, to come back to the divine aid given Tydeus, need Homer have been accurately reporting an authority: his motive may just as well have been to glorify Diomedes. Indeed the linguistic evidence that makes the similes and the theology 'late' does the same for the references to Tydeus! It seems that the correct inference to be drawn from the linguistic lateness of so many of the digressions—some of which, like the description of the boars' tusk helmet, contain undoubtedly old material—is that the poet was condensing or paraphrasing. (See Webster, *Eranos*, LIV, pp. 44 f.)

the natural recipient of such a vow, but in 560 ff. Athena receives—or thinks she does—a similar expression of esteem from Menelaus. But nobody infers from that the existence of any special bond between the two.

Compare the relations indicated between Athena and Diomedes.

(a) The expedition, of which she is patroness, is primarily his, and it is he who killed not only the twelve companions but also the king.

(b) She twice gives him μένος (366 and 482), and once advises him to make good his escape (507 ff.). This is admittedly not much, but it is more than is granted to Odysseus, who never gets a word out of her.

(c) She arranged that Rhesus, at the moment of his murder should be having a nightmare about Diomedes (497).

In his speech of congratulation on the successful return of the two heroes, Nestor says (553) that Zeus and Athena love them both. This seems a just summary of the position. The poet of K thought of Athena still as a warrior goddess, though perhaps with a *penchant* for stratagem. Further than this one cannot go. It is inconceivable that he knew of the very special relationship between Athena and Odysseus established by the *Odyssey*, or of its intellectual basis about which Athena is quite explicit. "Among mankind you are far the best in speech and counsel, and I am famous among all the gods for cleverness and cunning" (ν 297-9, cf. ν 331-2).

It thus appears that Athena's reputation for μῆτις developed *pari passu* with her favouritism for Odysseus. Both are embryonic in the *Iliad*. Odysseus is visited and aided by Athena, but not as frequently as other heroes. He is not yet marked out as a unique favourite. One cannot attach much weight to the lesser Ajax's petulant complaint after his athletic defeat that Athena has always stood by him like a mother (Ψ 784). It probably means no more than "he always has the luck," and in any case conveys no hint of any intellectual bond. Once, in passing, Diomedes calls Athena πολύβουλος (E 260), and here there is no connection with Odysseus. The only time the two things are apparently associated is when Athena advises Odysseus how to stop the mutiny. But though her advice is certainly

'wise,' it comes originally from Hera, and though Odysseus' 'wisdom' is specially mentioned, it is in a form which compares it to that of Zeus (Δὲ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντος, see *infra* and Appendix). In the *Doloneia* we see Athena's patronage of cunning, and her connection with Odysseus, both somewhat further emphasized. Finally in the *Odyssey* the two strands are fully developed and woven together. And if we ask who made the running in their friendship, the answer is clear—Odysseus. In the *Iliad* Athena has not acquired any divine monopoly in stratagems, or any stock epithets for cleverness. Odysseus already has. Among the Greek heroes he is the quickest on the uptake, and the most plausible speaker. And some of his stock epithets suggest that these qualities are no new acquisition. It would be surprising if they were. The development of type characters represents a comparatively primitive stage in the development of a heroic poetry. And Odysseus must have been earmarked almost from the beginning as the man of cunning.

Athena acquired her reputation for μῆτις and βουλή as a result of the part she played in Homeric poetry. It was a post-migration, Ionian, development. Yet the two allegorising accounts of her birth in the Boeotian *Theogony* are clearly composed to aetiologise this conception of her character, and must therefore presuppose an audience whose ideas had been moulded by Homeric epic.¹⁸

I should like to conclude by considering some related problems. The concept of Athena is not the only element in which the theology of the *Odyssey* differs from that of the *Iliad*. Zeus himself is greatly changed. He has lost his concern for individual men. In the *Iliad* he is three times stated to love par-

¹⁸ Another strong indication of the influence of Homer on the Boeotian tradition is the parentage of Phobos and Deimos to Ares and Aphrodite. They make strange brothers for Harmonia, and contrast with the care normally taken to keep families compatible in temperament. Moreover, as Solmsen points out (*Hesiod and Aeschylus*, p. 55 and *passim*) the children of the Olympians belong to a new order. Their names symbolise peace, good government, and the happier arts of mankind. The proper family for Phobos and Deimos to have belonged to was that of Night (*Theog.*, 211 ff.). They would there have found brothers and sisters of like mind. The only motive one can see for their exclusion from this family and their attribution to Ares is the influence of the *Iliad* (see Δ 440, Δ 37, N 299, O 119).

ticular mortals, and several times people are compared to him in counsel—*Δὲ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντος*. *Δὲ φίλος* is a frequent epithet. None of these phrases occurs in the *Odyssey*. Zeus has become far more impartial, dignified, and remote—just as his dwelling-place, Olympus, is no longer regarded as an earthly mountain. It does not seem to me that this change would take place except in an atmosphere where there was a great deal of interest in stories about the gods and their activities. That this interest existed in the final stages of Greek epic is suggested by the existence of the *Homeric Hymns*. Before these there is the story of Ares and Aphrodite told in Book Eight of the *Odyssey*, which looks like a typical lay of the post-Iliadic period. So, perhaps, is also the story of the Hanging of Hera (O 18 ff.) if Zenodotus' omission of it is evidence of its later insertion into the body of the *Iliad*. Outside the direct Homeric tradition we have the *Theogony*. In fact there can be little doubt of the existence of lively theological speculation in post-Iliadic times. Can we go further and date the beginning of this interest? Can we say, in fact, when the vivid personalisation of the gods, which we associate with the name of Olympian religion, first took place? I think we can establish a strong likelihood that it is to be dated to a comparatively recent stage in the Homeric tradition.

(a) Approximately 30% of the lines or passages in our *textus receptus* of the *Iliad* athetised or omitted by Alexandrian scholars have a theological purport. In this count I have not included lines which merely expand information about the gods or their actions which has already been given. 30% is a large proportion in view of the fact that so many of the athetised lines are made up of trivial expansions and explanations. Its significance of course depends on the position we take on the question of the athetised lines in general. If we disbelieve altogether in the objective integrity of the Alexandrians, we can only regard the athetised lines as evidence for the prejudices of Ptolemaic times. But neither this nor the supposition that they represent lines casually omitted by later copyists seems to tally with the probabilities. The most likely explanation is that the Alexandrians did have access to genuinely early manuscripts, and that these manuscripts differed. In this case it is likely that the athetised lines represent early accretions, and we can use them as evidence for the religious interest of the first Homeridae.

(b) In particular it is worth considering the line from II 89-94, to which Shipp (*Studies in Iliad*, p. 110) draws attention. Achilles' Six lines of our text were for Zenodotus. One of the lines Zenodotus omits says of the

μάλα τοὺς γε φιλεῖ ἐκάεργος Ἄπ

Compare the athetised line B 197:

τιμὴ δ' ἐκ Διὸς ἐστὶ, φιλεῖ δέ ἐ

This is said of Zeus-nurtured kings, and the motive for its athetisation in Ptolemaic Eg have had textual evidence for his reading. two passages shows that they belong to a tradition. And we can date this stratum to the *Iliad*, early in relation to the post-I "late" because of the contraction φιλεῖ, "being reasons. The difference in the first passage of Zenodotus and of the *textus receptus* is not to simple addition or subtraction. This tradition was still alive. In the second passage assumed between Zeus and mortals contradiction find in the *Odyssey*, where Zeus is never said (*infra*, p. 132). The same relationship is evident in H 280,

ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ σφῶε φιλεῖ νεφεληγε

The *Doloneia* occurrence belongs to the period of the *Odyssey*. This only leaves H 280. The evidence to show that this line was not used in the *Iliad*. If it is genuine, its uniqueness and colloquial contraction in φιλεῖ suggest that it was by the poet himself rather than inherited from

(c) These inferences are reinforced by the lateness of the theological passages and the work shows, these are on the same linguistic level. The similes, for literary reasons, can confirm the final stages of the growth of the *Iliad* to more complex forms are likely to be original. This fact is reflected in

it is a reasonable conclusion that if the language of the theological passages is also late, the explanation is the same. The theology is largely "Homer"'s creation. Thus we can vindicate Herodotus' very definite statement of opinion: "It is only since yesterday, one might say, or the day before, that the Greeks have known their gods—how each was born or whether they have always existed, what character they have, and what they look like. I take Hesiod and Homer to be four hundred years earlier than myself and not more. It is they who created for the Greeks their theogony, who gave the gods their titles, who differentiated their offices and skills, and explained their characteristics" (Herodotus, II, 53).

That Greek epic should not only reflect but should have played a major part in the development of Greek theology is not altogether a surprising conclusion. One cannot suppose that Homeric minstrels are in every respect to be compared with the illiterate bards who survive in the modern world. They must have been intellectuals in their day.¹⁹ And their theological activity was ultimately that of analysing implicit assumptions about human behaviour. It is progress to refer the inexplicable to the operation of a god. It means that at any rate you have consciously distinguished between the normal course of events and the abnormal, instead of taking them all for granted. But the Ionian poets went further. They asked insistently what sort of a god. This exploration, which must have called for great freedom from prejudice and considerable intellectual honesty, led them eventually to their vivid differentiation of divine characters. It is easier to smile at their achievement, as later

¹⁹ A constant to and fro of critical questioning must be posited to account not only for the intense rationalism of the *Iliad* (contrast the *Kalevala*, etc.) but also for the consistency and watertightness of the story-telling. A small instance will illustrate. In A 123-9 Achilles speaks on the impossibility of granting Agamemnon immediate compensation for the loss of Chryseis. He says

πῶς γάρ τοι δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι Ἀχαιοί;
οὐδέ τί που ἴδμεν ξυνήγια κείμενα πολλά·
ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πολλῶν ἐξεπράθομεν, τὰ δέδασται,
λαοὺς δ' οὐκ ἐπέοικε παλλίλλογα ταῦτ' ἐπαγγέλειν.

The only motive for these lines can be to answer the potential criticism from a politically conscious audience "Why not just vote him a reward from the public monies?"

satirists did, than to realise its magnitude. The only way to escape from a false assumption is to clarify its implications.²⁰ The idea came to him. Why? A god sent it. What god? Athena. Why did she? To help the Achaeans because she hated the Trojans. Why did she hate the Trojans? Because . . . , etc. Athena has now become an individual. The vagueness is resolved, but the absurdity manifested. To explain what you mean by her you must make her more human; but the more explicit her humanity, the less credible it becomes that she can be prompting people all over the world simultaneously. The only way to keep a god is to keep him vague—like the Stoic Zeus. The crystal gods of Homer needed only to be created to pass from the sphere of intellectual acceptance, and leave the way clear for naturalistic attempts to explain the world. It is no coincidence that Ionian science and humanism sprang up among the same people and in immediate succession to the Homeric epic. It is not that they were merely different manifestations of a national genius, but that the work of the one tradition was a necessary preliminary to the work of the other.

²⁰ Piaget, *The Child's Conception of the World* (*passim*) shows that the animist conceptions of children become their most explicit when they are about to be discarded. The parallels between children's logic and mythopoeic thought, which are both numerous and of high interest, do not of course prove that Homer's mental age was six, that children repeat racial memories, or any such facile mysticism. Rather they show the universal homogeneity of the human mind, and what solutions appear most obvious to it when first exploring the problems of the universe.

APPENDIX.

THE EPITHETS OF ODYSSEUS IN THE *ILIAD*, THE *DOLONEIA*,
AND THE *ODYSSEY*.*Epithets of Odysseus.*

+ = the epithet is used in the poem to describe characters other than Odysseus.

* = the epithet is confined to Odysseus.

Where a line reference is given, the epithet is used of Odysseus only once.

	<i>Iliad</i> (except K)	K	<i>Odyssey</i>
ἀμύμων	+ 0	+ 0	+ saepe
ἄναξ	+ 0	+ 0	+ saepe
ἀντίθεος	+ Δ 140	+ 0	+ saepe
δαίφρων	+ Δ 482	+ 0	+ 10
διογενές (in stock line)	* 6	* K 144	* saepe
“ (alone)	+ 0	* 0	* κ 443
διογενής	+ 0	* K 340	* 7
δῖος	+ saepe	+ K 460	+ saepe
Διὶ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντος	+ 3	* K 137	* 0
Διὶ φίλος	+ 2	+ K 527	* 0
δόλων ἄτ’	* Δ 430	* 0	* ν 293
δουρικλυτός	+ 4	+ 0	+ 0
δύστηνος	+ 0	* 0	+ saepe
ἔσθλός	+ 0	+ 0	+ 3
θεῖος	+ 3	+ K 243	+ saepe
Ἰθακήσιος	+ 0	* 0	* 2
κυδάλιμος	+ 0	+ 0	+ 2
Λαερτιάδης (see διογενές)	* 6	* K 144	* saepe
“ (not in stock line)	* Γ 200	* 0	* saepe
μεγάθυμος	+ 0	+ 0	+ ο 2
μεγαλήτωρ	+ E 674	* 0	+ 6
ποικιλομήτης	* Δ 482	* 0	* 6
πολύαινε	* 2	* K 544 = I 673	* μ 184
πολύμητις	+ saepe	* 6	* saepe
πολυμήχανος (v. διογενές)	* 6	* K 144	* saepe (see note on word)
πολύτλας δῖος	* 4	* K 248 = I 276	* saepe
πολύτροπος	* 0	* 0	* 2
πολύφρων	+ 0	* 0	+ 6 (in same stock line)
πτολίπορθος	+ B 278	* K 363	* 8 (inc. -ιος)
ταλασίφρων	+ Δ 466	* 0	* 7
ὁ τλήμων	* 0	* 2	* 0
φαίδιμος	+ 0	+ 0	+ 4

The preceding is a list, intended to be complete, of all the epithets of stock type applied to Odysseus in the *Iliad*, the *Doloneia*, and the *Odyssey*.

Inspection of the list confirms what we have seen from its treatment of Athena, that the *Doloneia* is closer to the *Iliad* than to the *Odyssey*. Every epithet it applies to Odysseus has precedent in the *Iliad*. On the other hand it does not apply to Odysseus those epithets which are used of him in the *Odyssey* and not in the *Iliad* (e.g. ἀμύμων, ἄναξ, δύστηνος, ἐσθλός, κυδάμιος, πολύφρων, φαίδιμος) or the epithet πολύτροπος which is peculiar to the *Odyssey* and very likely a special coinage since it so well summarizes the character in which Odysseus is regarded there. Two important epithets, Διὸ φίλος and Διὸ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντος, which are avoided by the poet of the *Odyssey*, are used in the *Doloneia*.

For difference between the *Iliad* and the *Doloneia* the list offers only slight evidence. The *Iliad* uses δουρικλυτός of Odysseus; the *Doloneia* and the *Odyssey* do not, although they both know the word. This is in keeping with Odysseus' association with the bow, which is stressed in both the later poems. ὁ πλήμων is unique to the *Doloneia*, and διογενής occurs of Odysseus outside the stock line. In both cases the article is noteworthy. These minor differences between K and the rest of the *Iliad* would certainly not be conclusive by themselves, but they support the rest of the evidence for the separate composition of the poem.

Considered individually the epithets suggest some interesting conclusions:

Διὸ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντος: ἀτάλαντος is used with freedom by the *Iliad* (26 times in seven different phrases describing eleven different characters). In the *Odyssey* it occurs only twice—each time in the phrase θεόφιν μῆστωρ ἀτάλαντος used of Patroclus (γ 110, P 477) and of Neleus (γ 409). Nevertheless this suffices to show that the *Odyssey* knew the word, and we may wonder why it did not employ it elsewhere. I can think of three possible explanations:

(a) ἀτάλαντος may have already sounded archaic, and thus be suitable only in the mouth of Nestor or in describing his father.

(b) Or its meaning may have been quite forgotten. Neither

θεόφιν nor μήστωρ occurs elsewhere in the *Odyssey*. The phrase may have been taken over from P 477 without understanding.

(c) But if the *Odyssey* borrows mechanically, the phrase Δὲ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντος could equally have been taken over. Why wasn't it? It may have been objectionable for either its scansion or its meaning. Let us consider the phrase in conjunction with Δὲ φίλος where the same problem arises.

Δὲ φίλος: Used 17 times in the *Iliad* (of Achilles 5 times, Hector 4, Odysseus 3, Patroclus, Phoenix, Apollo, the father of a hero in the Catalogue, and of heralds). Why does the *Odyssey* not use the word?

(a) The first possibility is that the *Odyssey* did not know it. Page²¹ uses the word in his list of verbal variations to prove that the *Odyssey* is a cousin rather than a descendant of the *Iliad*. Even if this unorthodox view is correct, the common ancestor cannot be very far back. There are over two hundred repeated lines in common between the two poems. And Δὲ φίλος because of its free application in the *Iliad* and the archaic scansion of its second syllable²² is not likely to be a recent coinage in the tradition. Moreover the occurrences of ἀτάλαντος mentioned above make Page's view difficult. θεόφιν μήστωρ ἀτάλαντος must, according to his reasoning, have been a current epic phrase in the time of the common ancestor, and Δὲ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντος either was not invented then or was dropped by the poets of the *Odyssey* branch of the tradition. But θεόφιν μήστωρ ἀτάλαντος is used by Nestor to describe Patroclus in just the same way as Automedon had used it, and in almost the same line (γ 110, P 477). It is used once, soon afterwards, in the same scene of the *Odyssey*, and never again. Is this coincidence? If not, the only alternative is that it was already a fixed epithet for Patroclus. But is Patroclus of such antiquity in the tradition? Or could there be a less suitable epithet to describe a young man and one who is not even a full hero? But you may think such literary feeling subjective. In that case can you disregard the powerful linguistic argument put forward for the comparative lateness of θεόφιν μήστωρ ἀτάλαντος.²³ The phrase seems almost

²¹ Page, *The Homeric Odyssey*, pp. 149 ff.

²² Buck, *The Greek Dialects*, 112, i.

²³ Shipp, *op. cit.*, p. 7, n. 2.

certainly derived from $\Delta\iota\ \mu\eta\tau\iota\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$. $\Delta\iota\ \mu\eta\tau\iota\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ must therefore have been current before the two traditions separated. The adoption of Page's view does not release us from the problem. The *Odyssey* dropped a phrase which it knew. Whether it knew it from its own previous tradition or from the *Iliad* is for this purpose immaterial. The poet must have had a reason and we are entitled to ask what it was.

(b) $\Delta\iota\ \phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ and $\Delta\iota\ \mu\eta\tau\iota\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ both necessitate scanning $\Delta\iota$ as an iamb. The *Odyssey* may have declined to use either phrase because the long vowel of the dative singular was too archaic.²⁴ ($\Delta\iota$ is only elsewhere iambic in the stock expression $\delta\iota\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\varsigma\ \pi\omicron\tau\alpha\mu\omicron\iota\omicron$ which occurs in both poems, but whose etymology and meaning may well have been forgotten.) This scansional conscience on the part of the poet of the *Odyssey* accounts for the facts, but does not have a very convincing ring.

(c) The most natural explanation is that both phrases were meaningful, and that the *Odyssey* disliked the meaning. The poet must have felt that Zeus was too omnipotent and majestic to have particular human friendships, and that it would seem either arrogant or absurdly exaggerated to compare a man's $\mu\eta\tau\iota\varsigma$ with that of Zeus.

$\pi\omicron\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\mu\eta\tau\iota\varsigma$: There is only one instance in the epics— Φ 355, certainly not an early passage—where this does not refer to Odysseus. In the *Homeric Hymns* it is used of Hermes (*H. H.*, IV, 319) and of Athena (*H. H.*, XXVIII, 2). It would seem both from its convenient scansion and its highly appropriate meaning to be a coinage made specifically to describe Odysseus.

$\pi\omicron\lambda\upsilon\mu\acute{\eta}\chi\alpha\nu\omicron\varsigma$: The word occurs 7 times in the *Iliad*, and 14 times in the *Odyssey* in the stock line

$\Delta\iota\omicron\gamma\epsilon\nu\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma\ \Lambda\alpha\epsilon\rho\tau\iota\acute{\alpha}\delta\eta,\ \pi\omicron\lambda\upsilon\mu\acute{\eta}\chi\alpha\nu'\ \acute{\omicron}\delta\upsilon\sigma\sigma\epsilon\ddot{\upsilon}.$

The vocative occurs in a variant line spoken by Agamemnon's ghost in the certainly late "continuation":

$\delta\lambda\beta\iota\epsilon\ \Lambda\alpha\acute{\epsilon}\rho\tau\alpha\omicron\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\iota,\ \pi\omicron\lambda\upsilon\mu\acute{\eta}\chi\alpha\nu'\ \acute{\omicron}\delta\upsilon\sigma\sigma\epsilon\ddot{\upsilon}.$

The nominative occurs only once, when Athena assures Telemachus that Odysseus will be scheming ways and means for his

²⁴ See note 22.

return ἐπεὶ πολυμήχανός ἐστι. πολυμηχανίη occurs once—also in the continuation—

καὶ Κίρκης κατέλεξε δόλον πολυμηχανίην τε.

This is a good example of a word emancipating itself. There can be little doubt that the compound was coined not only as an epithet for Odysseus, but also specifically for the stock line; and that only later was it felt to be familiar enough for more general use.

πολύαινε, on the other hand, never occurs except in this case and in reference to Odysseus.

πολύτλας similarly never emancipates itself from the phrase πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς which is found five times in the *Iliad* (in 'late' books—if there are such things—@ 97, I 676 = K 248, Ψ 729, 778), and thirty-six times in the *Odyssey*.

πτολίπορθος: The fact that this epithet remains in favour in the *Odyssey* whereas δουρικλυτός does not suggests that in its avoidance of the latter it is not the militarism which it objects to but specifically the allusion to spearmanship. The *Odyssey*, like the *Doloneia*, thinks of Odysseus particularly as a bowman. These epithets are used not as mere metrical counters, but with a sensitivity to their meaning.

Note also the emancipated variant πτολίπόρθιος (ι 504).

δ τλήμων: For the articles see Chantraine, *Grammaire Homérique*, II, pp. 240, 245. The precedent for K's use of the word is perhaps E 670 Ὀδυσσεύς /τλήμονα θυμὸν ἔχων. The only other occurrence of the word is Φ 430 where Athena calls the gods who assist Troy θαρσαλέοι καὶ τλήμονες. The word is not found in the *Odyssey*. ἀνθρώπων τλημοσύνας occurs in the *Hymn to Apollo*, 191.

πολύφρων: It seems impossible to apply to this word our previous conclusion and derive all its occurrences from the stock line in which it is most frequently found—νοστήσαι Ὀδυσσῆα πολύφρονα ὄνδε δόμονδε (α 83, ξ 424, υ 239, φ 204, υ 329). Not only does the line itself seem of such poor quality as to be unworthy to receive the gift of a new mintage, but we should be reduced to special pleading to prove that the word's two occurrences in the *Iliad* were post-Odyssean. Admittedly in Φ 368, Ἡφαίστοιο βίηφι πολύφρονος, the genitive dependent on βίηφι (see Shipp, *op. cit.*,

p. 10) and the allegorical context make it plausible to call the line 'late.' And the original application of the epithet to Hephaestus is perhaps more likely to have been in the end-tag *πολύφρονος* 'Ηφαίστοιο as in θ 297, 327, than in the order of Φ 368. But these considerations are quite inadequate to prove the dependence of the latter on the *Odyssey*. Even worse is the case with Σ 108

καὶ χόλος, ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ χαλεπῆναι

which forms an integral part of Achilles' speech, and which can hardly be independent of ξ 464

οἶνος . . .
ἦλεος, ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ μάλ' ἀείσαι.

The lines ξ 462 ff. read extremely like a parody of the *Iliad*,²⁵ and one is tempted to assume that the poet must have had in mind either the passage in Achilles' speech, or a similar epic *sententia*.

Both from the more intellectual concept of the *φρένες* that its sense implies, and from the pattern of its occurrences, *πολύφρων* would seem a decidedly later coinage than *πρόφρων*. It might therefore be expected to have left a trace of its original use. Odysseus, though the obvious person for the epithet to have been invented for, is not called it in the *Iliad*. The passage in the *Iliad* where it is applied to Hephaestus has marks of "lateness." The earliest looking of our extant passages is Σ 108. It is conceivable that a gnomic phrase of the pattern

. . . ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ . . .

²⁵ Not only is the whole attitude taken in ξ 462 ff. towards the Trojan war mock-heroic, but the motif of the cloak may be suggested by B 183, where Odysseus drops his cloak in his haste to check the mutiny. The line was a favourite among moralists in later antiquity to show the superiority of character to clothing, and it is possible enough that the sermon in the incident was an early discovery. Certainly the passage in the *Odyssey* is well suited to give such a moralising interpretation. Among the verbal parallels with the *Iliad* are ξ 464, cf. Σ 108; ξ 468, cf. H 157, etc.; ξ 471a, cf. A 271; ξ 471b, cf. A 270, all of which seem to gain considerably in point if they are conscious parodies of the *Iliad*. In fact for the line

εἶθ' ὥς ἡβώοιμι βίη τέ μοι ἔμπεδος εἴη

we have virtual certainty. It occurs twice in this story, and nowhere else in the *Odyssey*.

was its birth-place. Compare the similar pattern of Δ 421

. . . ὑπό κεν ταλασίφρονά περ δέος εἶλε,

and of N 300

Φόβος . . .

ἔσπετο, ὅς τ' ἐφόβησε ταλάφρονά περ πολεμιστήν.

The results arrived at in these notes on the individual epithets may be summarised under three heads:

1. *The increasing dignity and remoteness of Zeus.* This seems to be the reason for the later dropping of the epithets Διὶ φίλος and Διὶ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντος.

2. *The meaningfulness of stock-epithets.* The discarding of traditional epithets because of a no longer palatable meaning shows that to the Homeric poet—at least when the art of epic was at its peak—the epithets were felt as meaningful and not just used as line-fillers for purely metrical convenience.

3. *Newly-coined words.* In some instances it seems possible to detect the line or metrical formula for which a particular word was coined. As the line was repeated the new word became familiar. It could then be weaned from its original matrix and pass into the normal stock of epic vocabulary.

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CICERO ON THE *COMITIA CENTURIATA*:
DE RE PUBLICA, II, 22, 39-40.*

Nearly all recent discussions of the third century reform of the *Comitia Centuriata* have started from the assumption that some of Cicero's observations in *De Re Publica*, II, 22 may be treated as evidence for the nature of that reform.¹ The aim of the present paper is to demonstrate that the assumption is not valid, and to support the demonstration by a fresh interpretation of what Cicero has to say about the *Comitia Centuriata*.

At *De Re Publica*, I, 46, 70 Scipio Aemilianus, the principal speaker in the dialogue, announces his intention of giving an account of the Roman constitution as established by the ancestors and transmitted to the present generation. In II, 1, 1-3 he says that his discourse is derived from the elder Cato, and that in accordance with Cato's own practice it will go back to the *origo* of the Roman people. *Libenter enim etiam verbo utor Catonis*, he adds. Thus Cicero delicately indicates his main source, Cato's historical work *Origines*.

Scipio promises that he will set forth the historical development of the Roman state, from its birth to its full maturity

*I should like to express my thanks to Professor A. D. Momigliano, who read a first draft of this paper, for his courteous advice and assistance, without in any way involving him in responsibility for the opinions here put forward.

¹ The solitary exception is A. dell' Oro, "Rogatio e riforma dei comizi centuriati," *Parola del Passato*, XIV (1950), pp. 138 ff. His view of the Ciceronian passage has been adequately refuted by J. J. Nicholls, "The Reform of the *Comitia Centuriata*," *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 235 f. The views of E. Schönbauer, "Die römische Centurien-Verfassung in neuer Quellenschau," *Historia*, II (1953), pp. 35 ff., and "Die Centurien-Reform," *Studi in memoria di E. Albertario*, I, pp. 699 ff. have been discussed by Nicholls, *op. cit.*, pp. 236 ff. and E. S. Staveley, "The Constitution of the Roman Republic 1940-1954," *Historia*, V (1956), pp. 115 ff., and their criticisms appear conclusive.

The most recent treatment of the whole subject, L. R. Taylor's paper, "The Centuriate Assembly Before and After the Reform," *A. J. P.*, LXXVIII (1957), pp. 337 ff., illustrates the general tendency to take for granted the applicability of the Ciceronian passage to the reformed assembly.

(*et nascentem et crescentem et adultam et iam firmam atque robustam*). The historical narrative that follows reveals that the translation of the metaphor is: "from the beginnings, through the regal period, to the time when the Republic was firmly on its feet, about the middle of the fifth century." Scipio does not concern himself with developments after the fifth century B. C. The major portion of his story deals with the regal period, and at II, 21, 37 he arrives at the reign of Servius Tullius. There is a lacuna in the text between §38 and §39, but there is, of course, no doubt that when the text resumes in §39, the reign of Servius is still the subject under discussion.

The passage which is to be discussed (39) runs as follows:—

. . . duodeviginti censu maximo. deinde equitum magno numero ex omni populi summa separato relicuum populum distribuit in quinque classes senioresque a iunioribus divisit easque ita disparavit ut suffragia non in multitudinis sed in locupletium potestate essent, curavitque, quod semper in re publica tenendum est, ne plurimum valeant plurimi. quae discriptio si esset ignota vobis, explicaretur a me;

At this point textual trouble sets in, unfortunately in the vital passage. The only MS (Vat. 5757) presents a text wherein the readings of the first hand (V¹) are clearly corrupt and have been corrected and added to by a second hand (V²). V¹'s text is as follows:—

nunc rationem videtis esse talem ut equitum certamine cum et suffragiis et prima classis addita centuria quae ad summum usum urbis fabris t<i>gnariis est data VIIII centurias—tot enim relicuae sunt—octo solae si accesserunt, confecta est vis populi universa, relicuaeque multo maior multitudo sex et nonaginta centuriarum neque excluderetur suffragiis, ne superbum esset, nec valeret nimis, ne esset periculosum.

The text generally printed by editors is based on V²'s corrections and supplements. In the following extract the changes due to V² are shown in italics:—

nunc rationem videtis esse talem ut equitum *centuriae* cum *sex* suffragiis et prima classis, addita centuria quae ad summum usum urbis fabris tignariis est data, *LXXXVIII* centurias *habeat*; quibus *ex centum quattuor centuriis*—tot enim. . . .

The rest of the passage (40) is straightforward:—

in quo etiam verbis ac nominibus ipsis fuit diligens; qui cum locupletis assiduos appellasset ab asse dando, eos qui aut non plus mille quingentos aeris aut omnino nihil in suum censum praeter caput attulissent, proletarios nominavit, ut ex iis quasi proles, id est quasi progenies civitatis, exspectari videretur. illarum autem sex et nonaginta centuriarum in una centuria tum quidem plures censebantur quam paene in prima classe tota. ita nec prohibebatur quisquam iure suffragii, et is valebat in suffragio plurimum, cuius plurimum intererat esse in optimo statu civitatem. quin etiam accensis velatis, liticinibus, cornicinibus,^{1a} proletariis. . . .

(*desiderantur paginae quattuor*)

Now it is evident that Servius is the grammatical subject both of the verbs *distribuit*, *divisit*, *disparavit*, *curavit*, in §39 and of the verbs *fuit*, *appellavit*, *nominavit*, in §40. In fact, the critical passage (*quae descriptio . . . periculosum*) is surrounded by verbs denoting actions of Servius; and when §40 begins, there is no indication at all that the acts of Servius have at any point ceased to be the subject under discussion. The words *quae descriptio* clearly constitute a resumption of the preceding verbs *distribuit*, *divisit*, *disparavit*; and since these verbs describe acts of Servius, it follows that *quae descriptio* means the *descriptio* made by Servius. Therefore, when Scipio says: "if that *descriptio* were unknown to you, I should expound it," he is unquestionably referring to the Servian *descriptio*; and it is clear that the exposition which his audience's familiarity with the subject makes it unnecessary for him to offer is such an exposition as is found in Livy, I, 43 and Dionysius, *Roman Antiquities*, IV, 16 ff., an exposition in detail of the organization set up by Servius. These points are painfully obvious, but it is necessary to stress them because they seem to be often slurred over.

Accordingly, when Scipio proceeds in the next clause, beginning *nunc rationem videtis*, to present certain selected figures relating to the *Comitia Centuriata* and certain inferences as to the political results of the organization, the obvious and natural interpretation of his words in their context is that they will refer to the Servian system. This conclusion is confirmed by the next

^{1a} *liticinibus* V¹; *cornicinibus* V²; K. Ziegler (Teubner, 1958) reads only *cornicinibus*; other editors *liticinibus cornicinibus*.

sentence, at the beginning of §40, *in quo . . . fuit diligens*. The phrase *in quo* can only be a resumption of the preceding sentences, equivalent, in other words, to *in qua discriptione*; while *fuit diligens* shows that the arrangements described in those sentences, including the facts and inferences presented in the clause beginning *nunc rationem videtis*, are derived from consideration of the organization attributed to Servius himself.

But Mommsen adopted a different, and less natural, interpretation of the context.² And this interpretation, with modifications, is the foundation for theories employing the Ciceronian passage as evidence for the reform.³ Mommsen held that Cicero treats the Servian and the reformed assemblies as if they were equivalent, and that he is entitled to do so, because, for his purposes, which are political, not antiquarian, the differences were not significant. According to the Mommsenian view, the arrangements described and implied in the clause *nunc rationem videtis . . .*, etc. belong to the *Comitia Centuriata* in its reorganized form.

² *Staatsrecht*, III, p. 275, n. 1; *Droit Public Romain*, VI, 1, p. 311, n. 4.

³ P. Fraccaro in "La riforma dell' ordinamento centuriato," *Studi in onore di P. Bonfante*, I (1929), pp. 105 ff. subjects Mommsen's justification of his view to a devastating critique, but nevertheless retains the essential part of the view, that the *ratio* is that of the reformed assembly. Moreover, recognising the formidable difficulty encountered by his own view, he appears to be willing to fall back on precisely that Mommsenian view he had previously torn to pieces. See pp. 112-13 of his paper, especially: "Posso anche ammettere che tutto questo mio ragionamento sia errato e che la menzione delle 96 centurie della minoranza nel passo testè riferito di Cicerone, nel quale il soggetto è indubbiamente Servio, dimostri invece che anche sopra Cicerone intende parlare dell' ordinamento serviano; ma in tal caso è necessario . . . ritenere . . . che Cicerone abbia sostituito interamente al serviano l'ordinamento riformato" (my italics). Fraccaro gives no indication how he would defend this return to Mommsen's position. It is therefore hard to see why Staveley, "The Reform of the Comitia Centuriata," *A. J. P.*, LXXIV (1953), p. 5, considered that Fraccaro had shown "conclusively" in this part of his paper that Cicero must be referring to the centuriate organization as of the late 2nd century B. C. In fact, adherents of the view which I call for convenience 'Mommsenian' have generally shown this tendency to avoid the difficult task of defending their interpretation of Cicero's actual words, by referring to earlier discussions. That is why it is still necessary to consider Mommsen's statement of the case for the defence.

There seem to be overwhelming objections to this kind of interpretation. They may be detailed as follows:—

(a) Though the general trend of the *De Re Publica* is undoubtedly political (or rather, politico-philosophical), the special purpose of this part of the work is to give a historical account of the development of the Roman constitution up to the middle of the fifth century, based primarily on the authority of Cato. To interpolate descriptions of contemporary institutions into the account must inevitably give a distorted impression of the constitutional development, especially when the divergences from the original institution, whether insignificant or not, were clearly marked. Yet the Mommsenian view requires us to suppose that Cicero was either obtuse enough not to realise this or guilty of deliberately perpetrating such a travesty of historical method. The work is neither a political speech nor a political pamphlet, in which the author might be expected to take liberties with the facts if it suited his partisan purpose, but a would-be serious contribution to political thought. Its claim to that status would be jeopardized if Cicero were found tampering with historical truth. Indeed, there is in the correspondence with Atticus ample evidence of Cicero's care for historical accuracy, even in minutiae.⁴ The assessment which the upholders of the Mommsenian view are forced to make of Cicero's attitude to history is far too depreciative.

(b) We may fairly assume that Cicero could, if he had wished, have given an account of the Servian centuriate organization, that is, of the organization as it was before the reform; the citation of the authority of Cato, born only seven years after the earliest possible date for the reform (241 B. C.), seems to guarantee this. Why then should Cicero have deliberately avoided giving an account of the Servian organization? Why should he have preferred to interpolate, in the middle of a description of the activities of Servius Tullius, an account of the reformed centuriate organization? Mommsen's answer is that Cicero had to refer to the contemporary system because he

⁴ For detailed references see M. Rambaud, *Cicéron et l'histoire Romaine* (1953), pp. 55-7. Rambaud devotes most of his third chapter to a critical examination of the historical part of the *De Re Publica* and establishes beyond question its claim to be a serious piece of historical writing.

could not assume a general knowledge of the nature of the Servian arrangements. This might have been the case if the *De Re Publica* had been intended for, so to speak, mass consumption. But since, by the nature of the work, this could hardly be so, since, in fact, it must have been directed at a reading public on the same social and intellectual level as Cicero himself, he had every right to assume his readers' familiarity with the Servian organization. This is, indeed, the clear implication of *quae descriptio si esset ignota vobis, explicaretur a me*. As has been demonstrated above (p. 138), these words can only mean that Scipio assumes on the part of his audience a knowledge of the Servian centuriate organization. In putting the words into Scipio's mouth, Cicero must clearly be making the same assumption about his own readers. And, in any case, he does not leave everything to memory, but supplies them with what, for his purpose, are the relevant details.

(c) Since there were, on any theory, differences between the Servian and the reformed *Comitia Centuriata*, it would, *prima facie*, be a curious proceeding on Cicero's part to give an account of the former in terms of the latter. The Mommsenian view justifies such a method on the ground that the differences were not significant. Now, if the differences between the two systems were limited in such a way that the statements Cicero wished to make applied indifferently to either of them, one might accept the justification as valid. But in fact the words of Cicero, as read and interpreted by Mommsen and those scholars who refer them to the reformed assembly, are not really compatible with that supposition. The Mommsenian view is that Cicero's language indicates the following differences between the Servian and the reformed *Comitia*. Instead of the 80 centuries assigned to it in the Servian system, the first class in the reformed assembly had only 70, while the lower classes had their total number of centuries correspondingly increased from 90 to 100. As a result, whereas in the Servian system the Equites and the first class, with a combined total of 98 centuries, held a clear majority, in the reformed assembly this was no longer the case, since, as Cicero himself is supposed to state, they now required, not only the vote of the century of *fabri tignarii*, but the votes of eight centuries from the lower classes as well, in order to obtain a

majority. The Mommsenian view thus results in the extraordinary paradox that Cicero, whose supposed design is to draw attention to the preponderance of the Equites and the first class in the *Comitia Centuriata* as established by Servius,⁵ deliberately refrains from citing the clear-cut figures afforded by the Servian *discriptio*, which gave these voters an absolute majority, and chooses instead to present figures, supposedly derived from the reformed organization, which considerably diminish the force of his argument. If in the reformed assembly the Equites and the first class did not command an absolute majority, then a fundamental principle of the Servian organization had been modified. It seems merely perverse on the part of adherents of the Mommsenian view to refuse to recognise this as a significant difference in relation to what they would hold to be Cicero's theme.

(d) The Mommsenian interpretation⁶ of *nunc rationem videtis esse talem ut . . .*, etc. is that Scipio (Cicero) hereby gives notice that he is going to refer to the "present-day" centuriate organization; because he is thought to give details involving differences from the Servian system, he cannot, it is believed, be referring to the Servian organization in what follows. But the clause *in quo . . . fuit diligens*, which immediately succeeds Scipio's analysis of the centuriation, is a serious difficulty for that interpretation. If *nunc* signalized a transference to the present, Cicero would be guilty of contradicting himself. After attributing the centuriation to the "present-day," reformed assembly, he would then proceed, with *in quo . . . fuit diligens*, to refer to it as belonging to the Servian organization. It is clear, then, that if *nunc* is taken in this purely temporal sense, Cicero has to be considered as implying something definitely untrue, namely that the centuriation in the Servian and in the reformed systems was identical.

A similar confusion would arise as a result of a later sentence in §40: *illarum autem sex et nonaginta centuriarum in una centuria tum quidem plures censebantur quam paene in prima classe tota*. The "ninety-six centuries" are, as *illarum* empha-

⁵ This is the usual view of Cicero's intention. I hope to show later that it is inexact: that Cicero is concerned only with the preponderance of the first class in the Servian system (pp. 148 ff.).

⁶ So also Fraccaro, *op. cit.*, pp. 111 ff., who to some extent recognizes the difficulty; cf. n. 3 above.

sizes, those which have already been referred to in the phrase *relicua multo maior multitudo sex et nonaginta centuriarum* in the part of §39 which, according to the Mommsenian view, analyses the "present-day" centuriate organization. But now, as is clear from *tum quidem . . . censebantur*, these 96 centuries are attributed unequivocally to the Servian organization. This can be reconciled with the Mommsenian theory only if the 96 centuries were a continuing feature of the *Comitia Centuriata*, present both in the Servian and in the reformed system. But this could not be the case. According to the Mommsenian view, the 96 centuries are an arithmetical abstraction: namely, the remainder of the 104 centuries of the lower classes, etc., in the reformed assembly, after 8 centuries have been subtracted to give the higher classes a majority. This calculation has no meaning at all for the Servian assembly, in which the lower classes, etc., did not have 104 centuries assigned to them, while the higher classes held a clear majority and did not require the assistance of any centuries from the lower classes. It is true that, according to Dionysius' figures for the Servian organization, the total number of centuries was 193, so that 96 would be the remainder of centuries not participating in the majority vote.⁷ But this is an entirely different calculation. Instead of being the remainder of the 104 centuries of the lower classes and supernumeraries (except the *fabri tignarii*) after the subtraction of 8 centuries, the 96 centuries in the Servian system would be the whole of the centuries of the lower classes and supernumeraries (including the *fabri tignarii*) with the addition, moreover, of one century of the Equites or the first class, since only 97 of their 98 centuries would be required for a majority. Apart from the fact that Livy appears not to agree with Dionysius about the Servian total, so that inference based on the Dionysian version is challengeable, it is hard to believe that Cicero would have applied the same phrase to two such different concepts, especially when the demonstrative *illarum* seems to establish without question the identity of sense in the two uses of *sex et nonaginta centuriarum*.⁸

⁷ Dion. Hal., IV, 18, 2, *al.* Livy's figures, and the question of the Servian total, are discussed below (p. 154).

⁸ *quidem* in *tum quidem . . . censebantur* might seem to lend support to the Mommsenian view by suggesting a contrast between the 96

Since the Mommsenian interpretation of *sex et nonaginta centuriarum* cannot be applied to the Servian system satisfactorily, and yet the 96 centuries are certainly represented by Cicero as a feature of the Servian system, there cannot be much doubt that the Mommsenian interpretation is incorrect. And since it is impossible to apply the arithmetical calculation of which the 96 centuries form a part to both forms of the centuriate organization indifferently,⁹ and yet the calculation has to apply to the Servian system, the 96 centuries referred to by Cicero cannot be a feature of the reformed assembly. Therefore, the reference to them in the clause *nunc rationem videtis* . . . , etc. conclusively proves that this clause does not refer to the reformed, but to the Servian centuriate organization.

Unless, then, we are to suppose that Cicero (a) was guilty of an unintelligent perversion of the historical facts, (b) inexplicably failed to develop his theme in the natural way, (c) with-

centuries of the past and those of the present. But this interpretation is open to the general objections already indicated. Either it implies a continuity of "the 96 centuries" from the Servian to the reformed organization: which is not possible. Or it implies a covert admission by Cicero that when he mentioned the 96 centuries the first time, he was not actually referring to centuries of the Servian assembly, although he purported to be doing so; and this hopping backwards and forwards between the Servian and the contemporary organization would be an objectionable and improbable procedure, since the two organizations were not interchangeable.

It is evidently necessary to give an interpretation of *tum quidem* that does not make it imply a contrast between the Servian and the reformed organization. This can be done without strain. When Cicero says that more were registered by the census *in una centuria* of the 96 than in almost the whole of the first class, he is clearly thinking of the century of the *proletarii* (whom he has just mentioned); Dionysius (IV, 21, 1) makes a similar point. The contrast Cicero implies by *tum quidem* must be between the original ratio of *proletarii* to first class (*tum*, i. e. in Servius' day) and a changed ratio brought about by economic changes in later (but pre-reform) times, which may well, with increasing prosperity, have seen a relative increase in membership of the first census class and decrease in the number of people with a proletarian rating.

⁹ This must necessarily be true, whatever view of the reform be taken, since the total of centuries in the first class of the reformed assembly could not be the same as in the Servian organization; 80 centuries could not be fitted into a system based on 35 tribes. So the arithmetic of the majority is bound to be different in the two organizations.

out justification ignored an important difference between the Servian and the reformed *Comitia Centuriata*, and (d) set forth the data in a most confused and contradictory manner (in which case his evidence would surely be of dubious value anyhow)—the conclusion is inescapable that in the passage *nunc rationem videtis . . .*, etc., Cicero is doing what, in the context, we may reasonably expect him to be doing, namely, analysing certain significant aspects of the Servian centuriate organization.¹⁰

We seem to be faced with a dilemma. Scipio's analysis has to apply throughout to the Servian centuriate organization. But the accepted text based on V²'s corrections will not permit this. V²'s figure for the centuries of the first class is 10 less than the figure given by the annalistic tradition represented by Livy and Dionysius; and the figures for the other classes must be correspondingly disturbed. One might perhaps make the supposition that Cicero really did give different figures. But since Livy and Dionysius, though differing on some other points, are unanimous on the class totals and afford no hint of another tradition, we should have to suppose also that Cicero's figures were erroneous; and on general grounds it seems better to avoid making such a supposition. The obvious solution is to refuse to accept V²'s text.

Against adopting such a solution it is commonly argued that V² must have had independent manuscript authority for his emendations since they display unusual learning in regard to the existence of the *sex suffragia*. This argument contains not merely one assumption, but two: not only the hypothesis that V² had access to another MS, with which to compare V¹'s text,

¹⁰ There is of course no difficulty about the Latin of the actual phrase in question, which lends itself to a natural interpretation on such lines: *nunc* is to be understood, not in a purely temporal sense, but in its common logical sense (= *νῦν δέ*), and is to be taken with the main clause (*videtis*), not with *esse*. The sense is: "if that *discriptio* were unknown to you, I should expound it (i. e. in detail); but, as it is, you perceive the *ratio* to be such that . . . (etc.)." Of course, too, the present tense of *esse* requires no more defence in such a context than "to be" does in the English version; the *ratio*, though relating to a thing of the past, is the subject of present consideration, and the present infinitive, especially in view of its capacity to embrace the imperfect tense, is natural; and just as naturally Cicero is able to move into tenses of the past in the following subordinate clauses.

but the assumption that V², whoever he may have been, was not a person of sufficient learning to be able to emend the corrupt text by introducing a reference to the *sex suffragia*. Since, however, we have no evidence as to the identity of V², we could just as well make the hypothesis that he was not a mere scribe, but a man of antiquarian interests, whose corrections were those of a reader trying to make sense of the corrupt text before him. The MS is considered to be of early date, of the fourth or the fifth century, so that the postulation of such antiquarian knowledge on V²'s part is not necessarily far-fetched. Alternatively, even if we accept the hypothesis that V² had access to another MS, we are still not forced to accept V²'s corrections in this passage. The other MS need not necessarily have given V² any help in making his corrections here, so that he would have to use the light of his own reason; or else, the text having previously become corrupt, the other MS might have contained the result of corrections made earlier by some possessor of antiquarian knowledge. The fact is, that whether we suppose the corrections to emanate from V² himself or from an earlier source, we still have to reject them *because they make Cicero write nonsense*.¹¹

The principles which the emender will have followed are not hard to discern. He would be able to work for the most part from the text as seen in V¹'s version. In the first place, he took *relicua multo maior multitudo* to refer to the minority of centuries remaining after eight centuries (*octo solae si accesserunt*) had been deducted from the lower classes to give a majority.¹² So

¹¹ It is interesting to note that D. M. Lewis in a paper, "Ithome Again," *Historia*, II (1953/4), pp. 412 ff., was moved to make a similar suggestion with regard to the text of Thucydides, I, 103, 1. He discusses at some length the possibility that Thucydides' text was "corrected" in order to bring it into line with the "official" version, that of Ephorus, and suggests that similar considerations might be relevant to the problem of the Thucydidean text at II, 13, 3.

In the case of Cicero, the text has, in my view, been "emended" to make sense of it, and a piece of antiquarian knowledge has been brought in from another source to help with the emendation. I do not discuss the possibility that the text has been emended to give the "official" (actually Dionysius') total of centuries, because I find that the emender could have produced his results by using the data supplied by V¹'s text (and misinterpreting them).

¹² I hope to show a little later (pp. 148 ff.) that this assumption, which, indeed, has to be made by the interpreters of V²'s text, is mistaken,

this remainder, i.e. the minority, totalled 96 centuries, and therefore the majority was 97. He took *tot enim reliquae sunt* as referring to the remainder of all the centuries after those of the Equites, first class, and *fabri tignarii* had been considered apart: in other words, the total of the centuries of the lower classes before the deduction of the eight centuries. This gave him the equation: $x - 8 = 96$. So he inserted before *tot enim reliquae* the appropriate figure: *ex centum quattuor centuriis*. He had still to account for the first part of the sentence (*equitum . . . centurias*), which was now left high and dry. He took this as another equation: Equites + first class + *fabri tignarii* = y centuries. On this assumption the solution of y was evidently his majority figure, 97, minus the added 8 centuries. To V's *VIII centurias* he therefore added *LXXX . . . habeat*. As he had now bisected the sentence, he had to provide a connection between its two halves. This was done with the connecting relative *quibus*. There remained the first words of the clause. Here he had to call on resources beyond the text itself, though the alteration of *certamine* to *centuriae* was fatally obvious. His treatment of *cum et suffragiis* must have been governed by the knowledge that certain equestrian centuries were sometimes referred to as *sex suffragia*, a fact known to us from an article in Festus, and perhaps known to the emender from the same or a related source.¹³

since it entails, within the very clause containing the phrase, the possibility of a contradiction.

¹³ Festus, p. 452 L.: *sex suffragia appellantur in equitum centuriis quae sunt adiectae* (MS *adfectae*) *ei numero centuriarum quas Priscus Tarquinius rex constituit*. The passage is notoriously difficult. J. H. Oliver, "Festus on the Sex Suffragia," *Studi in onore di P. de Francisci*, I (1954), pp. 129 f., would retain the manuscript reading *adfectae*. He draws attention to Cicero, *Topica*, II, 8, where *adfectae sunt ad* appears to mean something like "are closely connected with," and considers this sense applicable in the Festus passage, which he translates: "The so-called sex suffragia are among the equestrian centuries those centuries which correspond to that group of centuries which king Tarquinius Priscus established." However, there seems some difficulty in progressing from "are closely connected with" to "correspond to," as the latter expression implies a kind of identity and the former does not. If "are closely connected with" is substituted for "correspond to" in the translation, the sense is not so satisfactory; the idea that the *sex*

In tracing the principles on which the emender reconstructed the text, it was suggested that his basic assumption was that *relicua multo maior multitudo sex et nonaginta centuriarum* designated the minority of centuries when 8 had been detached from the lower class centuries to make a majority. This assump-

suffragia are the same as (in the sense of descendent from) Tarquinius' six centuries is not thereby conveyed.

If we retain the long-established emendation *adiectae*, a possible explanation of the difficulty is that Festus has expressed himself confusedly in the process of compressing an article, perhaps from Verrius Flaccus, which contained the information (a) that *sex suffragia* was a name for the centuries established by Tarquinius Priscus (cf. Livy, I, 36, 7-8), and (b) that the rest of the equestrian centuries were "additional to that number" (cf. Livy, I, 43, 8-9). Festus probably meant *quae . . . centuriarum* to be taken as a parenthesis: "*sex suffragia* is the name for those among the equestrian centuries (which were added to that number of centuries) which king Tarquinius Priscus established." If so, Festus failed to realise that the form of the expression was illogical—he would appear to say that the equestrian centuries were added to a part of themselves. But this is at least understandable if he was merely summarizing. (This is in effect a refinement on Lindsay's interpretation; instead of making *quae . . . centuriarum* a parenthesis, he puts a semicolon after *centuriarum*. See H. Hill, *The Roman Middle Class* [1952], pp. 208-10, with reference to an earlier article in *A. J. P.*, LVIII [1937], pp. 458 f.).

Livy, XLIII, 16, 14-16 (*cum ex duodecim centuriis equitum octo censorem condemnassent multaeque aliae primae classis . . .*, etc.) and Cicero, *Phil.*, II, 33, 82 (*sortitio praerogativae: quiescit. renuntiatur: tacet. prima classis vocatur, renuntiatur: deinde ita ut adsolet suffragia, tum secunda classis: quae omnia sunt citius facta quam diu. confecto negotio . . .*, etc.), are generally held to indicate that in the reformed assembly the equestrian centuries were divided so that 12 voted with the first class while the *sex suffragia* voted between the first and the second class (cf. Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, III, p. 292; *Dr. Pub.*, VI, 1, p. 331; C. Meier, *s.v. Praerogativa Centuria*, *R.-E.*, Suppl. VIII [1956], cols. 567 ff., esp. 574). This view rests in part on what is probably a misinterpretation of Livy's phrase *multaeque aliae primae classis*. In accordance with the idiomatic usage of *alius*, the phrase would be better construed as "and many *also* of the first class" than as "and many others of the first class." This knocks away the support of Livy for the view that any equestrian centuries were combined with those of the first class. (And Dion. Hal., X, 17, which is sometimes cited, seems quite irrelevant.) As for the Ciceronian passage, if *suffragia* is supposed to be technical jargon for *sex suffragia*, we then miss a reference to the other twelve equestrian centuries. Even if they did vote in with the first class, it would surely be extraordinary if

tion is demonstrably invalid. Cicero states that, under the conditions postulated, "the remaining . . . multitude" was not excluded from the voting (*suffragiis*—not merely *iure suffragii*). But the nature of voting at Rome was such that when a majority had been reached, the casting of votes ceased. Therefore, in the

Cicero really had failed to allude to them, as he could easily have done in some such phrase as *prima classis cum equitibus*. Surely a far better solution would be to assume that, as *sex suffragia* was a name for six of the equestrian centuries (also, however, referred to as *sex centuriae*: cf. Livy, I, 36, 8 *quas nunc . . . sex vocant centurias*), so *suffragia* came to be used as technical jargon for the equestrian centuries as a whole. Then the missing reference in Cicero, *Phil.*, II, 33, 82 to the equestrian centuries presents no problem. In that case, Cicero, far from supplying indirect evidence for combination of Equites and first class, would afford direct evidence that, by 44 B. C. at least, all the equestrian centuries voted after and separately from the first class. Livy, XLIII, 16, 14-16 refers to only twelve equestrian centuries. This problem might be resolved by emendation: for example, *ex XII . . . VIII* could be a corruption of *ex XVIII . . . XII*. On the other hand, there is no necessity to accept the usual interpretation of the existing text; a perfectly natural, and, I think, preferable interpretation of it will allow for eighteen equestrian centuries voting together. There is no compelling reason to assume that Livy is listing the actual order of voting when he puts the equestrian centuries before the first class. (Cicero, by contrast, in *Phil.*, II, 33, 82, is explicitly detailing the order of voting.) Livy probably mentions the equestrian centuries first simply because their vote against the censor was especially noteworthy. The fact that, at least by the time of the Second Punic War (cf. Livy, XXIV, 7, 12, *al.*), the *centuria praerogativa* was drawn from the first class may reasonably be taken as indication that by this time the equestrian centuries had lost the priority in the voting attributed to them in the accounts of the Servian system: especially as, in Livy, XXVII, 6, 3, the (*centuriae*) *iure vocatae*, which appear to be the centuries of the first class summoned to the vote by tribes (cf. Livy, V, 18, 2: *iure vocatae tribus*; Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, III, p. 290, n. 3; p. 294, n. 1; *Dr. Pub.*, VI, 1, p. 330, n. 1; p. 333, n. 5), are found voting immediately after the *centuria praerogativa*. (C. Meier's notion, *op. cit.*, cols. 572 f., 583, that the *centuria praerogativa* may by this time have been taken from a combination of the twelve equestrian centuries with the first class is surely untenable in face of the clear evidence of Cic., *pro Planc.*, 20, 49; there the *centuria praerogativa* is designated as *unius tribus pars* when the reference is not to a specific century, but to the *centuria praerogativa* considered generally and in abstract; this surely excludes any equestrian centuries; cf. also Plutarch, *Cato Min.*, 42, 4: ἡ τε πρώτη κληθεῖσα τῶν φυλῶν). We have therefore adequate grounds for believing that for a considerable time before the date of the incident referred to

not unlikely event of a unanimous vote by the first 97 centuries, "the remaining . . . multitude of 96 centuries" would in fact be *wholly excluded from the voting*. The difficulty is caused by the fact that the 8 centuries, which are included, and which obviously constitute the justification of Cicero's assertion, are not allowed by V²'s text, and its inevitable interpretation, to be a part of the *relicua multitudo*. If the balance of votes in the assembly were really such as V²'s text represents it, Cicero would only be justified in saying that the 104 centuries of the lower classes were not excluded from the voting (because 8 of them were needed for a majority).

These considerations lead to a conclusion of great significance for the interpretation of the whole passage. The phrase *relicua*

by Livy (169 B.C.), the equestrian centuries as a whole had been voting after the first class. In view of this, the phrase *ex duodecim centuriis equitum octo* should be interpreted, not as "eight of the twelve equestrian centuries," but as "eight out of twelve centuries of the Equites." Thus, to take a general view of the whole context, when the first class had voted heavily for condemnation of the censor, and when 12 of the equestrian centuries had proceeded to the vote, also with a majority for condemnation, the *principes civitatis* became desperately anxious, and, before the equestrian voting was over, hastened to make their dramatic appeal to the rest of the voters on the censor's behalf. This would actually be consonant with the commonly accepted view that the six unmentioned centuries were the *seu suffragia*. These, being the most ancient and distinguished of the centuries, may have incorporated the votes of the senators (cf. Cicero, *De R. P.*, IV, 2, . . . *equitatus in quo suffragia sunt etiam senatus*; Hill, *op. cit.*, pp. 14 ff., 208 ff.) and so of the *principes* themselves,—certainly of the patricians among them. Their appeal would be rendered the more effective if followed up by a solid vote of the *seu suffragia* in favour of the censor.

The *seu suffragia*, then, may be regarded as a distinct, but not a detached, element of the 18 equestrian centuries. There was no especial reason for Cicero to mention them when discussing the balance of votes in the *Comitia Centuriata*. Indeed, it would appear somewhat strange that he should go out of his way to refer to the *seu suffragia* in this context, and yet should not mention until two books later (*De R. P.*, IV, 2) the *plebiscitum reddendorum equorum* of 129 B. C. which appears to have had the effect of excluding the senators from the equestrian centuries and so, presumably, from the *seu suffragia* (cf. Stein, *Der römische Ritterstand* [1927], pp. 1 ff.). After the passing of this measure there would be less reason than before for paying attention to the ancient distinction between the six and the twelve centuries of the Equites.

. . . *multitudo* does not mean "the remainder after the subtraction of 8 centuries," but simply "the remaining multitude" (including the 8 centuries) as contrasted with the higher classes previously mentioned, especially the first class. This is confirmed in §40 when *illarum sex et nonaginta centuriarum* (i. e. the *relicua multitudo*) is placed in contrast with *prima classe*. In other words, Cicero's 96 centuries are the centuries of the classes below the first. So when he speaks of the 8 centuries added to make up a majority, he does not mean 8 over and above the 96 centuries, but 8 *from* the 96. It then becomes universally true that the 96 centuries were not excluded from the voting, since 8 of their number had to be included in the majority vote.

This conclusion points the way to a revised interpretation of the arithmetic of the passage. The basis of Cicero's calculations is, not that $(104 - 8)$ is less by 1 than $(89 + 8)$, but that $(96 - 8)$ is less by 1 than $(81 + 8)$. There can be no doubt as to the significance of the figure 81 in terms of centuries. The odd century being that of the *fabri tignarii*, the other 80 are the centuries of the first class in the Servian system. This calculation would be represented in the text if, ignoring V's supplement (*habeat . . . centuriis*), we read *ad LXXXI centurias—tot enim relicuae sunt—octo solae si accesserunt* in place of V's *VIII centurias . . .*, etc.¹⁴ The parenthetical *tot enim relicuae sunt* is now seen to refer to these 81 centuries of the first class and *fabri tignarii*. The meaning implied is clearly—"81 are left of the centuries of the higher classes." And the implication of this must be that in the first words of the *ut* clause, the equestrian centuries have been exempted from the calculation in some way.

That Cicero's arithmetic should take this form need cause no surprise if the whole of §39 is brought into consideration. Scipio says that Servius "after separating off a large body of *Equites* from the total sum of the people, divided the rest of the people into five classes, distinguished seniors from juniors, and demarcated them (*the classes*) in such a way that the voting was in the power of the rich, not the multitude, and saw to it . . .

¹⁴ It is conceivable, perhaps, that corruption of the numeral might have come about through abbreviation of *octoginta unam* to *octo unam* (especially with *octo solae* following), this expression then being rationalized into *novem* or *VIII*.

that the 'most' should not be the most powerful." It is clear, then, that Scipio is paying special attention to the fact that, even within the five classes, the rich, i. e. the first class, had a striking preponderance of power vis-à-vis "the remaining much greater multitude." The *discriptio* referred to in the next sentence is the *discriptio* of the five classes; the centuriation of the Equites had already been dealt with in the sentence of which *duodeviginti censu maximo* is the surviving fragment. But *nunc rationem videtis . . .*, etc. purports to introduce an analysis of this *discriptio*. Therefore it is only to be expected that attention will be confined to the five classes and that the equestrian centuries will somehow be eliminated from consideration.

Before attempting to apply this conclusion further to V's text, it may be noted that, with the removal of V's supplements, it becomes possible to regard the whole passage from *nunc* to *periculosum* as a complete sentence. Syntactical irregularity is easily avoided by the correction of *confecta est* to *confecta esset*, so that there are three verbs governed by the consecutive construction introduced by *ut*; this affords a more satisfactory explanation of the subjunctives *excluderetur* and *valeret* than is possible with V's text. It is also an improvement that the consecutive clause is no longer broken off at *habeat*, since at that stage the account of the *ratio* is far from complete.

The phrase in which the exclusion of the equestrian centuries from the calculation is signalized forms the most corrupt part of V's text, and emendation must necessarily be speculative. The text is:

ut equitum certamine cum et suffragiis et prima classis . . .

The nominative *prima classis* has no function in the sentence. It is only a slight change to the genitive *primae classis*, dependent on *suffragiis*; then *et* is used in the sense of *etiam*. The sense given is: (eliminating the equestrian centuries from calculations) "by the votes even of the first class, with the century of *fabri tignarii*, if to their 81 centuries (for that is the number remaining of the higher class centuries) only 8 were added, the whole of the mighty will of the people was effected. . . ." With regard to the exclusion of the Equites, the word *certamine*, the facile emendation of which has seemed to many a particularly unsatisfactory feature of V's textual changes, appears in fact to

have an important function. Contention among the Equites, resulting in an evenly divided vote, would be the most convenient hypothesis for Cicero's purpose of ruling them out of calculations. The required sense could be given by

ut *aequatis* equitum certamine *suffragiis*, tamen *suffragiis*
 . . . ¹⁵

The complete text, incorporating the suggested emendations, now becomes:

nunc rationem videtis esse talem ut *aequatis* equitum certamine *suffragiis*, tamen *suffragiis* et primae classis, addita centuria quae ad summum usum urbis fabris tignariis est data, ad LXXXI centurias (tot enim reliquae sunt) octo solae si accesserunt, confecta esset vis populi universa, reliquaeque multo maior multitudo sex et nonaginta centuriarum neque excluderetur *suffragiis* ne superbum esset, nec valeret nimis ne esset periculosum.

"But, as it is, you perceive the system to be such that, even though the votes of the Equites should be equalized through contention among them, nevertheless even by the votes of the first class, with the addition of the century which to the great advantage of the city was granted to the *fabri tignarii*, if to their 81 centuries (that being the number of the remainder) only eight were added, the whole of the mighty will of the people was effected, and the remaining much greater multitude in 96 centuries was neither excluded from the voting, lest that should be too disdainful, nor given too much power, lest that should prove dangerous."

The detailed implications of the argument may be represented as follows:—Even if the equestrian part of the higher class vote cancelled out, 9 centuries voting one way and 9 the other, nevertheless the preponderance of the rich remained; for the 81 votes

¹⁵ L. Lange, in *Rh. Mus.*, N. F. VIII (1853), pp. 616 ff., had already proposed to read *aequato equitum certamine*, offering parallels from Livy, XXIX, 34: *aequaverant certamen*; I, 25: *aequato Marte*; Lucretius, II, 573: *aequo geritur certamine principiorum*. This could be adapted to my text by omission of *suffragiis* which I consider to have been lost through haplography. I do not think it necessary to consider the rest of Lange's text, which is open to fairly obvious objections. (He read: *cum esset suffragiis IX, prima classis addita, centuriae octo solae si accesserunt, confecta esset*. . .)

of the first class and *fabri tignarii* (plus, of course, the appropriate half of the equestrian vote), with the addition of only 8 votes from the lower classes (total, 98), were sufficient to secure a majority over the 96 lower class centuries less the eight centuries (and plus, of course, the other nine equestrian centuries) (total, 97).

It may be suggested that the hypothesis of an equalization of the equestrian vote is somewhat unreal. On the other hand, it was undoubtedly a most effective method whereby Cicero could concentrate attention on the special position which the first class enjoyed in the Servian organization by virtue of the disproportionate number of centuries allotted to it.

It results from the foregoing interpretation of Cicero's calculations that his total for the number of centuries in the Servian *Comitia Centuriata* is found to be 195. Dionysius, on the other hand, gives 193 as the total. Livy does not explicitly mention a total, and there is a difficulty about working one out from his detailed figures for the classes, because of a dispute concerning the correct interpretation of *in his accensi cornicines tubicinesque in tres centurias distributi* (I, 43, 7). Some editors omit *in* here and change *tres* to *duas* without MSS authority, on the dubious ground that Livy should be made to conform with Dionysius. With the text as it stands, *in his* might be interpreted so that 3 centuries of *accensi* and musicians were incorporated in the total of 30 centuries of the fifth class; in which case Livy's grand total would be 191. But it is more probable that the three were additional centuries *counted in with* the fifth class centuries;¹⁶ then the total number of centuries mentioned by Livy would be 194.

The discrepancies in the totals are entirely due to discrepancies about the supernumerary centuries. Livy has two centuries of *fabri* added to the first class, and three of *accensi* and musicians added to the fifth. Dionysius attaches two centuries of *fabri* (*χαυροῦχαι*) to the second class, and two of musicians to the fourth; he fails to mention the *accensi*. Cicero cites only one century of *fabri*, which he says was added to the first class. But by calling them *tignarii* (cf. Dionysius' *τέκτονες*), he seems to imply the existence of another century of *fabri aerarii* (Dio-

¹⁶ Cf. Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, III, p. 282, n. 4; *Dr. Pub.*, VI, 1, 320, n. 3.

nysius' ὀπλοποιοί).¹⁷ Perhaps this was added to the second class in his version; that might account for the discrepancy between Livy and Dionysius, and also for Dionysius' strange notion that the artisan centuries were divided according to age, so that one voted after the *seniores* of the second class and the other after the *iuniores*. It should be remembered that Cicero is not setting out to give a detailed account of the *Comitia Centuriata*, and so had no call to mention the other century of *fabri*, which happened not to be relevant to his purpose. He refers incidentally to a further four centuries in *quin etiam accensis velatis, liticini-bus, cornicinibus, proletariis* . . . , thus confirming Livy's century of *accensi*.¹⁸ His figure of 96 centuries for the *relicua multitudo* evidently implies the existence of 6 supernumerary centuries in this group (the *fabri tignarii* not being included), of which 5 are now accounted for. The remaining century could be identified with the *ni quis scivit centuria* referred to by Festus.¹⁹ We thereby obtain virtual agreement between Livy and Cicero concerning the total of centuries. Livy, in detailing the centuriation of the classes and supernumeraries from the point of view of the Servian census, had no occasion to refer to this century which was unconnected with the census and was in fact merely a voting arrangement for the convenience of late voters. Cicero, while not needing to refer to the century, was bound to take account of it, by implication, when making computations connected with the total number of voting centuries, which it completed. The figure 195 is, indeed, more attractive in itself than Dionysius' figure. It would indicate a voting system deliberately ordered so that the Equites and the first class together were assured of the bare majority (98 to 97), and it

¹⁷ Dion. Hal., IV, 17, 3: cf. Mommsen, *Staatsr.*, III, p. 282; p. 287, n. 3; *Dr. Pub.*, VI, 1, p. 320; p. 325, n. 2.

¹⁸ Cf. P. Fraccaro, "Accensi" in *Athenaeum*, V (1927), pp. 133 ff.

¹⁹ P. 184 L.: *ni quis scivit centuria est quae dicitur a Ser. Tullio rege constituta, in qua liceret ei suffragium ferre qui non tulisset in sua, ne quis civis suffragii iure privaretur . . . Sed in ea centuria neque censetur quisquam neque centurio praeficitur neque centurialis potest esse, quia nemo certus est eius centuriae*. There seems no justification for denying the existence of this century. The second sentence quoted strongly suggests that the century was a phenomenon still to be observed, if not in Festus' own day, at least at the time when his source wrote, so probably in the first century B. C. (whether it was Varro or Verrius Flaccus).

FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS OF AURELIA TITOUAIS.¹

The financial transactions of a certain Aurelia Titouais, daughter of Hatres, mother's name Tapaeis, of the village of Karanis have been made known to scholars within the past twenty-eight years by the publication of three papyri in three collections in three different countries, two European, one American.² These papyri—along with the three papyri published in this article—have been known to derive from purchase through a consortium of institutions (and one individual, Mr. Wilfred

¹ The following short-titles will be employed for some of the more commonly cited works in this article: Evelyn-White = H. G. Evelyn-White, *The Monasteries of the Wadi 'n Natrun*, Part II: *The History of the Monasteries of Nitra and Scetis* (New York, 1932); Hardy, *Christian Egypt* = E. R. Hardy, *Christian Egypt: Church and People* (New York, 1952); Johnson and West, *Byzantine Egypt* = A. C. Johnson and L. C. West, *Byzantine Egypt: Economic Studies* (Princeton, 1949); Kapsomenakis, *Voruntersuchungen* = S. G. Kapsomenakis, *Voruntersuchungen zu einer Grammatik der Papyri der nachchristlichen Zeit* (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, XXVIII [Munich, 1938]); Mayser, *Grammatik* = E. Mayser, *Grammatik der griechischen Papyri aus der Ptolemäerzeit* (Revised edition, 2 vols. in 6 [Leipzig and Berlin, 1923-38]); Piganiol, *L'Empire Chrétien* = A. Piganiol, *L'Empire Chrétien (325-395)* (Vol. IV, Part II of G. Glotz, *Histoire Romaine* [Paris, 1947]).

References to papyrological publications will conform to the citations in Liddell-Scott-Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*,⁹ pp. xliii-xlv. One work which does not appear there will be cited by short-title in this article, as follows: Preisigke, *Namenbuch* = F. Preisigke, *Namenbuch enthaltend alle griechischen, lateinischen, ägyptischen, hebräischen, arabischen, und sonstigen semitischen und nicht-semitischen Menschen-namen, soweit sie in griechischen Urkunden (Papyri, Ostraka, Mumien-schildern usw.) Ägyptens sich vorfinden* (Heidelberg, 1922).

² These three papyri are (1) *P. Osl.*, II, 38 (Karanis, 374 A.D. or 375 A.D.). An excellent new version of this papyrus, suggested by the second papyrus in this list (*P. Merton*, 37), is given by H. C. Youtie, "Critical Notes on Greek Papyri," in *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIII (1952), pp. 100-19, especially pp. 116-19. (2) *P. Merton*, 37 (Arsinoite nome, 373 A.D.). (3) *P. NYU*, Inv. No. xvi (Karanis, 373 A.D.), published by N. Lewis, "An Aurelia Tetouais Archive?," in *Studi in onore di Aristide Calderini e Roberto Paribeni*, II (Milan, 1957), pp. 321-3.

- ὑπαρχόντων μου πάντων
 παντύων εἰδὼν πράσσοντι σοὶ
 20 καθάπερ ἐκ δίκης καὶ ἐπερ(ωτηθεῖσα) ὁμω-
 λόγησα. ὑπατίας Δωμετίου
 Μωδέστου τοῦ λαμπροτάτου ἐπάρ-
 χου τοῦ ἱεροῦ πρετορίου καὶ Φλ(αυίου)
 Ἀρινθέου τοῦ λαμπροτάτου κόμμε-
 25 τος καὶ μαγίστρου τῆς πεδικῆς δυνά-
 μ[ε]ος Μεχὶρ θ. Αὐρηλία Τιτούεις
 ἢ προκειμένη ἔσχον τὰς τοῦ σίτου
 ἀρτάβας ἐννῆα (ἀρτάβαι) θ καὶ τὰς τῆς κρι(θῆς)
 ἀρτάβας ἑξ (ἀρτάβαι) ς καὶ ἀποδώσω πρ[ο]-
 30 θεσμία ὅς πρ[ο]κιτε. Αὐρήλιος Πέ-
 τρος Νεμεσιαγοῦ ἔγραψα ὑ-
 πὲρ αὐτῆς γρά(μματα) μὴ εἰδ(υίας).

Verso:

Χ(ειρόγραφον) Τιτούεις ἀπὸ κόμης Καρανίδος σίτου (ἀρτάβαι) θ
 καὶ κριθῆς.

2. l. Καρανίδος. 5. l. χαίρειν. 6. l. ὁμολογῶ. l. ἐσχηκέναι. 6-7. l. μεμετρηῆσθαι. 8. l. ἡμιολίας (for ἡμιολία). l. ἐννέα. 10. l. ταλάντων. 11. l. ὄντων. 12. l. σοὶ. 12-3. l. ἀποδώσω. 13. l. Ἐπεὶφ. 14. l. εὐτυχούς. l. ἰνδικτίονος. 14-5. l. ἀνυπερθέτως. 16-7. l. περιγυνομένης. 17. l. τῶν. 18. l. ὑπαρχόντων. l. πάντων. 19. l. παντοίων εἰδῶν. 20-1. l. ὠμολόγησα. 21. l. ὑπατείας. l. Δομητίου. 22. l. Μωδέστου. 23. l. πραιτωρίου. 24. l. Ἀρινθαίου. 24-5. l. κόμης. 25-6. l. δυνάμεως. 26. l. Μεχέρ. 27. l. προκειμένη. 28. l. ἐννέα. 29. l. ἀποδώσω. 30. l. ὡς πρόκειται.

NOTES

3. Κουτίνου: For feminine names in -ον in the papyri, see Mayser, *Grammatik*, II, i, pp. 31-2. Aside from the vocative, the other cases of these names are treated as feminines. See E. Schwyzler, *Griechische Grammatik*, II (Munich, 1950), p. 37. The termination -ον instead of -ω is to be explained not merely by the frequent interchange between ο(ω) and ου and ου and ο(ω) in the papyri (for which, see Kapsomenakis, *Voruntersuchungen*, p. 117; Mayser, *Grammatik*, I, i, pp. 99-100, 116-17), but also by the gradual replacement, in late Greek, of the dative by the genitive (for which, see J. Humbert, *La Disparition du datif en Grec* [Paris, 1930], pp. 168-71).

9-10. ἀργυρίου Σεβαστοῦ νομίσματος: L. C. West and A. C.

Johnson, *Currency in Roman and Byzantine Egypt* (Princeton, 1944), p. 67, counted "at least eight instances" of "Augustan (imperial) silver" in papyri of dates which range from 235 A. D. to 305 A. D.

11. *εἰς τιμήν*: F. Pringsheim, *The Greek Law of Sale* (Weimar, 1950), p. 280, construes this phrase "not as a price, but for the price." A common meaning in later Greek is "as the price." See F. Blass-A. Debrunner, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch*⁹ (Göttingen, 1954), §157, 5; W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature* (Chicago, 1957), s. v. *εἰς*, 8.

14. The second indiction here is 372/3 A. D.

25-6. *μαγίστρον τῆς πεδικῆς δυνάμεως*: This part of the title of the *magister militum*—which appears also in *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 181 (28), 3-4, and No. 181 (30), 4-5—has, to our knowledge, not hitherto been attested. For the titlature of this office, see W. Ensslin, "Zum Heermeisteramt des spätrömischen Reiches, II: Die Titulatur der *magistri militum* bis auf Theodosius I," in *Klio*, XXIII, Neue Folge V (1930), pp. 306-25, especially pp. 309-12, 323; cf. Piganiol, *L'Empire Chrétien*, pp. 331-2. (There is no need here to consider specifically the *magistri militum praesentales*, who were investigated by A. Hoepfner, "Les 'magistri militum praesentales' au IV^e siècle," in *Byzantion*, XI [1936], pp. 483-98.) Up to the time of Theodosius, the *magister militum* was frequently designated as *magister equitum et (ac) peditum*. The Greek translation of *magister* was *στρατηλάτης* or *στρατηγός*, but a half-Latin version of Arinthaëus' title, *μάγιστρος τῶν στρατιωτῶν* appears in *B. G. U.*, IV, 1092, 3, and *P. Lips.*, I, 85, 3 (as read in *Berichtigungsliste*, I, p. 212). While the *πεδικὴ δύναμις* in the three Columbia papyri could satisfactorily translate the Latin *pedestris militia*, under the Ptolemies already, it is to be observed, *πεζικαὶ* (and *ἱππικαὶ*) *δυνάμεις* had been employed in official terminology. See Preisigke, *Wörterbuch*, III, p. 217, s. v. *πεζικός*; P. M. Meyer, *Das Heerwesen der Ptolemäer und Römer in Ägypten* (Leipzig, 1900), pp. 65, 67, 93, 94. In any event, there is reason to believe that it is only because of the haphazard survival of evidence that *μάγιστρος πεδικῆς δυνάμεως* should appear now, for the first time, as one of the various forms of titlature of the *magister militum*. It will

suffice to cite two passages from the works of Libanius where the phraseology is probably not to be attributed to mere coincidence. In the first passage (Libanius, *Or.*, XX, 5, ed. Förster), when writing of a certain Barbatio, he employs the following circumscription for the office of the *magister militum*: μετὰ τοῦ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἐφεστηκός. In the second passage (Libanius, *Epist.*, 1032) where, again, he is writing about Barbatio, he uses these words: ἄγων αὐτὸς τὰς δυνάμεις.

30-31. Αὐρήλιος Πέτρος Νεμεσιανοῦ: this man appears as scribe also in *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 181 (30), where his father's name is written Νεμεσιανοῦ. For the frequent change from *a* to *ε* in the papyri, see Mayser, *Grammatik*, I, i, pp. 55-9.

TRANSLATION

Aurelia Titouais, daughter of Hatres, of the village of Karanis, of the Arsinoite nome, to Aurelia Koutinon, of the city of the Arsinoites, greetings. I agree that I have received and have had measured from you nine artabs of wheat, interest in the amount of one half charged in advance, and three thousand talents in Augustan silver coinage (3000 talents) which are for the price of six artabs of barley (6 artabs), which I shall repay to you, in full, in the month of Epeiph of the second happy indiction with no delay and without any dispute, the right of execution, when you exercise it, being yours from me or even from all my property of all kinds and sorts as though by legal decision, and when the formal question was put to me I gave my assent. In the consulship of Domitius Modestus, the illustrious Praetorian Prefect, and Flavius Arinthaëus, the illustrious *Comes* and Master of the Infantry Force, Mecheir 9. I, the aforementioned Aurelia Titouais, received the nine artabs of wheat (9 artabs) and the six artabs of barley (6 artabs) and will repay them at the appointed time, as stipulated. I, Aurelius Petrus, son of Nemesianus, have written on her behalf, she being illiterate.

Verso: Deed: Titouais, of the village of Karanis: 9 artabs of wheat, and barley.

P. Col., Inv. No. 181 (28) November 4, 372 A. D.

26.9 cm. × 13.2 cm.

ὑπατείας Δομετίου Μοδέστου τοῦ λαμπρο-
τάτου ἐπάρχου τοῦ ἱεροῦ πραιτωρίου καὶ Φλ(αυίνου)

- Ἀρινθέου τοῦ λαμπροτάτου κόμης καὶ μαγίσ-
 τρου τῆς παιδικῆς δυνάμεως Ἀθὺρ κζ.
 5 Ὁμολογεί Αὐρηλία Τετούεις Ἀτρῇ μητρὸς
 Ταπάειτος ἀπὸ κόμης Καραν[ί]δος
 Φλ(αουίω) Οὐναφρίω στρατιώτῃ λεγεῶνος
 Πρίμα Μαξιμιανῆς διακιμένης ἐν Ὁξυ-
 ρύγχων ἔχιν παρ' αὐτοῦ τ[ὴν] ὁμολογοῦσαν
 10 Τετούειν τὴν συμφωνηθεῖσαν τιμὴν σίτου
 καθαροῦ ἀρταβῶν ἕξ καὶ κριθῆς καθαῶς
 ἀρταβῶν ἕξ καὶ λαχανοσπέρμου καθ(αροῦ)
 ἀρταβῶν τριῶν ἅσπερ ἐπάνα[γ]κον ἀποδώ-
 σι τῷ Οὐναφρίω μηνὶ Παῦνι τῆς β' ἡντι-
 15 κτίονος ἐπὶ τῇ[ς] πόλεως μέτρῳ τετραχονίκῳ
 τὸ δὲ λάχ[α]νον δωδεκαμα[τ]ίω, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπαι-
 τήσεως γίνεσθαι τῷ Οὐναφρίῳ τὴν πρᾶξιν
 ἕκ ται τῆς ὁμολογούσης Τετούεις καὶ ἐκ τῶν
 ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῇ πάντων καθάπερ ἐκ δι-
 20 κης καὶ ἐπερωτηθεῖσα ὡμολόγησε).

Verso:

Χ(ειρόγραφον) Τετούεις Ἀτρῇ ἀπὸ Καρανίδος [σίτου (ἀρτάβαι) s
 καὶ κριθῆς (ἀρτάβαι) s] καὶ λαχάνου (ἀρτάβαι) γ.

1. 1. Δομιτίου. 3. 1. Ἀρινθαίου. 1. κόμης. 4. 1. πεδικῆς. 8. 1. διακει-
 μένης. 9. 1. ἔχιν. 13-14. 1. ἀποδώσει. 18. 1. τε.

NOTES

3-4. For the title, see the note to *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 59, lines 25-6.
 10. Τετούειν: There is no doubt whatsoever as to the reading of the final *nu*. Hence the name is treated as declinable, whereas in line 18, below, the indeclinable form Τετούεις is used where the genitive is called for.⁵ The nominative of the name is, in all probability, regularly Τετούεις (or Τιτούεις), rather than Τετούειν (or Τιτούειν), for, while the editors of *P. Osl.*, II, 38, followed by Youtie (see footnote 2, above), have read Τετούειν for the nominative case of the name, Lewis' suggestion (*op. cit.*,

⁵ Mayser, *Grammatik*, I, i, p. 265, observed the frequent treatment of Egyptian names formed on the *iota* stem as indeclinable. This tendency was extended farther still, for the scribes had a frequent penchant for retaining in the nominative proper names that were formed on various different stems. See J. Humbert, *La Disparition du datif en Grec* (Paris, 1930), pp. 163-4.

p. 322; see footnote 2, above) that the final *nu* was really a *sigma* resembling *nu* seems quite probable, not only because five of the six extant papyri where the name is mentioned have nominative *Τερούεις* or *Τιρούεις*, but also because the name seems quite clearly to be related to the following series of names in Preisigke, *Namenbuch*: *Τιθόεις*, *Τιθόις*, *Τιθωῆς*, *Τιτοῆς*, and *Τιτόις*. For the interchange of *θ* and *τ*, see Mayser, *Grammatik*, I, i, pp. 183-5. The spelling *Τιρούεις* occurs in *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 59; and Inv. No. 181 (30). *Τερούεις* is the spelling in *P. NYU*, Inv. No. xvi; *P. Merton*, 37; *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 181 (28).⁶

14. The second indiction here is 372/3 A. D.

15. ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως: "at the city," presumably Arsinoe, where the deed was probably drawn up.

16. δωδεκαματίω: For the proper reading and interpretation of this measure we are indebted to Professor H. C. Youtie, who, with his colleague, Professor A. E. R. Boak, generously permits us to quote the following comment on *P. Cair. Isidor.*, 71, line 12, which will appear in their forthcoming volume of Isidorus papyri: "δωδεκαματίω: the *mation* is 1/12 artaba (Wilcken, *Gr. Ostr.* I, 751 f.; for references see Preisigke, *Fachwörter*, s. v.; *LSJ*, s. v.). The *ματιαῖον μέτρον* is attested in *Sammelbuch* I, 4683, 6; the *τριμάτιον μέτρον* in Wilcken, *Gr. Ostr.* 1018, 1; the *ἡμμάτιον* in Guéraud, *Ostraca grecs et latins* (*Bull. Inst. fr. arch. or.* 41 [1942] 176)."

18. The name is treated here as indeclinable. See footnote 5, above, and the note to *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 181 (28), line 10, above.

TRANSLATION

In the consulship of Domitius Modestus, the illustrious Praetorian Prefect, and Flavius Arinthaëus, the illustrious *Comes* and Master of the Infantry Force, Hathyr 27. Aurelia Tetoueïs, daughter of Hatres, her mother being Tapaeïs, of the village of Karanis, makes acknowledgment to Flavius Venafrius, soldier of the Legio I Maximiana which is stationed in Oxyrhynchus, that she, Tetoueïs, the acknowledging party, has received the

⁶ For the frequent interchange between *ε* and *ι* in Greek in Egypt, see Mayser, *Grammatik*, I, i, pp. 80-2; Kapsomenakis, *Voruntersuchungen*, pp. 63, 69.

covenanted price of six artabs of clean wheat and six artabs of clean barley and three artabs of clean vegetable seed, which of necessity she will repay to Venafrius, by the four-choenix measure, in the month of Payni of the second indiction, at the city, and the vegetable (seed she will repay) by the *dodekamation* measure, and, upon demand, Venafrius is to have the right of execution both from Tetoueis, the acknowledging party, and from all her property as though by legal decision, and when the formal question was put to her, she gave her assent.

Verso: Tetoueis, daughter of Hatres, of Karanis: [wheat, 6 artabs, and barley, 6 artabs], and vegetable (seed), 3 artabs.

P. Col., Inv. No. 181 (30) December 17, 372 A. D.

26.7 cm. × 14.2 cm.

ὑπατίας Δωμετίου Μωδέστου τοῦ
λαμπροτάτου τοῦ λαμπροτάτου ἐπάρχου
τοῦ ἱεροῦ πρετορίου καὶ Φλ(αοῦ)ῖου Ἀρι(ν)θέου τοῦ λαμπρ-
οτάτου κόμης καὶ μαγίστρου τῆς πεδικῆς

5 δυνάμειος Χύακ κα. Αὔρηλία Τιτούς Ἀτρή
μη(τρός) Ταπαί(ος) ἀπὸ κόμης Καραν[ί]δος τοῦ Ἀρσι(νοῦ)του
νομ(οῦ)

Αὔρηλιω Οὐενάφρι Σαραπίωνος ἀπὸ τῆς
Ἀρσινωιδὸν πόλεως χαί(ρειν). ὡμολογῶ
εἰληφαὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ ἱριθμῖσθαι ἀργυρίου Σεβ-

10 αστοῦ νομίματος ταλάντων τρισχιλίων
ἐξακωσίων ὄντων ἐς τιμὴν κριθῆς
ἀρταβῶν ἐξ (κριθῆς ἀρτάβαι) εἰς ὅσπερ σοὶ ἀποδώσω μη-
νὶ Παῦνι τῆς εὐτυχῶς β' ἰνδικτίωνος
ἀνυπερθέτος καὶ ἀνευ πάσης ἀντιλο-

15 γίας τῆς πράξεως σοὶ γιγνωμένης
ἐκ ται ἐμοῦ ἢ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων
μου πάντων παντῶν εἰδὼν πρ(ά)τ-
τοντι σοὶ καὶ ἐπερωτητῆς ὡμολόγησα.
Αὔρηλία Τιτούς ἢ προκίμένη ἔσχον.

20 τὰ τοῦ ἀργυρίου ταλάντων τρισχιλίων ἐξα-
κωσίων ὄντων εἰς τιμὴν κριθῶν ἀρ-
ταβῶν ἐξ (κριθῆς ἀρτάβαι) εἰς καὶ ἀποδώσο τῇ προθ-
εσμία ὡς πρόκειται. Αὔρηλιος Πέτρος
Νεμαιοσινοῦ ἔγραψα ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς

25 γράμματα μὴ εἰδύης.

Verso:

X(ειρόγραφον) Τιτούεις Ἀτρῆ ἀπὸ κόμης Καρανίδος κριθ(ῆς)
(κριθῆς ἀρτάβαι) ς.

1. 1. ὑπατείας Δομιτίου Μοδέστου. 3. 1. πραιτωρίου. 1. Ἀρινθαίου. 4. 1. κόμητος. 5. 1. δυνάμεως. 1. Χοίακ. 6. 1. Ταπάειτος. 8. 1. Ἀρσινοϊτῶν. 1. ὁμολογῶ. 9. 1. εἰληφέναι. 1. ἡριθμῆσθαι. 10. 1. ταλάντων τρισχιλίων. 11. 1. ἑξακοσίων ὄντων εἰς. 12. 1. ἀρταβῶν. 13. 1. εὐτυχούς. 1. ἰνδικτίονος. 14. 1. ἀνυπερθέτως. 16. 1. τε. 1. τῶν ὑπαρχόντων. 17. 1. πάντων παντοίων εἰδῶν. 18. 1. ἐπερωτηθεῖσα. 1. ὠμολόγησα. 19. 1. προκειμένη. 20. 1. ταλάντων. 20-1. 1. ἑξακοσίων. 21. 1. ὄντων. 1. κριθῶν. 22. 1. ἀποδώσω. 23. 1. πρόκειται. 24. 1. Νεμεσιανοῦ. 25. 1. εἰδυίας.

NOTES

1-2. τοῦ λαμπροτάτου τοῦ λαμπροτάτου ἐπάρχου: It is preferable, we believe, not to assume dittography here. Instead, we would see stilted formality, the first τοῦ λαμπροτάτου representing *vir clarissimus*, the second being the regular descriptive adjective with the title of the Praetorian Prefect.

4-5. For the title, see the note to *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 59, lines 25-6.

9-10. ἀργυρίου Σεβαστοῦ νομίσματος: see the note to *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 59, lines 9-10.

11. ἰς τιμὴν: see the note to *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 59, line 11.

13. The second indiction here is 372/3 A. D.

21. εἰς τιμὴν: see the note to *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 59, line 11.

23. For the scribe, see the note to *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 59, lines 30-1.

TRANSLATION

In the consulship of Domitius Modestus, *vir clarissimus*, the illustrious Praetorian Prefect, and Flavius Arinthaëus, the illustrious Comes and Master of the Infantry Force, Choiak 21. Aurelia Titouis, daughter of Hatres, her mother being Tapais, of the village of Karanis of the Arsinoite nome, to Aurelius Venafer, son of Sarapion, of the city of the Arsinoites, greetings. I agree that I have received and have had measured from you for myself three thousand six hundred talents of Augustan silver coinage, which are for the price of six artabs of barley

(6 artabs of barley), which I will repay to you in the month of Payni of the second happy indiction with no delay and without any dispute, and you are to have the right of execution, when you exercise it, from me or even from all my property of all kinds and sorts, and when the formal question was put to me, I gave my assent. I, the aforementioned Aurelia Titoueis, received the three thousand six hundred talents, which were for the price of six artabs of barley (6 artabs of barley) and I shall make repayment (in barley), at the appointed time, as stipulated. I, Aurelius Petrus, son of Nemesianus, have written on her behalf, she being illiterate.

Verso: Deed: Titoueis, daughter of Hatres, of the village of Karanis: barley (6 artabs of barley).

To facilitate consideration of the six documents in which the name of Aurelia Titoueis appears, we have compiled a table (Table I, p. 167), which presents some of the more essential data with respect to each papyrus.

Of these papyri which document business transactions of Aurelia Titoueis, the three published hitherto are loan contracts, with interest included in advance (σὺν ἡμολίας). The Columbia documents—with the partial exception of Inv. No. 59—are of a different form. Documents of the type of Inv. No. 181 (28), where Titoueis received an unspecified price for specified amounts of commodities, delivery to be made some months later, have sometimes been classified by jurists under the rubric *datio in solutum*, while documents of the type of Inv. No. 181 (30), where Titoueis received a specified sum for the price of six artabs of barley, delivery, again in this instance, to be made some months later, have been characterized as “sales on delivery.” There is now substantial agreement that both types should be classified as “sales on delivery.”⁷ The form of Inv.

⁷ For these contracts, see R. Taubenschlag, *The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri*² (Warsaw, 1955), pp. 336-8, where the most important discussions of the subject are cited. A few of the important recent discussions may be cited here. F. Pringsheim, *The Greek Law of Sale* (Weimar, 1950), pp. 268-86, especially pp. 281-5; he thinks that the transaction is neither a pure loan, nor a pure sale, but consists, instead, of a mixture of elements. See also O. Montevicchi, “Ricerche di sociologia nei documenti dell'Egitto greco-romano, IV: Vendite a termine,” in *Aegyptus*, XXIV (1944), pp. 131-58; two articles by J. Hombert and C. Préaux: “Les Papyrus de la Fondation Égypto-

TABLE I

Date	Source	Commodities	Second Party	To Repay
Mecheir 9 ¹ , (Feb. 3 ¹), 372	<i>P. Col.</i> , Inv. No. 59	9 art. wheat, <i>σὺν ἡμολίας</i> ; 3000 tal. <i>εἰς τῆμῆν</i> 6 art. barley	Aurelia Koutinon, of Arsinoe	Epeiph, 2nd indiction = June-July, 373
Hathyr 8 (Nov. 4), 372	<i>P. Col.</i> , Inv. No. 181 (28)	<i>τῆμῆ</i> (unspecified) 6 art. wheat, 6 art. barley, 3 art. vegetable seed	Flavius Venafrius, soldier stationed at Oxyrhynchus	Payni, 2nd indiction = May-June, 373
Choiak 21 (Dec. 17), 372	<i>P. Col.</i> , Inv. No. 181 (30)	3600 tal. <i>εἰς τῆμῆν</i> 6 art. barley	Aurelius Venafier, son of Sarapion, of Arsinoe	Payni, 2nd indiction = May-June, 373
Thoth-Choiak (Aug.-Dec.), 373	<i>P. NYU</i> , Inv. No. xvi, 1	9 art. wheat, <i>σὺν ἡμολίας</i>	Aurelia Koutina, daughter of Elias, of Arsinoe	Payni, 3rd indiction = May-June, 374
Thoth 6 (Sept. 3), 373	<i>P. Merton</i> , 37	27 art. wheat, <i>σὺν ἡμολίας</i>	Aurelia Kottine, daughter of Ammon, of the quarter Phremei in Arsinoe	Payni, 3rd indiction = May-June, 374
Month ¹ , 374	<i>P. Osl.</i> , II, 38 (as revised by Youtie; see footnote 1, above)	40½ art. wheat, <i>σὺν ἡμολίας</i>	Aurelia Kottine, daughter of Ammon, of the quarter Phremei in Arsinoe	Payni, 4th indiction = May-June, 375

No. 59 is mixed, being, on the one hand, a pure loan with interest included in advance, on the other, a "sale in advance." But whatever the juridical classification of the Columbia documents should be, such transactions as Inv. No. 181 (28), Inv. No. 181 (30), and Inv. No. 59 partly may well have been loans in disguise.⁸ Certainly the provisions of the advance sale contracts were admirably adapted as a hedge against inflation for the lender—loans in money to be repaid with commodities which rose in value along with the price level—and would, therefore, have been a most useful device in a century when many a less prudently negotiated debt was wiped out by the great inflation. At any rate, then—so far as these six documents are concerned—Titoueis was acquiring (borrowing) money, for the most part, in 372 A. D., but in the later months of 373 A. D. and in 374 A. D. she was borrowing grain. The 40½ artabs of wheat (σὺν ἡμολίας) in *P. Osl.*, II, 38 look like a borrowing undertaken for the purpose of repaying the 27 artabs contracted for in *P. Merton*, 37. Yet, however likely it may be that Titoueis was pyramiding debts and borrowings, it would be an unrewarding speculation to attempt to see in each of these six contracts a borrowing made for the purpose of meeting a previously incurred debt, for current crops could have furnished part of the commodities required for payment. Moreover, it is probable that during the years 372-374 A. D. Titoueis entered into more financial transactions of this nature than the six transactions thus far attested. And yet, this last observation need not necessarily indicate the existence of a Titoueis archive.

As regards the identity of the individuals with whom Titoueis had dealings, a few observations may be made. The Aurelia Kottine of *P. Merton*, 37 (written Κοῦτινη) is clearly the Aurelia Kottine of *P. Osl.*, II, 38. The name is uncommon,⁹ the father's

logique Reine Elisabeth, V," in *Chronique d'Égypte*, XIV (1939), pp. 161-70, especially pp. 165-70; "Les Papyrus de la Fondation Égyptologique Reine Elisabeth, XI," in *Chronique d'Égypte*, XXI (1946), pp. 121-6. The most recent discussion of contracts of this sort in Coptic documents, along with citations of the apposite literature, may be found in A. Steinwenter, *Das Recht der koptischen Urkunden* (Munich, 1955), pp. 26-8.

⁸ This suggestion was made by Johnson and West, *Byzantine Egypt*, p. 171.

⁹ Preisigke, *Namenbuch* has the names Κόρος, Κόρτος, and Κόριως.

name is the same, and the quarter of residence in Arsinoe the same. But further attempts at identification run into difficulties, for definite recurrence of individuals may be established only when complete data (father's, mother's, and grandfather's name) or some very distinctive phenomena (such as unusual name or circumstance) are available.¹⁰ Moreover, slight variations in spelling of names are common, and they increase the difficulty of identification. Hence it is possible that the name Aurelia Koutina in the New York University papyrus may be the same name as Aurelia Kottine. Whether the names belong to the same person is another matter. Certainly the name is uncommon and the person to whom the name is attached in all instances resided in Arsinoe. But there is a very important, although not insuperable, difficulty in identifying these individuals as the same person. The father of Koutina was Elias, the father of Kottine was Ammon. We may have to do here, however, with alternative names, Ἀμμων ὁ καὶ Ἡλίας, or Ἡλίας ὁ καὶ Ἀμμων, with only one of the names given in each instance, a practise known to be rather common, even in official records.¹¹ This contingency seems probable to us in regard to Kottine (Koutina), and we would, therefore, consider Aurelia Kottine and Aurelia Koutina likely to be the same person. Likewise, on the grounds of unusual name and of residence in Arsinoe on the part of both, we would consider Aurelia Koutinon, in *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 59, to be also probably the same person.

Aurelius Venafer in *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 181 (30), and Flavius Venafrius,¹² in *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 181 (28), are not otherwise

While the woman in our papyri with the name Koutina (Kottine; Koutinon) probably had a very considerable admixture of Egyptian blood, it is still to be observed that her name is Greek. Thus, the names Κότινος and Κοττίνα appear in W. Pape, *Wörterbuch der griechischen Eigennamen* (3rd ed. by C. Benseler [Braunschweig, 1884]).

¹⁰ See the discussion of "Prosopography" by E. M. Husselman, in the Introduction to *P. Mich. Tebt.*, II, pp. 14-22, especially p. 14.

¹¹ The experience of the Michigan editors in the study of alternative names at Tebtunis was that "... From passages in which the identification of the person is certain we know (1) that either name might be used alone, ..." See E. M. Husselman, in the Introduction to *P. Mich. Tebt.*, II, p. 15.

¹² A Flavius Venafer, veteran from Dionysias, is known from the Abinnaeus Correspondence (*P. Gen.*, 48 [346 A. D.]), but he is clearly of an older generation than the soldier in the Columbia papyrus.

known, but the latter is of interest because he was a soldier of the Legio I Maximiana, which was stationed at this time at Oxyrhynchus.¹³ The establishment of the military there in force is not otherwise attested before the Arab conquest, at which time, as Maspero informs us,¹⁴ the Foutuh al Bahnasâ has numerous references to the walls and garrison of the city. Earlier than this time—with the exception of the Legio I Maximiana in the papyrus we are concerned with for the moment—we have evidence only of more minor encampments at Oxyrhynchus. The names of two quarters of the city, retained still in Roman times—"Lycians," "Cavalrymen"—attest the presence of military encampments there in Hellenistic times,¹⁵ encampments not to be compared, it would seem, with the establishment of a Roman legion. In 103 A. D. a Latin letter, from C. Minicius Italus, the Prefect of Egypt, to the prefect of the Cohors III Ituraeorum,¹⁶ seems to show that that unit was stationed in Oxyrhynchus, but, as Lesquier has observed,¹⁷ its assignment there was probably connected with the exploitation of the quarries north of Oxyrhynchus.¹⁸ For the sixth and seventh centuries A. D. Maspero was able to cite evidence for very inconsequential military units at Oxyrhynchus.¹⁹ The problem is posed, therefore, why Oxyrhynchus, which had never been an important military center, should have become, in 372 A. D., the station, for the time being, of the Legio I Maximiana, which was regularly stationed at the time of the *Notitia* far up the Nile, at Philae.²⁰

¹³ *P. Col.*, Inv. No. 181 (28), 7-9.

¹⁴ J. Maspero, *Organisation militaire de L'Égypte Byzantine* (*Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études*, Fasc. 201 [Paris, 1912]), p. 140. He does not, however, give specific citations from the Foutuh al Bahnasâ.

¹⁵ We cite the following passages as examples. *P. Oxy.*, II, 247, 20-21 (90 A. D.): ἐπ' ἀμφόδου Ἰππέων παρεμβολῆς. *P. Oxy.*, II, 250, 19 (61 A. D.): ἐν τῇ τῶν Λυκίων παρεμβολῇ. See H. Rink, *Strassen und Viertelnamen von Oxyrhynchus* (Giessen, 1924), pp. 39-40.

¹⁶ *P. Oxy.*, VII, 1022 (= Wilcken, *Chr.*, No. 453).

¹⁷ J. Lesquier, *L'Armée Romaine de l'Égypte d'Auguste à Dioclétien* (*Mémoires de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire*, XLI [Cairo, 1918]), pp. 91, 96.

¹⁸ *P. Oxy.*, III, p. 214, introduction to No. 498; cf. K. Fitzler, *Steinbrüche und Bergwerke im ptolemäischen und römischen Ägypten* (*Leipziger historische Abhandlungen*, Heft XXI [Leipzig, 1910]), pp. 71, 109.

¹⁹ Maspero, *op. cit.*, p. 140 (see footnote 14, above).

²⁰ *Notitia Dignitatum . . . in partibus Orientis* (ed. O. Seeck), XXXI,

We would suggest that the encampment of the Legio I Maximiana in Oxyrhynchus in 372 A.D. is to be explained by the fact that, just at that time, the government found it necessary to resort to force in dealing with the perennial problem of flight from burdensome public services. While there is no literary testimony to this effect, Oxyrhynchus, there is reason to believe, was one of the centers of resistance, as we shall observe more closely at a later juncture. In the fourth century—and acutely in the sixth and seventh decades of the century—the flight took a form that differed somewhat from the *anachoresis* of earlier Roman times: a religious element now supervened. The beginnings of this kind of flight go back to the early years of the century, when, on October 21, 319 A.D., Constantine the Great, in his enthusiasm for Christianity, issued to Octavianus, the governor of Lucania and Bruttium, an edict which provided that *clerici* were not to be subject to any form of public service whatsoever.²¹ There is also evidence to show that the same privileges were extended to monks as well.²² But this preferential treatment of the *clerici* was quickly subjected to abuse, for on July 18 of the next year Constantine issued another edict—this time to the Praetorian Prefect Bassus—which provided that no person who had the requisite property qualifications for service as a decurion or in other public service should be permitted to take refuge in the clergy; and should he do this, he was to be removed from the clergy and restored to his proper service.²³

37. More recently scholars have placed the date of the compilation of the *Notitia Dignitatum* at various times between 375 and 425 A.D. Van Berchem thinks that the eastern section—while possessing strata of various different dates—reflects the army organization in the time of Diocletian. See D. Van Berchem, *L'armée de Dioclétien et la réforme Constantinienne* (Paris, 1952), pp. 7, 117. Citations of the recent work on the *Notitia Dignitatum* will be found there.

²¹ *Cod. Theod.*, XVI, ii, 2. See also J. Vogt, "Zur Frage des Christlichen Einflusses auf die Gesetzgebung Konstantins des Grossen," in *Festschrift für Leopold Wenger*, II (*Münchener Beiträge für Papyruskunde und antiken Rechtsgeschichte*, XXXV [Munich, 1945]), pp. 118-48, especially p. 122.

²² This exemption is attested by a letter of Basil the Great which requests a censor to extend the exemption to the monks in his diocese. See Basil, *Epist.*, Cl. II, No. 284, in J.-P. Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca*, XXXII (Paris, 1857). But it is also implicit in *Cod. Theod.*, XII, i, 63. See Evelyn-White, p. 81, note 5.

²³ *Cod. Theod.*, XVI, ii, 3.

Nearly a half century later—although it was probably one among numerous times—the emperors once more attempted to check what may have been a similar evasion of service. This time, on May 10, 367 A. D., Valentinian and Valens addressed to Tatanus, the Prefect of Egypt, an edict which gave instructions that decurions were not to be permitted to remove to country districts.²⁴ It has been suggested that, to evade the provisions of this edict, the decurions became—or pretended to become—monks.²⁵ The plausibility of this suggestion seems to be supported by the fact that only a few years later, on January 1, 373 A. D.—or January 1, 370 A. D., for the date is not certain²⁶—Valentinian and Valens addressed to the Praetorian Prefect Modestus an edict which provided that all who had become monks to escape from compulsory public services were to be recalled to their proper duties, their family property to be confiscated (. . . *familiarium rerum carere inlecebris* . . .) if they did not comply with the terms of the edict.²⁷ At this juncture, in 373 A. D., following the death of Athanasius, a religious factor was added to the crisis. The Arians seized upon this opportunity to attack their monastic enemies now that they were under pressure from the political authorities because of their intimate association with the flight of the decurions from their public obligations.²⁸ An element of confusion is intruded into our picture of the situation, however, by the anti-Arian writers who constitute our sources, for there is some reason to believe

²⁴ *Cod. Theod.*, XII, xviii, 1.

²⁵ Evelyn-White, p. 81.

²⁶ The edict is dated by the consulship of Valentinian and Valens, but since no numeral appears with the consulship, scholars differ as to the date, some assuming Valentinian's and Valens' third tenure of the office (370 A. D.), others assuming their fourth (373 A. D.). O. Seeck, *Regesten der Kaiser und Päpste* (Stuttgart, 1919), p. 245, assigned the edict to 373 A. D. Among recent writers, Piganiol, *L'Empire Chrétien*, p. 380, adheres to the date 373 A. D., while 370 A. D. is supported by R. Rémondon, "Problèmes militaires en Égypte et dans l'Empire à la fin du IV^e siècle," in *Revue Historique*, CCXIII (1955), pp. 21-38, especially p. 34. Evelyn-White, p. 81, and Hardy, *Christian Egypt*, pp. 80-1, do not indicate a choice between the two dates.

²⁷ *Cod. Theod.*, XII, i, 63.

²⁸ Rather than give the detailed sources for this question here, we refer, instead, to Evelyn-White, pp. 77-80; Hardy, *Christian Egypt*, pp. 80-1.

that, through bias and the conflation of the two ideas of public service and military service that are implicit in the term *militia*, these writers portray for us violent attacks upon the monasteries and attempts to drag the monks into military service.²⁹ Whatever the facts may be, it will suffice, for the purposes of this article, to point out that the monks were certainly under pressure from the government, understandably so, since they were harboring delinquents from public service who were being sought out by the political authorities. And, naturally, the religious opponents of the monks made the most of their adversaries' discomfiture by joining hands with the political forces.³⁰ While the monks of the famous monasteries at Nitria seem to have suffered most from the forceful actions of their enemies and the government,³¹ it would seem to be very probable that the same political, economic, and religious factors were operative at other important monastic centers. And Oxyrhynchus must be regarded as an important monastic center, even if we do not take at full face value the report of the *Historia Monachorum* that, about twenty years after the assault upon Nitria, the Bishop of Oxyrhynchus was the spiritual superior of 10,000 monks and 20,000 nuns.³² In such a stronghold of monasticism the government might well have stationed a legion in this time of crisis. In this way, we suggest, the presence of the Legio I Maximiana in Oxyrhynchus in November, 372 A. D. is to be explained.

Two of the Columbia papyri published in this paper, both dated in 372 A. D., add their contribution to our meagre knowledge of the price of barley during the fourth century, but it is

²⁹ The expression *ad militiam cogerentur* is employed by Orosius, *Historia adversus Paganos*, VII, 33, while the phrase *ut monachi militarent* appears in Paulus' continuation of Eutropius, XI, 8 (*Eutropius Breviarium ab urbe condita cum versionibus graecis et Pauli Landolfique additamentis*, ed. H. Droysen, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica . . . Auctorum Antiquissimorum*, II [Berlin, 1879]). Cf. Evelyn-White, p. 82; Hardy, *Christian Egypt*, pp. 80-1. On the other hand, Piganiol, *L'Empire Chrétien*, pp. 162, 380-1, and J. G. Milne, *A History of Egypt Under Roman Rule*³ (London, 1924), p. 92, maintain that the monks were forced to serve in the army.

³⁰ See Evelyn-White, p. 83.

³¹ See Evelyn-White, pp. 81-2.

³² This is the report of the Latin version of the *Historia Monachorum in Aegypto*, §5 (edited by E. Preuschen, *Palladius und Rufinus* [Giessen, 1897]). The Greek version (§5) reports only 5000 monks.

possible that, owing to extraordinary circumstances—the rapidly worsening inflation, and, if our assumption in the preceding paragraph is correct, the political and religious crisis in Egypt—these prices may have been abnormally high even for that time. Certainly, a very abnormal situation is indicated by the steep rise in the price of barley—a rise of 100 talents per artab—between February and December of that year. See Table II. Here, at any rate, are the usable figures for the price of barley from the middle to the end of the fourth century A. D.³³

TABLE II
PRICES OF BARLEY, 350-400 A. D.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Price</i>
ca. 346	<i>P. Lond.</i> , II (p. 305), 248	30 tal. per art.
Feb., 372	<i>P. Col.</i> , Inv. No. 59	3000 tal. for 6 art.
Dec., 372	<i>P. Col.</i> , Inv. No. 181 (30)	3600 tal. for 6 art.
388	<i>P. Lips.</i> , 63	1 solidus for 30 <i>modii</i> ³⁴

While the data are much too scanty to provide a firm basis for a price curve for barley during this period, still we should hardly have expected such high prices in 372 A. D. Nevertheless, even these prices fit into Mickwitz's general scheme for the development of the inflation: (1) between 346 A. D. and 360 A. D. the solidus fell to one twentieth of its value in the earlier year; (2) between 360 A. D. and 400 A. D. the inflation developed at a slower pace, the solidus falling to one third or one fourth of its value in 360 A. D.³⁵

A final observation may be made. Mickwitz, when he observed the growth in the number of "Pränumeration" loans ("sales in advance")—especially in the sixth and seventh centuries—

³³ See the prices of barley given, with citations of the sources, by Johnson and West, *Byzantine Egypt*, pp. 176-7. The price of 500 denarii for 13 artabs of barley in *P. Oxy.*, I, 85 (338 A. D.) can not be properly evaluated, for the content of the artab is qualified by the uninterpreted abbreviation ἀραλ().

³⁴ The solidus was worth ca. 8000 talents (= 1200 myriads of denarii) in 360 A. D. and by the end of the century was the equivalent of 4550 myriads of denarii, according to G. Mickwitz, *Geld und Wirtschaft im römischen Reich des vierten Jahrhunderts n. Chr.* (*Finska Vetenskaps-Societeten. Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum*, IV, ii [Helsingfors, 1932]), p. 112; cf. p. 114.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

reached the conclusion that they reflected a growth in "Naturalwirtschaft" and narrowed opportunities for purchase and sale (or, as he expresses it, there was less "wirtschaftliche Beweglichkeit"), which had the result that one borrowed from one who bought from him.³⁶ The situation was brought about, he thought, by the growth of "Grossgüter," as in Western Europe in the Middle Ages. Clearly that situation had not developed in the fourth century—nor did Mickwitz contend that it had—for Aurelia Titouais entered into business relations with at least two individuals in Arsinoë and a soldier from Oxyrhynchus. Her repayments of loans with grain, rather than money, were made not because of "Naturalwirtschaft," but, instead, probably upon demand of the creditor, who thereby attempted to insure himself against loss in a time of acute inflation.

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³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 131-2.

THE PLACE OF CODEX VAT. GR. 1823 IN THE CEBES MANUSCRIPT TRADITION.

When Praechter published his critical edition of Cebes' *Tabula*, only twelve Greek MSS of this work were known to be in existence.¹ Scholars were still speculating about the possibility of recovering the lost codex Meibomianus, but Praechter's own efforts to locate this document had proved fruitless.² Recently it has come to the attention of the present writer that codex Vat. Gr. 1823 contains (ff. 152^r-161^v) a thirteenth MS of the *Tabula*.³ While this MS (here designated S) is definitely not the lost Meibomianus, it does assume more than average importance by virtue of the fact that it is clearly an ancestor of (and perhaps the immediate source of) Vat. Pal. Gr. 134 (P)—one of the twelve MSS already utilized—and, therefore, supercedes P in critical value.

The text of S, which is copied in a late fifteenth or early sixteenth century hand, breaks off abruptly after οὐκοῦν (38, 1, 5).⁴ Since this break occurs in the middle of a sentence at the end of the last line on the verso of f. 161, it is obvious that something has been lost by mutilation. In view of the close affinity existing between S and P, which will be demonstrated below, it is highly probable that S originally ended at 41, 4, 1, as does P along with a majority of the other MSS. Since in the format of S a single folium would be quite adequate to accommodate the intervening material, it may reasonably be inferred that only one leaf has

¹ Carolus Praechter, *Cebetis Tabula* (Leipzig, 1893), p. iv.

² Praechter, *op. cit.*, p. v.

³ The author wishes to express his gratitude to the Directors of *The Knights of Columbus Vatican Film Library at Saint Louis University* for permission to make use of microfilm copies of the Vatican manuscripts used in the preparation of this paper. At the same time he would like to express his thanks to the Custodians of the following libraries for their courtesy in providing microfilms of their Cebes MSS: Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, Biblioteca Nazionale di S. Marco in Venice, Biblioteca Laurentiana and Biblioteca Riccardiana in Florence, Biblioteca Corsiniana in Rome, and the Austrian National Library in Vienna.

⁴ The third numeral in the citations from Cebes is the line number calculated according to the line divisions in Praechter's text. This will doubtless vary slightly for other editions.

been lost. Several corrections of obvious errors in orthography have been made in S by a second hand. Also *καλῶς* (37, 3, 2), which was originally omitted, has been added in a late hand by someone who presumably had access to codex K⁵ or an early printed edition based on this MS, since this word is omitted by all the other sources. The same hand likewise inserted *θηρίον* (the reading of K and several other MSS) in the margin opposite 10, 1, 2 as a variant for *θύριον* and *σὺ* (the reading of K and C) above *εἰ* (38, 2, 2).

On the first page of S, between the title and the first line of the text, the following entry has been inserted in a sixteenth century Latin hand: *Hec et alterum manu Aristobuli una cum Hephestion*. The only scribe named Aristobulus listed by Vogel and Gardthausen is Aristobulus Apostolides (1465-1535), who is known to have copied over fifty MSS.⁶ The author has compared the writing of S with that found in four MSS which contain subscriptions identifying Aristobulus Apostolides as their scribe.⁷ All of the significant peculiarities of this scribe's writing as exemplified by these four MSS are absent from S. It must be concluded that the anonymous author of the Latin entry quoted above either was misinformed or was referring to some other scribe named Aristobulus.

The readings of S and P are in very close agreement throughout. S, in addition to showing all the omissions common to P and one or more other MSS, also shares the following omissions with P alone: 3, 3, 3 *μέν*; 11, 1, 1-2 *εἶτα . . . συναντήσῃ* (also omitted by W, but added in margin by first hand); 24, 1, 2 *ἡ ποί*. Of particular interest in this connection is the fact that both S and P repeat the passage *οὐδὲν* (33, 4, 5) . . . *γενέσθαι* (33, 5, 2). The first instance has been deleted in S, but this deletion is obviously by a much later hand. In addition there are a little more than fifty instances in which S and P agree against all other MSS in presenting erroneous readings. While many of these common errors, to be sure, consist merely in orthographical

⁵ For a complete listing of the previously known MSS and the symbols used in designating them see Carolus Conradus Mueller, *De Arte Critica Cebetis Tabulae Adhibenda* (Virceburg, 1877), p. 10 or Praechter, *op. cit.*, p. xii.

⁶ Marie Vogel und Victor Gardthausen, *Die griechischen Schreiber der Mittelalters und der Renaissance* (Leipzig, 1909), pp. 42-4.

⁷ The four MSS are Vat. Gr. 1311, 1396, Pal. Gr. 139, 149.

variations, the effect of all this evidence taken together is to establish beyond doubt the existence of a very close relationship between S and P.

There remains, however, the problem of determining whether the one is the source of the other, or the two derive from a common source. That the former is the case, with S being the source, is indicated by several instances in which S obviously represents an intermediate stage between the readings of the majority of MSS on the one hand and corruptions of those same readings in P on the other hand. The words δὲ (33, 4, 1) and μὲν οὐδεμία (33, 4, 3), which are omitted by P, are present in S; it would appear, however, that water or some other liquid was accidentally splashed on the page of S containing the two expressions with the result that serious blurring occurred in both instances. Although the words are still legible, it is apparent that the scribe of P (or possibly of some copy intervening between S and P),⁸ on seeing the blurred words, assumed that deletion was intended and thus deliberately omitted them from his copy. In writing δεινὰ οἶονται (31, 4, 3), the scribe of S apparently read the initial *o* of the second word as *β*, and thus copied δεινὰ βίονται. P's scribe, interpreting the first part of βίονται as the noun βίον, changed δεινὰ to make it modify βίον, thus producing δεινὸν βίον τε. S copied βλέποντας (31, 6, 2) as πλέποντας. P, being unable to make any sense out of this, left a blank space for three letters and copied ποντας. A similar development occurs in the case of ἐρμηνέως (33, 6, 1). The scribe of S apparently intended to write ἐρμυνέως (confusing *v* and *η*, as in many other cases). By a slip of the pen, however, *v* appears as a nondescript character halfway between *a* and *v*. This proved quite puzzling to the scribe of P, with the result that he wrote ἐρμ followed by a blank space for several letters. Where most MSS have πρότερον αὐτὸν (26, 3, 2), S, by a simple orthographical error, wrote πρότερον αὐτῶν. P tried to correct the passage by

⁸ Since there is no way of determining whether one or more copies intervened between S and P, it is to be understood that the phrase "scribe of P" employed in listing the following examples is simply a convenient device for designating the copyist who, in the transmission of the text from S to P, first made the particular change involved in each instance. It is conceivable, of course, that the actual scribe of P merely copied faithfully changes which had already been made by some predecessor.

writing *προτέρων αὐτῶν*. The pronoun *ταῦτα* (32, 5, 1), which appears in the text with an added accent on the last syllable because of the following *ἐστιν*, was written by S without any accent at all. P, in attempting to correct this, placed the acute on the last syllable, but overlooked the circumflex on the first. The adjective *δυσμαθέστεροι* (35, 2, 6) was erroneously copied by S as *διαμαθέστεροι*. P simplified this by writing *ἀμαθέστεροι*. Additional examples of the same type are: 20, 3, 3 *ταύτης*] *ταύταις* S, *ταῦται* P; 33, 6, 3 *αὐτοῦς*] *αὐτὸν* S, *αὐτὴν* P; 38, 2, 3 *βούλοι*] *βούλη* S, *βούλη* P.

These examples, showing, as they do, an intermediate stage of development between the archetype and P, point rather definitely to the conclusion that S was an ancestor of P. In complete conformity with this conclusion is the fact that, whereas there is no single case in which P fails to share omissions found in S, there is the following substantial number of instances (in addition to the two already cited) in which S does not share omissions found in P: 1, 2, 6 *πολὺς*; 3, 2, 3 *οὖν*; 9, 3, 3 *ἀν*; 18, 1, 3 *δ'*; 20, 3, 3 *ἀδελφαί*; 21, 3, 6 *ἐστὶν ἡ*; 24, 3, 3 *τοῦ βίου*; 27, 2, 3-27, 3, 2 *εἰς* . . . *ἀπεγνωσμένοι*; 32, 3, 3 *ἐκείνας*; 33, 1, 2 *τι*; 33, 4, 4 *τὸ* (second); 37, 1, 1 *οὖν*. Further evidence tending to support the view that P is derived from S is provided by the fact that in the relatively small number of instances in which S and P disagree, aside from a minor number of cases in which P removes obvious errors in orthography, it is always S rather than P which is in agreement with the majority of the other MSS.⁹

Although all the lines of evidence agree in pointing to S as a source of P, there is obviously no way of determining definitely whether P was copied directly from S or was separated from S by one or more other MSS. But, whichever was the case, the

⁹ The following is a list of the most significant examples. Several instances showing mere variation in orthography have been omitted. 1, 3, 4 *προσάττων* S, *προσάττειν* P; 2, 2, 1 *οὐδὲ* S, *οὐ* P; 5, 1, 1 *οὖν ὁδὸν κελεύει* S, *ὁδὸν αὐτοῦς κελεύει* P; 6, 3, 4 *παρὰ τῆς Ἀπάτης* S, *παραπορεύονται* P; 8, 1, 6 *δοκοῦσι* S, *δοκοῦντες* P; 8, 2, 1 *οἱ* S, *εἴη* P; 10, 1, 6 *δοκοῦσι συνεῖναι* S, *δοκοῦσιν εἶναι* P; 10, 3, 3 *λεπτὴ* S, *ῥυπαρά* P; 10, 4, 3 *κακοδαιμονίαν* S, *κηδαιμονίαν* P; 11, 2, 3 *αὐτὸν* S, *αὐτὴν* P; *ἀληθινὴν* S, *ἀλήθειαν* P; 13, 2, 4 *περιπατητικοὶ* S, *περιπατηκοί* P; 18, 2, 1 *θυγατέρες* S, *θυγατέρα* P; 25, 3, 4 *πράσσουσιν* S, *πράσσοντας* P; 26, 1, 3 *βούληται* S, *βούλονται* P; 30, 3, 3 *ἐστάναι* S, *ἐφεστάναι* P; 33, 1, 2 *δεῖ* S, *δὴ* P; 35, 1, 2 *τὸ αἴτιον* S, *τὸν αἴτιον* P; 37, 2, 1 *κακῶς* S, *κακὸν* P.

fact remains that, for critical purposes, P may in the future be disregarded in favor of S, except for the brief section extending from 38, 1, 5 to 41, 4, 1 which is missing from S by reason of the loss of the last folium.

It is assumed by both Mueller¹⁰ and Praechter¹¹ that the text of P derives from two separate sources, with the portion beginning with chapter 31 coming from some MS quite distinct from the one from which the first thirty chapters were copied. It is now apparent that P is derived in its entirety from S, but, since the text of SP in the portions before and after chapter 31 represents two different traditions, the problem of identifying those two traditions remains the same as before, merely shifting from P to S.

In his excellent study of the MSS of Cebes Mueller¹² divides the twelve Greek copies known to him into two families, with one being comprised of A alone, and the other made up of V and the ten remaining MSS, all of which, in his opinion, are descended either directly or indirectly from V. Of these ten L is considered by Mueller to be a direct copy of V; the rest, with the exception of P, are divided into two subfamilies, BRFEDW and CK, both deriving from V. In dealing with P Mueller simply points out in his general discussion that the first part of this MS (to chapter 31) belongs to the CK subfamily and the remaining portion, to the BRFEDW group.¹³ In his stemma, however, he becomes somewhat more definite, deriving the first part of P specifically from C and the final portion from BR.¹⁴

Praechter agrees with Mueller in placing all the Greek MSS other than A in a separate family, but, at the same time, he effectively refutes Mueller's contention that all these MSS have V as their archetype, setting up instead a division of the same MSS into four subfamilies: VL, BR, FEDW, and CK.¹⁵ He agrees with Mueller that L is a direct copy of V, and also accepts, without discussion, Mueller's account of the origins of P.¹⁶

The present writer, being engaged in the preparation of a new critical edition of Cebes' *Tabula*, has recently collated all thirteen of the Greek MSS from microfilm copies of the originals. His

¹⁰ Mueller, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

¹¹ Praechter, *op. cit.*, p. v.

¹² Mueller, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹⁵ Praechter, *op. cit.*, p. vi.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xi.

study confirms the validity of Praechter's fourfold division of the late MSS.¹⁷ His examination of the evidence also supports the conclusion reached by both Mueller and Praechter that the first part of P derives from C (although it is, of course, now clear that S intervened between the two).¹⁸ He finds it difficult, however, to understand how Mueller and Praechter could have reached the conclusion that the final portion of P is derived from BR. As a matter of fact, a careful study of this part of the work in the fuller version of the SP tradition found in S (where none of the omissions which mar this part of P is present)

¹⁷ In fact, the evidence for his classification is somewhat better than he himself realized, since, as he indicates in his preface (p. iv), he had not seen the seven MSS in Italy, but had relied on collations of these made for him by his friend Tschiedel, and, therefore, was misinformed as to the actual readings of some of these MSS at certain points. In dealing with the FEDW subfamily, for instance, Praechter indicates (p. ix) that F and E are *gemelli*, descending independently from the lost subarchetype, while DW in turn derive indirectly from E. He admits (p. x), however, that this structure is inconsistent with what he supposes to be the readings of the four MSS at 2, 1, 2, where his *apparatus* lists FDW as changing the order to *πολὸν χρόνον πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, while E agrees with all the other MSS in keeping *πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολὺν χρόνον* and at 14, 2, 4, where FE are listed as reading *ἔφημεν* and DW as having *ἔφη μὲν*. Actually, in both cases Praechter's worries are occasioned by erroneous reports on the readings of the MSS. In the first instance E agrees with the other three MSS of its subfamily in reading *πολὸν χρόνον πρὸς ἀλλήλους*. In the second instance the reading *ἔφημεν* appears only in F, while E agrees with the other two in reading *ἔφη μὲν*—a distribution which is entirely consistent with Praechter's stemma.

¹⁸ An examination of the *apparatus* of Praechter's edition would lead the reader to suspect that there are discrepancies between C and P where they do not exist. C is listed as agreeing with M against all other MSS in reading *τοῦ* for *καὶ* (1, 3, 3) and in reading *παράγονόμενος* for *γενόμενος* against all other MSS (19, 2, 3). Since P agrees with the other MSS in both of these instances, it might be doubted whether it or its source, if copied from C, could have restored the correct reading by conjecture. Actually, however, this in no way precludes the possibility of assuming that S (P's source) was copied directly from C, since an examination of C will reveal that the readings here ascribed to it are by a second hand, with the first hand in both cases having copied the readings which are found in SP and the rest of the MSS (except M in the one instance). According to Praechter's *apparatus* δὲ was inserted after *βαθεῖς* (15, 3, 3) in C alone. Actually, however, the word is also found in both S and P.

shows much closer agreement with V than with any of the other three subfamilies. (L is not brought into consideration since its text ends at 21, 3, 2.) In several instances SP agree with V against all other MSS, including, of course, BR, both in readings which are correct and in others which are doubtful or clearly erroneous. In the sentence, οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει πάλιν ταῦτα ἀφελέσθαι καὶ ἐτέρῳ δοῦναι (31, 2, 1-2), VSP have the order πάλιν ταῦτα ἀφελέσθαι adopted by Praechter, whereas all the others have a different order: πάλιν ἀφελέσθαι ταῦτα (αὐτὰ F) BRFEDW, ταῦτα πάλιν ἀφελέσθαι CK. A similar situation is found in the sentence, οὐδὲν ἄρα, ἔφην, λέγεις ταῦτα χρήσιμα εἶναι πρὸς τὸ βελτίους γενέσθαι ἄνδρας; (33, 5, 1-2), where, as in the text adopted by Praechter, VSP have ἔφην after ἄρα, whereas RFEDW insert it after εἶναι, B after ἄνδρας, and CK omit it completely. The reading ποιήσωμεν (36, 1, 1) in VSP where all other MSS have ποιήσομεν is doubtless an instance in which V and SP are in agreement in an error. While the subjunctive provides a possible reading, the future indicative, which is adopted by Praechter, seems much better, and furthermore is confirmed by the reading *faciemus* in Elichmann's Latin translation of a ninth century Arabic paraphrase of the *Tabula*.¹⁹ In 36, 3, 2 VSP have ἐκείνο, which is clearly erroneous, in place of ἐκείνῳ in other MSS. The final ν of ὧν (35, 5, 7) has almost certainly been added in V by a second hand. S at this point has ὧ, which was corrected by P to ὧν.

In addition to the above examples in which SP agree with V alone against all other MSS, there are a few instances in which the two agree with CKV against BRFEDW: 31, 5, 1 ἔχειν CKVSP, ἔφη BRFEDW; and 33, 6, 4 οὕτω BRFEDW, οὕτως CKVSP. Note should also be taken of the fact that VSP (along with various other MSS) are in agreement in several instances in which the *apparatus* of Praechter's edition erroneously reports V and P as being at variance. Instances of such readings common to the three MSS are: 31, 3, 1 ἀλλὰ for ἀλλ'; 33, 2, 4 ταῦτα for ταῦτ'; 34, 4, 3 ἄνδρες for ἄνδρας; 36, 3, 4 τοῦτο for τούτῳ.

In spite of the close affinity between V and the final section of SP demonstrated above, this portion of S cannot be regarded as a copy of V for the reason that in several instances it agrees with other MSS against V. It is quite significant, however, that in practically all such cases SP rather than V have preserved

¹⁹ Mueller, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-9.

the correct reading, and in no such instance do SP agree with other MSS against V in a reading which can be labelled as unquestionably erroneous. At first sight the inclusion by SP of the meaningless δὲ after τὸ in the expression τὸ τέκνα ἔχειν (36, 1, 4) appears to constitute an exception. Although Praechter lists only P as containing δὲ, the word also appears in R and F, or, in other words, in representatives of two of Praechter's four subfamilies in addition to SP. While it is true that V at present reads τὸ τέκνα ἔχειν, Praechter indicates that τὸ has been written over an erasure by a second hand. The microfilm copy of V available to the writer confirms this observation by Praechter and also indicates that the characters used by the second hand are in this instance about twice the size of the letters normally used by the first hand. Hence the space now occupied by τὸ is just about what would have been required for τὸ δὲ in the script of the first hand. While no trace of δὲ can actually be seen, since the original reading was quite thoroughly erased, there are certainly good grounds for suspecting that the word was at one time present in V. The wide distribution of this meaningless particle among the various subfamilies of late MSS suggests that it existed in the archetype of the family, passed into at least three of the four subarchetypes, and was removed from various individual copies, as apparently from V, by emendation. If this is the correct explanation of the situation, then the agreement of SP with other MSS against V in an incorrect reading has little significance in this particular instance, since the disagreement with V is probably only apparent rather than real, and since, in any case, the retention of the incorrect reading in SP could be interpreted as proving only that S was following the archetype very closely.

There are, on the other hand, several instances in which SP agree with some or all of the other MSS against V in preserving the correct reading. In 31, 2, 5, where VBR add *οἶον πῶς ἴσους γίνεσθαι* after *γίνεσθαι*, SP agree with all other MSS in omitting the passage. In 32, 3, 4 SP agree with all other MSS in reading *ἀκρασία* where V has *εὐκρασία*. SP join with a majority of the MSS in retaining *οὖν* (34, 1, 1) which is omitted by CKV. In 35, 2, 6 R and S alone have the correct *εἰ ἀκινήτοτεροι*, with *εἰ ἀκινήτοτεροι* appearing in P, *ἢ ἀκινήτοτεροι* in CK, and *εἰ εὐκινήτοτεροι* in VBFEDW. In 35, 5, 3 CVK have *οὕτως*, but SP agree with all the others in having *οὕτω*.

While it is conceivable that a scribe copying from V might have been able to correct the text by conjecture in some of the instances just noted, such could hardly have been true in the case of *οὖν* (34, 1, 1). Since it is reasonably certain, therefore, that the final portion of S, though closely related to V, cannot have been copied from V, it is highly probable that this part of its text derives from some lost *gemellus* of V, and should be placed in the VL subfamily. Thus, while the first part of SP has no critical value by virtue of the fact that it derives from C which still exists, the final portion, on the contrary, assumes considerable importance as an independent witness of the V tradition, especially since V itself has long been regarded as the best source for the portion of the *Tabula* extending beyond 23, 2, 3, where the text of A breaks off.²⁰

The chief effect of S, interpreted from this point of view, is to confirm the validity of most of the readings adopted by Praechter. In the following few instances, however, agreement of S with a substantial number of other MSS in readings which have been rejected suggests that these readings may well be the correct ones. The text of Praechter for 31, 2, 3-7 is: *καὶ διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν αἰτίαν κελεύει πρὸς τὰς παρ' αὐτῆς δόσεις ἴσους γίνεσθαι καὶ μήτε χαίρειν ὅταν διδῷ μήτε ἀθυμεῖν ὅταν ἀφέλῃται καὶ μήτε ψέγειν αὐτὴν μήτε ἐπαινεῖν*. The *καὶ* after *γίνεσθαι* has been included on the testimony of CK alone. VBR have the interpolation *οἷον πῶς ἴσους γίνεσθαι* (without *καὶ*); FEDWSP omit both the interpolation and *καὶ*. Since K is a copy of C, the inclusion of *καὶ* in the text is based on only one MS. If one punctuates with a dash after *γίνεσθαι*, the meaning is quite clear without the connective. The absence of *καὶ* from SP suggests that it was absent from the subarchetype of VL as well as from that of FEDW, and therefore should probably be dropped from the text. The spelling *συντομωτέρως* (33, 4, 4) depends on V alone. CK omit the entire clause in which the word occurs, but all the rest of the MSS, including SP, have *συντομώτερον*. This latter spelling should be adopted on the basis of the overwhelming MS support enjoyed by it. In 37, 3, 4 Praechter reads *μοι δοκεῖς* on the basis of CKV, although the rest of the MSS all reverse the word order. (Doubtless by an orthographical error S has *δοκοῖς μοι*, which has been

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 67-8; Praechter, *op. cit.*, pp. iv-vi.

corrected to *δοκεῖς μοι* by P.) While it is true that in other places in which the expression is used Cebes usually favors the *μοι δοκεῖς* order, the presence of the opposite arrangement in so many MSS suggests that this may well have been the order in the archetype of the late MSS at this point.

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TWO TERMINOLOGICAL NOVELTIES.

1. Ex-strategos.

In the papyrus collection of New York University there is a loan document of 329 A.D. (inventory no. XV, 14; unpublished) in which the lender, one Antonius Sarapammon, is styled ἀπὸ στρατηγῶν.¹ While this expression for "former strategos," or "ex-strategos," is unprecedented, the designation of a previously held office or status by ἀπὸ followed by the title in the genitive plural is common enough in the documents of the fourth century and later. The following examples will show the pattern: ἀπὸ στρατιωτῶν for "retired soldier,"² ἀπὸ ἐπαρχῶν for "ex-prefect,"³ ἀπὸ ἐπαρχῶν εἰλης for "former praefectus alae";⁴ similarly ἀπὸ βενεφικιαρίων, ἀπὸ ἐξακτόρων, ἀπὸ πριμιπλარიών.⁵

These parallels lead us to expect ἀπὸ στρατηγῶν in the NYU papyrus, and one's first temptation is to find that reading by punctuating στρατηγ{ι}ῶν. But Antonius Sarapammon is similarly styled in a similar document in the Columbia collection. It would be preferable, then, if the new form could be explained without postulating a scribal error in both instances. Two possibilities will be suggested here.

One possibility is that the expression employs the genitive plural of στρατηγία, "office of strategos." If the genitive plural of the abstract noun seems strange, it is nevertheless not without precedent: for example, ἀπὸ στρατειῶν (= *a militiis*) is found as well as ἀπὸ στρατείας.⁶ Unfortunately, the picture is clouded by *P. Théad.* 15 (= *Select Papyri*, 262; 280/1 A.D.), where the advocate addressing the court is characterised as being ἀπὸ [συν]η-

¹ Antonius Sarapammon is known to have been strategos of the Arsinoite nome some fifteen years earlier: cf. *P. Strasb.* 45 (312 A.D.) and *P. Flor.* 54 (314 A.D.; revised text in *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, IV [1908], p. 434); cf. now also *P. Cair. Isidor.* 54.

² Cf. J. Maspéro, *L'organisation militaire de l'Égypte byzantine* (*Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études*, fasc. 201), p. 58.

³ Cf. *P. Lips.* 14, 3, and note.

⁴ Cf. *P. Lond.* 233, introd. (II, p. 272).

⁵ *B. G. U.* 1049, 2; *C. P. R.* 247, 3; *P. Flor.* 71, 697.

⁶ Cf. Liddell-Scott-Jones, *s. v.*, and D. Magie, *De Romanorum . . . vocabulis sollemnibus*, p. 127.

γοριῶν (line 2). The apparent discrepancy is perhaps explicable on the ground that *synegoria* is a professional status, which, once attained, is retained for life; while *strategia* is an administrative office, from which, once it is relinquished, one retains only an honorary title. In other words, an ἀπὸ συνηγοριῶν, one having attained the status of advocate, still enjoys that status, but an ἀπὸ στρατηγιῶν, one having held the office of strategos, no longer holds it.

A second possibility deserves consideration. The influence of Latin in the word-formation of postclassical Greek is particularly noticeable in the proliferation of adjectives ending in *-ios*.⁷ Therefore, since Latin *praetor* is rendered in Greek by στρατηγός, it would not be surprising if imitation of *praetorius*, in which the suffix *-ius* conveys the sense of rank derived from previous officeholding, produced the adjective στρατήγιος denoting "former strategos." Indeed the neuter, στρατήγιον, was from Hellenistic times the Greek rendering of *praetorium*, the general's headquarters.⁸ Perhaps it is this adjective which is used in designating Aurelius Sarapammon as ἀπὸ στρατηγιῶν.

2. One Thirty-second.

Ancient Greek expressed small fractions (and their corresponding ordinal numbers) in two ways, e. g.

A. ἑξήκοστοτέταρτον, "a sixty-fourth"

or

B. τετρακαεξήκοστόν, "a four-and-sixtieth."

In the case of the fraction $1/32$, the "A" form is τριακοστόδυν. The "B" type has hitherto occurred only (I believe) in a few papyri of 299-303 A. D., *P. Cornell* 20 and 20a, and *P. Cair. Isidor.* 3 and 5. These texts appear, moreover, to evidence two discrete forms of the term. One, clearly attested in several occurrences, is δυοτρίαντον, a form obviously connected with the late (→ modern) Greek word for "thirty," τριάντα. The other is δυοτριακοστόν. This form, plausibly restored by the editors in *P. Cornell* 20a, line 53—but, unlike δυοτρίαντον, not admitted

⁷ Cf. e. g. L. R. Palmer, *A Grammar of Post-Ptolemaic Papyri*, p. 31.

⁸ Cf. Liddell-Scott-Jones, s. v. *Praetorius* in the sense of ex-praetor appears in Greek as στρατηγικός (similarly, ὑπατικός = consularis): cf. Liddell-Scott-Jones, and Magie, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

into the Liddell-Scott-Jones *Lexicon*—is definitely attested in P. Wisconsin inventory no. 56 (unpublished). In that petition of 244/6 A. D. the writer complains that an official has registered his seven-aroura parcel of land as ἀρούρας δέκα ἡ[μι]συ δυο-τριακ[ουσ]τ[όν], προ[σ] | [ποι]ήσας ἀρούρας τρεῖς ἡμ[ισ]υ δυοτριακοστόν (lines 17-18).

Since the other words of the "B" type regularly connect the two component numbers with καί,⁹ it may be postulated that the original form of this new word was *δυοκαιτριακοστόν. But with the example of the even further curtailed form δυοτρίαντον before us, there is no reason to doubt that, by the third century at least, δυοτριακοστόν was in fact pronounced as written.

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⁹ Cf. 1/64, above; also 1/16 = ἑκκαίδεκατον, 1/22 = δυοκαιεικοστόν, 1/24 = τετρακαιεικοστόν, 1/72 = δυοκαιεβδομηκοστόν.

REVIEWS.

ARTHUR E. GORDON in collaboration with JOYCE S. GORDON. *Album of Dated Latin Inscriptions. I: Rome and the Neighborhood, Augustus to Nerva.* Two volumes. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958. Pp. vi + 160 + 6 + portfolio of 67 plates. \$15.00.

JOYCE S. and ARTHUR E. GORDON. *Contributions to the Palaeography of Latin Inscriptions.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1957. (*University of California Publications in Classical Archaeology*, III, No. 3; pp. xii + 65-242; plates 10-17.) \$4.50 (paper).

The Greek philosopher's idealistic dictum that all men by nature desire to know has as its corollary the American satirist's sardonic observation that "we always know So much that isn't so." We are forever weaving hypotheses into theories, and converting theories into premises, so that half the labor of scholarship must be devoted to the thankless task of demolishing old certainties or dissipating new speculations.

The epigraphers of Mommsen's generation, living in an age in which simple doctrines of linear evolution were prepolent in all domains of thought, could glance at a Latin inscription and confidently classify it with some such pronouncement as *litteris saeculi primi ineuntis*. But so many exceptions to the rules given in our handbooks have now accumulated that the time has come to re-examine the premises of Latin epigraphy—to lay the foundations of a more secure palaeography by clearing the ground of accumulated assumptions and theoretical constructions to find the bedrock of real certainties on which we may build anew. Professor Gordon, whose discovery of a new fragment of the *Laudatio Turiae*¹ was, in the circumstances, a most impressive demonstration of what can be done by the skilled eye and minutely retentive memory of an expert epigrapher, has, with the able assistance of Mrs. Gordon, addressed himself to this arduous task. The first installment of his work appears in the present volumes, which therefore require as systematic a review as the limited competence of this reviewer may be able to provide.

CONTENTS. The plates give with unusual clarity and detail one or more views of the whole or parts of 159 inscriptions, of which 129½ have been published in the *Corpus*, 23½ have been published elsewhere, and 6 are apparently here published for the first time. In the companion volume the texts are transcribed, the inscriptions are minutely described with reports of the maximum and minimum height of letters in each line and measurements of each abnormal letter, and virtually exhaustive commentary on all palaeographic details. The history of each stone is given, so far as it is known,

¹ *A. J. A.*, LIV (1950), pp. 223-6.

and the latest publication of each is collated. From these collations (of which fifty have been checked by the present writer) it appears that the present work corrects all but nine of the previously published texts in matters of some palaeographic significance. Given the purpose of this work, restorations and interpretations are considered only to the extent that they affect the reading of what is on the stone or the date of the inscription. The conclusions to be drawn from this palaeographic material are set forth in the *Contributions*.

The collection is limited to inscriptions *on stone* found in or near the city of Rome, and only a few are earlier than the time of Augustus. Of the 159 inscriptions, 100 either bear dates or can be dated within comparatively narrow limits by prosopographic or historical evidence, 40 can be assigned with certainty to a definite period such as a decade or part of the reign of an emperor, 16 can be dated on the basis of more or less probable identifications or inferences, and one is included to invite attention to the question whether or not it is a forgery. With only two inscriptions, therefore, is it necessary for the authors to depart from their announced plan and to assign dates on the basis of palaeographic criteria.²

FORMAT. Though carefully and expensively produced, each of these volumes bears an indication of the growing economic stringency that afflicts our hapless age. In the *Contributions* the footnotes, which, as is the function of footnotes, give not only documentation but also necessary qualifications or pertinent amplifications of what is said in the text, have been numbered by chapters and segregated at the end of the book, where the exasperated reader, who must keep all three volumes open before him on his desk, has to track them down while wishing that he had at least as many arms and as long a life-expectancy as Siva. The plates of the *Album* have a clarity and sharpness that is seldom found in pictures of inscriptions, but economy doubtless made necessary the reductions in size which will force you to use a magnifying glass with several of them, and in at least two instances (6a, 22b) will even then defeat your best efforts to read the smaller letters. The transcriptions of texts have been accommodated to a printing industry in which even the comparatively modest typographical devices of the *Année épigraphique* have become impossible luxuries—if, indeed, the necessary craftsmanship can still be procured at any price.

The transcriptions are in capitals (as all transcriptions should be—who, with a serious interest in epigraphy, can refer to Dessau without a shudder?), with the indispensable acute accents, tall I, and medial periods, but although they are set line-for-line, only one size of type is used, and there is no letter spacing, and no centering of lines. To such restrictions we shall all have to accustom ourselves, but in one instance, at least, we can make a better use of the resources left to us in our typographical poverty. To my eye, at least, the printing of a word as AGATH(TH *lig.*)OPVS is intolerable, and I venture to suggest the desirability of a convention whereby ligatures would be indicated by putting the first letter in capitals and the rest in the lower-case of which we now make no special use.

² Nos. 2 (tomb of C. Poplicius Bibulus) and 13 (tomb of Caecilia Metella).

AGATHOPVS conveys the information without delaying or puzzling the eye.

One may also complain that in the present work transcriptions are too often interrupted by unnecessary expansions—surely no one who will open these books needs to be told every time that C. before a nomen is the abbreviation of *Gaius*, or if he does, he should not be misled into thinking that the name was *Caius*. And there is a further objection to such expansions as VIXIT·AN(nis)·II, which the Gordons invariably use³—how do we know that the author of the epitaph was not sufficiently well educated to use the correct accusative? In general practice, I think, it is best to transcribe an inscription as exactly as is feasible, to place all exegetic material, including expansions, below the text, and, wherever there is doubt about the syntax, to give the author of the inscription the benefit of that doubt.

ERRORS. There are a number of *lapsūs typothetae*, of which the following seem the most important: No. 28b, line 7, read OASVS; 33a,4, read FLORVS; 64,6, read L(ucio); 86,3 and 118,5, the boxes are incorrect in terms of the system indicated on p. 14. On p. 122, col. 1, line 16 from bottom, something is wrong; perhaps we should read "except as a cognomen." Several other statements are not clear, and the English of the commentary is occasionally awkward, e.g. "Dipirus, a slave of another slave, Antigonus, who died," where the relative pronoun must refer to Dipirus.

No erasures should be indicated in No. 126; it is clear from the photograph that the stone was defaced either accidentally or by senseless vandalism. If the photograph of No. 112 does not mislead me, the commentary should note that the incorrect apex in IYLIVS differs radically in form from the correct one and from the four other clear apices on this stone; presumably, therefore, it is either an accidental chipping or an addition by a later hand. The statement that the apex on STATILIO in No. 39 is over a short vowel repeats an error common in our lexica, but we know definitely that the name is *Stātīlius*.⁴ The name of the woman in No. 42 is not "Phoebe or Phoebea" but Phoebeis (i.e. Φοιβίς, -βίδος), of which PHOEBENIS is the regular genitive singular according to the bizarre special declension of such names that we find very frequently in inscriptions, although not, so far as I know, in literature.⁵

There are a number of restorations and interpretations about

³ See especially Nos. 56, 68, 76, 77, 87, 99, 108, 120, 142, 153, 154; only in No. 101 is it certain that the abbreviations represent ablatives.

⁴ Ample evidence is cited by Wilhelm Schulze, *Zur Geschichte lateinischer Eigennamen* (Berlin, 1904), pp. 444, 166, 236; see also Johann Reichmuth, *Die lateinischen Gentilicia und ihre Beziehung zu den römischen Individualnamen* (Schwyz, 1956), pp. 111, 117. If it were needed, corroborative evidence could be adduced.

⁵ The anomalous declensions, of which I hope soon to present a study, are, in a way, the antithesis of a phenomenon that textual criticism has only recently taken adequately into account, the retention of Greek inflections, such as *Phaedra* = Φαίδρα and *Hecate* = Ἑκάτη, in verse, and perhaps even in prose, of the classical period. A dative in -ē, although normally indistinguishable from one in -ae in texts transmitted by Mediaeval MSS, may be indicated by the variant readings in such passages as Ovid, *Am.*, II, 6, 15 and *Ib.*, 359.

which debate is possible, but I shall here note only that the Gordons' long argument that the normal indication of filiation, *f.*, must have been omitted in No. 79 is based on the assumption that the second line of that inscription was not centered, although they themselves reproduce four parallel inscriptions from the same site (Nos. 38, 41, 80, 84) in which the lines are centered and in all of which, as it happens, *f.* appears at the end of the second line and would, of course, have been lost, had the stone suffered a fracture comparable to that which we see in No. 79. If the line in this epitaph was centered, we must read AGRIPPA[*E·F* to fill out the space, and we are spared the irksome conclusion that the imperial family could have been content to see Agrippina described as *M. Agrippae Divi Augusti neptis*.

STYLES OF LETTERS. The Gordons have made a painstaking and highly detailed study (*Contributions*, pp. 67-147) of the probable procedure in the layout and cutting of inscriptions on stone, the *ductus* of each letter (i. e. the order and direction of each cut), the different shapes of letters, and the wide variety of serifs. Theirs is the fullest treatment of the subject, and I do not see how exception can be taken to their cautious conclusions.

They propose certain changes in palaeographic terminology. I cannot see what is to be gained by coining the term "guided letters," which is susceptible of misunderstanding, to replace *scriptura quadrata*, a term perfectly descriptive of a style in which the horizontal strokes of such letters as T and E are at right angles to the vertical, nor do I see why *scriptura actuariaria* does not serve as well as "freehand letters" to designate the style in which the tops of T and E are slanted upward and curved.⁶ These are aesthetically distinct designs, of which the first is intended to express dignity while the second shows graceful informality. It may be that we need to use the terms with greater rigor; I should not myself hesitate to say that the title line of the *Laudatio Turiae* (Plate 17) is in *scriptura quadrata* while the body of the text is in *actuariaria*. If we use the two terms thus strictly, we (and the Gordons) will need a third term to describe the style of exaggerated asymmetry of which their collection contains two good examples (No. 128, A.D. 70, and 151, A.D. 91-92). The aesthetic purpose of a style is, of course, quite distinct from the skill or care with which it is executed, and if the term "freehand" is to be used at all, it should, in my opinion, designate the irregularity that is caused by failure to use mechanical guides (e.g. No. 30).

The results of the Gordon's minute study of letter-forms will be disappointingly negative to those who hope to determine dates by

⁶ Criticism of the established terminology (*Contributions*, pp. 66 f., 73 f.) because *acta* were usually inscribed on bronze and we are not quite certain what is meant by *quadrata littera* in Petronius (*Satyr.*, 29, 1) seems to me largely irrelevant. Palaeographers are not going to excogitate a new term to designate uncials, although William H. P. Hatch's article in *C. P.*, XXX (1935), pp. 247-54, has made it virtually certain that in antiquity *litterae unciales* were not letters of a specific style or shape; the term referred to the combination of large letters and very short lines that was fashionable for luxurious codices in the fourth and fifth centuries.

palaeography. They note that shading (i.e. contrast between thick and thin strokes) appeared about the middle of the first century B. C., the first example that can be exactly dated (No. 5) coming from 43 B. C., but variations in shading, at least during the period covered by their study, are indications of individual taste, not chronology, while letters of uniform thickness can be found in all periods, though not, perhaps, in good monumental work. Fully developed serifs become normal "some time before the middle of the first century B. C.," and serifs that drop below the line of writing are "not common in Rome from Augustus on." Certain shapes of some letters seem to have been more popular at one time than another, but there is no letter or combination of letters that can be taken as a sure indication of date—except, of course, the Claudian letters,⁷ which are found only during the reign of the imperial grammarian. In short, in the period from Caesar to Nerva, style of lettering is not an indication of date. The Gordons do not discuss in this connection what I have called "the style of exaggerated asymmetry" above, which may not be found before Vespasian and appears not to have become fashionable until later.

The authors properly emphasize the fact that accuracy of workmanship is not a criterion of date. Crude and shabby work is to be found in all periods, and so, within the limits of the study, is fine craftsmanship. I suspect that this will be found to be true to a very late period, since stone cutting is essentially a mechanical craft. On the Arch of Constantine, for example, where the sculptures attest not only a woeful corruption of taste but also the sheer incompetence of presumably the best sculptors to be found in Rome at that time, the central inscription is executed with quite satisfactory accuracy and regularity.

COLORING. The Gordons comment (*Contributions*, p. 73) on the coloring of incised letters in antiquity, and repeatedly have occasion to remark that the coloring applied to some stones in modern times misrepresents what a squeeze shows to have been incised on the stone. Since no one seems to have made the point, it would have been worth while to note that the use of paint probably explains some of the strange errors that we now find in inscriptions. In the first column of No. 119, for example, the cutter incised IMPLRATORIS, but it is probable that when he or another workman filled in the color, the missing strokes of the E were supplied in paint—and the customer may never have noticed the difference.

PUNCTUATION. The only punctuation which appears with any frequency in this collection is the word-divider. It would have been well to point out that this characteristic of Latin writing was derived, directly or indirectly, from Etruscan. In its origin it was probably a vertical line, such as is seen on the Phaistos-disk; in the earliest Etruscan inscriptions the line, doubtless to avoid confusion with I, is broken and formed by three dots; this is the standard form on the

⁷ No. 90 provides an occurrence of the Claudian vowel, which should be added to those collected in my article in *A. J. A.*, LIII (1949), pp. 249-57, in which I sought to show that the letter was taken from the Boeotian and Oscan alphabets and used by Claudius to represent *ȳ*, which therefore presumably had in his time a sound markedly different in *quality* from that of *ȳ*.

Fibula Praenestina and the Lapis Niger, but both show that a simpler form with two dots (:) had already made its appearance; the next stage of development may most conveniently be seen in the Tabulae Iguvinae, in which two dots divide words in the retrograde writing in the old alphabet, but the single medial point is used with the new alphabet. The single point became the normal word-divider in Etruscan (e.g. the Liber Zagrabiensis) and, of course, Latin, where it appears in our oldest Republican inscriptions. This makes it clear that the single medial point was the standard word-divider, and that the word-dividers in the form of crosses and outlined triangles, which the Gordons note as distinctively Republican forms, were merely decorative variations, corresponding in purpose to the later *hederae distinguentes*, of which they find no example before the reign of Tiberius.

The Gordons note carefully irregularities in the use of the interpunct and variations in the way of cutting it and hence its shape, but find no definite chronological indications other than that in the Augustan age the interpuncts become proportionally smaller in relation to the size of the letters than in many Republican inscriptions. I doubt that the statement (*Contributions*, p. 184) that "as a rule . . . no space [between words] is left for the interpunct" was intended to state a rule. The plates show conclusively that no such rule can be formulated for the period which they cover, although it is true that there are some examples in which interpuncts are merely fitted in to what would otherwise be *scriptura continua*.⁸ Although these examples anticipate what was to become prevalent in later times, no evolution can be discerned in the collection; in Nos. 147 (A. D. 86) and 156 (A. D. 83-96), for example, the interpunct has as much space and is as prominent as in No. 4 (44-43 B. C.).

Although the *Album* contains some interesting examples of the stronger marks of punctuation that show grammatical structure, these are not sufficiently common to serve as indications of date.

APICES. The Gordons' study of the use of the apex will be of great interest to anyone who wishes to carry on the work of Christiansen, whose fundamental dissertation⁹ is now in need of considerable revision and amplification. There are, however, some considerations that we should bear in mind in interpreting the data.

It is true that the use of the apex to mark long vowels frequently seems capricious to us, and that instances of it over diphthongs and short vowels, too frequent to be mere blunders by the engraver, seem inexplicable, but we must remember that in a city such as Rome, which, like New York City, was a *colluvies nationum*, there must have been many pronunciations of Latin, and that consequently mispronunciations of many words must from time to time have gained

⁸ On the use of the interpunct in early manuscripts, see *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXII (1951), pp. 241-3, where I permit myself to speculate concerning the reasons for its gradual disappearance.

⁹ *De apicibus et I longis inscriptionum Latinarum*, scripsit Jacobus Christiansen (apud C. F. Delff Husumensem, 1889). This book was published at Husum (of which the Latin name is *Husumum* or *Husenum*) in Schleswig-Holstein; the Gordons (*Album*, p. 49) were misled by what is at least an omission, if not a downright error, in Graesse's *Orbis Latinus*.

currency even in fashionable circles (which are never coëxtensive with cultivated circles). Some of the apices that we recognize as false probably reflect current mispronunciations, while many more, for which we can see no purpose, were doubtless intended to show that their writers knew better than to commit vulgar errors of which all trace has been lost to us. For a few peculiarities other explanations are *possible*. I have frequently toyed with the idea that the apex found with such remarkable frequency in CAËSAR may have been intended to show a connection between that name and the Etruscan word for 'god,' which Suetonius (*Aug.* 97,2) and Dio Cassius (LVI, 29,4) report as *aesar* (presumably Etruscan *aiser*).

I-LONGA. The Gordons have made (*Contributions*, pp. 186-201) an extraordinarily thorough and valuable study of the use of this letter, and have constructed a series of tables to show its occurrence in its various functions from the time of Augustus to the fifth century. Since their results are a little obfuscated by failure to recognize the existence of the diphthong *ei* in Latin, it will be best to summarize here the functions of a vexingly polysemous symbol.¹⁰ It is certain that I-longa was used to represent

(1) ī (VLXIT, IPSIVS, etc.). This, of course, is its most common and obvious use.

(2) part of the diphthong *ei* (DEINDE). It is probable, therefore, that the man who spells his name VELDIANVS was not guilty of ignorant affectation, as the Gordons suppose, but wished his name to be pronounced with the diphthong which, as we must infer from the unvarying scansion of the word in verse, was always pronounced in *deinde*, at least until the fourth century.

(3) part of a diphthong + *j* (MALA, ELVS, POMPEIVS, CVIVS). Such words were, of course, pronounced *mai-ja*, etc.

(4) *j* (CONIVNX, IANVARIVS). The statistics which show that I-longa is frequently a consonant in initial position, but rarely in medial position, merely reflect the fact that only a few words in Latin have an internal *j*, while there are many that begin with *j*.

(5) a kind of emphasis. This usage evidently begins with the word *imperator* used as a praenomen, and a pronunciation *im-* is excluded by the Gordons' report that in the Augustan stones of their collection "the I of *imp.* is never tall unless the word has first position in the line and begins a syntax unit." From the time of Hadrian a tall I is common in praenominal *imperator*, whatever the position in the line, but is only rarely found when the word follows the name of the emperor. From the time of Vespasian tall I also appears in *in* and *item* and occasionally as the initial letter of a few other words, presumably for emphasis or decoration. The Gordons' study has greatly clarified this non-phonetic use of the letter.

To the foregoing should be added two inconsistent uses of the

¹⁰ For further discussion of this letter, see *A. J. A.*, LIII (1949), pp. 255 f., where I failed to distinguish the use which I list as second here. In note 60 of that article my statement concerning *dies* in the fragment of Livius Andronicus is incorrect; I now see that the word could be scanned with an *i*.

letter which the Gordons do not particularly note: (1) the use of *I-longa* to represent *-ī* (e. g. No. 112, *ivlī*, nominative plural), and (2) the use of the combination *īl* to represent *-ī* when the long vowel is the result of contraction; this is made certain by metrical inscriptions, such as *C. I. L. VI*, 29896, in which *svbīl* is clearly a contracted perfect which must be scanned *sūbī*. This probably accounts for the many occurrences of *īl*s.

Among the remaining uses of *I-longa*, one of the most puzzling is its occasional use in words, chiefly proper names, ending in *-ius*. It is, of course, obviously correct in such names as *APHNIVS* (*Ἀφνειός*), but what are we to make of it in such names as *CLAVDIA*?¹¹ It is possible, of course, that the semi-educated may have thought it smart to give Latin names a distinctively Greek form; alternatively, Latin may have had, in addition to *ī* and *ī̄*, a short close vowel, which may be what is indicated in *HODIE*, *SALVIO*, *PISSIMVS*, and similar forms, possibly including *OPTIMVS*. But the Gordons have found and published (No. 51) a carefully and elegantly cut inscription in which *HERODIAS* is divided between two lines thus, *HERODIAS*, which, given the fact that the rules of syllabic division are almost invariably observed in even the crudest work, makes it extremely probable that the name was pronounced *Herodjas*. This may have been no more than a personal eccentricity, but a few corroborative examples would force us to revise our theory of the Latin pronunciation prevalent in the first century.

NUMERALS. The Gordons have made a very thorough study (pp. 166-82) of the forms of numerals, the relative frequency of the subtractive (e. g. *ix*) and additive (*viii*) modes of writing, and the use of bars over cardinals, ordinals, and the corresponding adjectives and adverbs. Theirs is by far the fullest treatment of the subject, and this chapter alone would make their book indispensable to epigraphers.

Our handbooks all assure us that the numeral for 500 is *D*, which is obviously half of *ϕ*, and this statement seems entirely reasonable because it is obvious that in the numerals of the type seen on the Columna Rostrata, the sign for 50,000 is merely half of the sign for 100,000, and the latter is merely *ϕ* multiplied by circumscribed circles. Under the influence of this dictum we have tended to regard all the occurrences of *D* as both exceptions and inconsistencies (since *V*, *X*, and *C* are never transfixt with a bar when they are used as numerals). But the Gordons now report that an examination of their entire collection of squeezes and photographs indicates that from the earliest times to at least the end of the second century A. D. *only D* was used to represent 500. This, obviously, is *not* half of *ϕ*. Without attempting to solve the problem here, we may observe that *D* is a recognized letter of the Paelignian alphabet, in which it is thought to have represented the palatal sound heard in French *je*,¹²

¹¹ One occurrence of this name is in No. 156, an inscription which perfectly illustrates the ambiguity of the letter, since it also has *conIVr* and *vIX(it)*.

¹² R. S. Conway, *The Italic Dialects* (Cambridge, 1897), Nos. 206, 216; W. M. Lindsay, *C. R.*, VII (1893), p. 103, describes the sound as the palato-dental found in Italian *maggio*.

and reappears in the Latin inscriptions of Gaul to represent the so-called *spirans Gallica* in proper names.¹³

CONCLUSIONS. The results of the Gordons' laborious and meticulous investigation could, in a sense, be epitomized by the two inscriptions shown on their Plate 20. Note the contrast:

- (a) tall, slender letters; slight shading; additive numeral; apex; 5 *I-longae*; tall K (for *kalendae*); no ligatures; EVDOXSVS.
- (2) letters more nearly square; strong shading; subtractive numeral; no apex; no *I-longa* (but one EI for -i); normal K; eleven ligatures, including at least three of the kind that we do not expect to find before the late second century; EVDOXSVS.

I suspect that not a few of us would be inclined to separate these inscriptions by at least a century, if we had to guess their dates on the basis of palaeographic details. But these are the two sides of an altar dedicated on 18 September, 2 B.C., and the two sides must have been inscribed (by different workmen, of course) within a few days (or, at most, weeks) of each other.¹⁴ Let that be a lesson to us!

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ANGELO BRELICH. Gli eroi greci. Un problema storico-religioso. Roma, Edizioni dell' Ateneo, 1958. Pp. xii + 410; 7 pls. (*Università di Roma, Pubblicazioni della Scuola di Studi Storico-religiosi*, 4.)

Gods, heroes, men. To classical Greece the distinction between these three classes seemed as self-evident as that between God and man seems to us. It is the heroes, the *ἥμιθεοι*, who give us pause. "Semi-divine" is not a concept current in our culture. Yet the classical belief about heroes is clear and unambiguous, however late the sources that attempt a systematic definition. The hero begins as a man, who lives and dies; unlike other men, however, he is powerful in death, and his supernatural powers are exerted from the tomb. His cult is normally, therefore, local and unique. Is he, then, simply a local divinity, some minor god whom an accident of history or geography has isolated? Attic cult inscriptions, in fact, do sometimes apply the term *θεός* to the heroes. But this is purely honorific.

¹³ See the indices to *C. I. L.*, XII and XIII; good examples in Dessau, especially Nos. 2911, 4655.

¹⁴ It is not probable that such work was ordered long in advance of the day on which it was presumably set up and dedicated. What I infer from the discrepancies in the text on the two sides is that after (a) was inscribed, Florus failed to pay his share, which was probably made up by contributions from the two Savonii, but there was still hope that he would pay up, since space for his name was left on (b). All this could have taken place in two or three days, or, conceivably, a single day, while the altar was in production in the manufactory from which it had been ordered.

cant connection of cult and myth. On the contrary this "Nourisher," whose cult is oracular, appears in myth as an architect, an arch-thief, and a murderer. Cult name, cult function, and myth are, so far as our sources go, totally incongruent. Farnell simply assumed that floating tales were attached to his name outside of Boeotia, and that the myth has no relevance to the cult. But in fact some of the persistent features of the myth seem securely localized, and since they have not been standardized or moralized through literary treatment they should be meaningful. If not specifically for the cult of Trophonius, are they, perhaps, meaningful for the hero as such?

Which are the recurrent themes of heroic myth and cults? Most prominent is that of the *Hero and Death*. A tomb is the normal locale of the cult; only rarely is the existence of a tomb denied. The sacrifice is commonly (though not exclusively) funereal in type, and there is often a complex ritual of mourning. In myth the heroes, with few exceptions, die, and many die violently or prematurely young. *Hero and Combat*. The heroes are above all warriors, and one of their most common functions is to protect their own city or people in war. Telamon and Ajax were invoked before the battle of Salamis; the Cretans sacrificed to Idomeneus and Meriones in war. Here myth and function do correspond. More significant, however, is the story in Herodotus (I, 67), that to defeat Tegea the Spartans must obtain the bones of Orestes. But Orestes had no fame as a warrior. The role ascribed to him rests simply on his status as a hero. Again, *Agonistic Contests* are closely associated with heroes. Besides the numerous games directly in their honor, heroes appear in one guise or another in many games dedicated to divinities (e.g. Pelops at Olympia, Opheltes at Nemea). Nearly all heroes were athletes, and many were founders of games or inventors of some special athletic skill. What is more, outstanding athletes, even in historical times, were heroized. Those who find it hard to reconcile the combination of religion and athletics would do well to ponder the words of Pausanias (V, 10, 1), who cites side by side the Eleusinian mysteries and the Olympic games as notable instances of divine concern. Closely allied to one another are the *Mantic* and *Healing* qualities of heroes, forming virtually a single art, *iatromantikê*. Such diverse heroes as Heracles, Odysseus, and Orpheus render oracles, while the oracular shrine of the seer Amphiaraus was in practice chiefly concerned with healing. Even athletic heroes, such as the famous Theagenes of Thasos, might become healers (Paus., VI, 11, 9).

Brelich's next two sections, on *Mysteries* and *Passage to Adulthood* show more tenuous and less convincing links with the heroes. And finally, his last three headings, *City-state*, *Blood-groups*, and *Human Activities* may well be considered together. Here we have the "founders," the inventors, and the "first men": virtually every human activity and institution has its heroic originator. Here Brelich makes two comments that are worth noting. The "inventions" ascribed to the heroes are, in general, those functional to human life; they do not include the later crafts, and no hero is worshipped exclusively by "trade" groups. The "inventions" relate either to the broad levels of human existence (e.g. agriculture, urban life) or to particular activities (e.g. war, oracles, slavery, agonistic) that are in themselves religiously significant or are basic to organized society.

No Greek really confused the two: the hero's close association with a tomb was a constant reminder of his original mortality.

The closest analogy in our own culture is the Christian saint. There are significant differences, but both saint and hero achieve recognition on the basis of proven power, a power that the ordinary dead do not have and that is therefore in some sense supernatural. Again, while the vast majority of both saints and heroes derive from a shadowy and more or less legendary past, the number of known individuals who have achieved sainthood or heroic status in the clear light of history is not inconsiderable. The detection of an occasional intruder like the unique St. Demetra of Eleusis (a "faded" god?) or St. Orestes of Soracte (an etymological blunder?) is hardly sufficient to discredit the Christian doctrine of sainthood. The human origin of the Greek hero seemed to antiquity equally certain and undeniable.

Not so to modern scholarship. One hero after another has been identified as a "faded" god, as a purely fictional ancestor, or as one of innumerable "functional" divinities. Farnell's classic study distinguishes seven classes of heroes, of which only one or two would conform to the Greek belief. The divine origin of a Helen or a Hyacinthus does, indeed, seem clearly indicated by the evidence, and many eponymous heroes may well be "transparent fictions." But theories are heady things, and it is tempting to follow them with too great enthusiasm. Farnell is wisely sceptical of some of Usener's extremes, but even he is ready to dismiss a Daides or Deipneus as "obviously late creations." The well-known case of Dexion should be a warning. Were it not for the specific information we have, who would ever have suspected that the "Receiver" was in fact, not a "functional hero," but the heroized poet Sophocles? Where our information is so scanty, often little more than a name, it is surely hazardous to disregard the unanimous opinion of those to whom the heroes were a vital part of religion.

Brellich's study provides a refreshingly new approach. He says, in effect, "If the heroes are so heterogeneous in nature and origin, how are we to explain the fact that in the view of the classical period they formed a *particular* category, quite distinct from the category of gods, daimones, or ordinary humans?" Granted the nature of our evidence, which with few exceptions is inadequate for the individual case, Brellich sets out to discover what things are characteristic of the heroes as a class, and in particular to correlate recurrent elements of heroic myth with what we know of heroic cult practices. In so far as persistent features emerge, we can hope to gain insight into what, for the Greeks themselves, was typical of the heroes.

Before embarking on his systematic analysis, Brellich first illustrates the problem by considering the complex figure of Trophonius. Though Trophonius is never called a hero—indeed, in some inscriptions he is styled Zeus Trophonius—, his myth is exclusively human (i.e. heroic). His name clearly means "Nourisher," and it has therefore been assumed that he was a local god or daimon of fertility; yet his cult, so far as our evidence indicates, is primarily oracular. Trophonius was not an epic hero, and since his myths were not therefore subject to extensive literary revision we might look for a signifi-

This suggests that the patterns have very deep roots. The other point is that we are not justified, just because eponymous heroes are so frequent and because we encounter such cult-titles as *heros strategos* and *heros iatros*, in assuming that such heroes are *Sondergötter*, limited to a single function. Brelich's broad survey shows that no hero is functional in the sense that he has an *exclusive* link to any activity or concept. The limitation suggested by a transparent name or title need not mean that he does not have a "full" personality. The case of Trophonius (and of Dexion) is instructive. Where our information on individuals is so scanty, Brelich's "global" consideration proves its worth.

Morphologically, then, the heroes are, as a class, complex beings, wherever we have sufficient evidence to go on. Heracles seems to represent all the activities that are typical of heroes, but any or all of these may appear united in any given hero. So Asclepius, both in cult and myth, is primarily a healer, but he displays as well many other heroic features: he suffers an extraordinary death; he has a tomb (or tombs) and his ritual is partly funerary-heroic; he appears as a warrior, and as a giver of oracles; he was initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries; he was a city-founder, and the ancestor of a group, the Asclepiadae; he is associated with hunting. Is this mere poetic elaboration, or does it point rather, as Brelich thinks, to an original complex in which all these things were alike characteristic of the hero?

Typological consideration of heroic myth is also revealing. Far from being ideal, the heroes show many monstrous features. They may be gigantic or again dwarfs (Heracles appears in both guises); sometimes they show theriomorphic traits, or are sexually ambivalent. Deformities are common. They are gluttonous, oversexed, given to homicide, deceit, and trickery. That such traits persist in the myths even in the face of more developed *mores* suggests that they are original and basic. Abnormality is then a primary aspect of heroes.

Moreover, the heroes share many of their basic characteristics with the "mythical collectivities," the Centaurs, Cabiri, Cyclopes, Satyrs, etc., and with at least some gods (Hermes, Dionysus). But whereas the collectivities are primarily concerned with cosmogonic matters, the heroes are concerned with man's world. Heracles, the hero *par excellence*, by his conquest of immortality, typifies the quasi-immortal character of all heroes. He is ἥρωες θεός.

Seen in this light, the hero is not, then, a being wholly distinct from god and man. The elements of similarity with the gods and the mythical collectivities point to a common origin. Even the gods, in the remote past, lived through periods of struggle and conflict, but once the cosmogonic process was complete, their immortality and blessedness was securely established. Considered *en bloc*, the heroes also belong to a mythical past, the time when human institutions were taking form. As men, they are necessarily imperfect and subject to death; their abnormality and ambivalence reflect the difficulties and perils of their unsettled times; but they are also superhuman in their creativity, by which the present age was brought into being. One of the primary aims of "archaic" religion is to perpetuate and guarantee the existing order. Greece could appeal to the creative and formative "heroic" age to give that order a sacred and immutable value.

Such, in broad outline, is Brelich's thesis. In detail one can point to errors of fact and interpretation, and at times the evidence seems to be pushed too far. There is a good deal of socio-religious jargon that the reader might have been spared, and at times even a certain unnecessary strain of arrogance. Yet in the main this is a persuasive and exciting book. The underlying pattern common to the vast majority of heroes emerges as something of a revelation, and the puzzling aspects of this or that individual cult begin to appear in a new light. Future studies will supplement, refine, and rectify Brelich's findings, but his approach to the problem is both original and sound, and the analyses that make up the heart of his study are a positive achievement. Though his conclusions, as he would himself admit, are necessarily tentative, at the least one can say that he faces squarely the question of the significance of heroic cult, and of its origins. Here, especially in the relation of the heroes to the "mythical collectivities," his work has points of contact with Hemberg's classic study, *Die Kabiren*, but where Hemberg is cautious and methodical, Brelich is impassioned and intuitive. One complements the other, and both succeed to a degree in illuminating the obscure processes through which Greek religion took its distinctive form. For this we may be sincerely grateful.

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E. BADIAN. *Foreign Clientelae* (264-70 B. C.). Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958. Pp. xi + 342. \$8.00.

This is an important book. The author shows how the traditional Roman institution of *clientela*, with its connotations of superiority and inferiority and its obligations (extra-legal) of *beneficia* and *officia*, was so basic a part of the Roman way of thinking that the Romans unconsciously transferred this attitude from private life to their relations with communities in Italy and throughout the Mediterranean world. Also the relationships of *hospitium* and *amicitia*, which had both a private and public character and by definition implied equality, inevitably tended, as Roman power grew, to merge with the notion of *clientela* proper and "to fit into the requirements of *beneficium* and *officium* that form the moral basis of that category" (p. 13). Badian finds in this Roman habit of thought a key to the understanding of the nature of Roman imperialism. Although it would be unrealistic to argue that there is only one explanation for the phenomenal growth of Roman power throughout Italy and the Mediterranean basin, Badian, by a careful analysis of the evidence, proves his thesis that the institution of *clientela* and the habit of mind behind it were probably the most decisive factors in Roman imperialistic growth. He also shows clearly in the second half of the book the importance of *clientela* in and beyond Italy, from the time of the Gracchi on, for the rise to power of individual Romans and thereby for the breakdown of the republic.

Part One is entitled *Foreign Policy*. Badian begins with an excellent succinct discussion of the organization of Italy before the

Hannibalic War. In his treatment of alliances he argues successfully against the prevalent notion that the commonest type of treaty was the *foedus iniquum*. Even though many of the signatories were *in dicione populi Romani*, theoretically the majority of the allies were independent. In practice, however, the growth of Roman power caused most of the allies to become dependent on Rome, hence clients. Badian describes the cynical way in which, under the guise of morality, Roman influence spread as follows: "Rome claims, and successfully exercises, the right to extend her alliance to any free state and to protect it against its enemies, even if the attack actually preceded the alliance. Thus the principle of fetial law which prohibited aggressive wars was overcome and the legal form was developed which later permitted the conquest of the Mediterranean without clear infringement of this principle. And thus, also, Rome was to an increasing extent to acquire the reputation of the strong protector to whom weak nations most naturally appealed in their danger" (pp. 30-1). The cases of the Campanians in 343, of the Lucanians in 299, and of Thurii in 282 are to the point. Still more important is the case of the Mamertines in Messana, for here the protection of the *fides Romana* passed beyond the confines of Italy. Badian's defense of the Romans in this connection against the charge of immorality (pp. 34-5) may strike many as somewhat sophistical. The Mamertines received a *foedus*, but in the ensuing First Punic War, although many Sicilian cities went over to the Romans, none received a treaty. Badian argues that these were the original *civitates liberae*, although scholars have generally dated the first appearance of this category to 197 B. C. The position of a "free state" without a formal alliance with a great power may well have seemed an unusual privilege. History taught only too clearly the fate which awaited a small state allied with a strong protector. Badian believes that originally the freedom of these cities was not limited or precarious, just as the freedom subsequently conferred on the Hellenes was originally without limitations. "It is obvious that this grant was not, on the part of the Romans, an act of disinterested generosity. . . . Rome could afford to be generous and refrain from imposing formal obligations, because she knew that she would have a strong *moral* claim on the states concerned—and the power to remind them of it. Just as, after 338, the Latins had been left in a state of moral and practical, rather than strictly legal, dependence, so the *civitas libera* had no legal link with Rome. . . . In this, its position is like that of the client as against his patron—and indeed, these cities had probably surrendered *in fidem populi Romani* and were free *beneficio populi Romani*—as it always to a large extent remained in Roman life: an extra-legal dependence of the weak on a strong protector, founded on gratitude, piety, reverence, and all the sacred emotions—and the patron's power to enforce them. . . . Rome's international relations cannot be analysed in terms of law alone: whatever their legal position, *all* states dependent on her became client states. And the relation of *clientela* is essentially extra-legal. If any state can, however, be called the *paradeigma* of the client state, it is the *civitas libera*—a state with no legal obligations at all. As we shall notice, the logical Greeks at first could not see beyond the law" (pp. 40-2).

Rome's interference in Illyria resulted from her protectorate over Italy, but, as often, Rome did not take action until she thought her own interests were at stake—on this occasion by the rise of a strong Illyrian power. The results of the First Illyrian War were important, for, among other things, they marked "the further development of the principle of association without treaty" (p. 45). Various Greek cities and Illyrian tribes became informal friends of Rome. Demetrius of Pharos, the strongest of these friends, presumably considering himself completely free, subsequently adopted an independent policy and one adverse to Roman interests. In the Second Illyrian War Rome quickly struck him down and gave "her friends a warning as to the limitations of their 'freedom.' The example of Demetrius, the ungrateful client, showed them the importance of remembering Rome's *beneficia*. The nature of political *clientela* was becoming clear: the client must not forget his station and the benefits he had received from Rome" (pp. 46-7; cf. Polybius, III, 16, 2).

Badian has a good discussion of Rome's fateful relations with Saguntum. He believes that after the Ebro treaty Rome received Saguntum into her *fides*. No treaty was made and hence the action probably should be considered a violation of the spirit rather than of the letter of the Ebro treaty. Thus Saguntum was in the category of those free states over which Rome assumed a protectorate so as to use them, if necessary, against a powerful enemy. In Badian's view Rome's great political discovery in the third century was this principle of the free client state. Such states because of their free status looked down on the subject allies. They formed, in a sense, "Rome's private *clientela*." Rome as protector of these free states had more freedom, than in the case of her allies, to decide when to supply protection, as Saguntum tragically learned. The case of Demetrius of Pharos showed that "the 'free' friend of Rome is free as long as Rome does not care. When she wishes to interfere, there will be formal pretexts—and above all, there will be the charge of ingratitude, justifying extreme measures. For the interpretation of the client's obligations rests largely—as in private *clientela*—with the patron. But the full realization of this was yet to come" (pp. 53-4).

Badian treats Rome's relations with the Greeks and Hellenistic kingdoms at considerable length (pp. 55-115). The discussion, as a whole, is excellent, although there are a few rather surprising judgments such as the following. The fact that Rome "refrained from intervening in the Social War in Greece" seems to be attributed to commendable restraint. One wonders what excuse even the Romans could have fabricated for intervention at that time. In several places Philip's treaty with Hannibal is referred to as a "stab in the back." That would be a natural Roman accusation, but it should be counterbalanced by mention of how the Macedonians must have viewed Roman interference in Illyria since 229. Also the characterization of Rome's demands on Philip which precipitated the Second Macedonian War as not harsh is somewhat startling. The comments on the significance of this ultimatum are so basic to the thesis of the book that they deserve to be quoted at some length. "In fact the Roman ultimatum is only a further extension of an old Roman political idea . . . ; just as, originally, Rome had invented a

method of evading the requirements of fetial law—that wars must be waged only in defence of one's own or of allied territory—by making alliances with, and thereby assuming 'legitimate' protection over, states actually facing attack, so now states were unilaterally taken under Roman protection without even the formality of a treaty . . . (The) practical effect was, of course, to do away with the last restrictions (except purely formal ones) which fetial law imposed upon policy. In the two generations since Roman armies first crossed the sea . . . there had grown up a system of informal connexion with free states, beginning in Sicily and further tested in Illyria, the elastic obligations of which fitted into the Roman habits of social thought which we know as 'clientela' and, while thus acquiring moral sanction, also fitted in well with the practical requirements of power politics. As this system was extended and became firmly established, it even transformed by its influence the earlier concept of *amicitia* . . . until the Romans could no longer imagine the co-existence of genuinely equal states: her *amici* could only be her clients" (p. 68).

There is neither space nor need in this review to discuss Badian's penetrating treatment of the complicated relations between Rome and the east from 200 to 146. Throughout this period Roman policy continued to be chiefly dictated by the concept of *clientela*, and many of the tragic situations arose from the Greek inability to comprehend the extra-legal aspects of this institution. After 146 "all allies—'free' or 'federate'—are clients, in the sense that their rights and obligations are in practice independent of law and treaties and are entirely defined and interpreted by Rome" (p. 114). The term *socii* came closer and closer to the meaning of *subjects*.

In Part Two, *Internal Politics*, the emphasis shifts from the clients of the *Populus Romanus* to "the network of personal links between great Roman individuals and families and individuals, families and states outside the City" (p. 154). These ties were generally established as a result of victory in war or of administrative contacts. Badian emphasizes that "the main point was that, in exchange for *beneficia* received and expected, the community undertook the *officia* of a client"; he then proceeds to give an interesting list of typical *beneficia* and *officia* (pp. 160-5). These last chapters present a skillful analysis of certain aspects of Roman political history from the time of the Gracchi through the first consulship of Pompey. In keeping with the thesis of the book attention is focused on the rôle played by *clientelae*, Italian and foreign. Particularly interesting are the accounts of Marius' professional army and of the opportunities thus opened up to a general born without hereditary *clientelae* and of Sulla's greater grasp of these possibilities and his efforts to perpetuate the influence of the professional army by surrounding Rome with various colonies of his veterans. By this time *clientela* had become an instrument of *dynastia*. The institution continued to be a great source of *dignitas* but also, increasingly, of *invidia*. Pompey, the young war lord from Picenum, early in life realized the potentialities of *clientelae*, both Italian and foreign, and it is to his career prior to his eastern campaigns that the last chapter is largely devoted. In these pages Badian makes good use of prosopographical evidence; see also Appendix B.

Badian's book is a difficult one to review adequately because it contains such a wealth of material and is so closely reasoned. Another review would be necessary to do justice to Part Two. As he states in the Preface, he owes much to predecessors such as Syme, Sherwin-White, Gelzer, and Münzer, but he has succeeded better than any historian I know in elucidating the fundamental significance of the institution of *clientela* in Roman foreign policy and internal politics. Scholars will surely hope that he will be able to continue his study of *clientela* down to the establishment of the Principate. One conclusion to which such a continuation would lead he has already suggested (p. 262; cf. p. 166). "The mystery of the cohesion of the Empire through successive civil wars, and despite manifest misgovernment, now becomes more intelligible. The Empire was based on the personal loyalty of leading men throughout the provinces to leading families at Rome, and this attachment proved to be independent of political vicissitudes and, as we have seen, on the whole unaffected even by the fortunes of those families. It was the foundation on which the emperors were to build."

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WALTER NEUHAUSER. *Patronus und Orator: Eine Geschichte der Begriffe von ihren Anfängen bis in die augusteische Zeit.* Innsbruck, Universitätsverlag Wagner, 1958. Pp. 210. (*Commentationes Aenipontanae*, XIV.)

Dr. Neuhauser concludes that in the Ciceronian period, *patronus* came to be used most frequently in the sense of legal pleader on behalf of another and thus was equivalent to *orator* in its forensic meaning. To prepare the ground for this conclusion, he carefully analyzes the history of the significance of both terms. The sections devoted to each open with an etymological study. That on *patronus* brings out its relation to *pater* and *patria potestas*. Presumably in the earliest period, a *patronus* had actual mastery over his clients, whether these were individuals, groups, or communities, just as the *pater* had over his *familia*. However, the patron, like the father, also had obligations towards his clients and with the passage of time the concept of mutual obligation came in the relationship of patron and client to overshadow that of mastery.

In the middle and late republic, the most frequent demand made upon the patron by his clients was to appear in court on their behalf. In early court procedure, the most important element was a knowledge of the formal (and often inequitable) rules and procedures of the civil law so that the patron was primarily expected to contribute technical legal knowledge. From the middle of the second century B. C., Roman law and procedure began to be liberalized in the direction of equity so that rhetorical skill in presenting the justice and reasonableness of a case became more important than ability to fit it into the formalities of the civil law. Thus by Cicero's day, the patron in court had to be a pleader of oratorical rather than of legal

ability. This line of argument is supported by a thorough consideration of the occurrences of *patronus* in literature. At the end of the study there is a list of all the passages discussed. Readers will, perhaps, find most interesting the varied meanings of the term in Plautus and the fact that the only instance cited from Cato the Elder refers to a *patronus* in court.

The treatment of *orator* depends almost wholly on its literary employment. Though it had a number of significances (all derived from *orare*) in every period, its most frequent use before Cicero appears to have been for an ambassador or representative speaking on behalf of another. Cicero, translating into Latin Greek rhetorical theory, emphasized the concept of the *orator* as a public speaker, and particularly as a pleader in court. Hence in Cicero the common meanings of the two words overlapped. A *patronus* was pre-eminently an *orator* pleading in court on behalf of another who, in consequence, became his client even if he had not been so already in the more extended and older relationship. This relationship of lawyer and "client" has survived into modern legal parlance.

Though Neuhauser ends his detailed analysis with the Augustan period, he sketches the history of the two words under the empire and, for *orator*, even into the middle ages, using the conclusions of P. Benedikt Hermann, *Zur Wortbedeutung von orator im Frühmittelalter usw.* (*Studien und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktinerordens*, N. F. XVI [1929]). Under the early empire, the meanings of the two terms again drew apart. The original concept of the patron's general responsibility for the welfare of his clients had not been lost sight of during the later republic. Indeed, it was then important both socially and politically for a patron to be attended both at his morning receptions and in public by a large crowd of obsequious clients. The social importance of clientship in the early empire appears in the frequent references in such writers as Martial, Pliny the Younger, or Juvenal, particularly to the "hand-out" or *sportula*, usually food commuted to cash, given by the patron to his clients.

Tacitus' *Dialogus* shows how, at the same time, the empire reduced the scope of rhetorical display in court pleading and restored importance to technical knowledge of the law. Hence the man called on to plead in court on behalf of another came to be denominated *advocatus* and either to be himself a person learned in the law, a *iurisconsultus* or *iurisprudens*, or to base his arguments on opinions received from such. *Orator* continued to be used generally for pleader, public speaker, or representative, but no longer had the specific meaning of pleader which Cicero had attached to it. Hence the connection of both *patronus* and *orator* with pleading in court and therefore their identification of meaning came to be lost sight of.

So detailed a treatment as this will appeal chiefly to those specifically concerned with social or legal aspects of Roman studies. For such, Neuhauser presents a thorough survey of both ancient and modern materials. His general conclusions will also bear upon such studies as that of E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae: 264-70 B.C.* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958). Badian argues that Roman foreign policy was conditioned by the concept of the patron-client relation and that her expectation of "services" from allied or subject

states, acceptable to her Italian allies, was alien to the diplomacy of the Hellenistic world and caused constant misunderstandings between Rome and eastern powers. Mention may also be made in connection with Neuhauser's book of one which C. G. Starr reviewed in *A. J. P.*, LXXX (1959), pp. 216-17, namely Louis Harmand, *Le patronat sur les collectivités publiques des origines au Bas-Empire, etc.* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1957). Harmand analyzes the concept of patronage, both of Augustus (but not of succeeding emperors) and of private individuals, over communities.

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ERNST PULGRAM. *The Tongues of Italy*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958. Pp. xi + 465.

Few scholars could have written a book which not only covers the linguistic history of Italy from the earliest Latin remains to the present day but extends back in time over the period ante-dating the spread of Latin and even to the first entry of man himself into Italy. Ernst Pulgram has the necessary familiarity with both the ancient languages and Italian, supplemented on the one hand by a thorough understanding of the principles of historical linguistics and on the other by an intimate knowledge of the country of Italy itself. As a result he has produced a work from which professional scholars can learn much and which non-technical readers can study with profit and with an enjoyment due in part to the fervent spirit which appears in many of its pages. At the same time, however, the reader may feel some surprise at the great scarcity of actual linguistic material treated. On page 250 some of the most typical Sabine loans in Latin are listed, but citations of linguistic forms and accounts of changes in grammatical structure are rare. Throughout the book the author's concern is with the external rather than the internal history of the languages of Italy, so much so, in fact, that what we have is really an account of the speakers of the tongues of Italy rather than of the tongues themselves. Palmer's *Latin Language* and the present work could be used as supplements to one another: Palmer has more phonological, morphological, and lexical data, while Pulgram has more anthropology, archaeology, and Roman political and social history.

There are four major divisions of the book: Modern Italy, Pre-Roman Italy, Roman Italy, and Mediaeval Italy. Among the various Italian dialects Pulgram considers Tuscan closer than other dialects to Latin, though on grounds which he admits are impressionistic and not susceptible of scientific demonstration; and he takes care to point out that this closeness to Latin could only have operated among the highly educated as a factor in determining the selection of Tuscan as the standard dialect (p. 59). At the same time he upholds the importance of Dante, together with Petrarch and Boecaccio, in advancing the selection of Tuscan.

It is difficult here, because of limitations of space, even to sum-

marize the comprehensive account of Pre-Roman Italy, which reaches back beyond the first remains of palaeolithic man in Italy to the beginnings of man himself. But it is possible to select for mention or discussion certain portions of Book Two which have a particular interest for students of the ethnology and languages of early Italy. The author attributes the introduction of Indo-European dialects into Italy to the invaders who introduced copper, bronze, and iron, reflected respectively in the palafitte, terramare, and Villanova cultures, with the warning that these invasions had rather the nature of slow infiltrations, and that we should not assume that all persons in possession of these cultures were Indo-European speakers. Metal cultures from the Near East entered Italy by a southern as well as a northern route, and the combination of the two immigrations had the character of a pincer movement, the northern and southern prongs of which had for a time little contact with each other. The bearers of the southern culture are to be regarded as non-Indo-European in speech. The theory of von Duhn regarding the cremating Italici of the northwest and the inhuming Italici of the southeast, and the Rome-Rimini line which separates them, is examined (pp. 219-23) and discarded because it does too much violence to linguistic groupings, especially the close grouping of Oscan and Umbrian, because it fails to explain the absence of inhumation burials in the northern area which the inhuming Italici are supposed to have traversed, and because there is too great a gap in time between the time of the iron-age burials and the earliest dialect records. In discussing the relationship between Latin and Oscan-Umbrian, which must inevitably arise in a work of this kind, he dissents from those who find common features in a "proto-Italic" dialect spoken in the original Indo-European home and regards Latin and the Italic dialects as largely the product of developments occurring on Italian soil, with the influence of distinct substrata responsible for many of their peculiarities and cultural contact for many features which they possessed in common. Here his interpretation of the evidence agrees with the opinions of several recent scholars, especially in Italy, while at the same time he emphasizes the analogy with the development of the Romance languages, whose peculiarities are to be accounted for by the substrata upon which Latin was superimposed rather than by dialectal features already present in Latin before its spread. To the Etruscan question, the importance of which in a book of this kind is obvious, he devotes a full chapter. Recognizing the striking resemblance of the language of the Lemnian stele to Etruscan, and the inevitability of admitting the existence of bearers of an orientalizing art and an orientalizing religion into the Etruscan culture as we know it in Italy, he ranges himself with the majority who regard the language as a non-Indo-European importation from the Anatolian-Aegean, but at the same time he considers that we must regard the Etruscan culture known to us in Italy within the historic period as largely a native product; here he admits at least a measure of soundness in the position of Pallottino and others who regard the Etruscans as "autochthonous."

Not only in the Etruscan chapter is there a warning against the theories of those who, by forcing the evidence, have sought to interpret the texts and classify the language, but at many points in the

book one can find skepticism, and sometimes ridicule, toward theses with a plausible appearance but an insecure foundation. Here we may include on the one hand the common failure to recognize the fact that language, race, and culture are not necessarily coextensive, and on the other the misuse of linguistics and related disciplines for the purpose of supporting nationalist ideologies. Other examples of doctrines dismissed as incapable of demonstration, if not downright invalid, include Huntington's over-exact application of his theory of climatic cycles to Roman history (p. 24); the alleged "Mediterranean language" and the linguistic fossils used to support it (pp. 106-7); the geographical distribution of the beech tree as a means of fixing the home of the proto-Indo-European speakers (p. 145), without, however, any mention of the more recent and less well-known attempt to place it with reference to the occurrence of salmon in the rivers of northern Germany; the linguistic connections and physical characteristics of the Ausones and other little-known ethnic groups of ancient Italy (pp. 162-3); racial theories to explain the patrician-plebeian dichotomy (p. 259). Scholars who have carefully read *The Tongues of Italy* can scarcely fail to exercise greater care than previously in handling problems in which linguistics and ethnology interpenetrate.

In the chapter entitled "The Spread of Latin" the colonies and the roads are taken as the two means whereby Italy gradually became Roman. For the question why Rome did not forcibly compel its subject peoples to adopt the Latin language he gives several answers involving practical motives on the part of the Romans themselves. It seems likely, however, that a stronger reason may have been the impossibility of any systematic attempt to enforce linguistic assimilation in the manner in which some modern governments have attempted to enforce it through universal education and mass media of communication. As to the type of Latin which ultimately spread through the empire, Pulgram takes account both of the linguistic cleavage which must have accompanied the wide difference of social classes in Rome, and of the relatively humble, often non-Roman, background of the veterans who largely composed the colonates. He accepts the commonly held view that features of the ancient Italic dialects have persisted in the modern dialects of Italy, but he gives no examples.

Errors of citation and typography are next to non-existent. On p. 321, footnote 12, the first word of the Praenestine fibula is MANIOS, not DUENOS. On p. 358 the year of Cicero's birth should be given as 106.

There is a very full bibliography, broken down into sections corresponding to the eight "parts" (not the four "books"), each section being further divided into "cited" and "additional" categories.

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JOHN CHADWICK. *The Decipherment of Linear B*. Cambridge, University Press, 1958. Pp. x + 147; 2 pls.; 17 figs. \$3.75.

This book is designed primarily for the general reader, as a non-technical counterpart to Ventris and Chadwick's monumental *Documents in Mycenaean Greek* (Cambridge, 1956). It is an excellent book; not only thoroughly competent, as one would expect from an author with Chadwick's qualifications, but also written in a lucid, fast-moving style which makes for very good reading. After a book like this, one wishes sincerely that more scholars with recognized standing in their fields would find it worth their while to acquaint a wider public with their problems and their results instead of leaving the important task of "popularization" of scholarship to journalists and professional writers who by necessity have to rely too heavily on second-hand information too hastily acquired.

For his professional colleagues, Chadwick prefaces his book with a warning (p. x): "this book is not for them, though I hope they will enjoy reading it." This reviewer did indeed enjoy the book, but he cannot help considering the disclaimer of scholarly value as an understatement. True, the book does not contain a formidable apparatus of footnotes and bibliographical references; but the mere fact that its core, chapters 2-6, offers a much more complete account of the steps leading to the decipherment than that found in *Documents* (let alone in "Evidence for Greek Dialect in the Mycenaean Archives" [*J. H. S.*, LXXIII, 1953, pp. 84-103]), makes this book a very useful item for the scholar interested in Mycenaean problems. The account of the trial-and-error approach shows one thing very clearly, which sometimes tends to be overlooked: the solution was arrived at by a combinatorial, not a statistical method; statistics has its place in the assessment of the odds for mere chance "identifications," but not in the basic discovery procedure. An exception to such an evaluation of the approach can be found only in the conjectures made about the "pure vowel" signs (p. 52). Here it is not without a certain irony that these conjectures did indeed lead to the right conclusions even though they were based on faulty assumptions: high frequency of "pure vowels" in initial position and almost complete absence of vowel clustering in the interior of forms is by no means a general distributional property of all languages, but rather of some undetermined number of languages only, of which Greek happened to be one.

The nature of the book under review makes it unfeasible to take up here any of the points of controversy mentioned by the author; instead, only a few matters of detail are added, which may deserve consideration for later editions of this book. P. 21: cuneiform signs can hardly be said to consist of "only three wedge-shaped strokes." P. 34: instead of "in certain Germanic languages including English" read "in the Germanic languages." P. 102: generalizations about the use of a foreign language for recording purposes will also have to take into account such developments as the use of Prakrit, not the literary Sanskrit, as the language of official documents in Central Asia in areas with highly developed literary languages of their own (Saka and 'Tocharian' B).

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PIERRE LÉVÊQUE. *Pyrrhos*. Paris, E. De Boccard, 1957. Pp. 735; 7 pls. (*Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, fasc. 185.)

King Pyrrhus of Epirus remains one of the most enigmatic, as well as one of the most interesting, figures in the history of Greece and Macedonia after the death of Alexander and of Italy in the age of the Roman conquest: the great tactician who could not use his victories, a tradition at least as old as Ennius, the eager adventurer who could not finish his undertakings, the disorderly and sometimes cruel enemy in Greece who is Rome's almost unique example of a chivalrous foe. He emerges from the pages of our chief source, Plutarch, and the other, more fragmentary ones, inconsistent in personality, policies, and achievements. Lévéque's attempt to find the unity behind these contradictions has produced a thorough and even exhaustive biography, of prime importance for its comprehensive and critical handling of difficult material.

A large initial section is rightly devoted to the sources, and lays the basis for a considerable amount of detailed analysis in the later sections of the work, for though late and often confused, they retain material from contemporary or early hands, in Greece from Hieronymus of Cardia, Pyrrhus' own Memoirs, Proxenus, Timaeus, and in Rome from Ennius and the earlier and later annalists. In Epirus inscriptions and coins make only a minor contribution. In spite of the author's skill in analysis doubts may remain when the early material preserved is so slight. How probable is it that the sober Hieronymus, who pictures Pyrrhus as the restless destroyer when he opposed the Antigonids, would heroise him when he faced the Roman barbarians? In fact he probably used that same restlessness to motivate the western adventure (pp. 25 ff.). Can so much be attributed to Proxenus on the basis of a single fragment? That he was an intimate of Pyrrhus remains a conjecture, however reasonable; and if so, the attribution to him of the stories of Pyrrhus' childhood and his thoughts and sayings are conjectures too. Ennius' part in the formation of the Roman tradition may be greater and more reliable than the author grants (pp. 45 ff.). After all, his Messapian forebears were allies of Pyrrhus and Tarentum in the war (p. 304), however hostile their previous sentiments toward the Greeks may have been. Tenney Frank's "brillante hypothèse" still has much in its favor. Perhaps more distinction should be made between the earlier and the later Roman annalists. And while the author attributes one passage in Plutarch (p. 12) to moralists he treats the conversation between Cineas and Pyrrhus (p. 14) before the departure for Italy as early and in essentials genuine (pp. 276, 289-92).

The greater part of the book takes up in turn the three great chapters of Pyrrhus' career: his activities in Greece and Macedonia up to the Italian expedition, his wars in Italy and Sicily, his wars in Macedonia and Greece after his return from Italy, and there are frequent and full appendixes on individual questions such as those relating to genealogy, chronology, and coinage. While the author admits the presence of a great ambition he finds evidence at each stage of political as well as military capacity and denies that the

major decisions were impulsive or unconsidered. Pyrrhus did first enlarge, strengthen, and enrich the little Epirot kingdom to which he returned in 297 (pp. 183 ff.), even though his later enterprises meant years of absence and some neglect. Yet his expulsion from Macedonia and Thessaly in 285 was more a political than a military defeat (pp. 176 ff.). Nor was his western venture decided on impulse. There elapsed a year of consultation and preparation between the invitation from Tarentum and his departure (pp. 261, 285 ff.). Rejecting the view that Pyrrhus was simply a condottiere, the author presents him both as a crusader for Hellenism against the barbarians (p. 279) and the intended creator of a vast western power (p. 262; cf. pp. 423 ff., 470 ff., on his coinage). And if he failed he was not the only man to discover the difficulties of leading a coalition or subduing the stubbornness of the Roman Senate. His departure for Sicily, again after months of reflection, was no abandonment of his Italian allies (he left forces in Tarentum and Locri) but a means at once of fulfilling his ambition and mobilizing strength to force a decision in Italy (pp. 420 ff.). Stopped at Lilybaeum after his successes in Sicily, he planned an expedition to Africa in order to complete his task in Sicily, and when the Sicilians refused to co-operate he returned to Italy to aid his allies there (pp. 491 ff.). When he returned to Epirus after Beneventum he did not abandon the Tarentines but left forces and officers who remained there until his death in 272. His hope was to recoup in Macedonia and Greece the means of renewing his western plans (pp. 531 ff.). His Peloponnesian expedition was not an act of grace to Cleonymus but was intended to complete the overthrow of Antigonus Gonatas and let him return to the west with force enough to win (pp. 578 ff.). The whole was ruined by his death at Argos in 272. This reconstruction of necessity involves too much emphasis on unaccomplished plans, yet it has some basis at each stage in our sources and is commended by the degree of consistency it brings into the picture of Pyrrhus himself.

Some points remain uncertain. The author holds that losses neither at Heracleia or at Ausculum justify the anecdote about a "Pyrrhic" victory (pp. 333 f.). His estimates of the rival forces and populations at the beginning of the war with Rome (pp. 312 f.) make them nearly equal, while those of Afzelius, which he does not mention, give the Romans a decided advantage (*Die römische Eroberung Italiens* (340-264 B. C.), pp. 186 ff., in *Acta Jutlandica*, XIV, 3 [1942]); and he stands in general with L. Breglia on the dating of the early Roman coinage (pp. 440 ff.). But one cannot fail to draw attention to the excellent discussion of the significance for Rome of the war with Pyrrhus (pp. 540 ff.) and the wealth of information in the Appendixes.

T. ROBERT S. BROUGHTON.

MANFRED NEUMANN. Die poetische Gerechtigkeit in der neuen Komödie: Untersuchungen zur Technik des antiken Lustspiels. Speyer, 1958. Pp. 192. (Dissertation Mainz.)

As one should expect of a dissertation prepared under the direction of Thierfelder and Marg, the work of Neumann is thorough and competent. His book contains 940 footnotes. He is commendably well informed in the field of New Comedy, and he shows judiciousness in regard to contamination. His subject is one of prime importance. From the point of view of higher criticism, however, neither this work nor any other with which the reviewer is acquainted can be considered a satisfactory treatment of Poetic Justice in ancient drama.

Neumann examines every character in extant New Comedy to determine to what degree deserts are received. He discovers (p. 178) that Poetic Justice, especially in regard to the main characters, is an important principle of dramatic technique. He admits some modifications. Where punishment is deserved, there is a general tendency to forgive, especially to forgive characters sympathetically presented, and we are likely to be sympathetic to youth, beauty, and cleverness. Indeed even those who deserve no pity are often forgiven. He also states (p. 181): "Die Grundregel der poetischen Gerechtigkeit gilt auch für die Posse: der Sünder wird bestraft und der Gute belohnt. Allerdings wird der Begriff des "Sünders" etwas anders bestimmt als in den übrigen Stücken. . . ."

Two points here are noteworthy. As soon as one changes his definition of "der Sünder" he in reality changes his principle. Secondly, the procedure of examining each character without bringing together all the characters of a given play results in a loss of the distinctive characteristics of each play. Actually there is wide variation among the plays in regard to Poetic Justice.

Most of the comedies of Menander are characterized by romantic emotionalism and a bland—not to say blind—optimism. In the *Andria* Pamphilus gives a promise to his father that contradicts his commitment to Glycerium, but his honor is saved by the long arm of coincidence. In the *Epitrepontes* Charisius suffers his conversion before he knows the true identity of the baby. He too is saved by the happy turn of events. In the *Perikeiromene* Agnoia explains that she has brought about the turbulent events in order that enlightenment may follow (cf. Neumann, p. 30). In short, chance itself seems benign in Menander's cosmos.

In no comedy is Poetic Justice more dominant than in the newly discovered *Dyskolos*, where the good are rewarded and enriched—for their goodness, as they themselves admit (*Dys.*, 644-772, 815-20, 862). Even the cook recognizes the triumph of Poetic Justice (*Dys.*, 644):

οὐδὲ εἰς
μὴ] γειρον ἀδικήσας ἀθῶος διέφυγεν.

The play is saved from becoming utterly flat by its winsome humor. Another saving grace is the choler of the old man. He has been "punished" for his boorishness, but his stubborn character is over-

come only by external compulsion in the farcical scene at the end of the play.

But even Menander occasionally lapses into a more honest outlook, as in the *Adelphoe*. Neumann has difficulty here. He (pp. 172-3) thinks that Micio should win out in the end, but that actually Demea, who earlier has been ridiculed, triumphs. Neumann's rejection of the usual opinion—which is the correct one—that the ending of this play involves a compromise seems to be based on a serious misinterpretation of vs. 994:

haec reprehendere et corrigere me et [δβ]secundare in loco.

This does not mean "... tadele, verbessere und euch auf diese Weise helfe. . . ." The first and second infinitives in the Latin line constitute Demea's old policy of severity, the third infinitive represents Micio's policy of concession.¹ Demea is obviously proposing a compromise. Nor is Neumann (p. 75) correct in viewing Micio as the ideal father. It is obvious from the first of the play that Micio has been much less successful than he thinks and that Aeschinus is a somewhat callow and inconsiderate young man.

But in some comedies satire and cynicism dominate, and there is little or no soft romanticism. In general Poetic Justice is the principle of melodrama. Of course it has no place in great tragedy, which is constructed upon the precisely opposite principle: the pathetic discrepancy between what man does and what he suffers. It is true, however, that even in tragedy we cannot bear the spectacle of a perfectly good man coming to dire misfortune. This we view as accidental, and great tragedy must appear inevitable. We insist upon some faint hope of moral law and order, some degree of responsibility.

Neumann's efforts to apply his principle in such plays as the *Menaechmi* or the *Pseudolus* or the *Truculentus*, therefore, are mistaken. The true principle of the *Truculentus* is *ridentem dicere verum* or perhaps to hold up vice to ridicule. If we must bring it into relation with Poetic Justice, the proper application lies not, as Neumann thinks (p. 114), in the attractiveness of Phronesium's youth, beauty, and cleverness. Actually Phronesium is not very clever. The proper application lies precisely in the fact that vice and not virtue triumphs in the play: here is a very real Circe turning men into swine. It is futile to conjecture with Neumann (pp. 39-40) that Strabax will be driven away as soon as he can pay no more and that he will deserve such treatment because he has not observed the proper *pietas* towards his parents. So Neumann (p. 44) is mistaken in finding that in the *Pseudolus* Calidorus' reluctance to offend *pietas* serves to make him deserving of forgiveness. Actually this reluctance is imaginary.

Erotium in the *Menaechmi* Neumann (p. 133) calls "die am wenigstens sympathische Hetäre der Komödie" and (p. 134) he says: "Diese Bestrafung hat sie verdient, da sie nur habgierig, nicht aber schlau ist." Resentment against the theft of what she has been given for services rendered can hardly be called avariciousness.

¹ Whether one reads *obsecundare* or *secundare* in this line, the meaning is obviously the same as *obsecundato in loco* in *Heauton*, 827.

The *Menaechmi* and the *Pseudolus* are farces and the *Truculentus* a satirical comedy, all written with spirit and wit and a cold cynical detachment which leaves no place for Poetic Justice.

At times Neumann frankly and rightly admits that what happens to a given character is not pertinent to Poetic Justice. So (p. 55) he remarks that Stichus and Sangarinus are allowed their celebration less out of considerations of justice than because celebration is the order of the day. But at times Neumann strains too far. Syrus in the *Adelphoe*, he intimates (p. 57), may have his faults; but he has been made a sympathetic character before he is freed. On the contrary, the very point of the freeing of Syrus lies in the fact that he does not deserve it: Demea is reducing urbanity to the absurd.

Neumann (p. 17) thinks that Ampelisca in the *Rudens* is presented as freeborn. This seems to put too much weight on the plural *liberas* in vs. 736 (note *civis tuas* in vs. 742). Since Trachalio does not know the *patria* of Ampelisca (cf. vs. 750), he can hardly know that she was born free.

Despite these criticisms, we should be grateful to Neumann for his extended study on this important subject.

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RICHARD M. HAYWOOD. *The Myth of Rome's Fall*. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., Inc., 1958. Pp. 178. \$3.50.

The title of this book is rather misleading. From it one might infer that the volume seeks to demonstrate the truth of the oft-made assertion that the Roman Empire did not in fact fall at all, but, like the old soldier, merely faded away. This, however, is not the purpose of the book. Rather it seeks to show that misconceptions exist about the reasons for the disintegration of the Empire. Consequently an apter title for it would be "Myths concerning Rome's Fall." In any case the title leaves one in no doubt that this is a "popular" book; and, as such, it abounds in audacious assertions, arresting analogies, common clichés, oversimplifications, selectiveness and disproportion in its use of material, considerable compression, allusiveness in place of straight narrative. These are all, so to speak, tricks of the trade. They are unavoidable in a work of this type; and if it be granted that there is room and need in North America for a popular book on the subject (and seeing that over thirty years have elapsed since White's *Why Rome Fell* appeared, Haywood may well be right in arguing [p. 1] that there is), then one cannot reasonably criticize the author for the methods he has chosen to adopt. The methods do, of course, involve certain risks; but Haywood is a competent enough scholar to be quite well aware of them. There is always the lurking peril of the misstatement of fact: Haywood does not always avoid it (e. g. on p. 72 he makes the Cimbri and Teutoni threaten Italy in the time of Augustus rather than in the time of Marius), but he usually manages to do so; on the whole he adroitly displays the most admirable skill in introducing so much

so accurately in so small a compass. An even bigger hazard, however, is the risk of misleading, and this risk is directly proportionate to the amount of information likely to be possessed by the reader. Haywood is confessedly (p. 1) writing for the general reader; but the general reader, like the abominable snowman, is a pretty elusive animal. On the whole one gets the impression that the reader Haywood has in mind is not a very knowledgeable one: time and again he resorts to the "folksy" note (archaeologists are "the scholars who go out and get their hands dirty," p. 3) or, in the manner of Durant's *Caesar and Christ*, to the spicy (Commodus' "gazelle-eyed, bell-voiced houris," p. 53). A general reader who is likely to be impressed by this sort of thing is also only too likely to form wrong ideas when told (p. 15) that "the encirclement of the Mediterranean by Roman possessions was completed by the conquest of Egypt," or (p. 140) that "schismatic struggles within the Church had largely ceased by the end of the fourth century," or (p. 145) that from the fourth century on "history fell into two great periods, that before Christ and that after Christ." In order to find space for a rather more exact exposition of such points it might have been better to eschew the repetitions (e.g. those on Alaric [pp. 100, 156], on Augustine [pp. 134, 136], on Clovis [pp. 163, 168]) and the irrelevancies (e.g. the excursus on the Olympic Games [pp. 138-9]).

Much more serious, however, than the cavils that can be raised against Haywood's way of writing up his facts are the criticisms that can be made against his interpretation of them. His view is that it is incorrect or, to use his own favorite word, unrealistic, to think that the Empire in the West fell because there was something rotten in the state of Rome: the fall was not inevitable, it was the chance result of fortuitous contingency, a sort of historical freak. There was no "trait clearly indicative of ill health and premonitory of decay and dissolution" (p. 149); there were no conditions to cause "the subtle and deadly miasma which historians have so often assumed" (p. 154). This conviction leads him into making assertions which, in some instances, strike the present reviewer as wildly improbable, if not preposterous. The loss of material resources in the third century, when, we are assured (p. 60 and elsewhere), there was not really any anarchy, is airily dismissed (p. 108) as "a minor factor in the financial problem of the fourth century." Nor is there any "way of demonstrating that the method of public finance was a cause of the events which led to the loss of the West" (p. 114). Although he admits that there was a drain of currency to the orient, he argues (p. 108 and elsewhere) that ultimately it all came back to buy products of the Empire (for all the world as if he were writing about modern paper currencies instead of gold and silver coins which can be melted down into bullion). The "barbarian" assaults are minimized: at worst they were "very heavy pressures from the outside," and in any case resistance to them "was not so poorly discharged that disaster was inevitable" (p. 149). Bureaucratic corruption, while "regrettable," was not "a cause of the loss of the West" (p. 150). Such statements, and a lot more like them, leave one with the impression that the troubles of the Late Empire were, so to speak, a mere passing breeze, the evil effects of which could have been easily avoided if only the Romans had not made a few mistakes

(p. 157) or had possessed a workable system for "the succession to the throne" (p. 73). In fact, for Haywood, the fourth century "may well be compared to the nineteenth century in England" (p. 141). At this point one feels inclined to quote his own words (p. 128) against him and point out that the features of nineteenth century England which he adduces for purposes of comparison are "weaknesses which a more penetrating analyst might have perceived to be the common weaknesses of mankind."

Haywood seems to the present reviewer to have confused "historical inevitability" of the type against which Isaiah Berlin has so recently and so cogently argued with the kind of inevitability that can reasonably be postulated as the direct consequence of some immediately prior event or action. Granted, *post hoc* does not always mean *propter hoc*; but it seems perverse to argue that the admitted failure of the Empire to "cope with the persistent problems of government" (p. 170) in the third century had little or no bearing on any malaise that may have existed in the fourth. None but the followers of a Spengler or a Toynbee will quarrel with the thesis that the fall of Rome was not, historically speaking, inevitable; but few will share the view that the events of the third century were not really disastrous and destined, *inevitably*, to have far more damaging consequences than the mere creation of temporary difficulties. In fairness it should be added that, whatever one may think of Haywood's judgement of the facts, he does at least record the facts. His "unrealistic" readers may not draw the same conclusion as he does from the fact that the numbers of the Germanic invaders of the Empire were exiguous, but he does draw attention to it (p. 157). In sum he can be said to have discharged fairly well his self-imposed task of "indicating what changes took place from age to age" (p. 5), but is considerably less satisfactory in explaining why those changes occurred.

Being "popular," the book is not equipped with documentation or bibliography. Its one concession to the academic fraternity is to include an index. Unfortunately, when tested, the index is found to leave out so many items as not to be very serviceable.

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OTTO SEEL. Die Praefatio des Pompeius Trogus. Erlangen, 1955.

Pp. 86. DM 8. (*Erlanger Forschungen*, Reihe A: Band 3.)

GIOVANNI FORNI. Valore storico e fonti di Pompeo Trogus, I: Per

le guerre greco-persiane. Urbino, 1958. Pp. 221. L. 1500.

(*Pubblicazioni dell'Università di Urbino*, 7.)

These two monographs show a renewed interest in a Latin historian who has been rather widely neglected of late. Pompeius Trogus was by descent a Gaul, but he became a good Roman. His grandfather, a member of the tribe of the Vescontii, was given

Roman citizenship by Pompey in return for services rendered during the war against Sertorius; his uncle accompanied Pompey on the campaign against Mithradates; and his father assisted Caesar in the Gallic wars. Then, in the early years of Augustus' rule, Trogus published his *Philippic History*, a history of the world in 44 books, beginning with the early empires of the ancient Orient and coming down to his own day. Though never mentioned by contemporary writers, Trogus' book was used by Valerius Maximus, the elder Pliny, and others in the first century, and in the fourth century it achieved wide popularity. It was frequently quoted by other writers; the authors of the *Augustan History* twice bracketed Trogus with Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, as one of the four bright lights of Roman historiography; Justin made his epitome which reduced the text to about one-fifth its original size (Seel dates this epitome about 300); and both Trogus and Justin were of great help to such Christian writers as Jerome, Augustine, Orosius, and Cassiodorus, who were then working out a Christian version of world history. The text of Trogus disappeared toward the end of the sixth century, but we still have the Epitome in full, and there are brief summaries of each book (the Prologi). Justin's epitome remained popular throughout the Middle Ages and was frequently used as a school text until the middle of the nineteenth century, by which time it had undergone more than 250 reprintings. During the last hundred years, however, it has received less attention.

Modern criticism of Trogus may be said to date from A. von Gutschmid's article, "Trogus und Timagenes," which appeared in 1882. This author argued that, since Trogus could not have written the history himself, he must have followed some Greek source, which Gutschmid identified as the work of an Alexandrian Greek named Timagenes. Since very little is known about this Timagenes—there is not even good evidence that he ever wrote a world history—Gutschmid's theory only confused and misled scholars regarding the importance of Trogus' work. His suggestion was in harmony, however, with the prevailing assumption that no Roman could possibly do more than ape a Greek model, and it therefore won wide acceptance, eventually finding its way into most manuals of Latin literature.

Nevertheless, this Timagenes theory always met with a certain amount of criticism, which reached its climax in the above-mentioned work by Otto Seel, who had already edited the Teubner edition of Justin (1935) and who has since published the fragments of Trogus (Teubner, 1956). Though nominally a study of the preface to the Epitome (31 lines), this 80-page monograph really is an important discussion of Trogus and his place in Roman historiography. Seel's criticisms of the Timagenes theory are thoroughly convincing; he shows that Trogus' vigorous anti-imperialism was wholly within the Roman tradition of Sallust and Tacitus (and Cato); he thinks that Trogus, like Vergil, wished to suggest that Augustus would soon inaugurate a new and better world order; and he seems to conclude that the author of the *Augustan History* was not far wrong in his judgment of Trogus' proper place among the Roman historians. However, Seel does not adequately explain why Trogus' contemporaries so completely ignored this able and patriotic historian who was a close associate of Caesar and Augustus.

Forni accepts Seel's conclusions as a foundation for his study of Trogus' sources and historical value, especially for the period of the Greco-Persian wars. In his opening chapter he lists and summarizes the views of scholars, from Gutschmid to Seel, who have written on Trogus, and he gives us a rather full account of Seel's contentions. He then proceeds to a detailed study of Justin's methods as an abbreviator, minutely comparing the Prologi with the Epitome. He shows that Justin did his work very mechanically, that he omitted long passages completely, and that he added nothing of his own. He was so colorless a person, in fact, that we may safely trust the Epitome as reflecting Trogus, save for the latter's more scholarly discussions of chronology and geography, and such literary embellishments as battle scenes, speeches, and character sketches. After completing these preliminary studies, Forni turns to a study of Trogus' sources and their use for the period of the Persian wars. He comes to the conclusion that, like other ancient historians, Trogus followed one source for one episode and then changed to another for the next, rarely blending the two sources, and that he preferred rhetorical writers such as Ephorus and Theopompus to the more restrained Herodotus and Thucydides. He concedes that the value of these sections as history is not great. Trogus is of value, not as a source from which modern writers can draw facts for their own narratives, but as a representative thinker of the Augustan age whose writings exercised a profound influence upon the historical thought of later times.

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OSCAR E. NYBAKKEN. *Greek and Latin in Scientific Terminology*. Ames, Iowa, Iowa State College Press, 1959. Pp. xi + 321.

This book has a twofold objective, which is stated on the first page: "(1) to increase the student's facility in determining the meaning of scientific words by analyzing their structure, and (2) to encourage the student to establish sound nomenclatural criteria for himself and his profession." It may be used for supplementary work in courses in language or science, or it may serve as the basic textbook for courses in scientific terminology, although in the latter case, since the plan of the book does not call for a division into separate lessons, the instructor must work out his own lesson plan.

The aim is practical throughout, and it is not expected that the scientists and science students who use it will be concerned with certain distinctions familiar to specialists in Greek and Latin historical grammar except in so far as these distinctions have a bearing on clarity and orderliness in scientific terminology. To a grammarian it is rather disturbing to find the terms "ablaut" and "vowel-gradation" made to include *facere*: *deficere* and other instances of the specifically Latin vowel-weakening along with such true instances of ablaut as Gk. *pherein*: *phoros*. Of more immediately practical importance, however, is the omission of any explanation of the dissimilatory principle which leads to the use of *-aris* in place of *-alis* in making adjectives from nouns already containing an *l* (e. g., *animalis* but *ocularis*).

The middle portion, amounting to about one half of the entire book, is devoted to two word-lists, the first Greek, the second Latin, containing the prefixes, suffixes, numeral stems, and all the words of general vocabulary which have any importance as sources of medical and biological terms. Under the reference word ***Daktylos**, for example, we find *ankylo daktylia*, *apodactylic*, *arachnodactyly*, *brachydactyilia*, *camptodactyly*, *dactylopterus*, etc. Asterisks are used in front of the more important vocabulary items as an aid to the instructor in the economy of his material. The emphasis throughout the book is on medicine, biology, and other closely connected sciences rather than on chemistry, physics, and mathematics. It is for this reason that, for example, the family of words from μέθυ including such chemically important terms as *methane*, *methyle*, etc., is not included here. The general word-lists, however, are very comprehensive, with 725 word-families from Latin and 885 from Greek, and in the opinion of this reviewer the author was right in presenting an abundance of words in preference to the alternative of few words and more explanatory matter. The lack of commentary really offers no difficulty for one who knows how to use the book as a whole. I have noted only one lexical item which might lead to confusion: *lethal* appears under the Latin heading ***Let(h)um** and again under the Greek heading ***Lethe**; the real source is *letum* with *h* introduced into the Latin spelling and English pronunciation apparently as a result of Varro's connection of the word with λήθη (*L. L.*, VII, 42).

The book contains a few misprints. Some involving linguistic material are: p. 25 *obvate* for *obovate*; p. 57 near the bottom χόγχη for κόγχη; p. 147 φερμός for θερμός; p. 151 *anthraconecrossi* for *anthraconecrosis*; p. 152 **Aracne** for **Arachne**; p. 157 *endrochondral* for *endochondral*; p. 170 *olighoydramnion* for *oligohydramnion*. On p. 269 ἀριστερός is glossed as "right" instead of "left." On p. 274, if the word coined by Sanoaville de Lachèse for hysteria in the male was really "tarassis" and not "taraxis," the form should not have been cited with approval. More serious, because it involves a small category rather than a single word, is the derivation of the *-ia* in *lithiasis*, *helminthiasis*, etc., from the verbal stem meaning "heal"; the forms in question are rather verbal nouns to verbs in *-iáo* designating morbid conditions (e. g. λιθίασις beside λιθιάω).

But all these minor blemishes are of slight consequence in comparison with the positive merits of the book, which is well conceived, well arranged, and excellently adapted to the objectives set forth on the opening page. The sections on transliteration, pronunciation, combining vowels, on eponyms, and on codes and rules of scientific nomenclature are only a few of the sections having particularly great value. Special mention may be made of the seven pages on word-elements frequently confused. There are a good bibliography and a good subject-index; in view of the plan of the book a word-index is not needed. The book, even where it is not the basic text for courses in scientific terminology, will be indispensable as a supplementary work of reference, and it will be no less indispensable for scientists who to any extent are concerned with the terminology of their specialty.

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JOHN MAXWELL EDMONDS. *The Fragments of Attic Comedy*, after Meineke, Bergk, and Kock. Augmented, Newly Edited with their Contexts, and Completely Translated into English Verse. Volume II. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1959. Pp. 682. 70 Guilders.

It may be that the recent discovery and publication of Menander's early play, *Dyscolus*, will inspire a revival of interest in Attic Middle Comedy, since Menander, in this play at least, seems to have more points of contact with earlier comedy than we used to suppose. Under the circumstances, the almost simultaneous appearance of a newly edited text of all the fragments of Middle Comedy seems a happy coincidence. Nonetheless, your reviewer must admit that the reading through of the complete collection of fragments, for the purposes of this review, was singularly unrewarding. We have to deal with quotations from about 650 plays, by 49 poets; most of the citations come from Athenaeus, who claims to have read 800 complete Middle Comedies. (One wonders why!) Most of the fragments have to do with eating and drinking; rare fish and exotic recipes abound. Whether this fact reflects merely the interests of Athenaeus, or a special tendency of this type of comedy, does not much matter. The result is the same in any case: we are almost completely in the dark about subject-matter, plot-construction, characterization, and other matters in which literary criticism involves the possession of entire works. Unfortunately, titles are only moderately helpful in revealing subject-matter: e. g., there is always the possibility that a title suggesting straight mythological burlesque may conceal political or social satire, as in Cratinus' *Dionysio-Alexandros*, or Aristophanes' *Plutus*. While mythological titles are frequent (over 150 out of the 650 known titles), still this is a smaller proportion than in Old Comedy (about 95 out of 300 titles). The common belief that there was a great increase of mythological burlesque in Middle Comedy needs revision.

The work under review here is the promised second volume of a proposed three-volume edition of the complete Attic Comic fragments. Shortly after the appearance of Volume I, Mr. Edmonds died (on March 18, 1958) while working on the proofs of volume II; the work was completed by friends and former pupils of Edmonds, under the direction of Alison Duke. And Edmonds' manuscript for volume III was left in such good shape that its publication in due time is assured. It is a fitting tribute to Mr. Edmonds, who devoted a long life to classical scholarship, that this monumental work should now appear, as a capstone to his career.

The second volume is in the same format and contains the same indices, lists, and other aids as volume I, for a description of which readers are referred to my review in *A. J. P.*, LXXX, 1 (Jan. 1959), pp. 95-8. This volume, therefore, has the same merits and suffers from some of the same drawbacks there mentioned, which need not be repeated here. A few points may be amplified.

The English versions continue to be far from helpful. The translations, usually in rhyming couplets, are too free, and often there are bits of British slang which throw the unwary American reader off balance: e. g., "bully" for pander (*Anaxilas' Hyacinthos Porno-*

boskos). Some of the versions are completely unintelligible (at least, to me); and others contain real mistakes: e. g., Eubulus 124, 125:

"Strange how the praises of old wine are sung
By ladies gay, while men prefer it young"
(Edmonds, p. 141).

The Greek plainly means that *hetairai* prefer their wine old and their men young. Epierates 11, the famous and witty description of an exercise in definition at Plato's Academy, is especially disappointing: on the strength of two or three Doric alphas in the 39 lines of text, the whole passage is rendered in broad Scotch dialect. I wonder how many of my colleagues would agree that it is time to put an end to this cute trick of rendering the Greek dialects in the almost unintelligible dialects of the British Isles.

The notes are filled with tentative suggestions for the nature of the missing plots or subjects of the plays. Edmonds was particularly prone to find political subjects or allusions, even in the most unlikely titles. Now, it is true that Middle Comedy did not give up Comedy's concern with politics, as Webster has demonstrated; but this hardly justifies finding references to Alexander and Jason, tyrants of Pherae in the fourth century, in almost any mythological title related to Thessaly or Pherae. Further, these far-fetched guesses are often used to date the play; and the list of dated or conjecturally datable plays in the appendix is filled with these bold conjectures. Any student using this appendix for a chronology of Middle Comedy should be warned that it is filled with unreliable items.

The critical apparatus is inadequate for scholarly uses. Although Edmonds gives in his apparatus any manuscript readings that differ from the printed text above, he often fails to inform us whether the emendation is his own or from earlier sources. Hence, it is constantly necessary to consult Kock and Meineke to discover which readings are new.

Finally, there are still too many misprints, in both the English and the Greek text.

Despite these rather serious flaws, the work has real value: Kock and Meineke have long been out of print, and are now almost unobtainable. Edmonds spent years of patient and (I suspect) dull toil to provide us with a new and usable edition; used with care and caution it may well serve the needs of this generation and the next. For this we should be properly grateful.

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JACQUES ANDRÉ. Notes de lexicographie botanique grecque. Paris, Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1958. Pp. 76. (*Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, Sciences historiques et philologiques*, fasc. 311.)

The author of this study is already well known, not only for his larger work on Latin words for colors, but also for his *Lexiques des termes de botanique en Latin* (1956), which was reviewed by me in *A. J. P.*, LXXIX (1958), pp. 102-3, and for various shorter studies.

In the course of his work on Latin botanical terms he was surprised to find how many were of Greek origin, and in the present work he similarly finds reason to stress the number of Greek plants whose names betray an Egyptian provenience, such as "Heart of Bubastis" and "Blood of Ammon."

For the convenience of the reader it would be well if André had included in a single catalogue all the Greek terms found in Latin writers, but he has deliberately refrained from repeating information already to be had in Liddell-Scott-Jones. From slag rejected by them, from Greek words of the fourth to the sixth century, and in various works on medicine, miscellaneous glosses, as well as from authors like Columella, Pliny the Elder (inadequately exploited hitherto), and Isidore, the author collects his specimens. He enjoys a great advantage over American students in the same field from being familiar at first hand—or first hand backed by the monumental *Flora Orientalis* of Edmond Boissier—with a considerable part of at least the more conspicuous and generally known species of the Mediterranean flora, and by means of nomenclature and of uses persisting to the present day as well as by ancient definitions and synonyms he can identify with some plausibility many plants mentioned by ancient authors. At times a user of the book would welcome more evidence for species rather blithely named, but he must recognize that there are frontiers where time-consuming collections and ingenious combinations are required to achieve even approximate results. Yet we must recognize that further steps are needed. As indicated in my review of the former volume, there is now demanded a courageous ransacking of the entire Greco-Latin literature down through Isidore, including such sources as Hesychius, Orion, the *Etymologicum Magnum* and *Etymologicum Gudianum*, the Homeric and other important scholia, the commentators on Aristotle, and the Church Fathers—a glance at Hier., *In Ionam*, 4, 6, and related passages in Jerome and Augustine will show the need of much dredging in unpromising waters. I suspect that Galen will furnish more not yet used, and an ambitious worker will probably want to consider archaeological materials in which plants like silphium appear on coins or carvings. In short, to the very valuable collections of André additional gleanings are both possible and needed, envisaging the creation of one Greco-Latin botanical lexicon.

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IMAGERY IN THE SATIRES OF HORACE AND JUVENAL.

Some Greek and Latin poetry abounds in figurative passages and lends itself readily to the modern interpretative technique of analysis through imagery. In this respect, one immediately thinks of Aeschylus, Pindar, and of Vergil. There are other types of poetry where imagery plays a less obvious, though still important, role. I shall concern myself in this paper with the latter class of poetry and attempt to define the general nature of imagery as employed by Horace and Juvenal in their Satires. Studies of the metaphors and similes in Horace's works and of the metaphors in Juvenal do exist; which, however, mainly written some time ago, exhibit the particular interest of this period in classification rather than interpretation.¹ No effort

¹ For Horace, cf. F. Bäker, *Die Metaphern in den Satiren des Horaz* (Stralsund, 1883); D. Eberlein, *Poetische Personifikation in den Dichtungen des Horaz* (Diss. Erlangen, 1914); F. Schneider, *Gleichnisse und Bilder bei Horaz* (Diss. Nürnberg, 1914); also, the more recent and specialized articles of E. A. Hahn, "Horace's Use of Concrete Examples," *C. W.*, XXXIX (1945), pp. 82-6 and 90-4; and of E. G. Wilkins, "The Similes of Horace," *C. W.*, XXIX (1936), pp. 124-31. I cannot agree with the methods employed by M. Andrewes, "Horace's Use of Imagery in the Epodes and Odes," *G. & R.*, XIX (1950), pp. 106-15. For Juvenal, the only study devoted exclusively to metaphor is that of H. Jattkowski, *De Sermone in A. Persii Flacci et D. Junii Juvenalis satiris figurato* (Allenstein, 1886). But some useful remarks on metaphor will be found in L. O. Kiaer, *De Sermone Juvenalis* (Copenhagen, 1875), pp. 220 ff.; and in I. G. Scott (Ryberg), *The Grand Style in the Satires of Juvenal* (Smith College Classical St. VIII [Northampton, Mass., 1927]), pp. 31 ff. and 64 ff. Juvenal's similes have never aroused interest.

has been made to distinguish the special function of the metaphor in Roman satire, nor has any study shown how the treatment of imagery changes with the particular view of satire embraced by a writer. It seems to me that we can study with profit three aspects of Horatian and Juvenalian imagery: 1. the place of the image in the texture of its passage, or, how the image fits into its immediate context; 2. patterns of imagery and their relation to the meaning of the Satires; 3. the logical structure of the image, or, in what respect the satirist equates two different entities for poetic purposes. By studying these three aspects I propose to connect Horace's and Juvenal's techniques of using imagery with their general approach in satire, on the assumption that the image, while an important aspect of poetic meaning, forms a part only, a representative part, of the total significance of each Satire.

I. Horace

In order to be clear about the class of imagery which Horace adopts, let us briefly consider an example of dense figurative usage, the famous beginning of Book IV of the *Aeneid*:²

at regina gravi iamdudum *saucia* cura
vulnus alit venis et caeco *carpitur igni*.
 multa viri virtus animo multusque *recursat*
 gentis honos: *haerent infixi* pectore vultus
 verbaque, nec placidam membris dat cura quietem.

Vergil describes the psychological state of Dido passionately in love, but struggling to conceal and control that passion. We are not to think of the love as a pleasant or beneficent sentiment: it is not *amor* but *cura*, mental disturbance. Even before we have arrived at *cura*, with its special suggestivity, we encounter the first of many metaphors: *saucia*; that is, we know how to interpret the queen's state of mind before we learn what causes her troubles. Continuing in this general manner, avoiding any concrete details, the poet elaborates his metaphor in the first half of the second line and introduces a new one in the second half: Dido nurses a wound and her vitals are ravaged by

² For a thorough discussion of the imagery in this book, cf. F. L. Newton, "Recurrent Imagery in *Aeneid* IV," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXXVIII (1957), pp. 31-43.

fire. In short, the poet has stated the metaphors by which we should regard Dido's love, and he has given them priority over the facts of her love; the metaphors stand clearly out from the passages in which they are set. The poet in fact has here announced the dominant images of the whole book: the wound becomes more and more serious until finally it is transformed into the fatal physical wound of suicide; the fire burns its way on and on until ultimately it becomes the funeral pyre and the symbolic burning of Carthage in the final simile.³ For the present—and I shall return to this passage—I call attention to the fact that the epic poet has used several metaphors to define and interpret Dido's feelings, has immediately re-stated the image of wounding (*haerent infixi*), and by the way in which he has introduced them, given the metaphors a strikingly significant function.

By way of contrast, let us take a number of passages where Horace states or at least anticipates an important metaphor at the beginning of a Satire.

sunt quibus in satura videar nimis acer et ultra
legem tendere opus. (II, 1, 1-2)

unde et quo Catus? "non est mihi tempus, aventi
ponere signa nova *praeceptis*, qualia *vincent*
Pythagoran Anytique reum doctumque Platona."
(II, 4, 1-3)

hoc quoque, Teresia, praeter narrata petenti
responde, quibus amissas reparare queam res
artibus et modis. (II, 5, 1-3)

"iamdudum ausculto et cupiens tibi dicere *servus*
pauca reformido." (II, 7, 1-2)

Those who are familiar with the four Satires involved⁴ might well object to treating the italicized words as metaphors in at

³ In addition, Vergil exploits an advantage of epic not available to Horace: he draws upon the associations of fire and wounds already established in earlier books. For instance, much of Book II links fire and wounds, as in the scene of Polites' death (especially II, 529). Cf. B. M. W. Knox, "The Serpent and the Flame," *A.J.P.*, LXXI (1950), pp. 379-400, and B. Fenik, "Parallelism of Theme and Imagery in *Aeneid* II and IV," *A.J.P.*, LXXX (1959), pp. 1-24.

⁴ It will be observed that the four examples above come from Book II of the *Sermones*. I cite no instances from Book I simply because there are none; Horace employed a different technique of introducing theme

least three cases. This is a legitimate objection and points up a striking difference between the dense metaphorical presentation of Vergilian epic and Horace's treatment of imagery. Vergil's passage calls attention to the metaphor and constructs the tragedy of Dido upon the metaphorical framework, while Horace employs a word which, in its context, remains ambiguous or seems so conventional as to possess no immediate force. In *Serm.*, II, 1 we listen to a discussion between the idealized person of the satirist and a well-known Roman lawyer, Trebatius. The satirist begins and focuses his attention immediately on the problems of writing satire; he registers the conflicting opinions that seem to prevail about his earlier work. Incidentally, as an apparent synonym for *nimis acer*, he uses the phrase *ultra legem tendere opus*. As the commentators have shown, an ambiguity exists in *legem* that concentrates the significance of the whole Satire. On the one hand, it is probably to be taken as a metaphor (the "law" or convention of the literary form known as satire); on the other hand, the literal-minded legalist Trebatius seems to interpret it as relevant to his professional status, for he immediately begins to play the role of attorney. Thus, while Trebatius stolidly argues out the legal implications of satire, the satirist keeps returning to the metaphor and probing the underlying significance of satiric conventions. The metaphor never emerges in complete freedom, but remains tied to and qualified by the literal content of the conversation.⁵ Here, then, we encounter a major technique of Horace in dealing with a key metaphor: he merges it with the dramatic framework of his Satire so skillfully that it possesses no immediate, but a cumulative, significance. It is only as we realize that the satirist and Trebatius converse on two entirely different levels that we sense the force of the legal metaphor.

There is no need to go deeply into the other passages cited. In *Serm.*, II, 4 Horace places an ambiguous metaphor in the

and metaphor in his earlier Satires, in keeping with his different method of development. As will be shown later in the discussion of *Serm.*, I, 1 and 6, the theme of the diatribal Satires tends to be so forceful that imagery recedes into the background, unobtrusively providing a cumulative insight into the deeper relevance of the theme.

⁵ For a recent discussion of the legal metaphor in *Serm.*, II, 1, cf. J. S. C. Teijeiro, "Apostillas jurídicas a una sátira de Horacio," *Arbor*, XXXI (1955), pp. 65-75.

mouth of Catus. In itself, *praeceptis* possesses no special vigor and consequently blends easily into its context. However, Catus qualifies these precepts as superior (*vincent*) to the doctrines of three great Greek philosophers, and the very flippancy of his reference to Socrates by antonomasia might well prepare us for what comes. As Catus starts retailing his precepts, it becomes clear that he is treating culinary recipes as equivalent to philosophic principles. Accordingly, Horace exploits the confusion between the literal meaning of *praecepta* and the common ethical associations (which may be considered metaphorical) of the word. In *Serm.*, II, 5 Ulysses asks Tiresias by what arts he may recoup his financial losses in Ithaca. As in *Serm.*, II, 1 the word receives a weakening synonym, and we soon perceive that Ulysses refers merely to means, devices rather than to the mental and moral associations of *artes*. However, the ambiguity inherent in *artibus*⁶ manifests itself throughout the Satire: the Homeric Ulysses, whose heroic values became defined through the high ethical goal implicit in his arts, has degenerated into the artful *captator*,⁷ merely unscrupulous in his devices. Finally, Horace exploits the confusion between the literal and metaphorical meanings of slavery in *Serm.*, II, 7. The slave Davus begins the conversation, and accordingly *servus* must be taken literally on its first appearance. However, its position gives it potential significance, and, as we soon see, Davus can take advantage of the Saturnalia to ignore his usual servile relation to his master. In fact, he attempts to reduce Horace to the status of a slave by misusing the Stoic metaphor and paradox. Once again, the point of the Satire consists in exploring the apparent relation between the literal *servus* and the moral "slave," and once again Horace prevents the metaphor from being stated in a glaringly obvious manner.

⁶ Horace has called attention to *artibus* by carefully separating the construction *quibus . . . artibus*, so that the reader remains in suspense while Ulysses explains his purpose of recouping his losses. Only then, in the emphatic position at the beginning of the next line, does the poet end the hyperbaton. As a result, Horace has succeeded in implying his whole ironic theme in that single phrase, that is, the degradation of *artes* for the service of *res*.

⁷ Horace plays upon the similarity between *captator* and *captor* by constant ironic reference to the military prowess of Ulysses, so as to render the will-seeker into a soldier trying to capture an enemy.

The relative unobtrusiveness of Horace's metaphors involves at least two factors. First, the context in which the metaphor appears so envelops it in literal associations that one does not sense the significance of the image in the same affective manner as those so pointedly affirmed by Vergil in the second line of *Aeneid* IV. Second, the metaphor itself is so conventional as to lack direct force, and it fades imperceptibly into the literal context. Conventional metaphors of a similar type occur in Book I of the *Sermones*. For instance, the common image of "fighting" a law suit provides the metaphorical substance of *Serm.*, I, 7; "suffering" the consequences of error functions as the Epicurean criterion for rejecting avarice in *Serm.*, I, 1 and indiscriminate sexual indulgence in *Serm.*, I, 2; moral "freedom" in *Serm.*, I, 6 serves as the answer to those who estimate personal worth solely according to free, noble birth. Such metaphors as these achieve their effect not by forcing themselves strikingly on the imagination from their first occurrence, but by repetition and cumulative association.

A glance at Horace's technique of developing his theme in *Serm.*, I, 6 will illustrate the methods of cumulative association or metaphorical patterns. In this Satire Horace sets out to define the relation between birth and personal value. Most people, he notes, would deny the right of the emancipated slave's son, like himself, to any dignity or honor at all. Horace does not fight this prejudice at first, for he prefers to leave the impression that he lives "free" of ambition—I use the metaphor advisedly. Incidentally, though, he provides insight into the political world of "honor" by his metaphors: the populace would not have "bought" Laevinus for more than a single as; the masses act as "slaves" (16) to fame; he Horace should stay in his own "skin," not masquerade as a politician (22); Glory drags noble and ignoble alike "fettered to its glittering chariot" (23); the ambitious man is "mad" (27) or "sick" (30). As a result, politics emerges as a slave's existence: the mob both masters and serves the ambitious; the ambitious enslave themselves to the dubious goal of Gloria, the hope of becoming lords of Rome. Honor therefore becomes a highly relative quality, desirable to an intelligent man only under special circumstances, for instance, when he is a Servius Tullius or a Decius. As Horace implies, he and Maecenas have removed themselves from vulgar

concepts (18); which amounts to saying that he understands the true concept of *libertas*.

Turning from the limited world of politics, the satirist defines an area of greater scope and importance, first friendship untinged by ambition, then the fundamental principles of the ideal life. It may be that the son of a freedman should not engage in politics, but no social stigma should taint him, to prevent him, if worthy, from enjoying the friendship of people like Maecenas. To describe the inception of his close relation to Maecenas, Horace does not resort to metaphor. Chance did not operate, but strict ethical principles, and any comparison, it seems, might weaken the force of such words as *optimus*, *pudor*, *quod eram*, *secernis honestum*. Ironically, then, the son of a freedman has reached a position next to the great which the common herd regards as political honor and resents, but which in fact bears no real resemblance to the false criteria of political success, since it is ambitionless and informed by the ethical purposes underlying true friendship.

Horace's irony does not stop there; he goes on to give his father, the emancipated slave, the entire credit for the moral character which he possesses and accordingly for that honor of Maecenas' friendship. Because of his father, he received a special education in Rome, worthy of sons of the nobility and those of inherited wealth; he escaped the plebeian training of the crude citizenry of Venusia. His father acted as his *custos* (a position usually assigned to an elderly and trusted household slave), but did so with a moral, not a servile, attitude. The former slave aimed at true honor (83) and paid no attention to what career his son would adopt, whether humble like his own or dignified, as in fact Horace's career came to be. Thanks to his father, Horace can express perfect contentment with his existence and would not exchange his humble parentage, which after all has accounted for his success, for any long pedigree. A family name, as he puts it, would amount to taking on a heavy burden (99); the metaphor alludes to the "slave" of ambition. Again, irony has altered the conventional perspective, to make the servile existence not that of the freedman's son, but that of the aristocrat's son or at least of the ambitious like Tillius. Horace lives a life of total freedom, goes where he wants, does what he likes and when he likes; and he implies this quality of

libertas in words like *si libet* (105) and *libido* (111). His life guarantees him pleasure, absence of worry, no pressing responsibilities, no formalities to be observed: he is a man "free of painfully heavy ambition" (129). To conclude, the slave's life and the life of freedom, if one searches at all profoundly, are found to have their reality not in the world of literal legalism, but in that of metaphor, of moral truth.

At no time has Horace asserted that he is a morally "free" man, that, to understand him properly, one should regard him as *liber* rather than *libertino patre natus*. The metaphorical theme, therefore, remains implicit, suggested by the images applied to the world of ambition, by the careful elimination of imagery in describing the discriminating friendship of Maecenas, by the ironic portrait of his father as *custos*, and finally by the contrast between his own liberal tenor of life with the overburdened, slavish ways of the ambitious. The metaphors for ambition, likening it to slavery, indicate by opposition that the freedman's son who knows better than to involve himself in politics must be "free."

How does that other class of imagery, namely similes, fit into these unobtrusive patterns? To go back to our original comparison with *Aeneid* IV, we observed there at the beginning two dominant metaphors of wounding and burning. At key points in the action of Book IV, similes occur involving these two symbols: for instance, the burning wound of passion makes Dido like a wounded deer (66 ff.); the burning madness of the queen at the rumor of Aeneas' departure renders her like a Bacchante (300 ff.); and the symbolic effect of the fatal wound that Dido deals herself resembles the disastrous results of an enemy assault on, and the burning of, Carthage or ancient Tyre (665 ff.). Vergil, it seems legitimate to remark, integrates his similes precisely with his metaphorical themes to form one rich pattern of symbolism; and the similes receive full emphasis together with the metaphors, standing out pointedly, affectively in their contexts.

Horace uses similes of a different order. It is well known that, in accordance with the prosaic tradition of satire, he frequently employs animal similes; and in general the level of such imagery avoids the "poetic." Moreover, the satirist does not lavish rich evocative detail on similes or permit them to

extend for more than a few lines, if that; he introduces similes with much less emphasis. Finally, he often substitutes for the simile the concrete example or analogy. Like metaphors, therefore, similes blend easily into the general texture, imperceptibly contributing to the general associations of the theme. In regard to patterns of imagery, similes in the conversational Satire function differently from those of the dramatic epic. The integration of simile with metaphor and general symbolic pattern exists, but in a looser form. Instead of forcing itself visually on the imagination as a part of the picturesque scheme of symbolism, the simile may well seem to contribute only a momentary effect, designed purely for its immediate context. But a subtle link with other imagery usually prevails. In *Serm.*, I, 6, whose metaphors I have discussed above, Horace inserts a brief simile (65 ff.) to describe his moral character: its faults are minor, like the scattered spots on an otherwise strikingly handsome body. Now, this appears at first sight to perform no general purpose, until one realizes the implications in the phrase *egregio corpore*. Without arousing any objections by his modest phrasing of the simile, Horace in fact suggests that his character, like the body, escapes the corruptions of the common slavish herd (*grex*).⁸ This etymological use of *egregio* illustrates the general technique of Horatian simile: the simile will possess an allegorical rather than an immediately dramatic connection with the theme.

The Satires of Book II do not employ much simile, and one can see good reason for Horace's practice: he permits another to do most, if not all, of the speaking, and the subjects of the speeches do not call for comparisons, being advice to hosts or will-seekers, accounts of personal experiences, or parodies of Stoic sermons operating with *exempla* more easily than with simile. For the simile, in two cases, Horace substitutes the animal fable: in *Serm.*, II, 3, 314 ff. Damasippus uses what he calls an *imago* about a frog,⁹ and *Serm.*, II, 6 exploits the story (*fabella* 78) of the country and the city mouse. In order to find a satisfactory illustration of similes integrated with total

⁸ We can connect this simile with the metaphor in 22: *in propria non pelle quiessem*. There, Horace refers to the popular prejudice against political upstarts, and the metaphor of the animal ironically reveals how the common herd thinks of others.

⁹ I discuss this *imago* extensively below, pp. 241-2.

symbolism, we must turn back to Book I. I have chosen one of the latest and most mature of the Satires, *Serm.*, I, 1.

In form this Satire is a diatribe which attempts to produce a true concept of *avaritia*. To do this, Horace engages in a fictive conversation with a typical materialist and forces him to defend his admitted goal of accumulating money. As his first excuse, the *avarus* claims that he intends to put aside the means whereby he can ultimately retire in leisure (31); then he tries to prejudice his argument by comparing himself to the industrious ant. At this point, Horace catches him in inaccuracy; spinning out the simile to its logical end, the satirist finds an essential difference between the *avarus* and the ant in the fact that the ant stops accumulating during the winter and utilizes its store of food, whereas the miser never pauses to enjoy his hoard. The simile, therefore, has served to expose the falsity of the miser's purpose, with the result that the ant's pile of food (*acervus* 34) can hereafter serve as an ironic metaphor (cf. 44 and 51) for the useless pile of things which the miser amasses. The satirist proposes a more accurate simile: the miser is like a slave carrying a pannier full of bread for a slave train, all destined to be sold; he benefits no more from his heavy load than the other slaves carrying nothing (46 ff.).

The above simile suggests the ironic point which Horace drives at in the Satire, that the miser's pile is a source of misery to him, not a means of pleasure (as he argues). With this insight, we can appreciate the excuse which immediately follows on the above simile: "*at suave est ex magno tollere acervo*" (51). We have seen the small amount of pleasure available to the miser, and we have watched the satirist analyze the inaccurate usage of the ant's pile. We are not surprised, therefore, when Horace moves on to examine a new aspect of the defense, namely, the pleasure derived from drawing on a *large* hoard. As a synonym for *tollere*, Horace uses *haurire* (52), proceeding immediately from that transitional metaphor to a new simile about drawing water to quench one's thirst. The obvious point is that it makes no difference to the thirst whether one secures water from a little spring (*fonticulus*) or a tremendous river (*magnum flumen*): the magnitude of the source does not make water wetter. However, again Horace analyzes his simile and ends by suggesting that the premium on size leads to disaster.

The largest river would logically be one swollen into a spring torrent, so we watch the fool approaching the turbid Aufidus, falling into the river, and swept away to his death, as the bank, hollowed by the action of the current, gives way beneath his weight. The pleasurable draught has resulted in drowning.¹⁰

Still another simile answers the excuse that one should pile up money so that one's family will take care of one in time of sickness. Obviously, says Horace, he who places money before family for the greater part of his life cannot expect to buy the love of his relatives in emergency, no more than he could expect to train an ass to run in harness (90-1). The pile of money has destroyed the love of the family and replaced it with hate, and similarly the ass will completely frustrate the expectations of his foolish trainer.¹¹ The image of training and driving an ass yields to the final simile of the Satire (114 ff.). The insatiate, always envious miser, hurrying to catch up to a richer man, resembles the driver of a chariot in a nightmarish race where there are always chariots ahead: he may pass some, but he keeps madly whipping the horses to catch up with the next ones. This little vignette of frenzied activity epitomizes the ceaseless anxiety of the *avarus*, an existence which stands in polar opposition to the Epicurean ideal of rational pleasure which Horace here espouses.¹²

¹⁰ This simile is picked up again in a momentary allusion to the thirsty Tantalus and his futile effort to catch *fugientia flumina* (68).

¹¹ This simile has been the subject of recent controversy. Cf. E. B. Stevens, "Horace, *Satires* I. I. 86-91," *C. W.*, XLII (1948-9), pp. 104-6, and N. W. DeWitt, "Horace, *Satires* I. I. 86-91; A Different View," *ibid.*, pp. 245-6. Stevens called attention to some proverbs which expose the folly of training an ass for war, to replace a horse in a glorious, but often fatal, role. DeWitt urged rather the Epicurean relevance of the simile and the stress on the trainer instead of the ass. I would only observe that both have ignored another aspect of the comparison, an aspect which is central to the Horatian simile. Horace does not merely introduce the comparison to describe futile effort; he also indicates the nature of the *avarus*, who does in fact think of his family as beasts of burden, donkeys to be beaten and trained to impossible tasks. It is because the miser cherishes this animal image of his family that human affection is impossible. Horace, as is observed below, refuses to see Man as an animal, but as a rational being.

¹² I said above that the chariot race was the last simile of the Satire. This is not quite true: it is the last simile describing the *avarus*, but

Now that we have considered five of the principal similes of *Serm.*, I, 1, we may summarize the Horatian handling of such imagery. Horace uses short comparisons, introducing them very casually. Sometimes, the brevity of a simile used by an interlocutor calls for further examination, and the satirist pushes it to its logical conclusion, at which point we find the interlocutor exposed. Sometimes, the simile starts from an unobtrusive metaphor; sometimes, it provides a metaphor for subsequent irony. Similes do not combine into a rich symbolic vision of avarice; there is no easy relation between the ant and the driver of the chariot such as subsists between Vergil's similes of the wounded deer and the burning city, both held together by the dominant metaphors. One perceives the connection only after thought.

I think it profitable to distinguish a special "intellectual" quality in the Horatian simile as against the Vergilian dramatic simile. By this, I mean that Horace uses the image to clarify his argument, whereas Vergil interprets psychological states or important actions through his type of simile. When the poet compares Dido to a wounded deer, he momentarily crystallizes the pitiful reversal in the once-proud queen; and it is vital to the total meaning of this simile that Dido should once have been compared to the huntress deity Diana, that love should have been defined explicitly as a wound. But when Horace describes the miser as a careening charioteer, chasing but never catching up with all the chariots ahead in an eternal race, the simile does not interact visually or emotionally with those that have preceded it. Rather, it sums up the futility of the miser's goal, an implicit aspect of previous similes which have concentrated primarily on subordinate qualities of avarice. To grasp the meaning of this simile, then, we abstract the allegorical significance, for the satirist urges us towards the abstract, the underlying truth, and only by combining the allegorical implications of the five similes do we grasp their interrelation. In short, as we might well expect, Horace responds to the exigencies of a careful analysis of a concept, in this case of *avaritia*, by taking different facets of the concept and illustrating them with different, superficially unrelated similes; Vergil responds to the

Horace introduces a brief comparison in 119 (*uti conviva satur*) to evoke the Epicurean ideal of rational pleasure. The satisfied banqueter provides an ideal antitype to the anxious charioteer.

requirements of dramatic epic and constantly shows the connection between the first and subsequent acts or passions of his characters, between feelings and their concrete results, between people and the natural order.

The above contrast between the "intellectual" quality of Horatian simile and the dramatic quality of Vergil's brings us to the final phase of our inquiry. To complete the discussion, we must take apart the metaphors and similes of Horace to determine their logic. It is conventional to analyze metaphor and simile into three components: the thing compared, the thing to which it is compared, and the link between the two. These components can be represented as three propositions, by which we come closer to the logical quality of the image. In the metaphor which we have discussed, *famae servit ineptus* (i.e., *populus*; *Serm.*, I, 6, 16), the propositions may be stated as follows: 1. The Roman populace possesses certain necessary qualities (including freedom). 2. Slaves do not possess freedom. 3. The Roman populace acts as a slave when it comes to *fama*. Now, the virtue of a metaphor or simile, as critics have defined it, inheres in the asserted connection between two different entities, whereby a tension is set up, the resemblance pulling one way, the differences another. In the next pages, I shall investigate this tension in Horace and Vergil, because it provides us with another aspect of the "intellectual" quality of Horatian imagery.

In the above metaphor of the slavish masses, Horace has created what appears to be a paradox. By definition, Romans are free, not slaves, so how can they be said to be slavish? The answer, of course, is that their moral nature belies the legal status of the Romans. However, the paradox does exist and constitutes the main effect of the metaphor: Horace, that is, overtly stresses the difference between the two compared terms at the same time that he asserts their likeness. A similar effect results from the Horatian simile. If we examine, for instance, the simile in *Serm.*, I, 1 about drawing water, we quickly grasp the common link between the avaricious and the thirsty man: both desire to satisfy a craving. But Horace does not leave it there. His point, which he carefully makes by discussing the comparison, is that the acquisitive miser differs radically from the thirsty man, for the physical need can be met by a moderate amount of water drawn from *any* pure source; whereas the miser

believes that he can satisfy his needs only from a large (unattainably large, as it turns out) accumulation of wealth and precious items. The needs are substantially the same, but the criteria of satisfaction so differ in the two cases that the miser rather resembles a fool who accidentally falls into a torrent while trying to satisfy his thirst. Such meticulous examination of comparisons to bring out both sides and especially to make clear fundamental and significant distinctions will account for the curiously ironic treatment of the ant simile in this same Satire. The *avarus* asserts a likeness between himself and the ant in terms of provident industry; Horace comments rather on the difference between ant and man in respect to the way they employ their hoarded stores.

Vergil again provides a useful contrast with Horace. To return to the passage in *Aeneid* IV already cited, we noted the striking metaphors by which the poet defined Dido's passion in terms of wound and fire. It is certainly true that the tension between likeness and difference operates in these metaphors, but Vergil's effect patently diverges from that of Horace. The common factor between passion and fire or wound is the destructive force inherent in all of them; and to make sure that we imagine destructive fire Vergil uses *carpitur*. The likeness is all explicit, overt; not so with the differences. We can point out that passion is a human feeling, fire is a physical force, and a wound results from a blow. Do the differences consist, then, in the opposition between human and inanimate (or inhuman)? Immediately, though, we plunge into a problem central to Vergilian psychology: are the passions human or subhuman? From the way the poet portrays the ruinous effects of Dido's love, of Juno's hatred, of Turnus' enmity, we can see the inhuman aspects of violent feeling. On the other hand, from the way our sympathies linger with Dido and Turnus and even with the blasphemer Mezentius, we might well argue that the supremely human quality for Vergil is passion. It is not my purpose to solve this problem, but to define it, for in this central ambiguity at the heart of Vergilian imagery—both metaphor and simile—we encounter the true distinction between Horace's and Vergil's approaches. Vergil does not argue out his similes nor does he present explicit paradoxes in his metaphors. On the surface of each comparison rests a broad mass of relevant, dramatically

vivid likeness; underneath, never discussed, but always implicit, exists a profound tension, the veritable ambiguity of man's nature. We should always ask the question whether or not our passions render us merely into beasts or destructive forces (fire, wounds, storms, savage waves, etc.), but Vergil will not answer it for us.

Horace does provide us with a type of answer by appealing to reason. For the satirist, man must be defined as rational. The rational universe has its complexities which Horace never minimizes, but it implicitly possesses a coherence which man, using his intellect, can control. Therefore, the satirist forces us to examine the differences between two compared entities and thus re-inforces his argument. As a result, we observe that the components of comparisons in Horace have a persuasive appeal which is absent from those of Vergil. Our mind, not our emotions or imagination, is engaged.

Ancient rhetoric notes that in comparisons four classifications exist: living things may be substituted for others; inanimate things exchanged for inanimate; animate for inanimate; or inanimate for animate.¹³ We might well subdivide the animate into the human and the animal; and, for Vergil, we might add the divine. Now, Vergil most characteristically compares humans to animals or inanimate things and vice-versa.¹⁴ It is not common for the poet to compare one type of human being with another, and, when he does so, the tension is more obvious than otherwise. For instance, Vergil uses the verb *immolo* three times in the *Aeneid*, all three in connection with Pallas' death, two as metaphors. Shortly after he has captured eight Italians for *sacrifice* to the shade of Pallas (X, 519), Aeneas attacks a priest and butchers (*immolat* 541) him. Then, in the final act of the epic, he plunges his sword into the heart of Turnus crying out: "*Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas immolat*" (XII, 949). The metaphor makes of Aeneas a priest sacrificing a victim, and the

¹³ Cf. Quintilian, VIII, 6, 9 ff.

¹⁴ In a few dramatic instances, Vergil also compares humans with deities and vice-versa. Thus, the first simile of the poem (I, 148 ff.) compares Neptune to a venerable statesman; we first see Dido in terms of Diana (I, 498 ff.); Aeneas, about to ruin Dido, is the handsome Apollo (IV, 143 ff.); and Turnus, the ringleader of the hostility towards the Trojans, properly becomes Mars himself (XII, 331 ff.).

horror of it is that he is killing fellow humans, one a genuine priest. I do not doubt that we should in fact feel the sacramental aspect of these deaths or at least understand Aeneas' sentiments, but the dominant reaction in the reader would properly be to shrink away from a man who treats a fellow human like a dumb beast, while seeing himself in a priestly role. A simile of the same ironic type occurs in X, 803 ff., again focused on Aeneas. Just before killing Lausus, Aeneas is compared to a plowman: the destroyer appears as the creative worker! Such stark images, as I have said, are rare in Vergil. Usually, the surface seems smooth in a comparison between man and beast or between man and inanimate force.

When dealing with his primary subject, Man, Horace most regularly compares one sort of man with another, or a man with an animal; that is, using Quintilian's classification, he substitutes one living thing for another. If we review the similes in *Serm.*, I, 1, for instance, we find that four out of the five treated compare man with man, and the fifth inaccurately compares man with ant. The equal humanity of each member of the simile enables the reader to perceive the distinctions which constantly emerge in Horatian comparisons. In a Satire which I have discussed more fully in a previous issue of this Journal, *Serm.*, I, 9, Horace creates a pattern of military imagery to help interpret his encounter with the *garrulus*.¹⁵ The "bore" turns out to be something more, namely, an eager, ambitious time-server, whose character is best defined by our metaphorically appropriate adjectives: aggressive and antagonistic. However, the point of the Satire does not consist in representing the *garrulus* dramatically, but rather in implying the correct values in a world of political antagonisms. Thus, Horace describes how he is trapped by the man, how the man applies his belligerent standards to the mild poet, and how the poet "defends" himself, by distinguishing moral from political values. In the end, Apollo enters to save the poet, as once before he had saved the warrior Hector. The analogy of the *garrulus* and the warrior has been appropriate, though the former lacks all heroic qualities; by contrast, the effort of the "bore" to apply his aggressive standards to Horace's serene world has, by its patent inappro-

¹⁵ Cf. "Horace, the Unwilling Warrior—Satire I, 9," *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 148-66.

priateness, brought into the open the moral doctrine of the Satire. Epic drama has become in the satirist's hands a means of rational inquiry, for, by comparing an ambitious man to a heroic warrior, the satirist has been able to probe into the ethical goals of mankind in general.

When Horace compares man and animal, he also brings differences to the fore. It should be observed, for example, that a large part of the animal imagery in the Satires applies ironically to the man who embodies the whole rational drive of the poems, namely, the satirist himself. The traditional apologia for satire which Horace inherited from Lucilius involved, among other things, coping with the popular image of the satirist as a malicious scandalmonger, or, in metaphorical terms, as a rabid dog.¹⁶ Horace dismisses this image, vigorously denying that he is *mordax* and substituting for the animal the concept of an intelligent, morally responsible human being.¹⁷ In other words, the animal imagery so frequently applied to Horace is either explicitly replaced or so patently inappropriate as to amuse the reader: e. g., the simile of the ill-tempered ass in I, 9, 20. Unlike Vergil, who represents inaccessible areas of human psychology by animal imagery, Horace constantly implies that man should never be comparable to a beast, that reason can and should operate permanently to direct a moral, not a purely physical, existence.

In conclusion, I should like to consider the implications of the *imago* connected with Horace by the fool Damasippus (*Serm.*, II, 3, 313 ff.). Damasippus tells how a calf stepped on and killed several young frogs, but one escaped to explain to the mother frog what had happened. Not knowing what a calf was, the baby frog could only say that a tremendous monster (*ingens belua*) had caused the disaster. The mother wanted to know how big, and started puffing herself up to approximate the size of this unknown monster. But the baby answers—and here Da-

¹⁶ Cf. G. C. Fiske, "Lucilius and Persius," *T. A. P. A.*, XL (1909), pp. 121-50, and my discussion of this point in *C. Q.*, LII (1958), pp. 195-7.

¹⁷ One of the reasons for introducing his father in *Serm.*, I, 4 lies in the value the old man has for the image of Horace as a highly rational, self-controlled human. The moral education which his father gave him seems to guarantee that Horace is anything but a "dog."

masippus makes his point—"You could not equal its size even if you burst." This little parable, which Damasippus thinks so apt to Horace's situation (320), receives no direct interpretation from the ironic satirist, and the reader is left with the problem of explaining it. As we might well infer from the effort to liken the satirist to a frog, the comparison leads the reader to observe the more significant differences and ultimately to attain a just understanding of Damasippus' diatribe. An immediate absurdity makes itself felt: the childless, peace-loving Horace is compared to a mother frog whose children have been crushed.¹⁸ Moreover, the details of this frog tragedy, in fact irrelevant to the point of the comparison, act to weaken one's contemptuous attitude towards the puffing parent, for one tends to connect her senseless effort to equal the monster with her maternal concern for her babes so cruelly destroyed. Damasippus has told his parable clumsily, then. Beyond this, as we consider the story more carefully and ask ourselves what it illustrates, an even greater absurdity emerges. According to the introductory lines (312-13), Horace keeps trying to copy the lordly gestures of Maecenas. We have good reason to suspect Damasippus' allegation in any case, but the parable completely undermines it. When we start equating supposedly analogous members in the comparison, we find to our amusement that Damasippus has made Maecenas the *ingens belua* who has done such damage to Horace's (the mother frog's) household that consequently Horace emulates Maecenas not out of admiration, but from outrage. One comment suffices to expose the inanity of the comparison: the conversation between Horace and Damasippus takes place in the country house which that "formidable monster" Maecenas has given the poet and which functions as a permanent symbol of Horace's escape from ambition and worldly concerns.

¹⁸ Damasippus tells the fable approximately as it appears in Babrius 28; Phaedrus 1, 24, followed by Martial X, 79, 9, gives a slightly different ending by making the mother burst. We have no example besides this passage of Horace where the whole tale is applied concretely. By recounting it all, instead of alluding to the ending as Martial, Damasippus encourages us unwittingly to inspect the details, to picture first of all the bereaved and vengeful mother. When we try to fit this to our concept of Horace, as the satirist plans, we find ourselves in disagreement with Damasippus even before we arrive at his main point.

In this section, I have attempted to make several points about Horatian imagery in his Satires and to focus these comments by reference to more familiar qualities of Vergilian imagery. Horace maintains a smooth argumentative or descriptive tone, and his metaphors and similes do not disturb the placid surface of discourse. Rather, because of their conventionality, their ambiguous statement in many cases, and the brevity with which they are developed, they tend to blend easily with the argument, not stand out against it as an overt means of interpretation. Analysis of typical Satires (*Serm.*, I, 1 and I, 6) shows that Horace does create a pattern of imagery, but that the pattern inheres in the allegorical or, as I have preferred to call it, the "intellectual" interaction of metaphors, similes, and theme. The intellectual quality of Horatian imagery, its essential difference from Vergilian imagery, manifests itself when we study the logic of the satiric image. The meaningful tension between likeness and difference becomes the target of the searching powers of human reason. Commonplace metaphors and similes are exposed to ridicule; moral metaphors are found to possess a reality that ironically reverses the literal meaning of words; and above all, man vindicates his claim to a special place in Nature because his reason defies animal comparison. In short, the intellectual imagery of Horace illustrates the dominant quality of Horatian satire, its rationality.¹⁹

II. Juvenal

Juvenal's Satires start from indignation, he affirms, and their general character differs accordingly from that of Horatian Satire. One would expect to find that Juvenal adopts themes capable of supporting a mood of indignation and that he constructs his Satires with the same purpose in mind. Similarly, Juvenal's imagery should, in order to fulfill its function, possess

¹⁹ It should go without saying that I regard the rational appeal of Horace's imagery as an asset of his poetry. I do not agree with those who still argue that verse relying on reason and logic, stressing reflection and thought, even verse such as that of Horace, can never attain the lyrical heights, the passionate fire that define poetry. For such a depreciation of Horace, cf. F. Durand, *La poesia di Orazio* (Turin, 1957), a book which ironically was awarded a prize by the Accademia dei Lincei.

a quality totally different from that which in Horace we have isolated under the title of intellectual imagery.

The writers and poets of Juvenal's age all labor under the stigma of modern critics for excessive use of rhetoric. In fact, it has often been found to be illuminating to characterize Juvenal in terms of the principles espoused by the declaimers or the grand poets.²⁰ If one appreciates the literature of Silver Latin, one can find in the Satires some of the finest features of the period. Therefore, in order to determine the exact nature of Juvenal's imagery, we should also be aware of contemporary poetic practices, primarily those of epic. I have chosen to analyze herewith the imagery of Statius, a poet whose work Juvenal knew well and indeed may have heard during a public *recitatio* (cf. 7, 82 ff.), one of whose pieces seems to have inspired the satirist to a savage mock-epic.²¹ Early in the *Thebais* occurs a passage which will start our inquiry into the function of the image in its immediate context:

atque ea Cadmeo praeceps ubi culmine primum
constitit adsuetaque *infecit* nube penatis,
protinus attoniti fratrum sub pectore motus,
gentilisque animos subiit furor *aegraque* laetis
invidia atque *parens* odii metus; inde regendi
saevus *amor*, *ruptaeque* vices iurisque secundi
ambitus impatiens, et summo dulcius unum
stare loco, sociisque *comes* discordia regnis. (I, 123-30)

Like Allecto in *Aeneid* VII, Tisiphone has appeared to cause the conflict in Thebes which forms the subject of the epic. The above lines describe the effect of her efforts and are immediately followed by the first sustained simile of the poem, which exemplifies the futility of the shared kingship of Thebes as the impossible pairing of two untamed bullocks. In such a context, we might well expect Statius to exhibit his artistic technique most clearly, and indeed the italicized words do illustrate important features in Statius' metaphors. First of all, what may be called the texture of the passage is not smooth, and the

²⁰ Cf. J. De Decker, *Juvenalis declamans* (Ghent, 1913), and Scott (Ryberg).

²¹ Cf. S. Reinach, "Juvénal et Stace," *R. Ph.*, XXXI (1907), pp. 45-50, and P. Ercole, "Stazio e Giovenale," *Riv. I. G. I.*, XV (1931), Fasc. I, pp. 43-50.

metaphors function patently as disturbing elements: one notices them. On the other hand, they do not stand out clearly against a purely blank background, for other words, non-metaphorical words, act in the same context to diffuse a general impression of lurid drama over the situation, and we cannot take in the metaphors apart from these other effects. One cannot help but notice, for instance, that Statius wrote: Tisiphone "infected" with her customary cloud the *Penates*; the household gods serve as a metonym for the palace and the royal brothers therein. Not that the metaphor conflicts with the metonymy, but the metonymy does reduce the immediate sharpness of the metaphor. If Statius had written, as Vergil would, that the infection worked directly on Eteocles and Polyneices, then we would not have been distracted from the metaphor. I do not here imply that Statius adopts a technique inferior to Vergil's, but I wish to define the difference. Accordingly, we find that the force of *aegra*, which continues the metaphor in *infecit*, competes for our attention with the word immediately juxtaposed, *laetis*: Statius has contrived an antithesis which deprives *aegra* of much separate effect. With the other metaphors similarly, the rhetorical phrase forms the unit of meaning which, as a whole, stands out in the texture, employing the metaphor as a portion of that total emphasis. The epigrammatic and paradoxical conceits, that fear is the "parent" of hate, that the brothers felt a bestially fierce "love" of ruling, that they decided upon a system of alternate rule which had as its inevitable "companion" discord, all these work strongly upon the reader's impressions and prepare him for the inevitable war; but the paradox rather than the metaphor is the effective rhetorical unit.

As an example of the texture in which Juvenal employs metaphors, we might aptly take the passage describing Statius' temporary success in Rome:

curritur ad *vocem* iucundam et carmen *amicae*
 Thebaidos, *laetam* cum fecit Statius urbem
 promisitque diem: tanta dulcedine *captos*
 adficit ille animos, tantaque *libidine* volgi
 auditur; sed cum *fregit* subsellia versu,
 esurit, *intactam* Paridi nisi vendit Agaven. (7, 82-7)

While Juvenal's tone differs from that of epic, his use of metaphor does resemble Statius', in that he contrives rhetorical

units that include metaphor but depend only in part upon the image for effect. To start with the texture of this passage, we observe that, despite the fact that many metaphors appear here, they stand out with less immediate clarity than those of Statius. We need only look at the first two to explain the muted quality of Juvenal's metaphors. Juvenal says that everybody rushed to hear the pleasant voice, the song of their friend (female), and, since he has finished the line, we can easily gather the verse into a complete scene devoid of metaphor; only then, with his regularly subtle enjambement, the satirist suddenly adds *Thebaidos*. For the first time, we realize that the "voice" and the "friend" refer metaphorically to the epic poem. As a result, when we finally grasp the image, we have already perceived other rhetorical qualities in the clause which create a totality of significance from which the metaphor should not properly be extricated: it is less the image than the surprising felicity of the sudden personification that strikes us. In a similar manner, Juvenal renders *laetam* metaphorical, but only after delaying the word which determines the image, *urbem*, to the end of the line. The metaphor in *captos* acts in the Statian manner, by paradox, inseparably bound up with *dulcedine*; and this suggestive collocation of words prepares us for the ironic sexual metaphor in *libidine*, sensed only as part of the phrase including *volgi*. Another surprise awaits us in the next line, where Juvenal tells us that the poet broke the seats, an act which one would normally take in a literal sense, then wittily adds the qualifying word *versu*. Now the phrase has become a typical conceit: Statius has provoked such enthusiasm that, as we might say, he brought the house down. Finally, the delayed revelation of metaphor renders the trite adjective by which poets claim originality (*intactam*) into a device of double-entendre, for suddenly the poet becomes a pander. In short, if this passage is, as I believe it is, representative of Juvenal's art,²² we find that the

²² For a similarly affective use of personification, cf. the description of the fall of Sejanus, especially how the statues of the great man, even the bronze or marble horses on which he sits, are made into pathetic victims, living victims, of fickle popular feeling (10, 56 ff.). Juvenal also exploits word-position when he makes the metaphor a means of epic parody. Scott (Ryberg), p. 65, cites as a case of parody 10, 218: *circumsilit agmine facto / morborum omne genus*. The epic phrase *agmine facto* receives considerable emphasis at the end of the line and

satirist exploits word position so that we cannot grasp his metaphors by themselves, but rather as elements in a whole striking attitude, often suddenly sprung upon us.²³

Before going on with metaphor, it will be appropriate to pause briefly over the use of simile in epic poet and satirist. Statius inherits a rich tradition of similes, a standard element of epic from the beginning, through his great predecessors Vergil and Lucan.²⁴ In the many scenes of battle and emotional tension of the *Thebais*, Statius regularly summarizes the dramatic situation with such an extended image. It is unnecessary to observe that similes stand out in the texture of the epic, because obviously they interrupt the narrative to evoke a picture of varying extent designed to abstract the reader from the immediate action and to concentrate his attention on a different world which somehow implies the significance of the world to which it is compared. In the three hundred lines that focus on the final battle of Tydeus (VIII, 456 ff.), Statius uses ten similes of length varying from one line to six.²⁵ Just after he has killed the unwarlike Atys, Tydeus is described in an image which may serve to epitomize Statius' treatment of similes:

sic ait, et belli maiora ad praemia mente
ducitur: innumeris veluti leo forte potitus
caedibus imbellis vitulos molliisque iuvencas

calls for a subject of heroic qualities. Instead, Juvenal takes advantage of the enjambement to raise our expectations, only to surprise us, for sicknesses of all sorts constitute the subject of the verb and the explicit point of the parody.

²³ The sudden force of metaphors makes itself felt especially when the image occurs by itself, often in a *sententia*, rather than in an extended, systematically developed pattern. For instance, in 6, 473, Juvenal describes the desperate efforts of women to improve their looks by expensive cosmetics and processes which amount to face-lifting, then comments on the results: *facies dicetur an ulcus*? The final position of *ulcus* and its radical difference from *facies* illustrate Juvenal's standard practice of rendering the metaphor a part of a larger rhetorical unit.

²⁴ Cf. B. Deipser, *De P. Papinio Statii Vergilii et Ovidii imitatore*, *Diss. Philologicae Argentoratenses*, V (1881), pp. 85 ff., and W. Michler, *De P. Papinio Statii M. Annaei Lucani imitatore* (Diss. Breslau, 1914), pp. 65 ff.

²⁵ Cf. VIII, 460-5, 474, 532-5, 544-7, 572-6, 593-6, 616-20, 675-6, 691-4, 749-50. These similes average slightly under four lines in length.

transmittit: magno furor est in sanguine mergi,
nec nisi regnantis cervice recumbere tauri. (592-6)

The point that can be made about Statius' similes, I believe, is that the comparison often becomes involved in a striking conceit, with the result that the details of the simile ignore reason for effect. I do not mean that Statius wastes details. Here, for instance, *regnantis*, a key term in the comparison, artfully prepares for the next scene in which we see Tydeus, in pursuit of King Eteocles (663 ff.). But we seem to detect the function of the simile in this: the lion must be personified with such human qualities that it can be said to discriminate between "unwarlike" calves and soft cows so as to lust for blood, but spurn all victims except the most glorious, that of the "king" of the herd. The pathetic fallacy emerges even more patently in other similes, as for instance when, to describe two evenly matched warriors, Statius employs two mountain torrents which descend into the same valley but, though in fact merged, refuse to blend their waters in their pride (VIII, 460 ff.); or when, to illustrate the death of Prothous, crushed beneath the weight of his dying horse, Statius adduces an elm tree falling and destroying a vine with itself, the tree especially grieving for the innocent vine (544 ff.). In short, the point of Statius' simile often makes a more pronounced impression than the image itself: our eye does not rest on the whole scene, but we focus our attention on a single aspect which is often patently personified. As a result, the texture of similes presents the same phenomenon as the texture of passages containing metaphors in Statius: there is a dual tension between image and other verbal effects so as to render the image less directly significant by itself.

Juvenal does not fall back on a tradition of simile in satire. While the first book of Horace's *Satires* contains a fair proportion of skillfully employed similes, the second book, using a less argumentative form of presentation, dispenses with the intellectually analyzed comparison.²⁶ Persius, who follows the ideas of the more mature Horace, also seems to have agreed with the elimination of simile, for there are less than ten such comparisons in his six hundred lines.²⁷ Therefore, Juvenal can

²⁶ See above, pp. 233 ff.

²⁷ In reading Persius I have found five definite similes, all short and

follow his own inclinations in this matter, either to use similes for argument and other poetic purposes or to treat them as a minor, inessential aspect of his poetry. To take, for example, a typical section of over three hundred lines, Satire 3 has a number of comparisons (47-8, 74, 90-1, 137), but no true similes. On the other hand, Satire 5 exploits a different technique of presentation and makes affective use of epic diction and allusions to qualify the banquet given by Virro. If Trebius dares to gape at the meat, he will be dragged out feet first just as the corpse of Cacus killed by Hercules (125); a mushroom is set before Virro like those delicacies which Claudius used to eat, of course before that fatal one given him by Agrippina (147-8); Virro partakes of apples like those which Phaeacia produced in its marvellous orchards, which might even have been stolen from the Hesperides (151-2). The savage point in all three of these momentary similes does not need to be elaborated, and it can safely be said that the point, the witty analogy, accounts for the main impression of the passages. Whereas Statius develops his similes in true epic manner, Juvenal moves directly to the effective portion of the comparison; rarely does the Juvenalian simile have the opportunity to expand into a complete picture. Normally, a line or two provides adequate scope for the striking comparison, and the satirist ties it closely to the grammar and sense of a larger sentence. As one might expect, then, Juvenal treats similes like metaphors: he makes them stand out sharply in their context for a line or two, but lets them contribute part only of the total rhetorical effect of their context. Virro enjoys apples like those of Phaeacia or an African paradise, yes, but the passage remains incomplete. Juvenal must insert between the apples and the qualifying simile a relative clause to enhance the total significance: Virro eats apples which Trebius enjoys only as a delightful scent wafted in front of his nose (150).

We have found that the texture of passages in which Statius uses imagery follows the general epic convention, the imagery being prominent; but we have also observed that various other verbal devices achieve concomitant prominence, so that the image forms but one of several elements, all contributing to the total

rather unimportant, namely, 1, 97; 3, 16; 31; 79; and 6, 62. In addition, it could be argued that the following serve as similes: 1, 66; 2, 70; 3, 42; and 5, 73.

rhetorical effect. In Juvenal, too, it became clear that, unlike Horace, his imagery achieves a sudden brilliance rather than a moderate, almost unobtrusive statement. One might be tempted to deduce from these observed facts a theory connected with our next area of inquiry, namely, the extent to which Juvenal elaborates his imagery as a continuous element of meaning in a whole Satire. We might suspect, for example, that Juvenal would restrict himself to brief but overt and affective patterns of imagery. But rather than indulge in conjecture, let us proceed directly to the material in the text.

Statius limits himself considerably by the way he presents his subject of the Seven against Thebes, but it seems relatively clear that he exploits those self-imposed limits. Of the major characters in the epic, not one appeals to our sympathies. The story proceeds on a level of unrelieved hopelessness, savagery, and, with the exception of a few scenes containing women, sheer inhumanity. As one reads the poem, again and again one meets the adjectives *ferus* and *saevus*, epithets applied indiscriminately to any man. Most of the similes concentrate on animals: lions, wolves, tigers, bulls, boars, etc. Such imagery fits most aptly the character of Tydeus, and indeed Statius lavishes animal symbolism on the man. Tydeus comes from Aetolia wearing a boar's hide that serves as an omen for Adrastus and as a symbol for us. He fights Polyneices on the first occasion that we see him, and he continues to exist only for war and killing until his last moment. Thus, our final vision of the man presents to us his bestial character as a whole: he dies gnawing on the head of the Theban who has given him his fatal wound.

If Tydeus seems the most signal example of bestiality in the *Thebaid*, the brothers Eteocles and Polyneices do not lag far behind. Returning to the passage cited from I, 123 ff., we find that the metaphors possess extensive relevance to the picture of fratricidal hatred. In the royal family where one might expect to find prosperity and health, sick envy exists; love of a brother has been perverted to love of his throne; parental qualities cannot be assigned to Oedipus, who has cursed his sons, but to that fear which causes the perverse hatred of brother; and finally, the result of sharing the rule has paradoxically been to destroy companionship and rather to make discord the constant companion of Eteocles and Polyneices. Just as the proper succession has

been broken (*ruptae vices* 128), so all the normal fraternal bonds have shattered, so as to pervert the usual associations of family affection into terms properly applicable to the murderous ambitions of the two men. Polyneices receives less of our distaste, but he carries like Tydeus the symbol of his brute nature, in this case a lion's pelt. Eteocles can properly be compared to a snake (II, 411 ff.) as he meditates the ambush for Tydeus. And the lurid details of the final combat between the brothers combine into a striking portrait of savage beasts (XI, 497 ff.): the two fight like animals, with tooth, claw, and animal treachery, until fittingly they have killed each other. Even in death their bestial hatred persists. The symbolic scene in which the pyre of Eteocles repels the corpse of Polyneices exhibits, as Antigone states, the survival of savage feeling (*ferus* XII, 438; *saeuos* 446). In short, Statius employs his imagery as part of a general symbolic pattern, metaphors and similes contributing to the dominant impression of the poem, that men have cast off their human feelings and willingly become the most savage of beasts.

Juvenal, as we saw, does not use extended similes, and his metaphors recede into a position of subordination. Moreover, the nature of his satire does not lend itself to symbolic scenes very readily, especially because he cannot fall back on the dramatic associations of earlier books or Satires. To many readers, therefore, a unified pattern of imagery in Juvenal would seem unlikely, precisely because imagery plays such an ancillary role and disunity constitutes such a central impression of the Satires. It might be easier, then, to start with two Satires in which Juvenal does exploit symbolic scenes and achieve a result similar to that of Statius. Satire 4, after a short introduction, consists entirely of a story (*res vera* 35) historically narrated about Domitian and a turbot. With few open metaphors and no operative similes,²⁸ Juvenal elaborates his tale, using as one of his most prominent thematic words *saevus* and its noun *saevitia*.²⁹ That this generally pejorative word "savagery" here possesses its original animal associations may be quickly shown.

²⁸ In a certain sense, the whole story functions as a comparison, demonstrating how much worse Domitian's banquets were than those of his extravagant courtier Crispinus: cf. *qualis* . . . *epulas* (28).

²⁹ Cf. my article, "Studies in Book I of Juvenal," *Y. O. S.*, XV (1957), pp. 71 ff.

Domitian is said to rend the world (*laceraret*: cf. 15,102 for proper connotations); flattery makes his crest rise (70). His savagery (85) can be associated with *clades* and *pestis* (84).³⁰ He inflicts a brutal death (95) on the younger Acilius, having already failed to get rid of him by exposing him to bears in the Alban arena. Domitian renders his courtiers savage if he does not kill them: Pompeius, who readily murders (109), and Fuscus, who plans destructive wars and will eventually, ironically, feed vultures himself (111). In the last words of the Satire, therefore, the monarch dripping with the blood of his victims seems to epitomize the quality of *saevitia* which marked his times (151). As Juvenal presents his picture of Domitian's court, the original associations of *saevus* recover their force, and the Emperor emerges as a beast. More than that, the exaggerated attitude towards the turbot serves to symbolize this bestiality. The monstrous fish awakens the animal appetites of the Emperor, and his menacing violence pervades the atmosphere from the moment the poor fisherman catches the turbot. I do not say that Juvenal's dominant theme is *saevitia*, but certainly the perversion of imperial augustness into bestiality constitutes a powerful element in the meaning of this Satire.

Juvenal's exploitation of savagery as a theme remained throughout his career, to make *saevus* one of his favorite persuasive epithets and to incline him in his last complete Satire to center his attention on the paradox of man become a savage beast. As in Satire 4, so in Satire 15 metaphors and similes play an unobtrusive role in the total symbolism. When the people of two neighboring villages in Egypt become involved in a riot over religious beliefs, one man is killed, torn apart, and eaten raw, bones and all. It is this case of cannibalism which acts as the symbolic heart of the poem, and Juvenal proceeds to reflect on the incident, steadily eliminating parallels and potential associations until the deed emerges nakedly as sheer savagery, worse than the actions of animals. In introducing the act, the

³⁰ It is not uncommon for *clades* and *pestis* to be associated in reference to a plague: so Lucretius, VI, 1125 and Ovid, *Met.*, VII, 562. On the other hand, *pestis* frequently applies to a human being as here or to a snake: so Vergil, *Georgics*, III, 419 and Statius, *Thebaid*, II, 282 (at least paired with Tisiphone's serpent). I note that the Lewis and Short Dictionary erroneously refers to Nero in connection with this occurrence of *pestis* in Satire 4.

satirist calls it *feritas* (32). By itself, the word might easily be ignored, if the animal allusion had not already been established. In fact, Juvenal concentrates our attention from the beginning on the religious connection between the Egyptians and animals which they worship as deities, that is, as morally their superiors. The Egyptians would, accordingly, never slaughter even a goat-kid, but they cherish no scruples about human flesh as edible meat (13). To emphasize the enormity of his tale in advance, Juvenal continues with an analogy to the incredible adventures of Odysseus. If Odysseus had tried to spin a yarn about man eating man, he would have provoked a roar of disbelief; as it was, his savage (*saeva* 17) Charybdis and cannibalistic Laestrygonians and Cyclops remained within the bounds of propriety only by being monstrous. By such persistent reference to animals and inhuman behavior, Juvenal prepares his reader to sense the original implication in *feritas*, namely, animal behavior. The scenes of savage fury (54) and bestial appetite (78 ff.) reinforce the prejudice, and the subsequent reflections (93 ff.) make Juvenal's theme patent: the Egyptians are the supreme example of bestiality, worse than the Vascones who rent (*lacerabant* 102) human limbs only after consuming all their animals and herbage; more bestial (*saevis* 115) than Diana who demanded human sacrifice; more rabidly savage (*hac saevit rabie* 126) than northern barbarians; finally, worse than the rabid tiger (*rabida* 163) and savage bears (*saevis* 164), inasmuch as the wildest of beasts at least spares its own kind.

Satires 4 and 15 show Juvenal dealing with a theme of savagery and working it out by metaphor, symbolic episode, and analogy. Other Satires operate less through a single episode than by means of numerous representative details, discontinuous incidents, or separate *exempla*. As a result, when we study the structure of such Satires, we usually look for the unifying theme and do not expect much immediate help from the imagery. Such "catalogue" Satires, as Highet has aptly called them,³¹ state their subject at the start, imply the moral paradox with which they deal, and then proceed to illustrate the theme with example after example. Satire 6 serves as the most patent instance of this structural technique, but Satires 3, 7, 10, and

³¹ Cf. G. Highet, *Juvenal the Satirist: a Study* (Oxford, 1954), pp. 158-9.

presumably 16 exhibit similar tendencies. Now what part do systematic patterns of imagery play in these Satires? As we have already cited a passage of imagery from Satire 7, we may properly begin with it.

The metaphors in 7, 82 ff. transform the inanimate epic of Statius into a very attractive female, whose allure resides entirely in her sex. On the surface, Juvenal describes the tremendous popularity earned by the poet at his *recitatio*; by metaphor he concentrates our attention on the poetic product, implying that the poem was not merely a female, but a prostitute, that the delight of the mob (*libidine* 85) consisted of sexual pleasure. Therefore, as Rigault noted,³² the innocent phrase *promisitque diem* (84) acquires associations from the context and suggests the assignation of a prostitute with lover. As the passage continues, the personified adjectives *incundam*, *amicae*, and *laetam* become more and more restricted in meaning, referring to sexual delights. Statius acts as a pander, now pleasing with amorous *Thebais* the general public, now prostituting virginal *Agave* to a wealthy taker, Paris; and Statius the *leno* would starve without Paris. In adding this significant metaphorical level to the passage Juvenal does not repeat a metaphorical pattern already established in the Satire, but does fit into it. To state the dominant image of Satire 7, we can do no better than cite the *inscriptio* appearing in many manuscripts at the beginning of the poem or after verse 16: DE STERILITATE STUDIORUM.³³ The unproductivity of the arts accounts for a series of images related to farming (e. g., 48, 98, 103, 112); for the constantly ironic use of *labor* and *merces*, whose primary associations with hard physical labor conflict with their usage here to refer to the efforts and rewards of intellectuals; and for allusions to the unspoiled natural beauties of Helicon (8, 60), the gardens of Lucan (79), the groves of Quintilian (186), and the like. According to his characteristic approach, Juvenal proceeds in Satire 7 to strip away from the arts their normally honorific associations and expose them in the lurid light of his reality: the arts have sunk

³² I find this note mentioned, but not approved, in J. E. B. Mayor, *Thirteen Satires of Juvenal with a Commentary* (London, 1893²). Cf. R. Pichon, *De Sermone amatorio* (Paris, 1902), p. 6.

³³ For this *inscriptio*, cf. the recent edition of U. Knoche, *D. Iunius Iuvenalis Saturae* (Munich, 1950).

to the level of physical labor, and even lower, because the intellectuals cannot even earn a living wage (*merces*). Thus, Statius has prostituted his Muse, lawyers are obliged to leave Rome for the provinces, and in general the scale of intellectual values has suffered complete reversal. To conclude, when writing a more elaborate poem than those founded on a single episode, Juvenal introduces subordinate images, as in 7, 82 ff., to illustrate his central theme. In order to earn a living (*merces*) by verse, the poet has to become a pander to popular tastes.

When one reads Juvenal's Satires, imagery does not make a pronounced impression, and consequently one does not sense a particularly vivid system of symbolism based on metaphor and simile. Still, imagery does play its part in the Satires, working together with other devices to promote the emotional effect of the unifying theme. In the three poems which we have briefly reviewed, it appears that we could in fact state Juvenal's theme by metaphor. The medieval scholars perceived this point in connection with Satire 7 and rightly called attention to the farming image; and Satires 4 and 15 both concentrate on the bestial aspects of Domitian's court and the Egyptians respectively. If we attempted to apply the theory to other poems, we could express the theme, for instance, of Satire 3 as the un-Roman nature of Rome, and of Satire 10 as the deadliness of ambition. The metaphorical possibilities of the theme permit Juvenal to allude intermittently to the dominant image and in certain Satires like 4 and 15 to dramatize it by a single long *fabula* or *exemplum*. Elsewhere and more commonly, the satirist introduces a series of concrete instances or brief *exempla*—the passage on Statius serves in this capacity—which can employ their own pattern of imagery, subordinate to the dominant image and co-ordinate with the imagery of other such *exempla* in the same Satire. Accordingly, the passage on Statius aptly uses a sexual metaphor to illustrate the plight of the poet; the brief discussion of the historian (7, 98 ff.), which immediately follows, employs the agricultural image; and the next section on the lawyer (105 ff.) uses a mock-heroic technique to point up the ignominy of that once dignified profession. Similarly, in Satire 10, the tower constitutes the image for political ambition, the torrent for eloquence, and beauty for military glory, all implying the mortality of ambition in general.

Having discussed the texture of Juvenal's imagery and its systematic usage, I come now to the final area of inquiry, namely, the logic of the image. We can take a metaphor or simile and analyze its structure into the three parts of which it consists: two separate entities and a connecting link. To discuss the logic of the image would involve examining the connecting link and determining its proportion of likeness and dissimilarity and the poetic consequences for the image. For example, we have discussed the animal imagery of Statius and shown how the characters of Tydeus, Eteocles, and Polyneices exhibit bestial qualities, which are epitomized in their final symbolic acts. Now, Statius could, as Vergil does, leave us with an ambiguous impression about this animal image: that is, he could give us other facets of his heroes' characters and he could make the picture of the animal sympathetic, so as to stress the human as much as the subhuman in passionate actions. But in fact Statius adopts a different technique by narrowing his scope and eliminating uncertainty, so as to concentrate on affirming the totally bestial nature of his central characters. As one reads the *Thebais*, one does not reflect on the personality of Tydeus or Eteocles, in search of human traits. The metaphor and the simile are statements of fact: Tydeus is *saevus* and *ferus* without qualification, and he entirely resembles whichever wild beast to which he may be compared. As a result, instead of the Vergilian glimmers of hope, the suggestions of human complexity that make of Man an imprecise blend of destructive passion, noble emotion, rational design, and mechanistic inhumanity, Statius plunges us ever deeper into a picture of unrelieved blackness, where the leading warriors become cannibals, outrageous blasphemers, and fratricides, where they achieve nothing but futile destruction.

I do not need to observe that the restricted application of Statian imagery possesses great dramatic power, especially when combined, as it is, with luridly affective symbolic scenes. Rather, I am concerned with its absolute poetic quality, by which I mean its implicit representation of the nature of reality. While the world which Statius creates within the limits of his epic is a consistent world and does nakedly exhibit its bestial character, our experience informs us of another area of reality and might well suggest, if Statius gave us a moment for meditation by a

few qualifying comments, that his characters could be more fully explored. By giving us this partial view of Man, then, Statius appeals not so much to reason and experience as to emotion and produces what we might call a drama of horrors as distinguished from a tragedy.

Just as Statius represents a type of dramatic presentation opposed to that of Vergil (as exclusive to inclusive), so Juvenal exploits a style of imagery very different from that of Horace. Horace makes his imagery a part of his total appeal to reason by constantly emphasizing the degrees of difference between the two so-called similar entities in metaphor or simile. When he compares a man to an animal, Horace implicitly denies that the likeness is in any way desirable. Since Man by definition ranks above the animals, Horace always suggests the possibility of using Man's unique power of reason to negate the metaphorical relation. In the same way, he deals with the concept of slavery and freedom, as if true freedom has nothing to do with legal definitions, but with a certain moral attitude available to all classes of society. If he calls the Roman people slavish, he does so because he knows and urges that Man is born to a higher destiny. Horace, therefore, uses the image to suggest the fundamental nature of Man; one always senses the irony, the ethical direction in the metaphor or simile which depicts men through a lower order of reality.

The "intellectual" image does not exist in Juvenal. Whereas Horace can ironically compare himself to a mouse or a donkey and thereby suggest the rational and ethical goals of mankind, Juvenal says that Domitian is unqualifiedly a savage beast and the Egyptians worse than beasts. In this we may perceive one reason why Juvenal allowed the simile to decline in importance, for the Horatian simile, where we sense a certain hesitation about the comparison and an effort of the poet to examine in detail its relevance, does not answer Juvenal's need. He replaces simile with metaphor and changes the comparison into an outright assertion of fact, of total identity. Indeed, Juvenal's power inheres precisely in this: he asserts as unqualified facts the most outrageous paradoxes. Not that the satirist specifically denies the existence of that higher reality in human nature to which Horace continually appeals; he merely ignores it as irrelevant. He affirms that the world which he describes, whether it be Rome

or Egypt or, as in Satire 10, the human race, is devoid of ethical values or, in its perverse way, has transvalued all that once was good.³⁴ The capacity of Man to conquer his lower nature by reason, to achieve that higher "freedom," no longer exists in Juvenal's world; in Satire 3 we hear that a horde of servile Greeks controls Rome and effectively destroys the opportunities of a free client like Umbricius, and in Satire 5 we watch the "free" Trebius transformed into a slave before our eyes. While Horace could evolve a new concept of *libertas* in connection with the artistic function of satire (*Serm.*, I, 4), Juvenal stresses the crushing of freedom in his Program Satire and the prostitution of poetry in the passage cited from Satire 7. Juvenal's imagery, then, operates within the confines of a hopelessly perverted world and serves to depict that world as a fact. When we plunge into Juvenal's scenes of horror—and in this he resembles Statius—we cease to follow our reason, for rationality no longer applies here. Instead, we rely upon our instincts; or, to put it more accurately, Juvenal creates an atmosphere in which instinctive indignation alone seems to act. The fact that a poet must prostitute his art comes to us suffused with the outrage of a Roman who knows, and expects us to know, of those glorious days when Horace and Vergil wrote freely, exempt from financial worries. The infinite freedom of rational Man belongs to a dead age, Juvenal implies by imagery and theme, and the present involves the inescapable fact of Roman and human perversion, irrationality, bestiality. Since Man has hopelessly identified himself with the lowest species, all we can do is express our abhorrence of this reality, reveal in a futile manner through *indignatio* our latent concept of what Rome originally represented. We cannot expect to restore to Man his humanity, and, if we ourselves are to keep free of shame, we must abandon that reality like Umbricius.

If I were to propose an adjective to define Juvenal's imagery, I would attempt to suggest his radical difference from Horace

³⁴ Juvenal also insists that he produces a truthful picture of this corrupt world. Cf. his affective use of *verum* in 2, 64; 4, 35; 6, 325; 7, 112; and 8, 125. Within the limits of Juvenal's carefully defined world, "truth" can only expose degeneracy, Man's identity with beasts; it never involves hope by suggesting higher values or a nobler status open to a rational, moral human being.

and, without perjorative implications, epitomize Juvenal's as "irrational" imagery. We have seen this "irrational" factor in the technique of asserting identity rather than logically examining likeness. Looking at the texture of the Satires again, we can see how the "irrational" affects the presentation of the image to the reader. Although Juvenal does not conceal images, he does not state them directly to our imagination, but rather integrates them with a larger affective rhetorical unit. Thus, the image, subordinated to a purpose of sharp antithesis, sardonic personification, or the like, becomes an element of assertion, not suggestion. One has only to compare the unobtrusive image that forms such an integral part of Horace's discursive reasoning, to see what Juvenal accomplishes.

Again, when we study symbolic patterns in Juvenal, we detect a persistent appeal to the irrational emotions. Juvenal takes extreme images rather than conventionally appropriate ones³⁵ and makes the shocking disparity seem valid by able use of dramatic rhetoric. In the passage about Statius, he fixes on a brilliant image and reinforces it by carefully contriving an antithesis: we see Statius in a moment of great popular success, then turn sharply to the starving poet forced to sell his mime to Paris. Juvenal has selected the details for this antithesis; a reading of the *Silvae*, for example, would produce an entirely different impression of Statius' career. Whereas in Horace the pattern of imagery is unobtrusive, connected allegorically rather than visually by passages of argument, Juvenal develops patterns of imagery, as with Statius, which depend essentially on dramatically powerful symbolic episodes. These episodes, assuming the form of historical events or *exempla*, dominate the Satires, and, just as their inner structure exhibits rhetorical distortion, so their interrelation depends less on logical sequence than on sheer juxtaposition and accumulation. So in Satire 7 Juvenal presents several intellectual occupations and repre-

³⁵ Cf. the shocking quality, the motivation to indignation, in such images as the prostitution of poetry (Sat. 7), the feminine nature of aristocratic names once associated with military exploits (Sat. 2), the enslavement of Rome (Sat. 3), the bestiality of a Roman Emperor and master of the civilized world (Sat. 4), or, in passages of less general extension, the picture of a wife as master, king of the household (6, 224), of her face as an *ulcus* (6, 473).

sents them in parallel systems of imagery.³⁶ By varying his *exempla* and their imagery he seems to build up an indictment, an indictment which in fact depends upon affective juxtaposition of highly theatrical episodes exploiting a rhetorical antithesis and a strikingly paradoxical image. We may well conclude that such imagery blocks off reasoning or the logical development of an argument and constitutes a necessary element in Juvenal's satiric poetry, where, if one thing is emphasized, it is that unreason dominates the world. No longer does the image imply the capacity of Man to separate himself from the animals by his reason, as in Horace; Juvenal portrays only the bestial perversions of irrationality and leaves us with the feeling that Man has lost his highest potentialities. In this sense, the image of the pander Statius is the image of Juvenal's distorted, corrupt world.

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³⁶ I do not mean that Satire 7 has a haphazard organization of unrelated material, for it is clear that Juvenal has arranged the successive paragraphs on the intellectual disciplines with a clear sense of structure. Cf. the excellent remarks of Highet, p. 269, n. 1. I do mean, however, that in each instance we go over the ground already covered and do not try to proceed deeper into the problem of why the professions involve financial failure and what might be done about it. Juvenal concerns himself only with establishing the fact beyond possibility of denial that there is no hope for the intellectual. Hence, parallelism of imagery.

ERGON: HISTORY AS A MONUMENT IN HERODOTUS
AND THUCYDIDES.

*Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione
rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te
exempli documenta in inlustri posita
monumento intueri.*

Livy, Preface.

Every historian is faced with the problem of selecting his material, since history is written, not about everything that happens to man, but only about significant happenings. A historian's choice of material is dictated partly by its causal effect, but also by its significance to the historian and his audience regardless of such causal connections. The German historian Friedrich Meinecke has said rightly that historical events influence us in two distinct ways. The first of these proceeds through the chain of events that connects us directly with the past, while the other is a more immediate influence by which our lives profit from history, either in our practical affairs or in mere thought.¹ This second type of influence is independent of the time interval that has passed between a certain period of history and our own time. We may say, therefore, that history has for us both an intellectual interest (in that it explains the present through the past) and an immediate value.

The ancient historians express their ideas of value through their praise of the subjects they have selected. Since they are primarily concerned with human action in history, praise and condemnation express the attitude of the historian and his public (such as he envisages it) toward men in history. The question of how value judgments are transmitted by individual historians becomes therefore the question of the manner of praise con-

¹ F. Meinecke, "Values and Causalities in History," English translation in F. Stern, *The Varieties of History* (New York, 1957), pp. 271-2. For Livy's preface, see e.g., P. G. Walsh, *A. J. P.*, LXXVI (1955), p. 369. I have had the benefit of criticisms by Professor A. E. Raubitschek, Miss Margaret Reesor, and Professor A. M. Parry, but I have chosen freely among them and this paper does not reflect the views of my critics.

tained in their historical works. From this point of view, a study of Herodotus and Thucydides, our earliest historians, is particularly rewarding. Herodotus' conception of how to praise great personalities and their deeds established a pattern typical of much ancient historiography. Thucydides, in departing from this model, attempted the realization of a different set of standards for the evaluation of history. His work represents a crisis as regards the basic concepts underlying such evaluation, and his solution (so far as he succeeded in forming a definite view of fame) represents a more purely intellectual, and at the same time a more critical, method of presenting history.

The present study is based essentially on the observation of a contrast between the two historians in their use of the word *ergon*. So far as I know, a full study of this word has never been made, and in this paper I shall not attempt it. My purpose is simply to observe the function of the idea of great deeds, monuments, or events, for the evaluation of history found in these two authors, for it seems to me that this observation leads to a better understanding of ancient, as contrasted with modern, historiography.²

I

Herodotus' use of *ergon* cannot be understood without the background of the Homeric conception of fame. The Homeric poet is motivated primarily by the desire to immortalize the fame (*kleos*) of heroic individuals, and in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* this personal aspect overshadows the praise of achievement in its ultimate effect. *Kleos* is oral fame encompassing the whole world rather than a specific local group, and heroic deeds are important primarily as symbols of individual greatness rather than for their effect upon a later time. It is only in the later epic that specific local references come to the fore, and this is one reason why some scholars see in the Epic Cycle the true beginning of Greek historiography.³

² The starting point of this paper has been the unpublished Harvard dissertation of Professor Adam M. Parry, *Λόγος and ἔργον in Thucydides* (1957), which the author was kind enough to allow me to read in a preliminary version.

³ See recently K. Deichgräber, "Das griechische Geschichtsbild in seiner Entwicklung zur wissenschaftlichen Historiographie," *Der Lis-tensinnende Trug des Gottes* (Göttingen, 1952), pp. 17 and 143.

The difference between Herodotus' conception of fame and the Homeric can best be illuminated from his statement, at the beginning of his work, that one of his aims is to praise "great and marvelous deeds done by Greeks and barbarians": *ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θαυμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα*. It has been rightly felt that this statement directly echoes the *Iliad*, but it has also been pointed out that the objects of praise (the *erga*) are a specifically Herodotean feature.⁴ The meaning of the word *ergon* in this passage has long been controversial. One interpretation, originally proposed by Heinrich Stein in his commentary, assumes that Herodotus is referring to actual monuments such as temples or the Egyptian pyramids. Another, and older, interpretation translates the word "achievements," comprising thereby, as Regenbogen has clearly stated, both concrete monuments and deeds. A third interpretation is also possible, namely that the word here refers only to deeds, with perhaps a special reference to the wars between Greeks and barbarians, which follow immediately in the context.⁵ It is diffi-

⁴ M. Pohlenz, *Herodot der erste Geschichtschreiber des Abendlandes* (Leipzig, 1937), p. 3. G. Steinkopf, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Ruhmes bei den Griechen* (Würzburg, 1957), pp. 74-5.

⁵ H. Stein, comm. *ad loc.*, followed by: H. Diels, *Hermes*, XXII (1887), p. 440, note 1; F. Jacoby, *R.-E.*, suppl. II, cols. 333 ff.; A. E. Raubitschek, *R.-E. A.*, XLI (1939), pp. 217-22; B. B. Shefton, *B. S. A.*, XLV (1950), p. 154, note 38 (the whole paper is important for the idea of fame). In his recent book *Atthis* (Oxford, 1949), p. 389, note 3 (cf. also pp. 216 and 218), Jacoby still holds to his former opinion. For monuments in Herodotus, see the list of A. v. Gutschmid, *Kleine Schriften*, IV (Leipzig, 1893), pp. 148-57. *Ergon* in the meaning monument is particularly appropriate in passages such as Herodotus, II, 111, 4 and 176, 1, where the dedicator of the *ergon* is not directly named as the originator (but this, I believe, is to be understood).

The most important criticisms of Stein's interpretation are: E. Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides*² (Bonn, 1929), p. 20, note 1; K. A. Pagel, *Die Bedeutung des aitiologischen Momentes für Herodots Geschichtsschreibung* (Diss. Berlin, 1927), pp. 2-4 and 3, note 7; F. Focke, *Herodot als Historiker* (Stuttgart, 1927), pp. 1 ff. Cf. also Pohlenz, *op. cit.* (above, note 4), p. 3, note 1, and recently H. Volkmann, "Die Inschriften im Geschichtswerk des Herodot," *Convivium, Festschrift Konrat Ziegler* (Stuttgart, 1954), p. 52, note 33. For the definition given by O. Regenbogen, see *Die Antike*, VI (1930), p. 460, and Steinkopf, *loc. cit.* (above, note 4).

The connection of *erga* with wars was made long ago: see the com-

cult to decide the question from the wording of the proem alone,⁶ but the general context (vague as it is) of "events caused by men" and "how they (i.e. Greeks and barbarians) came to fight" does not accord with the idea of monuments. There is little stress on concrete objects in the proem until we come to the closing passage. Having named Croesus as the first aggressor against the Greeks, Herodotus says that he will proceed with his argument "passing through small and large cities of men alike": *ὁμοίως σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστυα ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξιών*; for the mutability of prosperity (*eudaimoníē*) has brought it about that those that were once great are now small and vice versa. The reference to the cities of men has been taken rightly as an echo of the *Odyssey*, and it must therefore be understood metaphorically of Herodotus' subject matter in general, for Herodotus does not write city histories. At the same time, the whole passage has a connection with the language of geographical literature, in which the *eudaimonia* of cities is a standard topic.⁷ Thus the proem begins and ends with a similar combination of epic and geographical allusions, and in both passages we must decide between a narrow and a very general meaning.

A study of the whole work shows clearly that the broader interpretation is correct for both passages, and in particular, that we must take the *erga* at the beginning of the proem, with Regembogen, in the widest possible sense as "achievements" or "works," including both monuments and deeds. Since the relevant passages have often been listed,⁸ I shall cite merely one well-known example. In I, 93, Herodotus says that the country

mentaries of Wyttenbach and Baehr, and further Schmid-Stählin, *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur*, I, part 2 (Munich, 1934), p. 599, note 2.

⁶ For the bibliography on the proem see *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVII (1956), p. 247, note 11. Add: H. Erbse, "Der Erste Satz im Werke Herodots," *Festschrift Bruno Snell* (Munich, 1956), pp. 209 ff.; F. Bizer, *Untersuchungen zur Archäologie des Thukydides* (Diss. Tübingen, 1937), pp. 1 ff.

⁷ Pohlenz, *op. cit.* (above, note 4), p. 8, note 2. This is familiar from Xenophon's *Anabasis*. Cf. also F. Jacoby, *Klio*, IX (1909), p. 89 ("large and small cities"). Stein, in his commentary, briefly noted the similarity of the beginning and end of the proem.

⁸ See especially Stein, Pagel, and Raubitschek (above, note 5). J. E. Powell, *A Lexicon to Herodotus* (Cambridge, 1938), s. v. *ergon*.

of Lydia has no marvels (*θώματα*) to compare favorably with other countries, except for the gold carried by the Pactolus. However, Lydia has one *ergon* that is (apart from the *erga* of the Egyptians and Babylonians) by far the greatest of all. This is the tomb of Alyattes, the father of Croesus. Herodotus continues with a description of the monument, listing its construction, the labor expended on it, and its overall size. A measured comparison of the contributions revealed that the *ergon* (i. e. the financial effort) of the prostitutes was the greatest. In this ethnographic passage, Herodotus makes a distinction between natural phenomena (the gold of the Pactolus) and a work made by man (*ergon*). At the same time, this particular *ergon*, being a tomb, is also representative of Alyattes in some way. The aim in measuring it (a measurement which is given partly in terms of human effort) is to give an idea of the greatness of king Alyattes. The idea that monuments afford a yardstick for measuring, quite literally, the greatness of persons underlies the mention of monuments in all the ethnographic logoi, especially the Egyptian.⁹ Thus in II, 35, 1 Herodotus says: "I shall extend the logos on Egypt because (that country) has the most marvels (*θωμάσια*) and because it provides *erga* beyond description in comparison with other countries." Here we may note the same distinction between natural and artificial phenomena, a distinction introducing the next section of the Egyptian logos, which deals with the customs of the people and no longer with the geography of the country.¹⁰

The idea that a monument may represent its author is for us a strange one, since a monument does not tell us anything about the personality of the builder, but merely serves as an indicator for measuring that unmeasurable quality, human greatness. Greatness is then simply wealth and power, and these we measure by reckoning up the troubles undergone in the erection of monuments, and by the marvelous size of the surviving structures.

⁹ E. g. Hdt., II, 111, 4 (Pheron's obelisks); 124, 3 and 5 (Cheops' road and pyramid); 148, 2 and 3 (comparison of Greek and Egyptian monuments); I, 186, 1 (Nitocris' lake).

¹⁰ In III, 60, 1, Herodotus, in a much discussed passage, excuses the length of his Samian account by referring to three Samian architectural monuments. He means that the Samians are famous for their buildings and that they ought to be famous also for their history. Hence the remark is based on an assumed parallelism between deeds and monuments.

The motivation attributed by Herodotus to the great builders is precisely that of arousing in the beholder a feeling of marvel, and thus perpetuating their fame.

In order to show that *ergon* can also mean "deed" and that the conception of fame underlying both monuments and deeds is exactly the same, it is useful, at this point, to consider the word *mnêmosynon*, noted already in this connection by Steinkopf.¹¹ In the majority of cases, this word denotes a concrete monument or dedication left by someone who wishes to be remembered through it; it is a memorial, as we understand the word. Many of the examples are *erga* in the concrete sense, and they are put up solely to gain fame. Thus they represent the builder or dedicator without containing a personal element: a *mnêmosynon* is an *ergon* considered purely as representative of its author. Examples are the spits dedicated by the courtesan Rhodopis, the coping blocks and bridges over the Euphrates built by Nitocris, and a number of buildings and statues put up by Egyptian kings.¹² Different is the dedication by Mandrocles of Samos, the builder of the Bosphorus bridge, of a picture showing the bridge and its use by Darius on the Scythian campaign, as Mandrocles' own *mnêmosynon*. This is comparable to the surviving dedications of artisans, and, as Herodotus' quotation of the dedicatory inscription shows, there is a personal relation between the dedicator, on the one hand, and on the other, his dedication, the *ergon* itself, and his city.¹³ Furthermore, all *mnêmosyna* share the feature that the utilitarian purpose of the *ergon* is secondary, or even disregarded. Thus, in IV, 166, 1 Darius' gold coinage is considered not under its practical aspect, but merely as a memorial sought by the king. The most famous instance of the disregard for the practical is the Mount Athos canal (VII, 24), which Herodotus considers merely as a memorial to Xerxes' pride (*μεγαλοφροσύνη*). The motivation of the builder is again to create that very effect in the spectator which Herodotus attributes to him.

¹¹ Steinkopf, *loc. cit.* (above, note 4), but he does not distinguish properly between *mnêmosynon*, *mnêmê* and *mnêmeion*. Powell, *Lexicon* (above, note 8), *s. v.* *mnêmosynon* (but I classify somewhat differently).

¹² Hdt., II, 135, 3 (Rhodopis); I, 185-6 (Nitocris); II, 121, 1 (Rhampsinitis); 136, 3 (Asychis' brick pyramid), etc.

¹³ Hdt., IV, 88, 2. Sesostris put up statues of his whole family (II, 110, 1).

In a few instances, however, *mnēmosynon* is not used concretely. In VII, 226, 2, Dieneses' quip about the shadow caused by the Persian host at Thermopylae is called a *mnēmosynon* to Dieneses. Famous sayings are thus comparable to buildings or dedications, in that they guarantee the fame of their author. Further, in VI, 109, 3, Miltiades before Marathon presents to Callimachus the desired decision to fight as an opportunity to leave behind a *mnēmosynon* "for the whole life of men, such as not even Harmodius and Aristogeiton have left." This is clearly an abstract memorial, but it is noteworthy that both Callimachus and the tyrant slayers had memorials in Athens of a concrete kind.¹⁴

Just as *mnēmosynon* in some instances may be used in an abstract sense (a use which is nevertheless often related to the concrete usage), so *ergon* may likewise carry this double connotation. Again, one well-known example will suffice. In I, 14, 4, Herodotus, having mentioned the Delphic dedications of Gyges, and having listed his campaigns, says that he will now pass him by, since no other great *ergon* was done by Gyges in 38 years of rule. The context clearly restricts the meaning of *ergon* to his campaigns, but it is also clear that both dedications and campaigns have an equal value for Herodotus, in that they are both "worthy of remembrance" (*ἄξια μνήμης*). In this sense, *ergon* is usually (although not always) a successful undertaking, one that stands before the spectator as an accomplishment.¹⁵ Such

¹⁴ Tyrannicides in the Agora: I. T. Hill, *The Ancient City of Athens* (London, 1953), p. 80. Callimachus Dedication: Shefton, *op. cit.* (above, note 5) and LII (1952), p. 278. Cf. A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, II (Oxford, 1956), p. 100, note 1.

In Hdt., IX, 16, 2, we find a very different use of *mnēmosynon*. At the banquet of Attaginus, a Persian gives advice to Thersander of Orchomenus which enables Thersander to save his life after Plataea. The thought of the Persian is: "I know that I will die with Mardonius; after my death, this piece of advice will be a memorial to my intelligence (*μνημόσυνα* . . . γνώμης τῆς ἐμῆς) in seeing the future; you may treasure it in memory of a table companion." *Mnēmosynon* is here abstract and personal; for this use see *LSJ*, and for the plural Stein *ad* Hdt., VI, 109, line 12.

¹⁵ There are only a few instances of *ergon* as an unsuccessful undertaking: Hdt., IV, 154, 2 at end (the plan to drown Phronime); IX, 27, 5, third occurrence (the word means here "undertaking," although this happens to be the battle of Marathon); cf. also VIII, 107, 1 and VII, 6, 1 and see Powell, *Lexicon* (above, note 8), *s. v. ergon* II 1.

erga are not confined to Oriental kings, nor to ethnographic logoi: Salamis is also an *ergon*. There are *erga* of nations, such as those listed by the Tegeans and Athenians at Plataea, and of individuals, such as the deeds of Aristodemus in the same battle.¹⁶ The vocabulary of words associated with *ergon* and *mnēmosynon* shows that Herodotus looks at a deed as if it were a monument. *Erga* are great (μεγάλα), they arouse marvel (θῶμα), they are praised as worthy of mention or of memory (λόγον, μνήμης ἄξια), they are "publicly produced" (ἀποδείκνυσθαι) or "left behind" (λείπεσθαι), whether they are concrete or abstract.¹⁷

¹⁶ Salamis: cf. VIII, 75, 2 and 85, 3. The description of the battle consists largely of individual *erga* (VIII, 88, 2; 89, 2; 90, 3; 90, 4). Tegeans and Athenians: IX, 26 ff. Aristodemus: IX, 71, 3. Schmid-Stählin, *op. cit.* (above, note 5), p. 619 wrongly state that exceptional deeds are reported only for barbarians. Herodotus speaks also of great Greek monuments (II, 148, 2-3; cf. also above, note 10) and of Greek deeds, especially Salamis and Plataea. If barbarian monuments and deeds are more conspicuous in the work, this is due in part to the greater power and lack of moderation in the East, but also perhaps to the fact that size and value are Herodotus' main criteria for the greatness of monuments (on this point see Raubitschek, *op. cit.*, above, note 5). Greek works are smaller and cheaper than Oriental works, but this is morally to the advantage of the Greeks, even if it reduces their glory.

¹⁷ Μέγας is used for physical dimensions (e.g., Hdt., I, 93, 2, the tomb of Alyattes) as well as for human greatness (V, 72, 4, an Olympic victory; I, 14, 4, Gyges' campaigns; VIII, 90, 3, Ionians at Salamis). Cf. further Pagel, *op. cit.* (above, note 5), p. 3, note 7. Cf. Aesch., *Agam.*, 1545-6: . . . χάριν ἀντ' ἔργων μεγάλων (see E. Fränkel, *Aeschylus Agamemnon*, III [Oxford, 1950], p. 831). Marvel is aroused both by concrete and by abstract *erga* (concrete: I, 68, 1-2; 3, 47; II, 148, 6; 149, 1; 155, 3; abstract: III, 3, 3; IV, 111, 1; VII, 135, 1). The proem is the only passage where a derivative of θῶμα directly qualifies *ergon*. Outside the proem, θωμαστός occurs only four times in the work. It is used of a building (II, 156, 1), of crops (IX, 122, 3), of persons (IX, 122, 2), and of an activity (III, 111, 1). θωμάσιος is not used directly of great deeds; see Powell's *Lexicon* (above, note 8). Focke, *op. cit.* (above, note 5), p. 2, distinguishes between the meanings of θωμαστός and θωμάσιος but the evidence is slight. All this shows that we cannot use θωμαστός to define the meaning of *ergon* in the proem. λόγου ἄξιος: this expression means that a deed or monument calls forth a corresponding account in praise of it; thus ἀξιαπήγητος, ἀξιόλογος, λόγου ἄξιος and the like are used both of buildings and of deeds. ἀποδείκνυσθαι: it is necessary to distinguish between the active ("to demonstrate") and the middle ("to produce publicly"). ἀπόδεξις derives in all cases but

Compared with the use of *ergon* in Homer, there has been a significant shift of meaning in Herodotus. In Homer, *ergon* is not only an achievement and a single act, but it may also be an activity, an occupation, or a profession.¹⁸ Its meaning varies from a work of art or of handicraft on the one hand, to the meaning "event" on the other. In Herodotus, these meanings can also be found, but they are marginal.¹⁹ In Herodotus, *ergon* has a tendency to mean the finished product of an activity. The effects of *erga* are not so much their historical consequences, but reputation, honors, or gifts accruing to the author of the work (λόγος, τιμή, γέρας).²⁰

This change in meaning is caused by Herodotus' new conception of historical fame. To him great deeds leave visible traces behind, and the historian and his public arrive at an understanding of the greatness of the past partly through these visible traces. In general, therefore, Herodotus prefers things seen to things heard, despite the fact that history is, by its nature, based on oral accounts.²¹ Visible traces of men's deeds are the guarantee of their greatness. Works, both concrete and abstract, thus represent (as already stated) past human greatness in the present and future.²² There is a close tie between the historical

one from the middle and means "production"; see Erbse, *op. cit.* (above, note 6), pp. 210 ff. (In Hdt., VIII, 101, 2, I translate "demonstration," with Stein, and Powell's *Lexicon*, and against Erbse.) ἐργων ἀπόδειξις occurs three times: in I, 207, 7, it refers to great deeds, in II, 101, 1 perhaps to monuments, and 148, 2 certainly to monuments. ἀποδεικνυμαι is found more often with abstract than with concrete *erga* (Erbse, *loc. cit.*). λείπεσθαι carries a strong concrete connotation, but it is used also with *mnēmosynon* when this word is abstract (Powell, *Lexicon*, s. v. λείπω 7). It so happens that λείπεσθαι is not found with *ergon* in Herodotus. Cf. Hdt., IV, 92: κολωνούς . . . καταλιπών.

¹⁸ See *LSJ*, s. v. *ergon*.


¹⁹ Powell, *Lexicon* (above, note 8), s. v. *ergon*.

²⁰ E. g., Hdt., IX, 27, 5 (γέρας); III, 160, 2 (τιμή); I, 14, 4 (μνήμη). This idea constitutes an important theme in the work, especially in connection with the Persians.

²¹ For the connection of *historiē* with eye witnesses, see *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVII (1956), p. 276. Herodotus stresses the survival of great achievements also by stating that certain monuments still exist in his own time. See the list of passages in Schmid-Stählin, *op. cit.* (above, note 5), p. 590, note 9.

²² Steinkopf, *op. cit.* (above, note 4), pp. 73-5, seems to imply that in Herodotus' eyes *erga* replace the agent, but it would be more correct to say that they represent him.

agent on the one hand, and the historian and his public (the spectators of history, as we may call them) on the other. This relationship may be schematized as follows, taking into consideration both *ergon* and *mnêmosynon*:



The important feature of this diagram is the strict correspondence between the agent's motivation and the effect upon the spectator. The scheme is, as we have stated, applicable to all human activities, whether buildings or deeds, and thus we find in Herodotus' work an underlying and implied comparison of human achievement with concrete objects. This metaphor is the basis for the apparent ambiguity of the word *ergon* in the proem of the work.

What is it in human achievement that calls forth this implied similarity between deed and monument? It is first of all the involvement of the historian with historical events, which is expressed through praise or blame.²³ The aesthetic enjoyment of monuments is an analogue to the sense of marvel aroused by great actions. Secondly, there is the idea of measuring buildings as an analogue to the evaluation of deeds. The units and types of measurement existing for buildings represent equally definite standards for measuring greatness. Thus Herodotus, by conceiving of greatness in spatial terms, has a definite scale according to which he can judge the comparative greatness of different personalities in relation to each other. In the third place, the architectural metaphor expresses the permanency of a judgment which, based on tradition, is not liable to change. Changes to Herodotus are changes of fortune rather than changes in stan-

²³ Wicked deeds (the counterpart to great deeds) find frequent mention in the work, e.g. I, 5, 3 (ἄδικα ἔργα); II, 114, 2 (ἔργον ἀνόσιον); VI, 138, 4 (σχετλῖα ἔργα). The account of Darius' capture of Babylon has for its main theme the αἰσχιστον ἔργον of Zopyrus' self-mutilation, which turns out to be κάλλιστον (III, 155, 3, etc.), and for which Zopyrus receives the highest honors. Cf. also the wicked deeds of Cheops and Chephren connected with the building of the pyramids (II, 124 ff.). List of passages including blame: Schmid-Stählin, *op. cit.* (above, note 5), p. 599, note 4.

dards of judgment. Just as monuments, because of their lasting quality, can still be seen by Herodotus' own generation (and by future generations as well), so the motivations of past actions, both good and bad, resemble those current in Herodotus' own time and in the future. Therefore, Herodotus emphasizes the preservation of monuments more than he does their destruction: he marvels at what remains rather than lamenting what is lost.²⁴ Built in a particular place and by an individual person at a specific time, they are first of all intended to impress a local public. Even where they are meant to spread the fame of their authors over the whole world, this fame begins in a certain place and has thus a local reference. Deeds likewise express particular social virtues or vices which are current first of all in a particular social group even where they may ultimately be liable to general moral judgments. The monuments and the deeds of Lydians, Persians, Spartans, or Athenians are first of all Lydian, Persian, Spartan, and Athenian deeds. These nations vie with each other in local pride, although they want to be admired by outsiders too, or perhaps even by the whole world. The local origin of great deeds is one of the main reasons for the architectural metaphor.

One additional point should perhaps be stressed separately. A monument is basically an individual item and the spectator can enjoy it independently of other monuments, or even apart from studying its historical background. To be sure, that background (the stories local guides tell about the origin of monuments) is to Herodotus a necessary complement to aesthetic enjoyment. Nevertheless, monuments can be looked at in isolation. The same is true of Herodotus' treatment of deeds. In praising individual deeds, he stresses their local character as well as their intrinsic value quite apart from their causal influence on later history or their interconnection with other contemporary events; and thus he appreciates more clearly their specific character. This fact has great importance for the study of Herodotus: when we analyze the work according to its patterns (such as the cycle of the rise and fall of great men), or in general trace the numerous interconnections between events, we should not overlook the fact that these patterns are based upon the individual character of single events and deeds. These deeds are

²⁴ See above, note 21.

of an immediate importance regardless of their effects and any other implications. Herodotus enables us to judge the death of Leonidas or the betrayal of Ephialtes as significant single acts. Perhaps the best example of a praiseworthy deed seen in isolation and therefore compared to a monument is the victory of Pausanias and the Spartans at Plataea.²⁵ The statement that Pausanias won a very great victory runs counter to the whole course of the battle, which is beset by accidents and even cowardice. This statement isolates the final combat from the preceding part of the battle and refers specifically to the achievement of victory. Likewise, the Panhellenism and modesty of Pausanias contrasts strongly with his later tyrannical inclinations, which Herodotus knew about.²⁶ The battle is called by the Aeginetan Lampon an ἔργον . . . ὑπερφύεῖς μέγαθός τε καὶ κάλλος calling forth *kleos*.²⁷ This emphasis on fame leads to the isolation of an action both from other contemporary events and from later history; at the same time, this is perhaps the outstanding description of a deed in spatial terms in Herodotus.²⁸

The origins of Herodotus' conception of fame obviously cannot be found in Homer, for it differs from the Homeric concept in many ways, and especially in its concrete references to a stable society. Neither can they be found in ethnographic literature alone, although the emphasis on the local element derives partly from that source. Basically, this conception is a phenomenon of the periods Herodotus writes about, especially the period of the Persian Wars, and accordingly the closest parallels occur in Pindar and in inscriptions of the first half of the fifth century. This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the complex relationships and metaphors which Pindar establishes among his heroes, their deeds, and his own poetry.²⁹ It may suffice to

²⁵ Hdt., IX, 64, 1.

²⁶ Hdt., VIII, 3, 2, and V, 32.

²⁷ Hdt., IX, 78, 2.

²⁸ The above remarks deal only with Herodotus' praise of his subject matter. Erbse, *op. cit.* (above, note 6), interprets the phrase *ιστορίης ἀπόδειξις* at the beginning of the proem (which he rightly connects with *ιστορίην ἀποδείκνυσθαι*) to mean that Herodotus thought of his work also as a representation of himself, through which *he* would gain fame. This is difficult to corroborate from the rest of the work. It seems rather that in Herodotus' estimation the work drew its fame from its subject matter, since he does not praise himself in the manner of poets.

²⁹ F. Dornseiff, *Pindars Stil* (Berlin, 1921), pp. 57-8. J. Duchemin,

call attention to the recurrence of architectural metaphors in his odes to express the greatness of deeds and, at the same time, of his own poetry. Thus, in the sixth Olympian, Pindar starts by comparing the beginning of the poem to a portico. He implies that just as the whole ode is more than a monument, since it carries fame all over the world too, so also the victory itself has more than a purely local fame. The seventh Pythian, in a similar vein, speaks of Athens as having laid the foundation for the fame of the Alcmaeonids (a fame increased by the building of the temple at Delphi) and thus for Pindar's song.³⁰ The architectural imagery of these odes shows a restricted and localized aspect of fame, which is connected with a wider and more generalized fame closer to the Homeric.³¹ Pindar's conception of fame is therefore more complex than Herodotus', and the architectural metaphors form merely part of the total picture.

Certain private dedications of the sixth and fifth centuries B. C. express a similar ideal of fame as a localized phenomenon originating within the limits of the city state. The accompanying epigrams contain, beside the dedicator's name and sometimes his family connections, an address to a local divinity, joined occasionally to a request for fame. Despite the Homeric formula often used for such requests, the fame asked for from the god has usually a local basis, even where the dedication is made in one of the great sanctuaries.³² In these inscriptions, *ergon* often means "monument," but the reference is primarily (although not exclusively) to the works of artisans, especially in artists'

Pindare poète et prophète (Paris, 1955), pp. 258-60. C. Karouzos, "Περικαλλῆς Ἀγαλμα," *Epitymbion Tsounta*, pp. 561 f. On *ergon* in Pindar see Schmid-Stählin, *op. cit.* (above, note 5), I, part 1, p. 590, note 10.

³⁰ Cf. Pindar, fr. 77: Athens (through her near-victory at Artemisium) has laid the *κρηπίς* of Greek freedom. Cf. Wilamowitz' commentary to Euripides' *Heracles* (2nd ed., Berlin, 1895), line 1261. C. H. Bennett, *H. S. C. P.*, LXII (1957), pp. 72-3.

³¹ Cf. the passages cited by Steinkopf, *op. cit.* (above, note 4), pp. 53-4. Pindar, *Nem.* 5, 1 ff., contrasts true *kleos* with the statue of the victor and finds it not restricted in space.

³² E. g., P. Friedländer and H. B. Hoffleit, *Epigrammata* (Berkeley, 1948), no. 44: *ὥς καὶ κεῖνος ἔχει κλέφος ἀπθιρον αἰφέλ*. For emphasis on the local element see the dedication by Smikros, probably the Athenian vase painter (no. 116; cf. A. E. Raubitschek, *Dedications from the Athenian Acropolis* [Cambridge, Mass., 1949], no. 53).

signatures, but also in other dedicatory inscriptions by artisans.³³ Hence the use of *ergon* in the meaning "monument" is more restricted than it is in Herodotus. Nevertheless, the connection of a "work" with its originator is the same. The meaning "deed" is less frequent in the inscriptions than is the other meaning of *ergon*, but it too corresponds to Herodotean usage.³⁴ In nearly all these cases, *erga* are representative of the greatness of individuals in the eyes of specific gods in specific places, and before specific local (or at least Greek) audiences. In this sense, *mnēmosynon* occurs in the dedication of a certain Οἰν[όβιο]s, from the Acropolis, which was made "out of gratitude, to Hermes (μ[ε]ν[ε]μοσύνης: ἡ[ε]ν[ε]κα)." Oenobius was a *kēryx*, and it is attractive to think, with Raubitschek, that he held the religious office of herald and that the dedication is a *mnēmosynon* of his having held this office.³⁵

Herodotus himself had a very clear conception of the importance of inscriptions as guarantors of fame, and he used them in his work both without naming them and in quotation. Of the twelve foreign and twelve Greek inscriptions he cites, the former

³³ Signatures: Friedländer and Hoffleit, nos. 121, 153, 154, 164. Other inscriptions by artisans: Raubitschek, no. 197 (dedication by the potter Nearchos). Raubitschek restores a good many inscriptions on the assumption that *ergon* is appropriate only to artisans: see his comments under nos. 155, 183, 210, and 234. Cf. also Karouzos, *op. cit.* (above, note 29), nos. IZ and IH. *ergon* may refer to a monument, without any mention of the artisan or dedicator, in the famous Lysander dedication at Delphi (M. M. Tod, *G. H. I.*, I², no. 95) and in a doubtful inscription cited in the Lindian Chronicle (Karouzos, no. ΔF). I suspect that this use is later than the restriction to artisans.

³⁴ Friedländer and Hoffleit, no. 29, cf. W. Peek, *Griechische Versinschriften*, I: *Grab-epigramme* (Berlin, 1955), 165: *ἔργων ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν*. A similar phrase occurs in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (above, note 17). Further Peek, no. 16 (funerary epigram for the dead in Cyprus, 449/8 B. C.). F. Hiller von Gaertringen, *Historische griechische Epigramme* (Bonn, 1926), nos. 56 and 60 (end of 5th century). Other examples are less certainly dated: *op. cit.*, no. 26 (contemporary with Plataea ?), no. 54 (bad deeds: after 424 B. C.?). In Friedländer and Hoffleit, no. 145 (see Raubitschek, *op. cit.*, no. 168) the phrase *ἔργασιν ἐν πολέμῳ* is not quite certain.

³⁵ Raubitschek, *op. cit.* (above, note 32), no. 295. Cf. the much later dedication by synchoregi at the Dionysia, G. Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca* (Berlin, 1878), no. 925 and A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* (Oxford, 1953), p. 46.

are mainly connected with famous monuments and the latter, with one exception, are metrical.³⁶ They are quoted, not simply as sources in our sense, but as honorific inscriptions to increase the fame of the persons and events mentioned in them. Herodotus reflects directly the spirit of the times he writes about, a spirit which to him still survives in his own day, so that there is no gap between past and present in his work such as exists in Homer.

II

For Herodotus, praise is a mainspring of historical thought, but in Thucydides this element is much harder to discern. Modern scholarship has therefore seen in him the origin of "scientific" history (in Bury's sense) and has emphasized heavily the pattern of causation in his work.³⁷ It is proper, however, from the ancient point of view, to ask whether Thucydides too was concerned with the praise of his subject. Failure to praise would constitute a special problem in terms of ancient historiography.³⁸

We may start with the use of the words *ergon* and *mnēmosynon*. The latter occurs only once in Thucydides, and in a typically Thucydidean context.³⁹ After the battle of Amphipolis, the allies of the Spartans buried Brasidas "in front of the present market place"; the people of Amphipolis enclosed the monument (*μνημείον*) and sacrificed to him as a hero, "and they attributed (the foundation of) the colony to him, razing the buildings of Hagnon to the ground and destroying any *mnēmosynon* that might remain of Hagnon's foundation of the city." The reader had previously heard of Hagnon's original foundation (IV, 102, 3), but his buildings are named only here at the moment when they are destroyed. The heroön of Brasidas is mentioned to show a change of allegiance under the pressure of

³⁶ Volkmann, *op. cit.* (above, note 5), pp. 41-65. The messages written by Themistocles on the rocks of Euboea after Artemisium (Hdt., VIII, 22, 1-2) are non-metrical, but Herodotus does not here report an authentic text.

³⁷ J. B. Bury, *The Science of History* (Inaugural Lecture delivered in the Divinity School, Cambridge [Cambridge, 1903]). Reprinted in Stern, *op. cit.* (above, note 1), pp. 210-23.

³⁸ Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Ep. ad Pomp.*, 3, 6.

³⁹ Thuc., V, 11, 1. *LSJ* notes "rare in early Attic prose."

war: Brasidas had saved the city, and the people wanted to please the Spartans out of fear of the Athenians. Honoring Hagnon was thus neither profitable nor pleasant for them. Thucydides is not interested in the fame of Hagnon, nor, at this point, in Brasidas' true worth as a war hero. Instead, he indicates that fame is liable to change under the pressure of emotion and external circumstances, especially in time of war.

The use of *ergon* has also undergone a decisive change.⁴⁰ In Thucydides, *ergon* almost always refers to an activity rather than an achievement, and to a fact rather than a deed.⁴¹ Verbs associated with *ergon* are usually neutral (*πράττειν, καθιστάναι*, etc.), rarely condemnatory (*αἰσχύνῃν φέρειν*, etc.), and hardly ever laudatory.⁴² Similarly, adjectives of praise or blame are infrequent, and where they occur usually involve a question of social reputation rather than an objective standard for judging actions.⁴³ Particularly interesting is the use of *megas*: in Thucydides a *mega ergon* means simply "great trouble," or "an important event," and never "a great deed" in the Herodotean sense.⁴⁴ Very characteristic of Thucydides' usage is the dative

⁴⁰ On *ergon* in Thucydides see Adam M. Parry's dissertation (above, note 2). See further F. Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis* (Basel, 1945), pp. 43 ff. and 46 ff. Both works discuss primarily the antithesis of *logos* and *ergon*. Cf. also in general, H. Bischoff, *Der Warner bei Herodot* (Diss. Marburg, 1932), p. 1, note 2 (Homer) and pp. 11 ff. (Herodotus); A. Grosskinsky, *Das Programm des Thukydides* (Berlin, 1936), pp. 77 ff. (on Thuc., I, 21-2); L. Pearson, "Three Notes on the Funeral Oration of Pericles," *A.J.P.*, LXIV (1943), especially pp. 404-7. The change in meaning of the word *ergon* seems to me due largely to the antithesis with *logos*.

⁴¹ Characteristic is the juxtaposition of *ἔργον* and *πάθος* in the speech of the Corinthians before the Spartan assembly (I, 68, 2): *καὶ δι' αὐτὸ οὐ πρὶν πάσχειν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐσμέν, τοὺς ξυμμάχους τοῦσδε παρακαλέσατε*. Cf. III, 83, 3: the revolutionaries *τολμηρῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἐχώρουν*. The second example shows that there is no difference in the use of *ergon* between speeches and narrative, although the word occurs largely in speeches.

⁴² Verbs of praise are not used with *ergon*, but cf. I, 5, 1, where piracy is said to have brought fame in the old days. Condemnatory: I, 5, 1 and 2. Neutral: e.g. I, 39, 1; II, 29, 3; IV, 34, 3, etc.

⁴³ Reputation: VI, 33, 4 (*κάλλιστον*); V, 63, 3 and III, 67, 6 (*ἀγαθόν*); VII, 87, 5 (*λαμπρότατον*). There is of course much indirect praise of *erga* in the Funeral Oration, e.g. *τῷ . . . ἐς τὰ ἔργα εὐψύχω*, II, 39, 1.

⁴⁴ *Μέγα ἔργον* as "great trouble": III, 3, 1; VIII, 68, 4. "An impor-

ἔργῳ "in fact" and such prepositional phrases as ἐς τὰ ἔργα, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ, etc.⁴⁵ In Thucydides one "enters upon an *ergon*," or one "is in an *ergon*," as if *ergon* were something beyond any individual's deed.⁴⁶ The main use of *ergon* is in connection with military events and battles. It is, I think, never used in a concrete sense of buildings or monuments.⁴⁷

Thucydides' use of *ergon* is of the greatest importance for an understanding of his philosophy of history. In the proem of the work (I, 1-23) he begins with an apparent praise of his subject. He expected the war to be "great" and "more worthy of an account" than preceding wars (ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων), and the remainder of the proem is meant to prove this estimate. His proofs include, as his second theme, the emphasis on the accuracy of his method, which is briefly hinted at in the first sentence (ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς καθισταμένον) and developed in the famous chapters on method (I, 20-2). The proofs are further based on a reinterpretation of the meaning of greatness as compared with Herodotus' conception: in the proem of Thucydides greatness is measured by the power of the contestants rather than by their splendor or virtue, and it does not express actual praise.⁴⁸ Actions are the signs (τεκμήρια, σημεῖα) by which the

tant event": I, 23, 1; VII, 87, 5 (the Sicilian expedition is called an ἔργον . . . μέγιστον, λαμπρότατον, and δυστυχέστατον).

⁴⁵ I count 58 occurrences of ἔργῳ out of about 150 occurrences of the word. ἐς τὰ ἔργα: II, 39, 1; III, 82, 4; cf. I, 90, 3; II, 11, 7; etc. ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ: I, 68, 2; 105, 5; 107, 7; 120, 5; 140, 1, etc.

⁴⁶ See Parry, *op. cit.* (above, note 2). Cf. ἐπεχείρησε τῷ ἔργῳ, I, 126, 6; ἔργῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν, V, 9, 10 (similarly III, 108, 1); ἐς τὸ ἔργον προῆσαν, VI, 57, 1; ἐν ἔργῳ ὄντων, IV, 131, 3.

⁴⁷ The following passages refer to building activities rather than to the concrete objects themselves: I, 90, 3; II, 75, 3; VII, 19, 1; VIII, 92, 10 and 11. Pausanias shows his Medism ἔργοις βραχέσι, i. e. by certain acts or gestures (I, 130, 1). In the Funeral Oration, *ergon* likewise refers to activities rather than to monuments; see below, notes 76 and 77.

⁴⁸ Both the greatness of the subject and the competence of the writer are stock themes of prose proems. See M. Pohlenz, *Gött. Nachrichten*, ph.-hist. Klasse, 1920, Heft 1, pp. 58 f. and 68 ff. Bizer, *op. cit.* (above, note 6), pp. 1 ff. H. Patzer, *Das Problem der Geschichtsschreibung des Thukydides und die Thukydideische Frage* (Berlin, 1937), pp. 112 ff. Thus Thucydides' first sentence announces the two main themes of the proem and these are fully developed in I, 20-3. The proem therefore owes something to the principle of ring composition. See recently R.

historian understands power. Therefore, the word *ergon* is little used in the Archaeology, in which facts are used only as proofs for certain abstract theses.⁴⁹

When coming to his own times, however, Thucydides must show not only that power is now at its highest peak, but also that he can portray it more accurately than his predecessors could portray the past. In this connection, *ergon* becomes important in the chapters on method. In I, 20-3, Thucydides returns, in the manner of archaic ring composition, to the two main points stated in the first chapter of his work: the greatness of the present war and the accuracy of his history. These chapters form a series of repeated statements dealing with the greatness of the war between which statements on method are interlarded.⁵⁰ Taking together the latter statements, we find that they give a comprehensive critique and theory of historical method: Thucydides first criticizes local oral tradition (I, 20, 2), then (it seems) technical errors of historians (20, 3), the exaggerations of poets and chroniclers (21, 1), and finally emotional attitudes toward past and present in time of war and in time of peace (21, 2). By contrast, the intervening statements on the greatness of the war deal with fact. Thus, in I, 21, 2, Thucydides says that the present war will appear to be the greatest ever to those "who make their investigation from the *erga* themselves," i. e. from the facts.

In I, 22, returning to the question of method, Thucydides gives his own theory of historical method. The contrast between speeches and *erga* in this chapter shows clearly that again the *erga* of the phrase τὰ δ' ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, must be understood as "the facts about the actions in the war."⁵¹ Here

Katičič, "Die Ringkomposition im ersten Buche des Thukydideischen Geschichtswerkes," *Wiener Studien*, LXX (1957), pp. 179-96, with previous bibliography (but I do not follow him in all respects). Cf. also Grosskinsky, *op. cit.* (above, note 40), pp. 51 ff. (following Schade-waldt).

⁴⁹ Thuc., I, 5, 1 and 2 (of piracy); I, 11, 2 (Trojan War); I, 17 (accomplishments of the tyrants).

⁵⁰ For other interpretations see especially Grosskinsky, *op. cit.* (above, note 40); Patzer, *op. cit.* (above, note 48), pp. 33 ff. and *passim*; Katičič, *op. cit.* (above, note 48).

⁵¹ For the meaning of this phrase, see also Classen-Steup, *ad loc.*, and Parry, *op. cit.* (above, note 2). Grosskinsky, *op. cit.* (above, note 40),

Thucydides is considering military events merely as happenings, and not as deeds. After a reference to the purpose of the work, which attaches itself to the discussion of his own theory of method, Thucydides returns once more to the present war, comparing it to the Persian campaign of 480/79 (the *Μηδικόν* sc. *ἔργον*). There is nothing in this comparison that should lead scholars to assume a break with the preceding.⁵² The use of *ergon* in the singular shows that Thucydides thinks of the Persian Wars as "an event," which found its decision in four battles.⁵³ These battles are not considered as great deeds: what corresponds to them in the Peloponnesian War are not other deeds, but suffering (*παθήματα*). Thucydides here differs from Herodotus in investigating facts rather than praising deeds, and in emphasizing suffering rather than glory. His manner of writing history, so far as it can be understood from the proem alone, does not stress achievement, and neither praise nor fame are mentioned as his themes at the beginning of the work.

Thucydides' use of concrete monuments accords well with these views. In speaking of the past, Thucydides sometimes mentions monuments (he does so especially when mentioning Pausanias and Themistocles, the early history of Athens, Pla-

p. 50, wrongly sees in *ergon* a reference to the proem of Herodotus. W. Schmid, *Philol.*, XCIX (1955), pp. 223, note 2 and 232, note 2 assumes that *ἔργα* and *πραχθέντα* are nearly identical, with the latter term more specific (*ἔργα* in so far as they are actions). I think this reverses the true relation: *ἔργα* are the exact details of actions, as shown by the phrase *ἀκριβέα περὶ ἐκάστου ἐπεξελθών*.

⁵² I, 23, 1 contains the stock topic (cf. Hdt., VII, 20; Plut., *Per.* 28, etc.) of the comparison of the Peloponnesian with the immediately preceding great war, in this case the Persian. I believe that this statement is placed here by antithesis with the preceding: there Thucydides had said that the value of the work was due to the repetitious element in history, i. e. not to the fame of single events. Here he adds that despite this the Peloponnesian War is exceptional, not because of single events, but for its length and the suffering of the participants. Cf. also Schädewaldt, *Die Geschichtsschreibung des Thukydides* (Berlin, 1929), pp. 54 ff. Other scholars have claimed that chapter 23 belongs to a different redaction of the proem. See in general Patzer, *op. cit.* (above, note 48), pp. 66 ff.

⁵³ Cf. Thuc., II, 7, 1 (the Plataean *ergon*); VII, 87, 5 (the Sicilian *ergon*); I, 118, 1 (*τά τε Κερκυραϊκά καὶ τὰ Ποτειδεατικά*). On the singular *τὸ Μηδικόν* see recently N. G. L. Hammond, *C. R.*, n. s. VII (1957), pp. 100 ff.

taea's rôle after the Persian Wars, and the family history of the Peisistratids), mainly as evidence for the correctness of certain statements, but occasionally, I suspect, also to emphasize past greatness.⁵⁴ However, since he speaks rarely of the past, these monuments are not an essential feature of his work. In most instances, contemporary monuments are closely connected with events of the war, and they do not as a rule indicate the fame of persons.⁵⁵ They are used either as proofs for the accuracy of claims made by the historian or to achieve a pathetic effect. Examples of the last use (which replaces their use as yardsticks of fame in Herodotus) are the tombs and temples of Plataea, the building of a hotel there by the Spartans, the temple of Apollo at Delium, and most impressive of all, the concrete descriptions of sacrifices from gold vessels at the outset of the Sicilian expedition. Even when mentioning trophies, Thucydides sometimes uses them to show that they represented merely the claim, not the actuality, of victory.⁵⁶

Sometimes, monuments are connected with a change of fortune or of attitude, as we have seen in the case of Brasidas' burial at Amphipolis. I would explain Thucydides' remark about the "faint letters" of the dedication by the younger Peisistratus by a similar feeling for the transitory nature of monuments.⁵⁷ In the Archaeology, Thucydides gives his own opinion about the historical value of visible monuments: the physical remains of Athens and Sparta would give a totally erroneous impression of the true power of the two cities, since Sparta, though powerful, did not build, and Athens (he implies) built beyond her actual strength.⁵⁸ This passage specifically contrasts

⁵⁴ See Schmid-Stählin, *op. cit.* (above, note 5), I, part 5, p. 155, note 5, for lists of monuments used as sources by Thucydides. The quotation of the epitaph of Archedice (VI, 59, 3) seems to me intended in part to glorify the Peisistratids.

⁵⁵ Possible exceptions are some monuments associated with Brasidas, e. g. his shield: IV, 12, 1 (hardly, from what we have said, his tomb, V, 11).

⁵⁶ Proofs for accuracy: II, 15, 4 (sanctuaries south of the Acropolis). Pathetic effect: III, 57 and 58 (Plataean speech); 68, 3 (Plataea); IV, 97, 3, etc. (Delium); VI, 32, 1 (golden vessels). Trophies: I, 105, 5 f.; II, 92, 4-5, etc.

⁵⁷ Thuc., VI, 54, 7. On the problem, see Tod, *G. H. I.*, I², no. 8 and *addenda* p. 258.

⁵⁸ Thuc., I, 10, 2.

perception of the eye with intellectual understanding, and on the whole, Thucydides thinks little of the visible as a criterion for knowledge. Seeing, in a concrete sense, is important primarily in tactical situations in battle, but otherwise it is used more often metaphorically of intellectual understanding.⁵⁹ Interesting also is the use of the phrase "to my own time," which is more commonly used of customs than of buildings, and for proofs of intellectual arguments rather than to express the idea of permanence.⁶⁰

In summary, up to this point, Thucydides shows us a radical reinterpretation of traditional historical terminology and imagery, such as we had found in Herodotus. Greatness and the noteworthy (*ἀξιόλογον*)⁶¹ are for him intellectual terms, and instead of an admiration for objects he exhibits a profound awareness for the truthful and the pathetic. In none of this does he show any overt preoccupation with fame.⁶² To judge by the proem alone, one would be led to think that war is important to Thucydides merely as an indication (*τεκμήριον*) of the power of the contestants.

III

Nevertheless, there is in Thucydides also a strong element of praise. The fall of Athens (as every reader surely has felt) is not merely an example illustrating the mechanism of power politics, but it has for him (and for us) a symbolic significance as well. In a sense, Thucydides has made of Athens the hero of his work,⁶³ and this fact has more than a purely biographical significance. A hero calls forth praise, and therefore we must

⁵⁹ E.g., Thuc., I, 1, 1: *καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ὄρων ξυνιστάμενον πρὸς ἐκατέρους*. This use is frequent and sometimes connected with pathos scenes, as in VII, 71 (onlookers at the battle in the Syracusan harbor). Seeing in battle is used ironically of Cleon at Amphipolis (e.g. V, 7, 4).

⁶⁰ Schmid-Stählin, *op. cit.* (above, note 5), I, part 5, pp. 107, note 2, and 143, note 3.

⁶¹ *Ἀξιόλογος* means "noteworthy" in a "scientific" sense rather than in the meaning of praise (e.g. I, 14, 2; 17; III, 90, 1). However, in I, 73, 1, *ἀξία λόγου*, said of Athens by the Athenians, is no doubt rightly glossed by the scholiast by *ἀξιέπαινος* (cf. Sthenelaidas, I, 86, 1: *ἐπαινέσαντες . . . πολλὰ ἑαυτούς*).

⁶² On the relation of pathos and fame see below, notes 71 and 85.

⁶³ Cf. my remarks on tragic greatness in Thucydides, *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXV (1954), p. 44. References to Athens: below, notes 82-83.

ask how praise can be achieved in Thucydides despite the obstacles we have seen to exist in his philosophy of history.

Praise to the ancients is a function of memory. Here, again, Thucydides has a view of memory which seems to preclude its connection with praise. Memory, although a function of the *logos*, is constantly beset by distortion under the influence of present circumstances and emotions. There is, however, another kind of memory which influences action by calling forth past greatness. This conception of memory occurs primarily in speeches or in descriptions of people's thoughts.⁶⁴ It is especially in the speeches that we find also an important conception of fame. A basic motivation of individuals and of states is their concern for contemporary reputation. In this respect, Thucydidean individuals and states show an almost Homeric sense of pride. One reason for the hatred of the Corinthians against the Corcyraeans was that they felt themselves slighted by their colony in the matter of customary religious honors: this in turn was due to the great pride of Corcyra in her power and past history. Thucydides first mentions these feelings as an objective fact, and again in the speech by the Corinthians at Athens.⁶⁵ The Athenian defense of her imperial policy before the Spartan Assembly (I, 73 ff.) is in large measure designed to prove that Athens is *ἀξία λόγου*—and here the phrase means "worthy of respect." Even Sparta, although she is more moderate, is proud of her reputation in Greece.⁶⁶ Among the great individuals in the *Histories*, Brasidas, Hermocrates, Nicias, and Alcibiades are especially motivated by a desire for contemporary fame. Here again we learn about the psychology of these leaders primarily

⁶⁴ Thucydides speaks of the exactness of memory in I, 9, 2; 22, 3; II, 29, 3; 87, 4, etc. Cf. especially II, 54, 3, apropos of the plague: *οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἃ ἔπασχον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιοῦντο*. *Μνήμη* recalling greatness: IV, 92, 7 (speech of Pagondas), VI, 68, 4 (Nicias), both in battle speeches. Pericles envisages this kind of memory in his last speech (II, 64, 3). For the Funeral Oration, see below.

⁶⁵ Thuc., I, 25, 4 and 38, 2.

⁶⁶ The speech by Euphemus in Camarina should be compared with the Athenian speech in Book I (see VI, 83, 1). *ἀξία λόγου*: above, note 61. Contrast with this passage the absence of the idea of fame in the Melian dialogue (especially in V, 91, 1, where we might expect it). Sparta: I, 84, 1-2 (Archidamus). Fame as contemporary social reputation is well treated by J. de Romilly, *Thucydide et l'imperialisme athénien* (Paris, 1947), pp. 73 and 115 ff.

from the speeches, but in the case of Alcibiades Thucydides makes it clear that desire for glory was in fact a prime moving factor in his erratic career.⁶⁷ It is natural that this desire for reputation should extend also to the future, and this is true not only of the immoral Alcibiades, but also to a lesser degree of the moderate Nicias.⁶⁸ This conception of fame becomes important in the attitude of the Sicilians, and of Hermocrates in particular, during the Sicilian expedition. The Sicilians think much of the glory to be won in Greece (and not only for the present, but also in the future), if they should defeat the Athenians. It is in this sense that their fight against Athens is a *κάλλιστος ἀγών*, and their victory *λαμπρότατον*.⁶⁹ In all this, however, there seems to be no true feeling for fame as a form of immortality. Brasidas alone seems to show a truly Homeric conception of eternal fame, for Brasidas was in fact a great military hero, and a "new Achilles."⁷⁰ Brasidas' desire for fame, however, contrasts with his actual lack of effectiveness in the larger picture of the war; similarly the aspirations of Hermocrates contrast with his later exile from Syracuse.

While it cannot be denied that the Thucydidean picture of states and individuals striving for present and future recognition is a grandiose one, and that Thucydides wanted them to be remembered for this, such indirect praise concerns only their attitudes and not any concrete achievement. In the course of the war, great victories had only restricted significance. The victors in the war did not achieve any lasting greatness, because they did not achieve stable power. Therefore, Thucydides stresses primarily the psychological attitudes both on the winning and

⁶⁷ Thuc., V, 43, 2.

⁶⁸ Future reputation: I, 10, 2 (fame of Sparta); II, 11, 2 (fame of Trojan War); II, 11, 9 (Archidamus); IV, 18, 5 (Spartans at Athens); V, 16, 1 (Nicias); VI, 16, 5 (Alcibiades); 80, 4 (Hermocrates at Camarina, speaking of Athens in case she is victorious); VII, 56, 2 (hope of the Syracusans). Similarly, infamy in the future is feared: III, 58, 2 (Plataeans).

⁶⁹ *Καλός* is used often in the sense of social prestige. This is an important motivation for the Syracusans in resisting the Athenians (e.g. VI, 33, 4, in a speech by Hermocrates: *κάλλιστον δὲ ἔργον ἡμῖν ξυμβήσεται*). Victory *λαμπρότατον*: VII, 87, 5.

⁷⁰ In Thuc., IV, 87, 6, Brasidas speaks of eternal fame to the Acanthians. The "new Achilles": Plato, *Symp.* 221C.

the losing side. Connected with this is the importance attached to suffering, and the development in the work of a series of pathetic pictures intended to be memorable, although not directly presented as praiseworthy, which indeed they cannot be. Many of the major actions of the war end with such static pictures of pathos (compare for example the end of the Plataean, Mytilenaeon, and Corcyraean affairs, the visit of the herald after the battle of Olpae in III, 113, 5-6, the battle of Delium, and especially the Sicilian expedition), and this treatment is in accord with the theme of *παθήματα* as stated in the proem (I, 23). Thucydides often uses the traditional motif of "the greatest" to express such pathetic situations, and by contrast he also gives pictures of the suffering in time of war of especially weak and powerless states. (Examples of the latter are the fate of Mycalessus and the destruction of Plataea.) In all this there is the Euripidean feeling that suffering alone is worthy of fame. This applies also to Athens: Thucydides admired her largely for her endurance after the Sicilian disaster and for the great losses she was able to sustain in a long drawn-out war.⁷¹

Neither the picture of the motivations of men and states, nor the static pictures of great suffering, form a sufficient explanation for the conception of the fame of Athens in the Funeral Oration and in the last speech of Pericles. These speeches, therefore, hold a special place in the work. In reading the Funeral Oration not merely as an expression of the psychology of Pericles, but also as a true hymn to Athens, we must assume that it reflects somehow Thucydides' own idea of Athens' greatness. What right do we have to single out this oration from among others in his work?

Without entering fully into the vexed question of how far the speeches reflect Thucydides' own views, a few remarks will show how unique the position of the Funeral Oration really is. In the first place, it is the only oration which, from the prag-

⁷¹ Thuc., II, 65, 12. Examples of pathos statements: III, 49, 4 (*παρὰ τοσούτον μὲν ἢ Μυτιλήνη ἦλθε κινδύνου*); 113, 6 (*Ambracia: πάθος γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν πόλει Ἑλληνίδι ἐν ἰσῆς ἡμέραις μέγιστον δὴ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε ἐγένετο*); VII, 29, 5 and 30, 3 (*Mycalessus*). The most famous such statement concludes the Sicilian expedition (VII, 87, 5-6). For Euripides, see *Troiad.*, 1240-5, and P. Friedländer, *Die Antike*, II (1926), p. 90 (cf. Steinkopf, *op. cit.* [above, note 4], p. 13, note 47). E. Beyer, *Würzburger Jahrbücher*, III (1948), pp. 36 ff.

matic view, is unnecessary. Its effect lies in part in the pathetic contrast with the plague, which it immediately precedes. Secondly, in Thucydides' theory speeches and argument (λόγοι and λόγος) are very closely related: not in the sense that the opinions expressed by speakers are necessarily those of Thucydides himself, but in the sense of a basic similarity of method and approach. Since the *logos* is fundamentally one, Thucydides was able to *reconstruct* speeches (I, 22). Furthermore, the Funeral Oration is in many ways analogous to the work itself. As we have seen, Thucydides praises attitudes rather than deeds. Pericles, having to praise a miscellaneous body of dead whose individual achievements and failures are unknown to him, likewise falls back upon their common attitude in dying for their country. Just as Thucydides found the endurance of Athens the most praiseworthy feature, so Pericles praises the courage of the citizen soldiers. Athens' endurance is linked with her power and her sufferings, and Pericles complements this Thucydidean picture by praising the attitude that produced this power: the central idea of the Oration is the definition of democratic courage as a kind of knowledge.⁷² The effect of the Oration, then, lies in the fact that it completes the picture of Athens drawn by Thucydides himself. This is not the place to draw in full the further parallels between the Oration and the work (such as the refusal to dwell on the past rather than the present, or the intellectual pride of the speaker). By a curious perversion, as it were, of the customary topics of funeral orations, the Periclean speech has become a true analogue and complement to the work itself.⁷³

⁷² Thuc., II, 40, 3 and 43, 1 (τολμῶντες καὶ γινώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα).

⁷³ For the traditional topics of funeral orations see T. C. Burgess, *Epideictic Literature* (Diss. Chicago, 1902), pp. 146-57). (I owe this reference to Professor Walter Allen, Jr.) G. Colin, *R. E. G.*, LI (1938), pp. 211-45. W. Aly, *Philologus*, suppl. XXI, 3 (1929), pp. 84 ff. L. Weber, *Solon und die Schöpfung der attischen Grabrede* (Frankfurt a.M., 1935), pp. 51-2, notes that individuals are not usually named in funeral orations. O. Regenbogen, *Thukydides, Politische Reden* (Leipzig, 1949), p. 49, has put the matter extremely well: "Thukydides hat ihn (i.e. the *epitaphios*) in gewollten Kontrast gestellt gegen die damals bereits fest gewordene übliche Form und in entschlossener Gewichtsverlagerung von den Taten auf das Verhalten nach Art und Charakter, in Staat und Leben, also von aussen nach innen, umorientiert . . ." The use of standard topics in this oration needs a fuller treatment than I can give it here. Cf. K. Oppenheimer, *Zwei attische Epitaphien* (Diss. Berlin, 1933), pp. 8 ff.

This analogy extends also to the manner of praise bestowed upon the dead by Pericles: being independent of success and failure, this praise is also independent of concrete monuments. It is true that, to an extent, this is inherent in the funeral oration as a type, but the Funeral Oration of Pericles exceeds in abstraction some of the other orations known to us.⁷⁴ This is apparent already in the description of the funeral ceremony itself, in which not even the suburb where it takes place is named.⁷⁵ It is apparent further in the use of *ergon*, which carries the same abstract connotations here as in the rest of the work. The *ergon* of the funeral is not the tomb, but the ceremonies. In subsequent passages *erga* refer to military actions, then to all activities of the Athenians, and finally to events or facts in general.⁷⁶ This progressive generalization of *ergon* in

⁷⁴ The fragment of the Gorgian epitaphios mentions monuments in one place: *μαρτύρια δὲ τούτων τρόπαια ἐστήσαντο τῶν πολέμιων, Διὸς μὲν ἀγάλματα, ἑαυτῶν* (Sauppe, *τούτων* MSS) *δὲ ἀναθήματα* (Diels-Kranz, 82 B 6, p. 286, lines 8-10). Cf. also W. Vollgraff, *L'Oraison funèbre de Gorgias* (Leiden, 1952), pp. 58 ff.; the emendation there proposed does not affect our argument here. Lysias' Funeral Oration (II) mentions *τρόπαια* several times and in § 63 the speaker refers directly to the tomb of the dead and to the Spartan tombs nearby. Similarly, Plato's *Menexenus* (242 C 1-2). Hyperides speaks of the tomb and also gives a concrete picture of Thermopylae (§ 17-18). It is noteworthy that the pseudo-Demosthenic oration on Chaeronea (LX) resembles the Thucydidean oration in having almost no references to concrete monuments (the tomb is referred to at the beginning only; § 27 is based on an indirect reference to casualty lists). For the Chaeronea speech the reason is that its occasion was a defeat: monuments are appropriate for victories or near victories. It is an important feature of the Thucydidean oration that the absence of a positive emphasis on concrete monuments suggests to the reader Athens' defeat, whereas Pericles is represented as speaking at a time when victory was expected.

⁷⁵ F. Jacoby, "*Patrios Nomos: State Burial in Athens and the Public Cemetery in the Kerameikos*," in his *Abhandlungen zur griechischen Geschichtsschreibung* (Leiden, 1956), p. 302 (the whole section is important here).

⁷⁶ At the beginning and at the end of the speech, *ergon* refers to ceremonies and to the honors accruing the children of the dead (II, 35, 1 and especially 46, 1). Military actions: 36, 4; 39, 1. Other activities: especially 40, 1-2. General meaning (event or fact): 41, 2; 41, 4; 42, 2; 42, 4 (*τὸ δ' ἔργον τῷ σώματι ὑπέμειναν*); 43, 1, etc. This use is remarkable especially in view of the fact that Funeral Orations by their very nature are a reward for deeds (cf. Demosth., *Or.* XX, 141).

the speech parallels the increasing generalization of its ideas. There is a single passage, however, in which it has been assumed that *ergon* refers to a concrete monument.⁷⁷ In praising the dead, Pericles speaks of the fair exchange that has taken place between them and the city. Having given themselves to the city, they have received immortal praise and a most illustrious tomb, not that in which they lie, but one in which their reputation remains immortal, "at the appropriate time of every *logos* and *ergon*. For the whole earth is the tomb of illustrious men, as is signified not only by an inscription at home, but in foreign lands there lives permanently an unwritten memory of the *gnômê* rather than the *ergon*." *Ergon* occurs twice in this passage: in the first instance, it has been rightly referred to funeral rites. At appropriate occasions the dead are remembered by the citizens, both by being spoken of and in the proper ceremonies. The second instance also should perhaps not be understood in a concrete sense. It is awkward to make Pericles say that an unwritten memory does not live in a monument. Furthermore, there is a certain parallelism between the two sentences cited: in the first, Pericles draws a contrast between the actual tomb and the local reputation of the dead; in the second, between the inscription on the tomb and world-wide memory. The concrete references are contained in the first halves of both sentences, and any reference to a monument in the second half would destroy the symmetry of the arrangement. Finally, nowhere else does Thucydides use *ergon* in a concrete sense. The choice for the meaning of the second occurrence of *ergon* then lies between "an unwritten memory of their resolve rather than their deed," and "an unwritten memory of their resolve rather than the event (in which they participated)." This last (passive) meaning of *ergon* seems most appropriate in view of Thucydides' usage elsewhere.

⁷⁷ Thuc., II, 43, 3. See the commentaries of Classen-Steup and Gomme, *ad loc.* Shefton, *loc. cit.* (above, note 5), follows Raubitschek (in *R. E. A.*) in translating "monument." Regenbogen, *op. cit.* (above, note 73), p. 122 translates: "ihres Sinnes mehr noch als ihrer Tat," which is my second possibility. Steup's conjecture *του έργου* for *του έργου* does not affect the present argument. It is interesting to compare my version of this difficult passage with the funeral representations of those fallen in battle in the early fourth century (and also the late fifth). The dead are shown in attitudes befitting a warrior, but not in action (B. Schweitzer, *Die Antike*, XVII [1941], pp. 35 ff.).

In this passage and in the rest of the Oration, buildings are mentioned only to be contrasted with a higher spiritual reality. Thus, the absence of any reference to the Periclean building program is in harmony with the tenor of the Oration.⁷⁸ Marvel (the word occurs several times) is aroused by things of the spirit rather than of the eye.⁷⁹ It is the purpose of the Oration, and especially of the panegyric section, to describe the spirit of the city, on which rest her present reputation and her eternal fame. Her present reputation is based on her power: she alone of contemporary states comes to the trial greater than any report (*ἀκοῆς κρείσσω*, II, 41, 3). Power is the proof (*σημαίνει*) of the reality (*ἔργων . . . ἀλήθεια*) of her spirit. Thus the fame of Athens is in no need of poets or logographers, for "having forced the whole sea and earth to be accessible to our daring we have founded everywhere memorials of good and evil" (*πανταχοῦ . . . μνημεῖα κακῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἀΐδια ξυγκατοικίσαντες*). Memorials are here mentioned in contrast to mere words of poets and prose writers, but again they are not actual memorials, for, as Wilamowitz saw,⁸⁰ they stand for the memory of the successes and failures of Athens. The record of her activities is recalled here as the guarantor of her spirit, just as the memory of the dead (in the passage previously discussed) is based on their attitude rather than their deeds. Such memory does not depend on the survival of the Athenian empire any more than the existence of a colony depends on the continued existence of the mother city.⁸¹ The fame of Athens is visible to the mind only. It is

⁷⁸ In II, 38, 1 private buildings are mentioned, since they "refresh" the mind. (Needless to say, I would reject the conjecture of W. Schmid *ierois δὲ καὶ κατασκευαῖς* for *idiai δὲ κατασκευαῖς*.) II, 40, 1: *φιλοκαλοῦμεν . . . μετ' εὐτελείας* is perhaps an oblique reference to the building program, but the emphasis is on its cheapness, not its glory. The use of *κοσμεῖν* in various places (especially II, 42, 2 and 46, 1) contains a metaphor from the concrete. The *ῥέλιμος στέφανος* (another concrete metaphor) and the *ἄθλα* of II, 46, 1 refer to actions.

⁷⁹ *Θαυμασθῆναι*: cf. II, 39, 4; 41, 4. When Athens is called a spectacle (*θέαμα*), this also refers to her activities rather than to her appearance: II, 43, 1 (the citizens see the power of Athens in daily activities); cf. 39, 1. See L. Pearson, *op. cit.* (above, note 40), p. 405, note 11.

⁸⁰ U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff *apud* Classen-Steup on Thuc., II, 41, 4. Cf. Gomme's commentary *ad loc.*

⁸¹ See also the remarks of Gomme, *op. cit.* (above, note 14), II, p. 130, on the difference between the Athenian and the Roman empires. *ξυγκατοικίσαντες* is a metaphor from colonization.

independent, ultimately, not only of the continued existence of Athens, but of the city state itself.

In the Funeral Oration, Pericles does not speak of the actual fortunes of his ideal. In his last speech he acknowledges that it cannot, so far as it exists in actuality, last forever. Instead of a present image in men's minds, it will become an image of the past. In envisaging the fall of Athens, Pericles contrasts with her misfortune an undying fame (μνήμη) based on the extent of her empire, the greatness of the wars fought by her, the magnificence of the city, and finally her endurance. In contrast with an ephemeral reputation (ἡ . . . παρὰντίκα . . . λαμπρότης), this fame is characterized as everlasting (ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα δόξα ἀείμνηστος καταλείπεται).⁸² Here once more we may ask how far this picture corresponds to that given by Thucydides himself. The greatness of Athens' wars is intimately connected with the main theme of the work. The extent of empire is related to its growth, which is the subject of the *Pentekontaetia* and other passages of the work. Her endurance is praised especially after the Sicilian expedition. The "wealthy and magnificent city" (πόλιν . . . εὐπορωτάτην καὶ μεγίστην) is eulogized only here and in the Funeral Oration.⁸³

Thus the element of praise appears in Thucydides in a peculiar form. When speaking for himself, Thucydides assumes a detached attitude, which prevents him from expressing the fame of Athens directly. In this sense, Pericles' speeches, although analogous to Thucydides' own ideas, nevertheless go beyond the actual words of Thucydides. This might be due in part to the narrow interpretation Thucydides gave to his subject (it was War, not the History of Athens), which excluded a description of civil Athens.⁸⁴ However, there are probably deeper reasons. Thucydides must at all times have found the praise of Athens particularly difficult. He could not praise her achievements either in the Archidamian War with its alternation of success and failure, nor later, when the city was beset by disasters. Events taught him that war means the destruction of society and of stable values. The spectacle of Athenian politicians

⁸² Thuc., II, 64, 5.

⁸³ Thuc., II, 64, 3. Endurance: VIII, 1, 3, etc., cf. II, 65, 12.

⁸⁴ For a genetic explanation, see W. Schadewaldt, *op. cit.* (above, note 52).

after Pericles was not such as to inspire a desire to immortalize them. There was, after the fall of Athens, no fixed standard on which to base fame. Therefore, Thucydides praised Athens by recreating the thoughts of a man who lived at a time when fame, and the desire for it, were still objective realities.⁸⁵

IV

The contrast between the Herodotean and the Thucydidean conceptions of fame is very striking. The Herodotean view is based on visible remains, is restricted to specific audiences, and praises achievement as a representation of personality and as embodying fixed standards of praise. Thucydides' view, on the other hand, is based on oral report, is concerned with humanity in general, esteems spiritual attitudes rather than concrete accomplishment, and is in part pathetic; it is founded on the recreation of past thought in the mind of his audience. Thucydides is actually closer to the Homeric view of fame than is Herodotus, but he differs from Homer in showing a basic uncertainty about moral values and the continued existence of a society that is to accept them in the future. Whereas Herodotus immortalizes existing traditions (to which he is close in spirit) and thereby himself establishes a firm tradition for the future, Thucydides creates his own interpretation of events and no longer writes for a definite audience. Thucydides is fundamentally critical of traditions, and indeed of the course of history, whereas Herodotus is in harmony with both. Concrete monuments are important to the Herodotean type of historiography, but not to the Thucydidean. I believe that a study of the use of monuments by later historians would bear out the reality of this distinction between two ways of viewing history.

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⁸⁵ For contemporary parallels to Thucydides' conception of *ergon* see A. M. Parry's dissertation (above, note 2). The idea of contemporary fame as a social phenomenon is sophistic and Euripidean: cf. the excellent remarks of Schmid-Stählin, *op. cit.* (above, note 5), I, part 3, pp. 45, 52, 739 f., etc. I do not, of course, agree with the treatment of Thucydides' conception of fame (I, part 5, p. 41, etc.).

I have been unable to consult A. Maddalena, "Tempo ed Eternità in Tucidade," *Riv. Stor. Ital.*, LXV (1953), pp. 3-18. For a survey of ancient notions of fame see Vollgraft, *op. cit.* (above, note 74), pp. 116 ff.

CORINTHIAN DIPLOMACY AFTER THE PEACE OF NICIAS.*

One of the most puzzling periods in the history of Corinth has been the one following the peace of Nicias (421 B. C.). Thucydides' account makes it plain that Corinth played a very important part in the diplomatic maneuvering of this critical time, but the nature of its aims, tactics, and achievements are far from clear in his narrative.

Modern historians¹ have done little to clarify these problems, partly because they have failed to approach them from the point of view of Corinth and partly because they have paid insufficient attention to the internal politics of the various cities involved. The greatest contribution to an understanding of this difficult time has been made by H. D. Westlake² who is the first to examine the diplomatic negotiations from the point of view of Corinthian aims. He is able thereby to arrive at a more satisfactory explanation than had been made previously. His conclusions may be summarized as follows:

- 1) The goal of Corinth in the period following 421 B. C. was the renewal of the war against Athens.
- 2) The tactics to be employed to this end were the substitution of Argos for Sparta at the head of the Peloponnesian League.
- 3) Corinthian policy was a failure, since this substitution was not accomplished.
- 4) Internal politics were not an influence in the conduct of the foreign policy of Corinth.

With the first of these findings it is impossible to take issue. The other conclusions, however, are less compelling, and West-

* The writer is indebted to Professor William F. McDonald of the Ohio State University for valuable criticism and suggestions.

¹ See Karl Julius Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* (Berlin, 1922), II, 1, pp. 344 ff.; Gustave Glotz, *Histoire Grecque* (Paris, 1925), II, 2, pp. 658 ff.; George Grote, *History of Greece* (London, 1884), VII, pp. 1 ff.; W. S. Ferguson, "Sparta and the Peloponnese," *Cambridge Ancient History* (Cambridge, 1927), V, pp. 254 ff.

² "Corinth and the Argive Coalition," *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 413-21.

lake's examination of the internal political and constitutional situation at Corinth is less than adequate. When this situation is taken into account it becomes evident that Corinth's tactics were a good deal more complex than those described by Westlake. The fact is that the Corinthian policy was successful in its primary goal, and the course of Corinthian diplomacy was very much influenced by the internal politics, not only of Corinth, but of the other Greek states as well.

In 421 the Archidamian War had been in progress for ten years, with disastrous results for Corinth. Not only had she failed to check Athenian advances and to recover her fading prestige, but she had also suffered severe additional losses. The Athenian occupation of Aegina and Potidea cut off her trade with the east, small as it was. Athenian victories in the west and north, Phormio's naval triumph off Naupactus and the democratic success in Corcyra, completely destroyed Corinthian trade with the west. The city which leaned heavily on commerce for its power and prosperity was shut off from all her areas of trade. The conclusion of the Peace of Nicias between Sparta and Athens left Corinth with none of her war aims accomplished and, indeed, far worse off than before.

With these facts in mind one can only agree with Westlake that at this time the Corinthians aimed at "nothing less than a renewal of the Peloponnesian War."³ The Corinthians, therefore, along with the other dissatisfied states of Elis, Megara, and Boeotia refused to sign the treaty,⁴ and, after Sparta and Athens had concluded their alliance, went to Argos to urge the formation of a defensive alliance under Argive leadership.⁵

The nature of the Corinthian overtures to Argos reveals much about the political considerations of the negotiating states, yet the significance of these strange proceedings has been overlooked. The proposal for an alliance was not made in public, before the assembly or council, but *πρός τινος τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων Ἀργείων*.⁶ Moreover, applications for membership in the new league were

³ Westlake, *op. cit.*, p. 416. He goes on to say, "with the substitution of Argos for Sparta as the formal leader of the adversaries of Athens." This statement goes too far. See below.

⁴ Thucydides, V, 17, 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, V, 17, 2-3.

⁶ *Ibid.*, V, 27, 2.

not to be made *πρὸς τὸν δῆμον*. Instead the Argives were asked to appoint *ἀνδρας ὀλίγους . . . αὐτοκράτορας*, in order that *μὴ καταφανεῖς γίγνεσθαι τοὺς μὴ πείσαντας τὸ πλῆθος*.⁷ Having made these suggestions, the Corinthians went home without having entered into any formal agreement with the Argives.

What motivated the Corinthians to suggest such unusual arrangements? The exigencies of diplomacy do not provide an adequate explanation. Surely Corinth did not wish to keep her plans secret from the other Greek states to which she immediately repaired in the hope of persuading them to join in the projected coalition. Nor did she make any attempt to hide her negotiations from Sparta, for the Spartans were immediately aware of what had occurred. If Corinth wanted to form a new alliance why did she not announce her plans openly before the Argive people?

The answer to this question is to be found in the political conditions in the cities concerned. In Corinth the political scene had been remarkably stable since the middle of the sixth century. After the fall of the Cypselid tyranny, the government came into the hand of an oligarchy which was to rule Corinth without interruption until the beginning of the fourth century. Practically all we know about the new constitution is contained in a passage in Nicolaus of Damascus which is either corrupt or based on a misunderstanding.⁸ Busolt's interpretation, which is the best of several,⁹ is that from each of Corinth's eight tribes one *πρόβουλος* was chosen to serve on an executive board. Likewise, from each tribe nine council members were chosen, so that the total number of the *βουλή* came to eighty, seventy-two members plus the eight *πρόβουλοι*. Undoubtedly this *βουλή* is identical with the *γερονσία* mentioned by Diodorus¹⁰ as controlling Corinthian foreign policy.¹¹ It is clear, then, that the governing body

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Jacoby, *Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker* (Berlin, 1926), IIa, Fr. 60, p. 358.

⁹ *Griechische Geschichte* (Gotha, 1893), I, p. 658. Cf. Heinrich Lutz, "The Corinthian Constitution after the Fall of the Cypselids," *C.R.*, X (1896), pp. 418-19.

¹⁰ XVI, 65.

¹¹ Busolt, *op. cit.*, p. 658, and Gustav Gilbert, *Handbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthümer* (Leipzig, 1865), II, p. 87, agree that this identification is legitimate. Although Diodorus is talking about the

was small in number and that the conduct of foreign policy was in the hands of no more than eighty men. Indeed, it is not unlikely that the actual formulation and execution of policy was in the hands of the eight *πρόβουλοι* who probably only referred general policies to the *βουλή* for approval and were given a free hand as to execution.

The mildness and equity of the Corinthian oligarchy are attested by Pindar and Herodotus¹² but even more convincingly by the remarkable longevity of the regime. There must have been a harmonious arrangement whereby the two leading social classes cooperated in domestic and foreign policy. By the sixth century Corinth had become predominantly a commercial state, but the agricultural aristocracy continued to play an important part in the government.¹³ Policy was usually determined by the merchants and manufacturers who may be called the Oligarchs. The landed nobility, however, had representation on the *βουλή*, though certainly not as a majority; this group may be called the Aristocrats. The lower classes had little voice in the government¹⁴ but at the same time had little cause for complaint so long as Corinth remained prosperous. Both peasantry and urban demos prospered under the benevolent oligarchy, and there was no reason for the development of a political consciousness within the lower classes until Corinth, at the end of the fifth century, faced the economic consequences of the great Peloponnesian War.

For a period of over a century (*ca.* 550-421 B. C.) we hear of no major disagreement in foreign policy between the Aristocrats and Oligarchs. The history of the sixth century shows that in general the Oligarchs guided policy and the Aristocrats acquiesced in it. The attack on Polycrates of Samos which Corinth urged on Sparta and took a leading part in herself was launched to stamp out the piratical raids of the Samian tyrant.¹⁵ Simi-

middle of the fourth century there is no reason to believe that the function of the *γερονσία* (*βουλή*) had changed since its establishment.

¹² Pindar, *Ol.*, 13; Herodotus, II, 67.

¹³ For the importance of a landed class in Corinth from the very beginning and throughout its history, see Édouard Will, *Korinthiaka* (Paris, 1955), pp. 13, 316-19, 477 ff.

¹⁴ Plutarch, *Dion*, 53. At no time before the fourth century is there even the suggestion of the influence of the lower classes on policy.

¹⁵ Will, *op. cit.*, pp. 634-8; G. B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of his Age*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1908), I, p. 645.

larly, Corinth supported Athens in her struggle with Aegina because of the latter's commercial and naval eminence.¹⁶ In each case the motive for Corinthian policy was commercial and of no concern to the Aristocrats, yet there is no evidence that they objected. These activities, however, took place in a period of prosperity and involved no great sacrifice on the part of Corinth. At the same time the policy of the Oligarchs did not come into conflict with the major goal of the Aristocratic policy, which was friendship with Sparta.

The lodestone of Aristocratic policy, then as later, was alliance with Sparta, which provided agrarian security. The Oligarchs, opposing social change at home as much as the Aristocrats, were equally anxious for domestic stability. They, however, regarded the Spartan alliance as a useful tool to achieve Corinthian ends and were not, like the Aristocrats, unalterably committed to Sparta and the League. If they should no longer find the alliance expedient they would not hesitate to drop it.

The reason, then, for the unique arrangements for negotiating the new alliance was that the Corinthian envoys wanted to keep the negotiations secret from the Aristocratic party in Corinth. To undertake an alliance with democratic Argos at the expense of Sparta must inevitably incur the opposition of the Corinthian Aristocrats. Unlike the Oligarchs, the land-owning Aristocrats had not been seriously damaged by the war. The Corinthian territory had not been the scene of any extensive campaign and its lands had not suffered the destruction undergone by Attica. With Sparta out of the war and opposed to renewal, themselves weary with ten years of hard and fruitless fighting, the Aristocrats must surely view with disapproval an alliance with a democratic state for the purpose of renewing a mercantile war. The reason for the secrecy of the Corinthian envoys, the reason why they left Argos without striking a pact is that the Oligarchs who were carrying on the negotiations needed first to assure themselves of Aristocratic support at home. A similar situation existed in other oligarchic states (e. g. Boeotia and Megara). Any envoy from an oligarchic state who appeared before the Argive assembly ran the risk of stirring up an active opposition at home and nipping the project in the bud. One means of acquiring the necessary support would be to

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

bolster the coalition with sound oligarchies, thus removing the odium of democracy from it.

At the same time secrecy was necessary for the Argive negotiators too. They were ambitious magistrates, eager to seize the opportunity for increasing Argive power and prestige, but in their plan they were pursuing a new policy. An alliance with such oligarchies as Corinth and Boeotia was certain to encounter the opposition of ardent democrats. An open debate in the assembly would very likely put an end to negotiations before they were fairly started.

Thus, the machinery for secret application for membership in the proposed league had a threefold purpose. In the first place, it enabled states to apply, secure in the knowledge that their applications would remain secret if unsuccessful. Secondly, it made it possible for Argos to negotiate without public debate. Finally, it permitted envoys from oligarchic states to negotiate without having to face domestic criticism beforehand. Underlying the entire plan was the notion held by all parties that the chief necessity was to produce a new coalition. Each party felt that when this was done the *fait accompli* would silence opposition at home. Each hoped to direct the league into channels of its own choosing once it had been formed, but speed in getting under way was of the utmost importance.

The Argives, therefore, accepted the Corinthian suggestions and carried them out with alacrity. They chose twelve men empowered to conclude an alliance with any Greek state except Athens and Sparta. These latter states were not expressly excluded from the alliance but, unlike the others, they could not enter merely by negotiating with the Argive board of twelve. For them a vote of the Argive demos was necessary for admission. At this point we get a glimpse of the extremely complex nature of the negotiations. What had brought these states together, each having little in common with the other, some even traditionally hostile, was a common belief in the desirability of creating a third force in the Hellenic world. The nature and purposes of this force, however, were viewed differently by each party. The goal of Argive foreign policy from time immemorial had been the hegemony of the Peloponnese. She had lost this hegemony to Sparta in the sixth century and had been forced thereafter to accept a subordinate position. The situation

in 421 seemed a golden opportunity for *revanche*. Sparta was weakened by the strain of the Archidamian War and the defection of her chief ally, Corinth. Moreover, as Thucydides makes clear, the Argives were moved by the fact that their truce with Sparta was about to expire, for they saw that war was inevitable and at the same time hoped *τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἡγήσεσθαι*.¹⁷ Argos, therefore, expected that the new coalition would be directed against Sparta and hoped to use Corinth for its own purposes.

The Corinthians, on the other hand, had wholly different intentions. Frustrated by their defeats, they were eager to resume the war against Athens. Their traditional policy had been to involve Sparta and the Peloponnesian League in their behalf. In 421, however, Sparta was war-weary and a peace party was in control. It was the Corinthian plan, therefore, to create a third force in coalition with Argos. By enrolling other oligarchic states they hoped to set the tone of the new coalition and to turn it against Athens. Argos, despite the ascendancy of the democratic party, could be moved to support the Corinthian plan by the fear of isolation and by the overwhelming weight of the oligarchic allies.

Westlake sums up the situation as follows:

The Spartans would probably be ranged [in the event of a war between the coalition and Athens] on the Athenian side, but if all the principal states of the Peloponnese were brought into the Argive coalition, Sparta would be hemmed in by a cordon of enemies and would be unable, as well as perhaps unwilling, to prevent invasions of Attica and attempts to break up the Athenian empire. Whereas the Argives at present regarded the war with Sparta as the chief objective of the coalition, the Corinthians probably hoped to reduce this to a purely defensive character.¹⁸

The hypothesis behind this analysis (*viz.* that if war came Sparta would ally herself with Athens) is extremely doubtful. It was much more likely that if the new coalition should attack Athens, Sparta would join it. The sight of Argos leading such a coalition and thus taking on the role of leader of the Peloponnesians and Dorians would be too much for the Spartans to bear. Confronted with such a likelihood, Sparta would surely

¹⁷ Thucydides, V, 28, 1-2.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 416.

reassert her own hegemony rather than permit it to fall to Argos by default. This must have been the reasoning of the Corinthians from the first. The overtures Corinth was making, openly, masked her ultimate purposes. From the beginning she intended to force Sparta to reopen hostilities; the creation of a third force was only a gambit to achieve her ends.

The Corinthian negotiators, therefore, were playing a highly subtle and complex game. In forming the new coalition they found it necessary to deceive not only the Aristocratic opposition at home but the democratic faction in Argos as well. They were confident that as soon as enough oligarchic states were drawn in, the Corinthian Aristocrats would support their policy and that the presence of the oligarchic allies would serve as a check on Argive ambitions.¹⁹

It is clear, then, that both at home and abroad Corinth's first interest was to induce the oligarchies to enter the coalition as soon as possible. This need became more urgent when democratic Mantinea became the first state to ally itself with Argos.²⁰ At this point the Spartans, by no means ignorant of what was happening and quite aware that the Corinthians were the instigators of the whole affair, sent envoys to Corinth in the hope of preventing the new coalition. They charged the Corinthians with provoking the whole movement and of violating their oaths by not accepting the Peace of Nicias, since they had sworn to accept the majority decision, *ἢν μή τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ*.²¹

Thucydides' account of the Corinthian reply is interesting. He points out that the speech was made in the presence of those allies who had not yet accepted the peace, for the Corinthians had summoned them to be present. It must also be remembered that all this took place at Corinth, no doubt in the *βουλή*, so that the Aristocrats were present. The spokesman for the Oligarchs who rose to answer the complaints of Lacedaemon directed his remarks to both these groups, and his task was a

¹⁹ To undertake such a delicate task bespeaks great confidence on the part of Corinth's Oligarchs, a confidence that came from years of unchallenged and successful control of foreign policy. The skill of Corinthian diplomacy brings to mind another merchant oligarchy, equally adept in the diplomatic art and for the same reasons, i. e., Venice of the late Middle Ages and Renaissance.

²⁰ Thucydides, V, 29, 1.

²¹ *Ibid.*, V, 30, 3.

difficult one. The oligarchic allies and the Corinthian Aristocrats had both been undeviating followers of Spartan leadership and they must now be persuaded to pursue a policy openly condemned by Sparta. It is at this point that Thucydides makes a rare claim to a knowledge of the secret motives of the Corinthians, for he realizes that their purpose is deception and that their true motives are suppressed:

ἀντέλεγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἃ μὲν ἡδικοῦντο οὐ δηλοῦντες ἄντικρυς, ὅτι οὔτε Σόλλιον σφίσιν ἀπέλαβον παρ' Ἀθηναίων οὔτε Ἀνακτόριον, εἰ τέ τι ἄλλο ἐνόμιζον ἐλασσοῦσθαι, πρόσχημα δὲ ποιούμενοι τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης μὴ προδώσειν.²²

Thus, the Corinthian argument seems to have run something like this: "We have given our oaths to our allies in the Chalcidice. If we abandon them now it will be an affront to the heroes and gods. We are not unjust, but it is rather you who are cooperating with the enslavers of Greece who are breaking your oaths." In the light of this appealing argument the new coalition was made to appear as a continuation of the struggle against Athenian tyranny, as a method of keeping faith with trusting allies deserted by Spartan selfishness, not, as it really was, a mere tool of the policy of the Corinthian Oligarchs. Such an argument could not fail to impress the uncommitted oligarchies whose representatives were present. That it had its effect on the Aristocrats as well is attested by the fact that the envoys of Sparta returned home without having accomplished their purpose of putting a stop to Corinthian trouble-making.

The domestic situation sheds further light on subsequent events. After the Spartans retired, the Argive envoys who were present urged the Corinthians to put an end to delay and join the Argive league. Even at this late date, when the Corinthians had already made public their break with Sparta, when indeed Corinthian adherence to the new coalition would have helped convince hesitating oligarchies to enter, the Oligarchs delayed their decision and told the Argives to come again to their next assembly.²³ The delay can only have been caused by domestic opposition. The cleverness of the Oligarchs made it possible for negotiations to continue, but as yet the Aristocrats had not been

²² *Ibid.*, V, 30, 2.

²³ *Ibid.*, V, 30, 5.

won over to a coalition with the democratic states of Argos and Mantinea. The power of the Aristocratic party to check the ruling merchant oligarchy is nowhere better demonstrated than at this point. If the Oligarchs were to carry through their policy it was imperative that they ensnare other oligarchic states immediately.

The next state to make an overture to the new coalition was Elis. Elis, to be sure, had a popular form of government, but it was of a "moderate and stable type—a democracy consciously preserving aristocratic elements, and still more aristocratic in practice than in theory from the fact that it was based not on a close civic but on an open country life."²⁴ It belonged to the class of democracies described by Aristotle, "where the husbandman and those who have moderate fortunes hold the supreme power and the government is administered according to the law."²⁵ Such a state was not likely to alarm the conservative Aristocrats of Corinth; indeed, its agricultural nature would arouse the sympathy and disarm the suspicions of those land-owning gentlemen. The enmity of Elis for Sparta derived from a private quarrel and the Eleans determined to break with the Lacedaemonians. Significantly, the Elean envoys stopped first at Corinth. There they concluded an alliance with the Corinthians, after which they proceeded to Argos and struck an agreement with the Argives. The enrollment of Elis seems to have quieted the protests of the Corinthian Aristocrats sufficiently to permit Corinth's entry into the Argive league. The Corinthians were followed immediately by the loyal and fiercely anti-Athenian Chalcidians.²⁶

With Elis and the Corinthian allies from the Chalcidice in the fold, the Corinthians next approached the Boeotian and Megarian oligarchies, likely candidates, for they, too, were dissatisfied with the Peace of Nicias and had refused to ratify it.

²⁴ A. H. Greenidge, *A Handbook of Greek Constitutional History* (London, 1896), p. 213.

²⁵ Aristotle, *Politics*, 1292b.

²⁶ Westlake, *op. cit.*, p. 417, says, "Whenever the Chalcidians are mentioned by Thucydides in this period, they appear in close association with the Corinthians who evidently represented themselves as the champions of a people betrayed by Sparta and likely soon to be subjected to Athenian attacks."

Both, however, refused, νομίζοντες σφίσι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὀλιγάρχουμένοις ἴσσον ξύμφορον εἶναι τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας.²⁷ Disappointed but still hopeful, Corinth now turned to Tegea, a bulwark of the Spartan league whose defection would have presented Sparta with a deadly menace on her border. This was the crisis for the Corinthian Oligarchs who needed to secure more oligarchic support in the new coalition to counterbalance the influence of Argos and Mantinea. To be sure, the entrance of Elis and the allies from the Chalcidice had overcome opposition at home but only as a promise of things to come. The refusal of Boeotia, Megara, and Tegea to oppose Sparta, therefore, was a serious blow to the Corinthian scheme. As Thucydides says, οἱ Κορίνθιοι μέχρι τούτου προθύμως πράσσοντες ἀνείσαν τῆς φιλονικίας καὶ ὥρρώδησαν μὴ οὐδεὶς σφίσιν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων προσχωρῇ.²⁸

Nonetheless, one last effort was made to save the entire plan. The Corinthians approached the Boeotians again, asking them to join in their Argive alliance. They also asked the Boeotians to accompany them to Athens and procure for them the same truce which was the basis of relations between Boeotia and Athens. They further stipulated that if the Athenians were unwilling, the Boeotians should renounce the armistice and make no further truce without the Corinthians.²⁹ In the matter of the Argive alliance the Boeotians asked for a delay; they did, however, go to Athens and request the extension of the truce to Corinth. Athens, of course, refused, since to make a separate truce with Corinth would be an admission that the Peace of Nicias was not binding on the Corinthians, a position wholly untenable for Athens. Corinth must have anticipated this refusal and counted on it to bring Boeotia into the coalition. But Boeotia failed them and refused to break off relations with Athens in spite of Corinthian recriminations.

In this way the first attempt of Corinth to renew the war by forming a new coalition seems to have come to an unsuccessful end. Westlake concludes that "Corinthian diplomacy thus failed utterly."³⁰ This conclusion goes too far, as a careful investigation of the subsequent maneuvers will show.

²⁷ Thucydides, V, 31, 6.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, V, 32, 4.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, V, 32, 5.

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 419.

The Corinthian attempt to create a third force had, it is true, collapsed. Political and ideological ties with Sparta on the part of their own dissentient Aristocrats and the Boeotian, Megarian, and Tegean oligarchies had proven stronger than dissatisfaction with the treaty of peace. It was clear now that Corinth's only hope for renewing the war was to approach Sparta directly. Thus Corinthian machinations entered their second stage.

The new policy was aimed at restoring Spartan hegemony and persuading Sparta to resume the war against Athens. The first problem was one of Spartan politics, for the very ephors who had concluded the Peace of Nicias were still in office and seemed to have the support of the citizens in their peace policy. So long as they continued in power no renewal of hostilities was possible. The Corinthians, therefore, backed the Spartan war party headed by Xenares and Cleobulus which was in opposition and anxious to resume the war. We are not informed as to the part played by Corinth in influencing Spartan politics, but it is not unlikely that Corinthian prestige, money, rhetorical skill, and political acumen were put at the disposal of the war party.³¹ At any rate, in the winter of 421-420 Xenares, Cleobulus, and three ciphers who are not heard of further, were elected to the ephorate, and the first obstacle to a renewal of the war was removed.

As for the Aristocrats of Corinth, it was not difficult to win their support for the new policy. They were only too glad to rejoin the Spartan coalition and could be counted upon even to support a war, provided that Sparta led the way.

Another difficulty remained to threaten the plans of the Oligarchs of Corinth and this one by far the most serious. Although the Spartan war party and the Corinthians agreed on the desirability of renewing the war, there were unrevealed differences in the strategy each thought it best to pursue. Xenares and Cleobulus had no doubt of their ability to carry the Spartan state with them; indeed they probably viewed their election as a mandate for the war policy. Planning a new war with Athens, they

³¹ Such assistance is powerfully suggested by the close relations between the new ephors and the Corinthians immediately after the election. The plans of Xenares and Cleobulus are revealed first in secret talks with the Corinthians and Boeotians; these plans required skill and secrecy for their success. The secret talks argue strongly for the highest mutual friendship and confidence among the parties concerned. (Thucydides, V, 36-8.)

were anxious to secure themselves on the side of Argos, at least to conciliate that city, perhaps even to draw the Argives into an alliance.

The Corinthians, however, had a different view of the situation in Sparta. They were well aware that there was still strong sentiment for peace among the Lacedaemonians. Ten years of war against Athens had not destroyed the Athenian empire or deprived Athens of her revenues. The capture of the Spartan hoplites on Sphacteria had been a severe shock, and their return had been the result of negotiation, not war. The Athenians still held Pylos, a constant invitation to escaping helots. With Nicias in power at Athens it was unlikely that the Athenians would offer any irritation to arouse hostile sentiment among the Spartans. Argos, furthermore, was traditionally friendly to Athens and might well exert her influence in favor of peace if allied to Sparta. An Argive alliance would give to the Spartans, never eager to undertake an aggressive war, a sense of security which would prevent the resumption of hostilities. Experience had shown that the only thing that could move Sparta to war was fear and it was on this emotion that the Corinthians had played at the beginning of the war. Since the obvious threat was Argos, it was the aim of Corinth to bring about an estrangement between Sparta and Argos even if that should lead to an alliance between Argos and Athens. The Corinthians felt that the war party was too sanguine of its ability to persuade the Spartans to resume the war unless Spartan safety were threatened. Only by presenting an Argos hostile to Sparta did the Corinthians hope to induce the majority of the Spartans to support Xenares and Cleobulus and go to war.

Their cunning was put to an immediate test. Cleobulus and Xenares, not lacking in cunning themselves and anxious to create the most powerful coalition possible, contrived a clever scheme for putting all the uncommitted states under Spartan leadership. First, the Corinthians and Boeotians were to make an agreement; next Boeotia was to persuade the Argives to join. Finally, the Boeotians were to throw the whole group, including Argos, into the lap of Sparta.

It happened that, as the Boeotians and Corinthians were leaving Sparta, they were accosted by two Argive officials who, unaware of the Spartan plot, were anxious to bring Corinth and

Boeotia into the Argive coalition. The leaders of Argos, unlike the Corinthians, had not yet given up hope of creating a third force with their own state at its head. Mindful of their previous failure to enroll oligarchies, they implied that the new coalition would not necessarily be employed against Sparta.³² The Boeotians were pleased at this opportunity to carry out the policy just agreed upon with the Spartans. They reported the matter to the boeotarchs who were equally delighted and immediately made arrangements to negotiate an alliance with Argos.

This turn of events must have caused consternation among the Corinthians. Were this alliance to be concluded, the danger to Sparta would be removed, the war party would fail to carry the day and the war would not be resumed. To avoid this without giving away her position was now the aim of Corinth. The scheme she hit upon was simple but one that required a remarkably acute understanding, not only of the foreign policy of the Greek states but of their domestic politics as well. The account of Thucydides must be examined carefully so that its full significance may be understood:

Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ἐδόκει πρῶτον τοῖς Βοιωτάρχαις καὶ Κορινθίοις καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Θράκης πρέσβεσιν ὁμόσαι ὅρκους ἀλλήλοις ἢ μὴν ἐν τε τῷ παρατυχόντι ἀμυνεῖν τῷ δεομένῳ καὶ μὴ πολεμήσειν τῷ μηδὲ ξυμβήσεσθαι ἀνεν κοινῆς γνώμης, καὶ οὕτως ἤδη τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Μεγαρέας (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐποίουν) πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους σπένδεσθαι.³³

Although it is not pertinent to Thucydides' purpose to reveal who initiated the plan for a preliminary agreement among Corinth, Megara, and Boeotia, it is not difficult to discern the hand of Corinth. It was to her interest to prevent the projected alliance between Boeotia and Argos, while Boeotia and Megara had no reason to fortify with a formal treaty their working agreement with Corinth. The agreement by all the signatories not to engage in diplomatic negotiations without the common consent made certain that any further agreement would require ratification by all the states, including Corinth. In addition, since this treaty itself required ratification by the home governments, the Corinthians were successful in delaying the completion of the Spartan scheme.

³² Thucydides, V, 37, 2.

³³ *Ibid.*, V, 38, 1.

The Corinthians were aware that the Boeotian constitution required ratification by the four βουλαί of the Boeotians. Generally such ratification was a mere formality, and the boeotarchs anticipated no difficulty in the present instance. In these troubled times, however, the conservative βουλαί were anxious to stay in the good graces of Sparta and were wary of the tricky Corinthians. The latter were aware of the suspicions and anxieties that existed in Boeotia and made clever use of their knowledge. The boeotarchs, as they knew, did not wish to reveal that it was Sparta which had urged them to ally themselves with Corinth and, what was worse, Argos. Secrecy was, no doubt, imposed by Xenares and Cleobulus who wished to keep their scheme hidden from the Spartan peace party until the new coalition could be presented as a *fait accompli*. Much to the amazement of the boeotarchs, but quite naturally in view of the Boeotians' lack of knowledge, the βουλαί refused ratification: δεδιότες μὴ ἐναντία Λακεδαιμονίοις ποιήσωσι, τοῖς ἐκείνων ἀφειστώσι Κορινθίοις ξυνομνόντες.³⁴

The Corinthian maneuver, more than merely delaying proceedings, seemed to have ended negotiations completely. The Corinthian envoys, who were present at Thebes and remained there until ratification had been denied, now departed for home, confident that the Spartan scheme had collapsed and that the danger of a Spartan-Argive alliance was past.³⁵ As long as Sparta feared a coalition between Athens and Argos the seeds of war were likely to take root.

To understand the subsequent activities and maneuvers it is necessary to have a clear picture of the political situation in each

³⁴ *Ibid.*, V, 38, 3.

³⁵ The foregoing reconstruction of the thoughts and actions of the Corinthian Oligarchs takes for granted an unusual insight on their part into the domestic politics of the various states. It will not, however, place too great a strain on credulity to grant such insight if an analogy again be made with Venice. The Venetian diplomats of the fifteenth century often knew more about the internal political conditions of the European states than did the native politicians. The long, uninterrupted experience possible under a firm and stable oligarchy made for experienced diplomats who were keen and shrewd observers. Likewise, the information gained through commercial intercourse proved immensely valuable in assessing the political situation. The Corinthian policy was based on a close appreciation of the strength of the war party at Sparta, an appreciation which very likely was more realistic than that party's own estimate.

of the important states. Athens was divided between the peace party led by Nicias and the war party led by Alcibiades. It was to the interest of Corinth that Alcibiades should be in the ascendent, for the keystone of his policy was an alliance with Argos aimed at Sparta. Argos, too, was divided politically. After the Persian Wars Argos had become a democracy. This fact combined with the traditional rivalry for hegemony in the Peloponnese guaranteed an anti-Spartan sentiment among the democrats of Argos. The Argive democracy had recently taken the dangerous step of selecting and paying out of public funds a corps of one thousand troops to be trained as an élite military force on a par with the Spartan hoplites. This action was dangerous because most of the members of the Thousand came from aristocratic families.³⁶ The aristocrats of Argos were willing to take the lead in the rejuvenation of Argive power but not at the expense of abandoning the friendship of Sparta, the bulwark of landed aristocracy.

The Corinthian task was made much easier by the rise to power of Alcibiades. After Corinth had wrecked the alliance between the Boeotians and Megarians on the one hand and the Argives on the other, Argos became alarmed at its isolated position and offered to make an alliance with Sparta, chiefly, no doubt, at the urging of the aristocrats. At the same time, however, Alcibiades came with an offer of a treaty with Athens which offered an alternative to the democrats of Argos who readily accepted.³⁷ It is a tribute to Corinthian subtlety that even at this point the Argives asked Corinth to join the alliance with Athens. The Corinthians, of course, declined, for the need for deception no longer existed. Corinth's goal had been achieved, for Sparta was confronted with the dreaded alliance of Athens and Argos. Now Corinth could come out into the open and urge the Spartans to resume the war.³⁸

In the summer of 419 the Argives invaded Epidaurus in the hope of bringing it over to the new alliance and opening an easy water route to Athens. This played directly into the hands of the Corinthians who were eager for an opportunity to involve Sparta in hostilities. Epidaurus was a staunch oligarchy, a member

³⁶ Thucydides, V, 67; Diodorus, XII, 75.

³⁷ Thucydides, V, 40-8.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, V, 48.

of the Peloponnesian League and thus under the protection of Sparta. If the war were permitted to continue, Sparta would surely be drawn in and Athens might be involved as well. Fearing just such a possibility, the Athenian peace party called for a conference at Mantinea in a last-minute attempt to save the peace.³⁹ The Corinthians, of course, were present to make sure that the conference would fail of its purpose and the war continue, and it was the Corinthian Euphamidas who arose and remarked that it was absurd to talk peace while the armies were in the field and fighting.⁴⁰ As neither side was willing to withdraw its troops the meeting broke up. The peace party at Athens, however, did not give up hope and later persuaded the Argives to withdraw their army. The reconvened assembly, however, was still unable to reach an agreement. The envoys returned to their respective cities and Corinth was still able to keep the spark of war alive.

In the summer of 418 the Spartans marched against Argos to relieve the pressure on Epidaurus and to retrieve their waning prestige among the Peloponnesians. Here was the opportunity Corinth had been hoping and working for; she sent two thousand hoplites to serve under King Agis. At this point once again, internal politics must be the deciding factor in foreign policy. Just as the two armies were ready to come to blows in the Argive plain, two of the Argives, the general Thrasyllus and Alciphron, the latter the proxenus of the Spartans, went out to parley with Agis. Amazingly, they returned with a truce of four months duration and the battle did not take place. The agreement had been made solely by the individuals concerned, without any consultation with the Argive democracy or the Spartan council.⁴¹ The action was unpopular with both sides, for each army felt confident in its superiority.⁴² What is the explanation for such

³⁹ Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

⁴⁰ Thucydides, V, 55.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, V, 60.

⁴² Agis was severely criticized and threatened with punishment. When he promised to atone for his errors διὰ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων he was let off but was shortly saddled with a board of ten advisers to watch his movements in the future. The two Argives were stoned by the citizenry and were lucky to escape with their lives; their houses were razed and their property confiscated. (Thucydides, V, 60; Diodorus, XII, 78.)

strange and unusual behavior? Subsequent events suggest that the two Argives, certainly leaders of the aristocratic faction, promised Agis that a coup d'état was forthcoming which would overthrow the democracy and bring to power a government favorable to Sparta. Such a development would make war unnecessary and accomplish the aims of Spartan policy. Naturally, Agis could not make this information public, but the leniency shown him on his return suggests that the ephors were privy to the scheme.

Once again Corinthian policy seemed to have been thwarted and war averted. Here again, however, the activities of Alcibiades proved useful to the plans of Corinth's Oligarchs. He arrived at Argos with a thousand hoplites and three hundred cavalry, gave support and encouragement to the war party, and led an expedition against Orchomenus in Arcadia. The capture of Orchomenus infuriated the Spartans and it was at this time that they appointed a board of ten *ξύμβουλοι* as a check on Agis.⁴³ If the Spartans were angry with Agis, greater still was Agis' fury against the Argives who had embarrassed and betrayed him. At the battle of Mantinea which followed Agis raged against the Argives and would have destroyed them all but was prevented by Pharax, one of the *ξύμβουλοι* who ordered the king *τοῖς λογάσι δοῦναι διόδον*.⁴⁴ The ephors had not yet given up hope of a successful aristocratic coup at Argos which would break up the dangerous alliance with Athens and bring Argos over to the Peloponnesian League. The élite corps of aristocratic hoplites was therefore allowed to escape.⁴⁵

The calculations of Pharax were accurate, for in the winter of 418-17 the Argive aristocrats gained control of the city. Sparta's victory at Mantinea had damaged the prestige of the democrats of Argos and discredited their policy of cooperation with Athens. By sparing the aristocratic Thousand the Spartans created a situation in which their partisans possessed the only significant military force in Argos. The Spartans took advantage of the situation to lead an army to Tegea on the Argive border and dictate terms of peace. With the threat of an aristocratic army

⁴³ Thucydides, V, 63.

⁴⁴ Diodorus, XII, 79, reading *λογάσι* for *ἀρκασι* with Reiske.

⁴⁵ Thucydides, V, 78.

at home and a Spartan force on the frontier confronting them, the Argive democrats were forced to accept the proffered treaty.

Shortly thereafter, in accordance with their new commitment to Sparta, the Argives renounced their treaties with Elis and Mantinea and became, in effect, a Spartan satellite. The Argive aristocrats were rewarded for their efforts when the Spartans helped them put down the democracy and establish an oligarchic government in Argos.⁴⁶

Once more Corinthian hopes had been disappointed, but again they were favored by fortune and the political instability of the Hellenic states. Seizing their opportunity while the Spartans were engaged in the celebration of the Gymnopaediae, the Argive democrats revolted and overthrew the recently established oligarchy. The revolution was marked by the familiar slaughter and exile of the defeated party. The successful democrats immediately prepared to renew the Athenian alliance and to build long walls to the sea, a project in which they were aided by Athenian carpenters and masons.⁴⁷ The Spartans finally realized the gravity of the situation in the winter of 417-16; they summoned their allies and marched out against Argos. Conspicuous by their absence were the Corinthians.⁴⁸ They did not lend their support to the expedition because they wanted it to fail; its purpose was to restore the oligarchy and renew the Spartan-Argive alliance, the very opposite of what the Corinthians wanted: they therefore stayed home.

If the Spartans calculated on help from the Argive aristocrats they were disappointed, for their power had been thoroughly crushed and the expedition failed. Soon afterward, Alcibiades arrived in the Argolid with twenty ships and deported the remaining oligarchs. The Argive democracy was saved, and saved, too, was the Corinthian plan for renewing the war. So long as Argos remained friendly to Athens and hostile to Sparta, war was inevitable. Only a spark was necessary to set it off and the Sicilian expedition was to provide that spark.

It is clear from the foregoing account that the Corinthian diplomatic operations did not cease when the original plan of an Argive coalition failed; on the contrary, only a shift in tactics took place. After failing to lure the Boeotians, Megarians,

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, V, 82.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, V, 83.

and Tegeans into the new league, the Corinthians performed a *volte-face* and attempted directly to restore the hegemony of Sparta and to maneuver the Spartans into war. Their evaluation of Spartan politics convinced them that only the threat of an Argive-Athenian alliance could keep the war party in control. They therefore employed their diplomatic skill in preventing a coalition between Sparta and Argos which might have avoided war indefinitely. Their efforts in this direction were decisive at several crucial moments. A state of hostility was kept alive until war finally broke out. Thus, in no sense can the foreign policy of Corinth between 421 and 416 be considered a failure.

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ON THE AGAMEMNON OF AESCHYLUS.

During a reading of the *Agamemnon* certain reflections arose particularly in using the convenient edition by Denniston and Page. Some are presented in my book, *Demokratia, the Gods, and the Free World* (Baltimore, 1960), Ch. III, and others will be presented here.

Lines 385-6

The chorus, speaking of the misdeed of Paris and its sure punishment, says:

βιάται δ' ἂ τάλαινα Πειθῶ, 385
προβούλον παῖς ἄφερτος Ἄτας.

The image is that of one proposing a ruinous plan and overcoming the resistance of a demos by means of wicked persuasion. For proposing the Parian expedition which ended in disaster Miltiades was prosecuted by Xanthippus on a charge called ἀπάτη τοῦ δήμου. The one who offers the ruinous plan may be largely responsible, but the decision did not rest with Miltiades. Surely many recognized that the demos which actually made the decision was at least partly to blame. Similarly Paris himself makes the ill-advised decision to violate the hospitality of Menelaus, and Aeschylus cannot regard him as without responsibility for what he does. It is not exact to say with Denniston and Page that "the poet insists upon the helplessness of the human victim," but the poet does suggest that Bia and a certain Peitho are sometimes not very far apart. This, however, is as much a paradox as the paean of the Erinyes in line 645.

Lines 942-3

Clytemnestra has been tempting Agamemnon to tread upon tapestries such as were offered to the gods and so to commit an act of presumption and provocation. He resists; she insists. The argument ends with the following exchange:

Αγ. οὔτοι γυναῖκός ἐστιν ἱμέρειν μάχης.	940
Κλ. τοῖς δ' ὀλβίοις γε καὶ τὸ νικᾶσθαι πρέπει.	
Αγ. ἥ καὶ σὺ νίκην τήνδε δῆριος τίεις;	
Κλ. πιθοῦ, κράτος μέντοι πάρες γ' ἐκὼν ἐμοί.	943

Agamemnon: "It is not a woman's place to yearn for battle."

Clytemnestra: "But for the fortunate it is becoming even to be vanquished."

Agamemnon: "Do you really think that victory in this is worth a struggle?"

Clytemnestra: "Please! But yield the *kratos* to me willingly" (i. e. without a struggle).

For Agamemnon this means only "yield the *νίκην καὶ κράτος*" in the sense of victory (Tyrtaeus, fr. 3a), but for Clytemnestra it means also "yield the royal power to me of your own accord." Thus Agamemnon will unwittingly accept a bad omen. Apart from the double meaning I attach to the word *kratos* my interpretation differs chiefly in that with Sir Frank Fletcher I take *δήριος* in line 942 as a genitive of price or value, and thus I justify the adversative combination of particles¹ in line 943, where editors have wished to emend.

Lines 1497-9

In the traditional text Clytemnestra says to the chorus:

1497
ἀνχέϊς εἶναι τόδε τοῦργον ἐμὸν
μηδ' ἐπιλεχθῆς
Ἀγαμεμνονίαν εἶναι μ' ἄλοχον.

The really serious difficulty here, to quote Denniston and Page, "is the fact, established by Fraenkel, that *μηδέ* *connective*, 'and . . . not,' *without a preceding negative* (or equivalent) is unexampled and therefore surely impermissible."

The main difficulty and also a very curious word are eliminated if we emend *ἀνχέϊς* to *μηδείς*. Not only is alpha an easy misreading of mu, but chi is an easy misreading of a delta with its oblique stroke(s) extending ornamentally above, as often in Roman times. The sigma at the end of *ἐπιλεχθῆς* would be a consequential error due to the need of bringing this verb into conformity with the second person singular of the misreading *ἀνχέϊς*. The speech of Clytemnestra now reads:

¹ Denniston and Page comment: *μέντοι . . . γε* is regularly adversative . . . , and it is hard to see what room there is for opposition or contrast between *πιθοῦ* and *κράτος* κτλ." None whatsoever. The contrast lies between *δήριος* and *πάρες ἐκών*. Sir Frank Fletcher, *Notes on the Agamemnon of Aeschylus* (Oxford, 1949), p. 49, though right about *δήριος* in line 942, missed the point of line 943 because he did not grasp the double meaning of *κράτος*.

μηδεὶς εἶναι τόδε τοῦργον ἐμὸν . . . 1497
 μηδ' ἐπιλεχθῆ
 Ἀγαμεμνονίαν εἶναι μ' ἄλοχον.

"Let no one after consideration say that this deed is simply mine and that I am simply the wife of Agamemnon."

Line 1662

After the murder of Agamemnon Aegisthus enters confidently and among other things he announces (lines 1638-9) "From this man's wealth I shall try to rule the citizens." He clearly expects to be accepted as king, but the chorus of old men greet him with words of insult and contempt. He is about to order his troops to draw and charge the old men, when Clytemnestra appeals for an avoidance of further bloodshed. He desists but (with exclamatory infinitives) says indignantly:

ἀλλὰ τοῦσδ' ἐμοὶ ματαίαν γλώσσαν ὦδ' †ἀπανθίσαι† 1662
 κάκβαλῆν ἔπη τοιαῦτα δαίμονος πειρωμένους.

Denniston and Page comment "ἀπανθίσαι: another unsolved problem. 'Cull the flowers of a foolish tongue,' Sidgwick, but then ἐμοί is hard to interpret. ἀκοντίσαι (Wakefield) gives a good sense but is too far from the tradition." Rose is inclined to emend to <ἐ>πανθίσαι, which is equally unnatural.

Surely the infinitive is ἀπαντήσαι, and the real but absurdly inappropriate word ἀπανθίσαι, which means "cease to flower," reflects an error of dictation or of simple iotacism.

Every student of Greek institutions is familiar with the ἀπάντησις² or ὑπάντησις of a visiting notable, whereat the city brings out representatives of all its groups and corporations and even images of the gods to greet him officially. The first appearance of a new king constitutes just such an occasion.³ Aegisthus,

² That ἀπάντησις rather than ὑπάντησις is the proper Attic term seems indicated by the formulaic language of Athenian ephebic decrees: Agora I 128 of 127/6 B.C. (O. W. Reinmuth, *Hesperia*, XXIV [1955], p. 228), lines 10-11, ἐποίησαντο δὲ τὴν ἀπά[ν]τησιν τοῖς ἱεροῖς, and Agora I 5912 of 116/5 B.C. (B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, XVI [1947], p. 171), lines 13 and 18, ἐποίησαντο δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπάντησιν τοῖς ἱεροῖς . . . ἀπήντησαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις τοῦ δήμου Ῥωμαῖοις, and *I.G.*, II², 1028 of 101/0 B.C., ἐποίησαντο δὲ καὶ τὴν ὑπαπάντησιν τοῖς ἱεροῖς . . . ἀπήντησαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις τοῦ δήμου Ῥωμαῖοις, and *I.G.*, II², 1030, ἀπ[ήν]τησαν δὲ τοῖς φίλοις [κα]ὶ συμ[μά]χοις.

³ On late and mediaeval developments see Ernst H. Kantorowicz,

who had hoped to be greeted with acclamations as the new king, exclaims bitterly:

"But that these men should receive me thus with an idle tongue and fling out such words, putting their fate to the test!"

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LIBANIUS, *DE SOCRATIS SILENTIO*, 35.

The received text (V, p. 144, lines 1-4 Foerster) reads:

ἔρωτῶσί τι Σιμμίας καὶ Κέβης ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς. μηδὲ ὑπὲρ τούτου
λέγει; ἀλλ' Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ Ἀθηναῖος
σιωπᾷ;

As it stands there is no point. The change of one letter provides one. For ἀλλ' Ἀθηναῖοι read ἀλλὰ Θηβαῖοι. The antithesis and irony are now clear. For the nationality of Simmias and Kebes see e.g., Burnet on Plato, *Phaedo* 59 C 1.

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"The 'King's Advent' and the Enigmatic Panels in the Doors of Santa Sabina," *The Art Bulletin*, XXVI (1944), pp. 207-31.

REVIEWS.

W. D. Ross. *Aristotelis Topica et Sophistici Elenchi*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1958. Pp. viii + 260. \$4.00. (*Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis*.)

Sir David Ross has offered us a new critical edition of the *Topica et Sophistici Elenchi* (hereafter *TSE*). We may hope that it will revive study in these very neglected yet important works of Aristotle, works which may be, as it has been recently suggested, "vraiment ce qu' Aristote dit d'eux, son travail logique le plus original, le plus utile, le plus fondamental, à l'intérieur duquel la méthode des *Analytiques* se distingue, comme méthode particulière, de la méthode générale sans laquelle la première serait à la fois incompréhensible, et inapplicable."¹ As a part of the *Organon*, a work which had an early and an extended use as a school text in the West, it is indeed surprising that the *Topics* and the *Sophistici Elenchi* have survived in a text tradition which is still one of the most secure among Aristotelian works as both Bonitz and Ross acknowledge. This is especially true in the light of the substantial misunderstanding of the character of both works.² Historically the *Organon* as a logical corpus begins possibly with Andronicus (some would place it later between the end of the third and the end of the fifth century) but the *Topics* has always commanded the attention of the ancient world. Evidence for this might be gathered from the fact that it is the one piece from the *Organon* to which reference is made prior to Andronicus (Cicero's comment on its presence in Sulla's library and his own composition of a *Topica*) and the fact that it was one of the pieces selected for an extended commentary by Alexander.

With the exception of a papyrus fragment (109b 7-14, ca. A. D. 100) our Greek sources for the text of the *TSE* date from about A. D. 900 on and include over 100 manuscripts. Only a very small part of this Greek tradition has been examined thus far. From this source Ross uses the major manuscripts as found in Bekker and later enlarged by Waitz and used by Strache-Wallies (hereafter SW) in their Teubner edition. Other Greek sources include the Aldine *editio princeps* (1495) and the Greek commentaries, paraphrases, and scholia of Alexander (*Top.*; ca. A. D. 200), John Italos (*Top.* 2-4; 11th c.), ? Michael of Ephesus (*SE*; 11th c.),

¹ E. Weil, "La place de la logique dans la pensée aristotélicienne," *Revue de Métaphysique et Morale*, LVI (1951), p. 294.

² Cicero's *Topica* does seem to have no more in common with Aristotle than its title, and some think it unlikely that Cicero ever read Aristotle's work. In view of the fact that we have no evidence that the *TSE* were read in Latin between ca. 524 and ca. 1115-30 Minio-Paluello suggests that this eclipse of Aristotle's *Topics* until the beginning of the 12th century might be owing to the mistaken notion propagated by Cassiodorus that Cicero's work was a translation of Aristotle's, as well as the popularity of Boethius' two works connected with Cicero's *Topica*: his commentary on it and his *De differentiis Topicis*.

? Sophonias (*SE*; ca. 1300), Leo Magentenius (*Top.*; 14th c.).³ Of these Ross uses Alexander, Michael, and Sophonias.⁴ Because of the time lag he does not consider the authority of the last two very great. But Strache notes correctly that there may well be places where they have preserved the ancient evidence (e.g. *passim*: 170b 17, 177a 21). Further Ross would agree with Buhle, Waitz, and Strache that the lemmata of Alexander are of small value since written by a later hand. Ross cites them infrequently. On the other hand the quotations and interpretations of Alexander and Michael are more important and are used by Ross as they were by SW. The readings of Alexander when they can be definitely ascertained obviously possess much value because of their antiquity. In this regard it might be said that Ross' edition, as that of SW, is based primarily on the Byzantine tradition (i.e. the best MSS), but Ross does take into consideration and more successfully so in places (e.g. 111a 16, 181a 17 λέγοντι vs. SW λέγοντα with codd.) what has been called the "neoplatonic tradition" (i.e. the commentary of Alexander and the translation of Boethius). The Arabic sources in the form of translations date from about A.D. 900, or relatively contemporary with our two oldest manuscripts A and B and have not been used in this edition.

Every new critical text ordinarily is the result of some new contributing factors. Ross' edition, it would seem, results from a re-evaluation of the role of the four major manuscripts, a new study of three manuscripts, and an extensive use of a new collation of Boethius' translation of our two works which has been made by L. Minio-Paluello.

In the first place Ross believes that the oldest manuscripts A (*Vaticanus Urbinas* 35) and B (*Marcianus* 201), both of which belong to the same family, possess practically equal authority. Bekker, as we know, preferred A whereas Waitz (who also collated AB), Strache, and Colli favored B. Ross uses Bekker's collation of AB, yet in view of the fact that he has apparently worked with our text from at least 1927 we would assume that his judgment on the parity value of AB is the result of careful study. In any event it is nicely confirmed by a study Minio-Paluello has made of these MSS and the others used by Ross, a study based on the translation of Boethius.⁵ Another significant point made by Ross is to advance the

³ An account of these may be found in Strache-Wallies, pp. xiii-xix.

⁴ Alexander and Sophonias agree more often with the MSS C c u than with A B (see below on these MSS); Michael agrees equally with both groups.

⁵ In general for the work of Minio-Paluello see *C. Q.*, N.S. V (1955) and XXXIX (1945) and the bibliography there cited; see also *Traditio*, VIII (1952), *App.* II of "Jacobus Veneticus Grecus." As Minio-Paluello would arrange the stemma on the basis of the collated Greek texts (including Ross' new collation of D and u) and Boethius' translation there were two hyparchetypes of *TSE* deriving from the archetype (α). One of these texts (hyparchetype β) is represented in a rather pure form by Δ (Δ = the Greek text underlying the Latin translation of Boethius) and by D (*Top.* 5-8), the other (hyparchetype γ) by B and A. The other manuscripts including D (*Top.* 1-4 and *SE*) shade off from these two families and represent varying degrees of contamination between the two. With a slight change in Minio-Paluello's arrangement

stature of another group of MSS. Owing to the age and mutual agreement of AB it was long thought that they possessed more authority than the other manuscripts. Ross believes, however, that two other main groups of manuscripts which he establishes as Ceu and D + Boethius ("Boethius," i.e. the Greek text underlying the translation of Boethius and identified by the *siglum* Δ) are almost as important. In fact all three groups may be considered "of fairly equal importance." The primary basis of this judgment is presumably Ross' new collation of C and u by microfilm (Waitz collated C only here and there) and D at Paris. In the light of his present evidence Ross does not believe that Ceu and D + Boethius constitute two distinct and separate families.⁶ Further he indicates the agreement on readings among certain members of these manuscripts by the use of a relatively new form of *sigla*; thus B = reading of A B, C = Cu, D = DA. This new evaluation of the MSS has enlarged the possibilities of our text⁷ but has not substantially changed its reading.

In the course of the work on our text the discovery of the true identity of our D manuscript was made. It was known for some time (Waitz, Torstrik, Strache) that no MS in the Coislin collection contained the readings which Bekker attributed to D, least of all *Parisinus Coislinianus* 170 as he identified it. Recently Père Saffrey discovered that Bekker's readings of D were those of *Parisinus* 1843 (13th c.). From his study of this manuscript and the work of Minio-Paluello Ross concludes that this manuscript, though comparatively late, is of major importance. For it gives us (for the *Topics* at least) a manuscript which presents rather accurately the readings of a codex older than Boethius.

This naturally brings up the question of the Latin sources of our text. All of them originate ultimately in Boethius' translation of the *Topics* and *Sophistici Elenchi*.⁸ The use of such translations as

of the D manuscript (his account is somewhat confusing) the relationship of our MSS as he views them might be set forth thus: A D(*Top.* 5-8) → u D(*Top.* 1-4; *SE*) C etc. ← A B. One point of significant importance here is the new value attributed to our D manuscript by Minio-Paluello. From a comparison of a series of passages in D with the translation of Boethius wherein Boethius time and again agrees with D over B (especially in the *Topics*; it is less striking in *SE*) he came to the conclusion that the D manuscript represents another codex older than Boethius. Owing to the exigencies of the tradition in the Oxford series, Ross while acknowledging the occasional importance (Intro., p. viii) of the *codices recentiores* cites them rarely. Of these Tfo belong to the group Ceu (with o possibly copied from u); NPi agree about equally with AB and Ceu.

⁶ *Mélanges Diès* (Paris, 1956). This article which presents a good part of the material now found in the concise and complete introduction of the Oxford text speaks of "three families" (p. 217). Ross, however, with whom Minio-Paluello would certainly concur, now believes that he cannot with any certainty divide this second series of MSS into two families (Intro., p. vii).

⁷ Cf. *passim* 113a 23, 126a 32, 33, 34 with SW on the use of C.

⁸ That we have the translation made by Boethius has been shown by the work done by Minio-Paluello (see note 5 for bibliography). An established text of the translation has not yet been published among

an aid in establishing the original text which underlies the translation is not new. Two things are obviously of the utmost importance: the competence of the original translation, and, of course, the quality of the text of that translation from which the editor works.

In the first instance the competence of the translation will clearly determine our certainty with respect to the reading of the original text. In this regard Boethius appears to have been a very careful and literal translator of the *TSE*. His method is characterized by Minio-Paluello as one "of a religious faithfulness to the words of his original. His sacrifice of Latin usage . . . is such as to give us almost a Greek text in Latin letters." Indeed Boethius' principle would appear to be that of his comment on *Cat.* 4b 34-5: "ne quid deesset, etiam hoc quod Latinam orationem minus esset conveniens transtuli."⁹ In other words if we assume that the method of using the translation is subjected to critical criteria¹⁰ we have reason to believe that with the careful translation of Boethius we have a way into the Greek text underlying his Latin, particularly in details of some interest. This is not to deny that some problems will always continue to exist, and they are readily admitted by Minio-Paluello who prepared the collation of Boethius used by Ross.¹¹ Thus there are many areas of minor detail (some of which could affect the substantial statement and so become major) where the Greek text cannot be reconstructed, e.g. use of tenses and moods, word inversion, omission of particles, etc. Again the elliptical character of Aristotle's language may on occasion cause the translator, just as the commentator, to add a word or phrase by way of explanation which is not found in his Greek text.¹²

the texts of the Union Académique Internationale. In the course of his studies on the problem of the translation of Boethius Minio-Paluello has fairly well established the following facts. (i) The medieval 'vulgate' edition which is at present found in Migne is Boethian in origin and is not by James of Venice. Actually it is the Basle edition of the works of Boethius published in 1546 and 1570. As such it is in fact a reprint of a 1502 revision of Boethius made by Jacques Lefèvre; since some of the revision uses the Greek of the Aldine edition as source material the translation is not genuinely Boethian although Buhle and Waitz considered it to be such and so used it. (ii) The 'vetusta translatio' of the *Organon* discovered by Buhle and also used by Waitz is a 1481 edition which is again Boethian, and is not by some 'vetus interpres' different from Boethius as Buhle and Waitz believed.

⁹ Thus it does not seem an insurmountable problem for a good Aristotelian trained in this area to get, for example, from "abstinere disputationis sophisticæ" to ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἀγωνιστικῶς (167b 14).

¹⁰ Minio-Paluello has said of his own work with translations that one must expend much care "di vagliarne l'attendibilità, di determinare i limiti precisi entro cui sono utilizzabili, di vedere che cosa pensino di traduzioni siffatte, per la ricostruzione dei testi originali, i molti editori della Bibbia, di testi giuridici, medici, grammatici, filosofici, teologici."

¹¹ See *Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione* (Oxford, 1949), pp. xvi-vii; *C. Q.*, XXXIX (1945), p. 69, N. S. V-VI (1955-56), p. 111.

¹² Thus in our text at 150a 33 Boethius adds to ἀλλ' ἐν ἑτέρῳ τὸ δλον καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ τὰ μέρη: "nam in quo totum in illo partes esse videntur." Yet this criticism urged by some should not cause us to question the value of the translation any more than the commentary for there are many areas where one would obviously expect an interpolation by Boe-

In view of the possible value of such a translation it is but right to ask about the quality of the Latin text of Boethius which was used in the preparation of our text. The task which faced Minio-Paluello in constituting a Latin text was a rather formidable one of about 250 MSS and a dozen incunabula. From these he selected and used the oldest known and best MSS, compared these with several later ones, and in selected passages with a number of English, Italian, Austrian, and German MSS of both works.¹³ From the recognized excellence of his own edition of the *Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione* and the competent study of the text of *TSE*, partial though it is, one feels assured that the collation he placed at Ross' disposal is rather definitive. Among other things an important result of his work has been to show that about half the "Boethian" readings cited by SW are wrong.¹⁴ At 128b 22, for example, Wallies reads correctly one would say: τοῦ πρὸς ἕτερον ἰδίου ἀποδιδόμενου against the codd. citing Boethius as the source. Ross who accepts this reading now identifies it as the reading of Wallies for he is able to show that Boethius read with the codices.

The importance of this translation of Boethius as an aid in constituting the text of the *TSE* in addition to the ordinary resources of our MSS and commentaries has been recognized for some time¹⁵ and is readily exemplified. For if we are able to get at the Greek text which underlies the translation of Boethius (written ca. 510) then we possess a Greek copy which is about four centuries older than any surviving Greek manuscript and also quite probably equally older than the Greek manuscripts underlying the Arabic translations,¹⁶ and older than all of our commentaries save Alexander. There is no older evidence of our text than Boethius' translation with the exception of the papyrus fragment and the readings quoted and discussed in Alexander. We have, then, through Boethius testimony of a good Greek text (A) antedating our earliest MSS. Furthermore this text A has given Ross grounds for attributing new value to D (*Parisinus* 1843) as representing another manuscript of great antiquity. These new elements together with Ross' new collation of C u D give to his edition importance and authority.

thius and one is not found, e.g. at 114b 37 one might have expected Boethius to have added, if anything: magis et minus: τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον.

¹³ Ross, *Introd.*, p. vii gives the codices used by Minio-Paluello for this collation; for Minio-Paluello's estimate of them see *C. Q.*, V-VI (1955-56).

¹⁴ Strache actually collated the 1546 reprint of Lefèvre's 1502-03 revision of Boethius' translation. I myself chose at random the first five from among the critical passages which Wallies called into question. In three of the five Ross is able to give evidence from Boethius for a reading favored by Wallies (101a 37, 102b 12), or correct a reading ascribed to Boethius by SW (101b 36). In the other two instances (102a 33-5, 102b 23) SW and Ross read the same Boethius.

¹⁵ Buhle and Waitz saw it, and it was this Strache had in mind when he made his comparison of Boethius' translation with the available Greek evidence. See also Solmsen, "Boethius and the History of the Organon," *A. J. P.*, LXV (1944), p. 74.

¹⁶ There may be a Greek text ca. 650-700 for the *SE* used as the basis for two Arabic versions of this work.

It is but right, however, on the appearance of a work like this to make a more specific inquiry and ask where it may supersede its predecessor, the Teubner edition of Strache-Wallies.

There are 112 larger critical passages in *TSE* which Wallies when he took over the task of editing Strache's work for publication considered in need of correction. In all but 50 of these passages our present text agrees with SW.¹⁷ In the places where Ross disagrees with Wallies the change is frequently a minor one in which Ross may favor the MSS over the *citatio* or *paraphrasis* of Alexander accepted by Wallies (e. g. 110a 5, 111a 3, 132a 13, 132b 30-1; and sometimes the procedure is reversed, e. g. 111a 16). Or again the disagreement may arise in Ross' preference to read with the MSS rather than with the commentators, or Boethius, or a suggested emendation (e. g. 122b 37-9, 128b 17, 153b 32, 168b 2, 170b 36, 178b 12, 15, 25, 180b 5). And sometimes the change from SW is not one that would be looked upon with disfavor by Wallies (e. g. 111a 16, 114b 38, 121a 36-7, 129a 26, 133b 4-5, 135a 18, 166 b 26, 167a 22, 176a 30 [where Ross reads with A], 183a 12). In other instances where Ross reads with Wallies he will frequently give more accurate evidence for his reading (e. g. 118b 15, 123b 12, 176b 34 [this last Wallies offers as a conjecture but Ross cites the paraphrasis of Michael; the value of A to Ross may also be seen here]). In other places also Ross' apparatus is at times more complete (e. g. 134b 16).

The conclusion to be drawn from this would appear to be that we do not have in our present edition, nor should we expect, a substantially new or different text. Rather we do have a more precise and exact text, grounded carefully in the tradition of both text transmission and critical scholarship. In this last regard a sign of Ross' care is his general acceptance of sound and valid emendations suggested by various scholars of the text (e. g. Bekker, Bonitz, Trendelenberg, Gohlke, Waitz, Diels, Poste, Imelmann, Zeller, Pickard-Cambridge, Colli), and his incorporation together with MS evidence of readings which were once suggested (e. g. 115b 26 [Shorey], 175b 39 [Richards]). There are a fairly good number of emendations suggested by Wallies which Ross accepts, all of them helpful and good (e. g. *passim*: 106b 5, 113b 15, 114b 3, 133a 12).

This brings us finally to Ross' own emendations of the text. As has been said, both Bonitz and Ross agree that the relatively good condition of our text precludes the need for much emendation. For Bonitz the main areas calling for emendation would center about the use of the article, and the repetition or loss of a word or words at places with like beginnings or endings. For Ross the problem is fairly much the same with one or two additional areas: the frequent confusion between $\delta\tau\iota$ (that) and $\delta\iota\acute{o}\tau\iota$ (because), e. g. at 134b 10, 13 read $\delta\tau\iota$, but at b 8, 11, 19, 22 read $\delta\iota\acute{o}\tau\iota$ (this occurs in a number of places a few of which were suggested originally by Bonitz, e. g. 133b 36, and above 134b 10, 13); again Ross has noticed

¹⁷ Aside from the passages immediately cited in the text as examples Ross reads differently from Wallies at 101b 36, 102b 23, 112a 13, 125b 26, 126b 29, 136a 34-5, 139b 35, 140a 11-2, 142b 33, 154b 7-9, 157b 30, 170a 38, 171a 20, 24, 172b 18-9, 173b 19-20, 174a 36, 174b 36-7, 177b 2-4, 178b 12-3, 33, 181a 16-7, 181b 28, 36, 182a 1-2, 183a 21, 25-6, 183b 1-2.

that when Aristotle is stating two opposed alternatives he exercises great care to maintain the same word sequence in stating the alternatives, e. g. at 103b 34 read λέγει with D u by reason of its presence at b 32 (thus too it seems that at a place like 122b 38 Ross would read with the codd. and not bracket with SW); finally for Ross the logic of the passage or Aristotelian usage may suggest the need for emendation.

In general in over 100 emendations introduced by Ross (over half of them in the *Sophistici Elenchi*) it would appear safe to say that his approach is conservative, governed by Aristotle's general usage, and the question of clarity, concinnity, and good Greek. In this last regard an editor of a work such as the *TSE* is at a distinct disadvantage in many ways, for it is always extremely difficult at times to determine what precisely Aristotle would have written. Frequently he is faced with what are disfigurements which are difficult to apprehend since they do not affect the sense and are not of necessity clearly contrary to Aristotelian usage. At 173b 20, for example, Aristotle could well have written *πῶλῃς ἄρρεν ἐστίν*. That he did write more accurately *ἄρρενα* is certainly questionable. On the other hand there would be no question about the character of the emendations at such places as 125b 26: τῷ μὲν <τὸ> ἀνδρείῳ τῷ δὲ <τὸ> πράγῃ εἶναι, 142b 33: <δ> τοῦ γράψαι ἢ <δ> τοῦ ἀναγνῶναι. A substantial number of Ross' emendations (almost half) concern themselves with correct Greek and good Aristotelian usage, and as one would expect from a scholar of Ross' discernment and intimate acquaintance with the text of Aristotle these emendations are pointed and precise (*passim*: 139a 11, 175b 4). Another group (about one quarter) are suggested either by the apparent logic of the text (*passim*: 115a 16, and a particularly pertinent one, it seems, 170b 24),¹⁸ or in some instances were seen by others but not quite in the same light (*passim*: 157b 30, Ross is more clear but see Wallies' conjecture; compare 182b 20 κατωνομένον with Einarson's οἰνωμένον *A. J. P.*, LVII [1936], p. 332). There is a third group of emendations which appear to be discriminating contributions of Ross to our understanding of the text: 109b 2, 118b 32 (there is no συμφερός), 133a 16, 135b 5, 137b 10, 154b 1, 154b 9, 171b 30, 173b 19, 174b 37, 176b 20, 177b 3, 178a 34, 179a 5 (can one read with MSS?), 179a 19, 179b 21, 181b 28. There are three passages which Ross obelizes: 137a 16-18, 137b 2, 173b 5-7. A decision with or against Ross is difficult, for the passages can and have been argued both ways. The same may be said of the one larger passage which is bracketed: 132b 3-7. In places such as these one always has in mind Wallies' com-

¹⁸ These decisions are not easy to make. Even when one has a fairly secure text doubt can enter: e. g. at 105b 1 Ross once thought that we should read κατὰ τέχνην with uA rather than κατὰ τέχνας his present reading with the codices. In this regard I would like to suggest a point which by now it should be obvious I have followed in this review: until scholars do more work upon the substantial content of the *TSE*, argument and disagreement about text readings established on good, critical norms seem unfair and unjustified. Final discussion on readings can only come when we possess a more thorough knowledge of the character and the role of this work in Aristotle's thought, a task yet to be accomplished.

ment on 126b 29 where Ross brackets a phrase as did Bekker and Waitz, namely, that the style of the *Topics* would not prevent the presence of these words here. On the other hand it may be said in conclusion that it does appear that *Parisinus* 1843 may well have preserved the correct reading at 178b 33: οὐδ' ὅταν τὴν κύλικα πίνη and that there is no need to emend; and could one not read προσκατασκευάζεται with B D c M^c Δ at 183b 1?

In the light of what Ross has given to us in his new text and the amount of effort and labor expended upon such a recension the following *errata* should be understood in the spirit in which they are mentioned: easily corrected oversights. Those mentioned here were come upon by the way and are not the result of special inquiry. With the use of the bold face characters B C D it seems likely that confusion will occasionally arise. The instances I noted are a confusion of the C font at 128b 30, and the D font at 127a 9, 133b 5 (ἐκτέρω D; ἐκότερον D), 146b 23. At 135b 1 D Δ is written for D. The following type of error when it occurs is disconcerting since we cannot tell who is correct without a look at the MSS: at 123b 24 Ross reads: καὶ + εἰ C and we know that he has read C. This is also found in the apparatus of SW, e.g.: "post καὶ add. εἰ C." Still we know that both Bekker and Waitz in their apparatus have ἀλλὰ εἰ καὶ C, and Wallies also read C in this way when he made a study of this passage (*Philologus*, LXXVIII [1923]). Again at 129a 28 Ross' reading of the B manuscript is wrong or Bekker, Waitz, SW are wrong; since Ross took his readings of B from Bekker it would seem that Ross is wrong. Certainly the reading οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις ἢ B C (see SW) makes more sense (although this would not prove its correctness) than Ross' οὐκ εἰ ἄλλοις ἢ. At 139b 35 if we accept Ross and his reading of C then Bekker, Waitz, Wallies are wrong in their reading of C as τὴν instead of τὸν. At 182a 2 where does Ross' ροικὸν come from in both the text and apparatus? Strictly speaking it could only be from B but B omits it. Further there is much divergence on the MS ascription in Ross, SW, and Waitz, e.g. SW: ἐνθα μὲν . . . ραυβὸν (κοῖλον B) σημαίνει Bcfi: om. ACDuBoStr., while Ross has: ἐνθα . . . ροικὸν (κοῖλον B) σημαίνει BA: om. ADeu. Mistakes of small importance noticed in passing are a wrong reading of Wallies' conjecture at 174b 36: read οἶον ὁ for οἶον ὁ, the omission of a parenthesis to conclude the parenthetic remark begun at 181b 34—probably to end at 35 ἐπιστήμη, and *exemplio* of apparatus at 137a 8.

In conclusion Ross' text in the logic and clarity of its punctuation is much superior to anything we have at present. This is exemplified throughout the work wherever one turns. An example of its general character may be seen at *passim*: 100b 1 ff., 138b 30 ff., 166a 26, 174b 2 ff., 180a 36 ff. The volume concludes with an index of the more important words.

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- R. E. SMITH. *Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army*. Manchester, University Press; New York, Barnes and Noble, 1958. Pp. vii + 76. 10s. 6 d.; \$2.50. (*Publications of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Manchester*, No. 9.)

This slim volume makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of an important problem. Superficially at least the Roman army in this period is a familiar subject, excessively so some may feel. Caesar and his legionaries are the Romans with whom most of us first became directly acquainted, and even the most casual students of the Late Republic are likely to know something about the part the armies came to play in Roman politics. From the time of Sulla the Senate found it difficult to control armies and their commanders, not always but often enough for the consequences to be disastrous. This situation was part of larger social and constitutional changes and problems, but though one cannot explain the fall of the Republic simply by the nature and conduct of the legions, one certainly cannot understand it while ignoring them. As a rule students of the period are, quite naturally, concerned with the dominant political class and the great individual figures, but obviously leaders require followers. Sulla, Caesar, and the others could not have marched on Rome if their legions had not been prepared to follow them. It is essential to know who the officers and men were and on what conditions they served. With good reason, Professor Smith believes that some assumptions and statements commonly repeated are misleading or wrong, and he seeks here to provide a more correct and adequate account.

In Ch. I Smith describes the character and gradual transformation of the army in the second century B. C., ending with the reforms of Marius. These resulted in an essentially professional army, in place of the citizen militia described by Polybius. It was recruited primarily from *proletarii* (though this is a statement requiring qualification) and was no longer broadly representative of the citizen body, in particular of the propertied classes. In Ch. II he presents evidence to show that during the period 100-48 B. C. standing armies of about 14 legions in all were maintained in the provinces, in addition to the armies raised for emergencies and major wars. Ch. III deals with length and terms of service, and Ch. IV with methods and sources of recruitment. The continuation of the *dilectus* deserves mention. Ch. V discusses the officers, and Ch. VI is a brief statement on the extent and significance of Augustus' military reforms. In general Smith regards these as less original than they are usually represented. Augustus did not introduce the conception of a standing army, though increasing its size to avoid the need of emergency armies. As regards length and terms of service, he merely rationalized the situation existing in the Late Republic.

The study is meant to be useful to both beginning students and advanced scholars. There can be no question about its value for the first group. They have here a clear, intelligent, and agreeably concise account of the questions discussed, one that is better as well as more convenient than any that they could discover elsewhere. Those who have already read, e. g., Gabba's articles in *Athenaeum*

(1949, 1951), Suolahti's *The Junior Officers of the Roman Army in the Republican Period*, or Premerstein's discussion of oaths will naturally find less that is new, but Smith's remarks on many points are original and valuable. Perhaps the two most important sections are those concerning the standing army in the Republic and the officers. Both deserve comment.

As regards the first, Smith is right in insisting on the importance of permanent provincial garrisons, whose existence is often ignored. It seems likely, however, that these legions were even more often under-strength than he is prepared to concede on the basis of Cicero's complaints from Cilicia (pp. 24, 26). The lack of adequate evidence gives rise to a series of problems. As Smith reconstructs the situation, the position of legionaries in provincial garrisons seems far less attractive than that of those in emergency armies; they would seem to be almost an inferior category of troops, like the later *limitanei*. They served longer terms (usually at least 16 years) with much less prospect of booty. He assumes that they received land or money on discharge, as did Sulla's or Pompey's veterans. This would have been just and may be true, but the efforts required, for instance, before Pompey could obtain anything for his men make it seem rather doubtful whether the principle of veterans' benefits had been firmly established for those in a weaker position to exact them. For many veterans, too, land in the provinces would not have seemed equivalent to land in Italy; it is clear that many wanted to go home. Smith has interesting suggestions about men recruited or settling in the provinces. Obviously the whole subject deserves more study, but Smith has done much more than raise important questions.

A second major point is that many military tribunes, prefects, and legates were essentially professional officers, at any rate not amateurs preparing for a political career. This is clearly true; Suolahti and others have made the same observation, less fully and consistently. Many officers can be shown to have served for long periods without having gone on to higher offices. Again, if there were usually at least 14 legions, the 84 military tribunes, not to mention the prefects, could not all become magistrates, nor presumably would there have been available enough young men of well-established senatorial families to fill so many posts. On the other hand, it is possible that more sons of leading families still served as junior officers than Suolahti and Smith conclude. The evidence is very incomplete, but it would appear that a high proportion of those whose full career is known did do so, as e. g. Caesar and Cato. One result of the expanded armies of the Civil Wars would be that such men reached higher commands quickly with fewer preliminaries. Also, it seems likely that there was even a stronger distinction between the 24 *tribuni a populo* (these being largely from senatorial families) and the others than Smith suggests (p. 62), one approximating the more rigid distinction between the *lati clavii* and *angusticlavii* of the Empire.

Some of the difficulties in making generalizations about these matters may be seen if we consider the following statement, which I believe is substantially correct (p. 62): "There are many examples even from the comparatively few names known to us of men who never advanced beyond the position of 'legatus' to embark on a

political career and probably had no wish to do so, many of them from comparatively obscure families where an army career seems to have become traditional." To begin with, it is often difficult in the Late Republic to distinguish between war and politics or military and political careers, and one wonders whether examples scattered over 35 years or so all fall in one pattern. But more disturbing than general reflections is the scrutiny of the 16 names chosen to illustrate the statement (n. 5). Two were killed in battle; two were executed by Sulla as political enemies, being fully involved in politics; a fifth was put to death precisely because he wanted to become consul. In all these cases (and possibly as many more) sudden death and a lost cause are a better explanation of failure to embark on or continue a political career than lack of interest or modesty. A sixth example, Labienus, also died in battle, having joined the losing side. He had been politically active as *tribunus plebis*, and his desertion to Pompey probably had political motives. Three other men are last heard of during campaigns which they may not have survived. Again, it is hardly correct to describe the family of C. Marcius Censorinus as comparatively obscure, and it is rather narrowly exacting to speak of C. Memmius' "politically undistinguished family" (p. 63), though of course he was not a *nobilis*. Resisting the temptation to quote Lucretius, one can reasonably assume that Memmius would have sought higher offices, with good prospects to become at least a *praetor*. He fell in battle serving under his brother-in-law Pompey against Sertorius. C. Volcatius Tullus may be a good example. Still, with two Volcatii Tulli consuls in 66 and 33 and presumably closely related, one would like positive reasons for thinking he had no political ambitions. Nothing is known about P. Annius except that he carried out a notorious political execution; as a compromised supporter of Marius his choice of careers may have been rather limited, to say the least, after Sulla returned, if he survived that long. Comments and qualifications could be made about some of the others. Obviously there is difficulty in framing new generalizations to replace old ones which have proved to be faulty. In the last decades of the Republic changes were so rapid and so irregular that it is safer and perhaps usually more illuminating to make analyses of particular groups and situations than to devise formulas to apply to a whole half-century, though they are needed too.

Some scattered points may be noted briefly. Grants of land to veterans were not finally abandoned in 13 B. C. (p. 52). The figure for annual retirement from the legions under Augustus involves at least two dubious or false assumptions: that men were always released after 16 years and that all who enlisted survived to be discharged (p. 73). At some point in the chapter Smith might well have mentioned the *auxilia* and other non-legionary forces. It is not clear why he is sure Labienus had not been *praetor* (p. 64, n. 1). In the same note the hyphenated Kromayer-Veith become one man. Not many will agree that the Augustan army was unnecessarily large for the ordinary demands on it (p. 71), and if the compromise he suggests (n. 3) had been made, why need the reserves have been kept in Italy, or in any one location?

It would be wrong to end on a negative note or to appear to stress

doubtful conclusions. This is a stimulating, valuable study, deserving to be widely and closely read. (Since it will be read and not simply consulted, the lack of an index is less regrettable.) Most surely would prefer to have it now in its sometimes sketchy and tentative form than to wait indefinitely for an expanded, more exhaustive version. As for the inevitable unsettled problems, Professor Smith could contribute as much to their solution as anyone else if he chooses.

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MICHEL B. SAKELLARIOU. *La migration grecque en Ionie*. Athènes, 1958. Pp. xx + 568; 5 maps. (*Collection de l'Institut Français d'Athènes*, 17; *Centre d'Études d'Asie Mineure*, 10; *Ionie* 1.)

This book is the first volume of a projected series on Ionia to be published by the *Centre d'Études d'Asie Mineure* of the French Institute, Athens. It was conceived originally as part of a general study of Greek migration in the Late Bronze Age, but discussion of the whole movement is reserved for later treatment and here Sakellariou offers an extremely thorough and minute analysis of the evidence for the migration to the Ionian region of western Asia Minor. The legends and traditions of migration, the filiation of Ionian religious beliefs and cult practice, of social organization and of dialect are considered with the available evidence of archaeology. All this material is organized, rather repetitiously, around four main topics: 1) the geographical origin of the colonists, 2) their ethnic origin, 3) the time of the migration, 4) the condition of western Asia Minor before and during the colonization. Frequent summaries of conclusions and a final summation of results keep the thread of argument reasonably clear. Sakellariou's general view of the evidence is that the legends are almost wholly later fiction, particularly the canonical tradition of antiquity, which told of a single, organized expedition from Attica to Ionia under the leadership of the Codrids in the eleventh century. The "facts" necessary for his conclusions are found primarily in the local Ionian traditions of ethnic and religious filiation. Despite this approach the net result is curiously like a restatement in modern terms of the canonical view of antiquity, both as to the ethnic character and the time of the main migration.

The process of colonization is described as a long-drawn-out movement over five centuries, with its beginning in Mycenaean times, *ca.* 1400 B. C., and continuing well into the ninth century; the period of greatest activity, however, on Sakellariou's own showing, was in the displacement attendant upon the Dorian invasion as successive waves of refugees fled from Greece. In the Mycenaean period itself there was no colonization from the great centers such as Mycenae, Pylos, Sparta, Orchomenos, and Iolkos; at this time the migrants came from the poorer districts, such as Arcadia and Aetolia, or were

refugees from the destruction of Thebes (ca. 1400?), coming in small numbers. In Ionia they found Cretan (Minoan) settlers at a few places, Miletus, Claros, Samos and Chios, and an unorganized, unaggressive native population identified by Sakellariou as Leleges rather than Carians. He argues, too, against the localization of Hittite control in Caria, Lydia, and Mysia. This coastal region of western Asia Minor was by-passed by the invaders of the twelfth century, which both allowed continuity of the Greek settlements in Ionia and made them a haven for the refugees from Greece. In the wake of the Dorian invasion they came directly from the Argolid and Pylos and indirectly from Boeotia by way of Athens (Athens' part is reduced to a minimum). During this same period the Carians appeared from the interior of Asia Minor to subdue the Leleges and contain the Greek migration. Following upon this main influx of population from Greece there were stragglers throughout the ninth century forced out by the growth of population on the mainland. Thus, historical Ionia was created by those settlers who came in the Late Mycenaean period, the refugees from the invasions, and the late stragglers. While the point is obscured by Sakellariou's detailed treatment of the local Ionian traditions and his emphasis on the non-Ionian elements among the settlers, he evidently considers that the area of settlement became *Ionia* (i.e., conscious of its own Ionian ethnic character) primarily because of the post-Dorian migration from the Argolid, Boeotia, and Pylos (p. 494): "l'élément ionien fut sans doute le plus importante au point de vue numérique, mais aussi le plus ferme, avec son organisation tribale et sa fête gentile des *Apaturia* . . . cet élément a fini par s'imposer aux autres dans les territoires qui devaient être appelés plus tard du nom d'Ionie." Despite the evidence, both literary and archaeological, for some Greek settlement in the Mycenaean period, Ionia's faithful retention of the Helladic traditions as represented in epic poetry seems to be the product of a refugee migration and the new Ionia was built largely on their continuance by this predominant group of settlers. Such was the implication of the canonical tradition of antiquity although expressed in its own terms of Greek historiography—a single expedition, founders from the great Mycenaean houses, and the like.

A very great amount of careful work has been devoted to the book, but, on the whole, its value is largely that of a compendium of the evidence and of the scholarly work on it, essentially bibliographical with many acute observations and thorough discussion. To the reviewer the author's conclusions about the primary filiation from Late Helladic Greece of significant ethnic and religious elements in Ionia seem very dubious. How surely can small ethnic groups and their movements be identified as belonging to pre-Dorian and not post-Dorian Greece? Perhaps there is some information to be derived from the Mycenaean inscriptions, but Sakellariou's basic work was done before their decipherment. Much of the literary evidence of the traces of such elements in Ionia is to be found in material as late as or later than that in which the canonical legend of migration is set. It is salutary to remember that Ionia experienced a second founding, after its eclipse in the Athenian Empire, in the fourth century and Hellenistic period. That time was fertile

for the renovation and invention of tradition, not only for its older families of Ionian descent, but for new settlers from Greece and native areas of Asia Minor. Similarly, the ethnic picture of western Asia Minor in the Late Bronze and Early Iron Age is rather arbitrary in the almost complete lack of archaeological evidence. The material from Old Smyrna is not published in detail and the picture of Mycenaean Miletus expands and changes with each season's excavation. Can we accept Sakellariou's view of a peaceful development of the Greek settlements there, when recent excavations indicate the destruction of the Mycenaean fortification wall? What are we to conclude when Sakellariou reduces the Athenian share in the colonization of Ionia to virtually nothing, but a strong Athenian influence is noticed on early Ionian (and Aegean) Protogeometric pottery? When he ascribes the growth of Ionia not only to the immigration of a numerically strong and cohesive Ionian element among the colonists but also to the imposition of their institutions after settlement on the other inhabitants, yet argues—on very flimsy evidence—against the secondary colonization of the northern Ionian towns from primary centers in Ionia, and against the traditions of war and conflict in Ionia? It would be invidious to multiply points of disagreement and interpretation over the scanty and difficult evidence and repetitious to repeat argument from the reviewer's own study of early Ionia, which appeared after the publication of Sakellariou's book. We are indebted to the author for his painstaking collection and study of the literary evidence of the migration; for that it will be necessary to consult the study. The main conclusion does, however, seem to involve a contradiction. Historical Ionia, with its strong emphasis on Helladic tradition, can hardly be accounted for by emphasizing the insignificant non-Ionian elements among the colonists and by an insistence on the peaceful continuity of indigenous growth from *ca.* 1400 B. C., when it is also admitted that the strong Ionian element came in the eleventh century from the former great Mycenaean centers. Of course, the specific historicity of the canonical legend of migration cannot be proved, and much of it can be disproved, but its implication accounts in part for the traditions of epic poetry. The evidence of local development in Ionia after the migrations is just becoming apparent from excavation. Perhaps from that will come a different approach to this problem—in terms of understanding the institutional and cultural growth of Ionian Greece, not in the virtually meaningless terms of uncertain ethnic designation.

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MNHNHΞ XAPIN, Gedenkschrift Paul Kretschmer. Edited by Heinz Kronasser. Two volumes. Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz; Wien, Brüder Hollinek, 1956 and 1957. Pp. vi + 236; xl + 256.

The two volumes of this Festschrift were originally intended for Paul Kretschmer's ninetieth birthday but unfortunately he died (on March 9, 1956) only a few months before that date. It is the third time such a Festschrift has been assembled to honor this veteran scholar during his long and productive life. A detailed account by Richard Meister of Kretschmer's professional career, followed by a list of his many publications, appears at the beginning of the second volume (II, pp. vii-xl); it offers a useful summary of Kretschmer's activities and skillfully delineates the various points of view which he successively expounded during his lifelong study of the earlier phases of Indo-European linguistic history. What is astonishing and heartening is the vigor displayed by Kretschmer in his extreme old age. When I used to see him in Vienna in the years immediately following the war, he was hard at work on a whole series of special studies, and his truly extraordinary powers of combination were undiminished. He led an active life and was keenly interested in many fields of endeavor over and above his favorite linguistic pursuits.

Kretschmer would have been pleased at these two well-printed volumes with their excellent indices. The fifty-one contributors deal with a host of special topics drawn from many branches of linguistics; a short article by Johannes Sundwall on Italian fibulae (II, pp. 157-8) is the only exception, and this may serve to recall Kretschmer's constant exploitation of archaeological evidence for linguistic purposes. Both volumes are remarkably free of typographical errors.¹

In a collection as extensive as this, it is naturally neither possible nor worthwhile to discuss more than a fraction of the articles. Perhaps the best is to divide them up into the principal categories and dwell upon the more important contributions.

A very few articles are devoted to questions of general linguistics. Thus Otto Höfler, "Nachahmung und Spontanentfaltung von Sprachneuerungen" (I, pp. 158-74), considers the transmission of linguistic changes among the Germanic peoples. He rejects the "Wellentheorie" in favor of simultaneous but spontaneous innovations which

¹ The following may be cited, however: I, p. 15, line 22, read *ἀγανᾶς* (incidentally, the citation must be in error since no such form occurs in the *Odyssey* at π 33; is this a slip for φ 289?); I, p. 62, line 2 from bottom, read *peut-être*; I, p. 63, line 12 from bottom, insert period; I, p. 68, line 6, read *Pap. Weill*; I, p. 69, line 9, read *οὐ* and line 18, *a pu*; I, p. 94, line 17 from bottom, read *In greco*; I, p. 96, line 20, read *naturale*; I, p. 117, presumably, all occurrences of **μεθυρός* on this page should have asterisk; I, p. 166, line 9, omit extra footnote number; II, p. 69, line 11, read *ἀπορίη*; II, p. 75, note 22, line 5, read *whatsoever*; II, p. 103, line 11, read *they* and line 27, read *this is a*; II, p. 106, line 5 from bottom, read *incompetent*; II, p. 164, note 18, line 3, read *the*; II, p. 194, lines 5 and 6 from bottom, transpose punctuation; II, p. 200, line 12, read *voiced*.

were favored by a general cultural unity. There is to my mind something most irrational and unscientific in Höfler's concept of a "pre-established harmony" in accordance with which, mysteriously, like siblings in a family, the separate Germanic tribes were bound to develop their dialects along parallel lines. Höfler has treated this problem in greater detail in three articles which appeared in *Beiträge zur Geschichte d. deutschen Spr. u. Literatur*; see a detailed criticism by George S. Lane in *Language*, XXXV (1959), pp. 315-21. Ernst Locker offers some brief remarks on analytical and synthetic languages ("Augenwasser und Süß-Salz," II, pp. 15-18), which include the questionable assertion that speakers of the more analytical languages (French, English) have the greatest difficulty learning and understanding a language of synthetic type. Piero Meriggi attacks the much vexed problem of defining the sentence ("Zur Satzfrage," II, pp. 40-8). In contradistinction to John Ries, who thought its most decisive characteristic was "Beziehung des Vorstellungsinhalts zur Wirklichkeit," Meriggi prefers to say, "die Gestaltung dieses Inhalts ist es, die den Satz ausmacht." In other words, Meriggi defines the sentence traditionally in terms of content and meaning; while granting some validity to such non-semantic factors as phonetic patterns, he criticizes what he calls "the behavioristic school of Bloomfield" for defining the sentence in exclusively functional terms. Joshua Whatmough, "Homogeneous Turbulence in Language" (II, pp. 199-201), suggests that coexistent phonemic patterns (like the rivalry of *f* and *h* in many contexts) arise when two languages are in contact or one language is in a state of disequilibrium. An article by Ladislav Zgusta on the incorrectness of the principle of binary digits in phonemic analysis (II, pp. 220-6) takes sharp issue with a recent article of E. Colin Cherry, Morris Halle, and Roman Jakobson, "Toward the Logical Description of Languages in their Phonemic Aspect," in *Language*, XXIX (1953), pp. 34-46. Basing himself, rather oddly, on his own analysis of the Cyprian dialect of ancient Greek, Zgusta contends that these authors have insufficiently defined the phonemes of a language (in their case Russian) by the presence or absence of a series of eleven characteristics, since so many of the phonemes neither have nor lack the required characteristics (i.e. they are merely indifferent in respect to nasality or the like). He argues that such a binary system of analysis is not effective since phonemes are perceived by the speaker rather as complexes of relevant positive characteristics.

A number of the contributions which deal with philological topics must be passed over rapidly here. Franz Altheim in his "Retractiones" (I, pp. 1-9) disputes convincingly R. Pfister's claim to find meter in certain Etruscan inscriptions (see Pfister's article in the Ferdinand Sommer Festschrift, *Corolla Linguistica*). Helmut Th. Bossert continues his valuable detailed explanation of the Phoenician-Hieroglyphic Hittite bilingual inscription of Karatepe (I, pp. 40-51). Rudolf Hanslik offers textual and philological comments on the *Regula Benedicti* (I, pp. 146-53). Herbert Koziol, writing on the contaminations of homonymous words and related matters in English (I, pp. 181-8), cites many examples all too familiar to the student of English etymology; unfortunately, he seems to lump together many authentic contaminations with some howlers scarcely

countenanced by educated speakers or writers of the language. He cites with approval a remark of Mario Pei that even "professional writers" do not always observe the distinction between *complement* and *compliment*, *principal* and *principle*: one can only wonder what meaning, if any, the term "professional writers" has in such a context. Wolfgang Krause compares the nominal *-ant* suffix of Hittite with the *-nt* plural formants of Tocharian, following a line of enquiry initiated by Benveniste (I, pp. 189-99). Krause, like Benveniste, thinks these formants are related, although he admits that the Hittite examples have collective force (or in some cases intensive force) while the Tocharian examples (like the Luwian ones, which however differ in other respects) indicate plurality. Heinz Kronasser comments on a number of items of Hieroglyphic Hittite vocabulary (I, pp. 200-10).

Emmanuel Laroche, "Notes de Toponymie Anatolienne" (II, pp. 1-7) takes a topic raised initially by Kretschmer, the Anatolian place names in *-assos*, *-assa*, *-issos*; in Luwian there are adjective derivatives in *-assa*-, *-assi*- which function like a gentive case form. Laroche has collected over seventy of such place names from Hittite sources and concludes that the Luwian usage is not their only origin. Fritz Mezger discusses with a wealth of citations the various Germanic words meaning "judgment, verdict, Urteil" (II, pp. 62-8). In his "Note on 'Heroic' Land Tenure" (II, pp. 69-77) Leonard R. Palmer hazards a number of ingenious assumptions which seem to rest on fairly shaky foundations (e.g. Mycenaean *ke-ke-me-na* is *κεκεμένα* 'shared land' which Frisk, s.v. *κείμαι*, calls "sehr unsicher"; cf. also a comment on Palmer's theories in Ventris-Chadwick, *Documents*, pp. 233-4). Vittore Pisani, "Zu Sappho 104 L-P., 120 D" (II, pp. 78-82) suggests a new series of readings to resolve the crux in Sappho's famous lines about the evening star. He wishes to read *φέρεις* in this fragment as a non-thematic present participle (**φερενς*) and reads *φέρεις* twice in the second line; both these readings are very unlikely, the second particularly so if Denys Page is right in saying that the syllabic augment is never omitted in Sappho (*Sappho and Alcaeus*, p. 328). Bernhard Rosenkranz discusses the textual tradition of an Old Prussian vocabulary (II, pp. 113-17). Emil Vetter, "*ire* und *fuisse*" (II, pp. 194-8), proposes to derive Osc. AMFRET from AM-F(e)RET, not AMFR-ET, and similarly for Umbr. AMPREHTU; this view is evidently not shared by the most recent editor of the Iguvine Tables, James W. Poultney (see *The Bronze Tables of Iguvium*, pp. 295-6). Vetter finds evidence for a suppletive paradigm in Umbrian comparable to the late Latin use of *fui* as perfect to *ire*. Friedrich Wild analyzes the significance for German phonetic development of a series of place names listed in a travel account by the Englishman, Sydnam Poyntz (II, pp. 202-12).

Many of the papers are devoted to etymology and some invite more detailed comment.

Émile Benveniste handles the IE words meaning 'winter' and 'snow' (I, pp. 31-9). Among other problems, he discusses the semantic relation of Skr. *snih-* 'be sticky' to Eng. *snow* and its congeners, arguing convincingly for a basic meaning 'coagulate' as deduced from various Sanskrit texts. Hermann Hirt once sug-

gested (*Die Hauptprobleme der indogerm. Sprachwissenschaft* [Halle/Saale, 1939], p. 22) that the basic meaning linking these words was 'moisture'; see now an amplification of Benveniste's discussion by Oswald Szemerényi, *Glotta*, XXXVIII (1959), pp. 121 ff.

Wilhelm Brandenstein, "Arice" (I, pp. 52-60) discusses several topics, of which the most interesting is a retouching of his previous etymology of the Iranian name, *Sataspes*. He interprets this, not as 'owning a hundred horses' but as 'one who is like a super-horse' (i. e. a sort of hundred horse-power horse). While he may be right in concluding, on the basis of ancient statistics, that the ownership of a mere hundred horses was no great attribute for a mighty prince, one wonders if it is not simpler to retain the traditional meaning with the added assumption that "a hundred" is an indefinite term for some vast number of horses.

Pierre Chantraine, "Les mots désignant la gauche en grec ancien" (I, pp. 61-9) surveys the history of these words in his usual thorough fashion and finds that *σκαίος* early became limited to its metaphorical sense; *λαίος*, probably Doric, was never widely used outside of military contexts; the euphemism, *ἀριστερός*, had the widest use in Attic-Ionic and persisted, winning out over a rival euphemism, *εὐώνυμος* (and, one might add, in modern Greek continuing to triumph over a modern rival, *ζεργός*).

Wilhelm Havers offers some remarks on the Latin words *gratus*, *grates*, *gratulor* (I, pp. 154-7) in which he sees an original religious terminology arising from the basic concept of 'praising'; *gratulor* was originally used only of thanking the gods.

Johann Knoblauch valiantly tries to provide an etymology for the 15th century German term *Nobiskrug* 'hell' (I, pp. 175-80) as an Italian oath *nabisso* (<Lat. *abyssus*) *ed orco*, whence **nobis adorca*, in which the first half gave a term for 'devil' (*Nobis*) and the second was related by popular etymology to Prov. *dorca* 'jug.' This is of course purely speculative; Kluge-Götze denies that *Nobis* could come from *nabisso*.

In his article on the etymology of Gk. *ἄνθρωπος* (I, pp. 211-26), Franciscus B. J. Kuiper tries to prove that this word is originally pre-Greek, as is the gloss *δρωψ*. *ἄνθρωπος* Hes. Both words exhibit variations (nasalization, prothesis) as might be expected in borrowings. It is certainly true that other attempts to etymologize this word have not been widely accepted. Kuiper wisely does not mention A. J. Van Windeken's "Pelagic" etymology (from IE **ant-* 'breath' comparing *ἄνται*. *ἀνεμοί* Hes., although this latter may more reasonably stand for *ἄηται*, cf. *ἄηται* in Sappho).

Václav Machek in his article, "Graeco-Slavica" (II, pp. 19-26) offers several interesting new equations between Greek and Slavic: *γαλήν* 'weasel' and Lower Sorbian *kořica* 'weasel' (Machek has no explanation for the difference in initial sounds except as indicating a borrowed word); *κλέδης* 'thief' and the Slavic root *kradō krasti* 'steal'; *παλεύω* 'decoy' (in hunting) and Slovak *poľovať* 'hunt'; *ἀρουρα* 'arable land' Lat. *arvum* and **orl̥ji* 'a field or area.'

Gustav Maresch neatly etymologizes Etruscan *avil* 'year' (II, pp. 27-8) as a borrowing from Doric-Aeolic **ἀφέλιος* 'sun,' despite some semantic difficulties.

Manfred Mayrhofer analyzes Gk. ἀσκός 'goatskin bag,' for which many untenable etymologies have been proposed (II, pp. 36-9). Although ἀσκός in Homeric usage shows no trace of initial digamma, he thinks there was one in view of the Boeotian name φασκωνδας. He derives it with fair likelihood from IE **uer-* 'cut up' as from **ur-sk-o-s*, with simplification of **φαρσκός* to **φασκός*.

With the two Greek etymologies proposed by Walter Steinhauser (II, pp. 152-6) we are back in the realm of uncontrolled fantasy. He makes the gratuitous assumption that Gk. θάλαττα originally meant 'salt water' (why? the meaning 'sea' is no guarantee for this semantic analysis), then finds a compound of "Pelasgic" **pal-* (<IE **sal-*) 'salt' with "Pelasgic" **atta* (< IE **aq^hiā*) 'water.' The "Pelasgic" **pal-*, he claims, has affinities in Illyrian (although cf. Pannonian *Saldae* cited by Pokorny in *I. E. W.*).

Paul Tedesco, "The Sanskrit and Middle Indian Words for 'Sinew'" (II, pp. 182-7), argues most convincingly that Sanskrit once possessed a form **snāvrt-* (replaced by *snāvan-*), a congener of IE **snēwrt-*, evidence for which is deduced from the analysis of Middle Indic.

A. J. Van Windekens proposes in his article, "Deux mots latins d'origine préitalique" (II, pp. 213-19) to derive Lat. *cibus* 'food' from the IE root **g^hiu-* 'life' (cf. Gk. βίος) in the sense of 'means of subsistence'; he further explains Lat. *corbis* 'basket' as related to Gk. κύρβις 'pyramidal tablet' and κυρβάσια 'pointed hat' on the basis of IE **ger-* 'turn, roll.' One may dismiss these etymologies confidently especially if, like the reviewer, one finds the "Pelasgic" hypothesis completely unscientific; incidentally, if Hjalmar Frisk rejects it *in toto*, as seems likely, there appears to be little reason for including etymologies of this sort in his Greek etymological dictionary.

I turn now to other articles on various themes. Hermann Ammann discusses Homeric usage of simple, non-compounded Greek verbal adjectives in -τός (I, pp. 10-23). These are of two types, called here quasi-participial (κεστός 'embroidered') and potential (φυκτός 'avoidable'). He concludes that the majority of the Homeric examples of the first type are technical expressions denoting the making of various commodities.

Nikolaus Andriotis discusses *Amredita* compounds in ancient and modern Greek (I, pp. 24-30), particularly dwelling on the curious frequency of such compounds in the dialect of Apeiranthos (Naxos); this village is cited as Apyranthos in a fascinating article by Demetrius J. Georgacas on ancient Greek terms surviving orally (I, pp. 114-29). Georgacas more than adequately traces *methira* 'large wine jar' (Naxos) from ancient μέθυ, and homonymous but of different origin *methira* 'snake' from **μυθήρας*, a variant of Aristotle's μυοθήρας 'mouse-catching snake.'

Both Albert Debrunner and Ferdinand Sommer have contributed solid studies of ancient Greek usage. Debrunner treats of δέγμενος, ἐσπόμενος, ἄρχμενος (I, pp. 77-84); Sommer discusses νέως (a textual variant of νέος at κ 172) and the form κρέα (II, pp. 142-51).

It lies outside my competence to do more than mention Björn Colinder's article rejecting the assumption that there are Lappish and

Finnish loanwords from Germanic which antedate the Germanic sound shifts (I, pp. 70-6). So also for Gerhard Deeters' speculations concerning the etymology of the Caucasian **Ιβηρες* (I, pp. 85-8).

Giacomo Devoto, in a closely-knit but highly speculative article (I, pp. 93-9), discusses the slaughter of the aged, which O. Schrader considered a general European practice. He tries to connect ethnographic evidence with such linguistic testimony as the disappearance of IE **sen-* 'old' in Germanic (without commenting on Goth. *sineigs*, *sinista*, etc.) and Slavic, or the Germanic semantic shift whereby the derivatives of IE **mrt-* 'death' come to mean 'murder.' Ernst Pulgram, "Names and Realities in Prehistoric Linguistics of Italy" (II, pp. 99-108), is also interested in weighing ethnic and linguistic evidence, especially where they diverge. Fritz Schachermeyr uses mainly historical and epigraphic evidence to determine who the various "sea-peoples" of the Near East were (II, pp. 118-26).

Ernst Fraenkel has collected much material on the shortening of compounds in the IE languages (I, pp. 100-6) although in many cases the phenomenon to which he refers is rather a specialization of meaning, e. g. when Gk. *σπαγός* 'sparse' came in late Greek to mean 'beardless' ('sparse' in reference exclusively to the face).

A particularly valuable study is Johannes Friedrich's analysis of the relationship among Hittite, Hieroglyphic Hittite, Luwian and Palaic. He sees a closer tie between Luwian and Hieroglyphic Hittite, a less close tie between Hittite and Palaic (I, pp. 107-13).

Otto Haas (I, pp. 130-45) derives the Greek adverbs in *-δα*, *-δην*, *-δον* from an IE suffix **-ia* seen in Sanskrit absolutes in *-ya* (*hasta-grhya-* 'grasping by the hand'); the *d* element of these words is said to have first developed from *i* after *b* (*σπλήβδην*, although not in Homer, is the best example). Haas cannot really establish this dubious phonetic development and, despite his claims, a formant or suffix **-do* is a much more likely hypothesis. Nonetheless, his analysis of Homeric usage of these forms is of considerable incidental interest: the marked difference between *Iliad* and *Odyssey* might shake any but a convinced Homeric Unitarian. Another suffix, IE *-iko-* *-ika-* occurring in river names is analyzed by Anton Scherer (II, pp. 127-37).

Jerzy Kurylowicz discusses the double representation of IE *ei* (>*ie*, *ei*) and *oi* (>*ie*, *ai*) in Letto-Lithuanian (I, pp. 227-36). He points out that *ie* is commoner in primary forms and *ei* or *ai* in derivative forms and believes that an originally accentual differentiation has been transformed into a conveniently identifiable morphological differentiation.

Anton Mayer's useful article on the chronology of Latin nouns in *-er* (II, pp. 29-35) supplements Ernst Risch's on the oldest Latin word for 'son' (II, pp. 109-12) which Risch sees in Lat. *puer* (< **putlo-* under influence of *gener*, *socer*).

Weriand Merlingen wrestles once more with such equations as Skr. *kṣam-* Gk. *χθών* 'earth' to decide against Brugmann's famous assumption of an IE *b* (II, pp. 49-61). He suggests that what is involved is varying treatment of a sound group like *-tp-* or *-tk-*. This may be on the right track but some difficulties have been pointed

out by T. Burrow, *J. A. O. S.*, LXXIX (1959), pp. 86 ff., notably the lack of intrusive -s- in Indo-Iranian for the group -tk- (cf. Skr. *atka-* 'garment').

Edgar Polomé, "Germanisch und Venetisch" (II, pp. 86-98) gives us one of the most important contributions. On the basis of an elaborate critique of recent opinions, he concludes that the Venetic evidence does not suffice to establish a closer relationship between Venetic and Germanic.

I should like to close with two articles of particular interest dealing directly or indirectly with Linear B materials. Antonio Tovar (II, pp. 188-93), noting that several Achaean traits can already be glimpsed in Linear B documents, e.g. -pi comparable to Epic -φι, regretfully concludes, despite his own theory of Greek migration, that the attempt to isolate Attic-Ionic traits has been less successful (cf. Ventris-Chadwick, *Documents*, p. 74). Oswald Szemerényi's article, "The Greek Nouns in -eus" (II, pp. 159-81) gives an extraordinarily ingenious explanation of this puzzling and productive category. He points out that "Mycenean Greek" shows over 200 formations in -eus, hereby establishing its antiquity, and claims -eus represents *-esus and is thus identical with Hom. *εύς* 'good' (cf. Hitt. *assus*); *ιερεύς* would be for *ιερά εύς* 'good at (expert in) sacrifices.' There remains the difficulty that this does not fully account for the oldest and commonest forms, *βασιλεύς* and perhaps the name *Atreus*. Nonetheless, I mention this article last because to my mind it is the best of all, which is to say a great deal.

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CATULLUS AND OVID.¹

1

That Ovid knew and admired the poetry of Catullus is not in doubt. He takes him as the type of the poet who has brought renown to his birthplace:

Mantua Vergilio gaudet, Verona Catullo;
Paelignae dicar gloria gentis ego.²

In his elegy for Tibullus he depicts Catullus and Calvus as welcoming the young laureate to the land of the shades:

obvius huic venias, hedera iuvenilia cinctus
tempora, cum Calvo, docte Catulle, tuo.³

The epithet *doctus* is also applied to Catullus by Lygdamus and Martial; it may be alluded to by Horace; at any rate it does not seem original with Ovid.⁴ In the light of this passage, and Propertius' inclusion of Catullus in the list of his predecessors,⁵ it is a little curious that Ovid does not mention him either in his early answer to Envy, or his later autobiographical poem to Posterity.⁶

¹ I cannot find that this theme has been much discussed. Zingerle, *Ovidius u. s. Verhältniss*, I, pp. 35 ff. has a useful collection of "echoes." I would like to express my gratitude to my colleague Mr. H. F. Guite for much helpful criticism. The errors that remain are my own.

² Ov., *Am.*, III, 15, 7.

³ *Ibid.*, III, 9, 61.

⁴ Lygd. [Tib.], III, 6, 41; Mart., I, 61, 1; VII, 99, 7; Hor., *Sat.*, I, 10, 19.

⁵ Prop., II, 34, 87.

⁶ Ov., *Am.*, I, 15; *Trist.*, IV, 10. He appears in *Trist.*, II, 427.

The explanation may be, as Rand suggests, that Catullus was not technically an elegist; we know that Quintilian does not so account him, though it is difficult, reading the 76th poem, to understand on what technical grounds he was excluded from the succession. It is possible, however, that his omission was more personal. After all, the autobiography only professes to deal, with the possible exception of Gallus, with poets whom Ovid knew or might have known in his lifetime. The poem from the *Amores* is more of a catalogue of predecessors. The selection is decidedly odd, and more might have been made of it in evaluating Ovid's approach to poetry. Among the Greeks he mentions Homer, Hesiod, and Callimachus, but not Sappho (too unbridled?), Simonides (too moralizing?), or Pindar (too obscure?); Sophocles, but not Aeschylus (again too obscure?) or Euripides (reformers were not in Ovid's line); Menander but not Aristophanes (polish preferred to vigour); and Aratus. The Romans are Ennius and Accius, Varro of Atax, Lucretius (Que fait-il dans cette galère? It is hard to discern an affinity between Lucretius and Ovid. But Ovid seems to have admired crude grandeur in Romans and polish in Greeks; he had a philosophical streak in him; and he may at one time have had Epicurean sympathies), Vergil, Tibullus, and Gallus. No Plautus or Terence, Propertius or Horace.

In fact, when Ovid was forming himself as a poet, Catullus attracted him for his love-themes, but not for his technique. In his younger days Ovid was not a learned poet. It was his studies for the *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti* which brought in myth as a significant element in his writing. Martini has shown that this period of his life marks a change in his approach to poetry.⁷ He is now picking up the work of the *neoteri*, for in undertaking simultaneously the elegiacs of the *Fasti* and the epyllia which make up the *Metamorphoses* he was bringing to the Rome of his day the two principal *genres* of Alexandrianism. Now parallels of treatment between his work and that of Catullus become more frequent. We may instance the use of the *παραδείγμα* or *exemplum*, which is found in the Theognis corpus.⁸ This use of parallels from Greek legend to establish a point was essayed by Catullus with notable success in the Laodamia theme in his

⁷ Martini in 'Επιτύμβιον H. Swoboda dargebracht (1927), pp. 165-94.

⁸ E. g. 1123-8, 1287-94, 1345-50.

long letter to Manlius.⁹ Ovid did not however take it straight from Catullus; it was mediated through Propertius.

In detailed technique they were poles apart, and it does not appear that Catullus had any influence upon Ovid's versification. Catullus' verse, though at times extremely skilful, is a different sort of medium of expression from Ovid's. Except perhaps in his hexameters he did not seek formal perfection. The poet who could produce as a pentameter

quam modo qui me unum atque unicum amicum habuit,

even though we can see that the harshness of the verse deliberately matches the harshness of the sentiment, was not likely to commend himself for his verse-form to the elegant Ovid. Modern taste has not always accepted this view, and Walter Savage Landor could write many years ago: "Those whose ears have been accustomed to the Ovidian elegiac verse, and have been taught at school that every pentameter should close with a dissyllable, will be apt to find those of Catullus harsh and negligent. But let them only read over, twice or thrice, the twelve first verses (*sic*) of this poem, and their ear will be cured of its infirmity. By degrees they may be led to doubt whether the worst of all Ovid's conceits is not his determination to give every alternate verse this syllabic uniformity." In truth, Catullus is a romantic poet, Ovid a classical, and this judgment, based on their approach to form, is seen to be true of their approach to matter also. There is nothing in Ovid, who can when he chooses give an admirable quiet description of a countryside, to compare with the romantic fervour of

montium domina ut fores
silvarumque virentium
saltuumque reconditorum
amniūque sonantum.¹⁰

Where the poets come together is that each is, in his way, a moral and political nonconformist. The point has not always been taken; once made, there is no need to labour it:

ille ego nequitiae Naso poeta meae.¹¹

⁹ Cat., 68, 73-86 and 105-30; cf. 65, 13-14.

¹⁰ Cat., 34, 9-12.

¹¹ Ov., *Am.*, II, 1, 2.

Ovid in fact uses Catullus as an instance of a poet of moral laxity, whose morals were reflected in his verse.¹² On the political side Catullus was a notable critic of Caesar's rise to power; Ovid refused to use his poetry as the instrument of the moral didacticism of the Augustan régime, and was, however accidentally, somehow implicated in a movement of opposition to the emperor.

2

The third section of Catullus' published works, the more epigrammatic elegies, have left little trace upon the surviving works of Ovid. This does not determine for certain their influence upon Ovid, since we know of works by him in this genre which have not survived, and a line quoted by Quintilian:

cur ego non dicam, Furia, te furiam?

is reminiscent of Catullus, who would however have pointed the line less sharply.¹³ A few verbal echoes are sufficient to demonstrate that Ovid knew this part of Catullus' work. Thus *foedus amicitiae* and *candidiora nive* come in both poets, one from a poem of Catullus which we should single out as outstanding, one which we regard as trivial.¹⁴

Other borrowings are more significant. Catullus has a famous phrase, derived from Sophocles, about the unreliability of women's words:

dicit: sed mulier cupido quod dicit amanti,
in vento et rapida scribere oportet aqua.¹⁵

The phrase became something of a commonplace, and Zingerle has catalogued a number of passages where the words of men are carried away on the wind.¹⁶ But in one passage of the *Amores* we are justified in thinking that Catullus is either the proximate or the proproximate source. Propertius' version of Catullus is:

¹² *Trist.*, II, 427.

¹³ Quint., IX, 3, 70, cf. VI, 3, 96; Priscian, V, 13, *G. L.*, II, p. 149, 14. Compare Cat., 81, 6.

¹⁴ Cat., 109, 6; Ov., *Trist.*, III, 6, 1; Cat., 80, 2; Ov., *Pont.*, II, 5, 37.

¹⁵ Cat., 70, 3-4.

¹⁶ Ov., *Am.*, II, 6, 43; II, 33; *A. A.*, I, 388; *Her.*, II, 25; VII, 8; XIII, 92; *R. A.*, 286; *Met.*, VIII, 134.

hoc perdit miseras, hoc perdidit ante puellas:
quidquid iurarunt, ventus et unda rapit.¹⁷

Ovid has probably both in mind; like Catullus he allows a couplet for the essential thought, but *ventus et unda* comes from Propertius:

verba puellarum, foliis leviora caducis,
irrita, qua visum est, ventus et unda ferunt.¹⁸

It is important for our understanding of the difference between Ovid and his predecessors, to notice that he expands the thought by the additional image of the falling leaves.

This process is even more obvious in another example. Ovid was fascinated by Catullus' state of mind during the renunciation of Lesbia. Three poems of this period gripped his imagination, the 8th, to which we shall return, the 76th and the 85th, and they blend in Ovid's memory in a single mood, the mood of "*odi et amo*":

odi, nec possum cupiens non esse, quod odi.¹⁹

This has a cleverness, an elaboration, which Catullus' direct passion lacks. Similarly, as Weinreich has pointed out, Ovid, in the same mood elaborates the word *excrucior* (with reference to Catullus 76?):²⁰

mens abit et morior, quotiens peccasse fateris,
perque meos artus frigida gutta fluit.
tunc amo, tunc odi frustra, quod amare necessest:
tunc ego, sed tecum, mortuus esse velim.

But phrases from Catullus are held in his brain, and *fortasse requireret* slips out.²¹ In the longest of the renunciation poems Catullus had a couplet:

quin tu animo offirmas atque istinc teque reducis
et dis invitis desinis esse miser.²²

¹⁷ Prop., II, 28, 7-8.

¹⁸ Ov., *Am.*, II, 16, 45-6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 4, 5.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, III, 14, 37-40; Cat., 85, 2; 76, 21. O. Weinreich, *Die Distichen des Catullus*, p. 70.

²¹ Ov., *Pont.*, IV, 5, 29; Cat., 85, 1.

²² Cat., 76, 11-12.

The first line recurs, quite appropriately, slightly modified in the *Metamorphoses*:

quin animum offirmas teque ipsa recolligis, Iphi.²³

We note here how Ovid irons out the rough edges of Catullus' work. More important is a passage in the *Remedium Amoris*.²⁴ It does not seem to have been observed that Ovid has Catullus in mind in this passage,²⁵ but it is a clear analysis and criticism of Catullus' psychology. The "odi et amo" state is there; the phrase *desinet esse miser* (657) points the reference; even *perfer* (642) may come from Catullus (8, 11). Ovid has seen that Catullus' very intensity is the sign that he is still in love (648):

qui nimium multis Non amo dicit, amat.

What a magnificent piece of Freudian analysis centuries before Freud! If you wish to be free of love, Ovid goes on to say, you must be free of hatred too, and cultivate indifference (657-8):

non curare sat est: odio qui finit amorem,
aut amat, aut aegre desinet esse miser.

This is direct criticism of Catullus.

But the "odi et amo" state of mind fascinated Ovid, and in the *Amores* he had given an elaborate analysis of it.²⁶ This is hardly self-analysis; I agree with those critics who feel that Ovid writes of love with the detachment of an onlooker rather than the involvement of a participant. The last part of the poem is an ingenious set of variations on the Catullan theme (33 ff.):

luctantur pectusque leve in contraria tendunt
hac amor, hac odium, sed, puto, vincit amor.
odero, si potero; si non, invitus amabo:
nec iuga taurus amat; quae tamen odit, habet.
nequitiam fugio: fugientem forma reducit;
aversor morum crimina: corpus amo;
sic ego nec sine te nec tecum vivere possum
et videor voti nescius esse mei.
aut formosa fores minus, aut minus improba, vellem:
non facit ad mores tam bona forma malos.

²³ Ov., *Met.*, IX, 745.

²⁴ *R. A.*, 641 ff.

²⁵ Except perhaps by Weinreich, *Die Distichen des Catulls*, p. 71, but he only adduces it as a parallel.

²⁶ Ov., *Am.*, III, 11.

facta merent odium, facies exorat amorem:
 me miserum! vitiis plus valet ipsa suis!
 parce, per o lecti socialia iura, per omnis,
 qui dant fallendos se tibi saepe, deos
 perque tuam faciem, magni mihi numinis instar,
 perque tuos oculos, qui rapuere meos!
 quidquid eris, mea semper eris; tu selige tantum,
 me quoque velle velis, anne coactus amem!
 lintea dem potius ventisque ferentibus utar,
 ut, quamvis nolim, cogar amare velim.

Weinreich comments: "Man stellt gewöhnlich fest: Catulls Distichon ist zerdehnt zur Elegie, die Hülle prall ausgestopft mit Rhetorik."²⁷ It is of course brilliant; it would be hard to better *odero, si potero; si non, invitus amabo* or *sic ego nec sine te nec tecum vivere possum*. But it is a cold brilliance. No one who felt what he was writing about could play on the idea in this way. Recollections of Catullus are there,²⁸ but the difference between Catullus and Ovid is nowhere to be more clearly seen than in Ovid's expansive and elaborate playing on a single conceit with all the instruments of his orchestra. Fénélon's comment is revealing "Combien Ovid et Martial, avec leurs traits ingénieux et façonnées, sont-ils au dessous de ces paroles négligées, où le cœur saisi parle seul dans un espèce de désespoir."

One other poem in this section calls for some brief notice. This is Catullus' elegy for his brother. There is a curious biographical similarity between Catullus and Ovid in that each visited Troy, and each lost a brother whom he dearly loved:

iamque decem vitae frater geminaverat annos,
 quum perit, et coepi parte carere mei.²⁹

The point here is a negative one; there is no trace of Catullus' elegy in this couplet. But there is an echo in the *Fasti*, appropriately in the story of Romulus and Remus:

atque ait, Invito frater adempte, vale.³⁰

This is an allusion without elaboration. The reason is clearly that in both passages Ovid is seriously involved. In the first,

²⁷ O. Weinreich, *Die Distichen des Catulls*, p. 73.

²⁸ 35, Cat., 85, 1; 39, Cat., 75, 3-4; 46, Cat., 76, 4.

²⁹ Ov., *Tr.*, IV, 10, 31-2. For Ovid's visit to Troy see *Fast.*, VI, 417-24.

³⁰ Ov., *Fast.*, IV, 852. Cat., 101, 6; cf. 68, 20 and 92.

it is his own brother, not a literary fiction, and an echo of Catullus would be almost improper. In the second, the echo is proper, but Ovid is genuinely interested in Roman legend, and does not wish to play with the theme.

3

Ovid was a story-teller in verse, and it was natural that he should look closely at Catullus' epyllion, especially as he was himself more than once concerned to write the story of Ariadne. Unfortunately we cannot easily now be certain what Ovid is taking from Catullus, and what from the latter's Hellenistic originals,³¹ though there are enough verbal reminiscences to make us realize that Ovid had made a detailed study of Catullus' poem.

If we go first to *Heroides* 10, a careful examination of parallels is illuminating. Ovid's Ariadne, like Catullus', rises from sleep with a start;³² she climbs a hill;³³ she cannot believe her own eyes.³⁴ Ovid's heroine wanders like a Bacchante; Catullus' stares out to sea like the statue of a Bacchante. (In Ovid the statue thought is separated and follows immediately.)³⁵ She asks herself frantic questions.³⁶ The island is deserted.³⁷ She may not go back to her father, even if she could;³⁸ had she not helped Theseus out of the labyrinthine *tectum*?³⁹ She refers to the Minotaur as her brother: Palmer comments that this is "perhaps the most flagrant instance of bad taste in Ovid, but Catullus is to blame for it."⁴⁰ She can only hope for a death by wild animals.⁴¹ She wishes that the past were undone,⁴² and recalls the death of Androgeos and the tribute of the land of Cecrops (which Catullus narrates as background to his story).⁴³ She

³¹ See J. N. Anderson, *On the Sources of Ovid's Heroides* (Berlin, 1896).

³² Ov., *Her.*, X, 13; Cat., 64, 56.

³³ Ov., 25; Cat., 126.

³⁴ Ov., 31; Cat., 55.

³⁵ Ov., 48, 50; Cat., 61.

³⁶ Ov., 59; Cat., 177.

³⁷ Ov., 59; Cat., 184.

³⁸ Ov., 64; Cat., 180.

³⁹ Ov., 71; Cat., 113.

⁴⁰ Ov., 77; Cat. 150, cf. 181; A. Palmer, *Ovid's Heroides*, p. 312.

⁴¹ Ov., 83-4, 96; Cat., 152.

⁴² Ov., 99; Cat. 171.

⁴³ Ov., 99-100; Cat., 76-83.

will be unburied and the birds will perch on her bones (in Catullus, a prey to birds).⁴⁴ She is left on her wave-beaten isle.⁴⁵

Three things stand out about this analysis. In the first place there is a coincidence of ideas too close to be accidental, but there is little coincidence of words. Elsewhere, as we shall see, Ovid uses the words of Catullus' epyllion; he has them in his mind. I conclude therefore that the avoidance is deliberate. Ovid has Catullus' narrative open before him; he is using the thought, but changing the language. Of course some of the thoughts are inevitable in the situation, but touches like the failure to believe her own eyes, and the image of the Bacchante show the derivation. Secondly, Ovid rearranges the ideas; this again seems a deliberate variation. In fact, Catullus' narrative follows a logical sequence; in Ovid the logic is deliberately disarranged—Ariadne keeps recurring to the thought of her unburied corpse. Thirdly, Ovid elaborates his original, not always with profit: the birds perched on the bones is a splendid conceit, but the Bacchante image is more compelling in Catullus. One can see Ovid's thought that a Bacchante should be associated with movement, but the thought of that movement frozen as to stone is finer. Similarly Ovid characteristically analyses the thought of wild beasts into wolves, lions, tigers and even seals (the slight comedy of this is out of place). He adds a number of touches of his own, like:

in me iurarunt somnus ventusque fidesque:
prodita sum causis una puella tribus,⁴⁶

which is over-clever, and his last line after she appeals to Theseus to return:

si prius occidero, tu tamen ossa leges,⁴⁷

which has a certain genuine pathos, which he has carefully prepared by the recurring theme of absence of burial.

Neither heroine, as Palmer has observed,⁴⁸ has much personality or depth of character. She is conceived as responding rather

⁴⁴ Ov., 123; Cat. 153. Ovid has also in mind Prop., III, 7, 11.

⁴⁵ Ov., 136; Cat., 52.

⁴⁶ Ov., 117-18, perhaps with Prop., I, 13, 30 in mind.

⁴⁷ Ov., 150.

⁴⁸ A. Palmer, *Ovid's Heroides*, p. xvii.

to a situation of loneliness and terror. In Catullus the loneliness predominates, in Ovid the terror. Both heroines soliloquize with some realism—the fear of seals is a not wholly successful attempt by Ovid to convey realistically the trepidation of a timid young girl. Ovid, who had an admirable streak of gentleness in his make-up, makes his Ariadne gentler; in Catullus she is more passionate, and thus (surprisingly) more rhetorical and more compelling. It is a subjective judgment, but I must confess that though I can coldly appraise the skill of Ovid's portrayal, it is Catullus' Ariadne who stirs my imagination and whose words remain in my memory.

Ovid reverted to the story more than once. He tells it again in the *Ars Amatoria*, this time with a greater intensity.⁴⁹ The picture of Ariadne is more summary and compact, but the adjective *perfidus* is again prominent, and the self-questionings are there. There is this time an elaborate description of the arrival of Bacchus, and again I have the feeling that Ovid is deliberately eschewing the phrases of Catullus, and probably has Catullus open before him and is varying his picture and language. When he speaks of Ariadne in the *Fasti* the language is Catullan:

dicebam, memini, periure et perfide Theseu;
 ille abiit: eadem crimina Bacchus habet.
 nunc quoque nulla viro, clamabo, femina credat:
 nomine mutato causa relata mea est.⁵⁰

Perfide Theseu recalls Catullus;⁵¹ the third line is directly from

nunc iam nulla viro iuranti femina credat.⁵²

(It is noteworthy that Ovid has lightened the first foot.) A line or two later *desertis . . . arenis* has been taken by some as a slight echo of Catullus' *desertam . . . arena*.⁵³ Ovid is dealing here with a later stage of the Ariadne saga; he seems to have felt that in tackling the same theme to echo Catullus' language would be plagiaristic, but in tackling a different theme an echo served as an allusion and bridge between two parts of the story.

⁴⁹ Ov., *A. A.*, I, 527 ff.

⁵⁰ Ov., *Fast.*, III, 473-6.

⁵¹ Cat., 64, 133.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 143.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 57; Ov., *Fast.*, III, 479.

This explains also the echoes in Ovid's treatment of Medea. Catullus has already linked the two heroines by applying to Ariadne the thoughts of Euripides' Medea.⁵⁴ Ovid carries the process further. Catullus says of Ariadne:

non prius ex illo flagrantia declinavit
lumina, quam cuncto concepit corpore flammam
funditus atque imis exarsit tota medullis.

Ovid uses the same picture of Medea:

spectat, et in vultu, veluti tunc denique viso,
lumina fixa tenet: nec se mortalia demens
ora videre putat; nec se declinat ab illo.

So too Medea cries to herself:

excute virgineo conceptas pectore flammās.⁵⁵

Further, *regia virgo* is applied to both heroines.⁵⁶ Plainly this is deliberate; Ovid wishes his reader to impose the image of Ariadne upon Medea. This is important for our understanding of Ovid's Medea, for Ariadne is a more immediately sympathetic person.

The story of Scylla and Nisus also offered Ovid the opportunity for Catullan reminiscences. The resemblance with the *Lock of Berenice* was too obvious to be passed over, and Ovid pointed it by borrowing the words *praemia nulla peto*, and transferring them from the end of a pentameter to the start of a hexameter.⁵⁷ But he also had Ariadne in his mind; there was a parallel situation in the betrayal of the home king for a foreigner, and the irony of Minos' part in each story gave the parallel added point. So Scylla is given words which recall Ariadne's self-questionings,⁵⁸ and Minos' parentage, like that of Theseus, is compared with wild animals, Syrtis and Charybdis.⁵⁹ The whole of the speech is based on Ariadne's. The allusion is meaningful; one feels, however, that perhaps before the immensity of the *Meta-*

⁵⁴ Cat., 64, 171 ff.; Eur., *Med.*, 1 ff.

⁵⁵ Cat., 64, 91; Ov., *Met.*, VII, 17 and 86.

⁵⁶ Cat., 64, 86; Ov., *Met.*, VII, 21.

⁵⁷ Cat., 66, 86; Ov., *Met.*, VIII, 92.

⁵⁸ Cat., 64, 177; Ov., *Met.*, VIII, 113.

⁵⁹ Cat., 64, 154; Ov., *Met.*, VIII, 120. Verg., *Aen.*, IV, 365-7 comes between the two.

morphoses even Ovid's inventive genius is beginning to flag. There is a great difference from the man who took such pains not to reduplicate Catullus in the *Heroides*.

There is also a touch of Ariadne in Phyllis' letter to Demophoon. Ariadne has said of her promised marriage:

quae cuncta aerii discerpunt irrita venti.

Mark what Ovid makes of this:

Demophoon, ventis et verba et vela dedisti:
vela queror reditu, verba carere fide.⁶⁰

It is of course brilliant; first the zeugma and then the point, the wit, hammered home with a light tap. It is also utterly unfeeling. But Phyllis has compared herself with Ariadne before the poem is through.⁶¹ We may note in passing that the same line gave Ovid in the *Tristia*

cunctane in aequoreos abierunt irrita ventos? ⁶²

It will be as well to consolidate Ovid's debt to this poem by noting a number of other reminiscences. The most important is in the *Amores* where one of the elegies begins:

Prima malas docuit, mirantibus aequoris undis,
Peliaco pinus vertice caesa vias,

in clear allusion to the beginning of Catullus' poem.⁶³ Elsewhere we notice *ventosa aequora*,⁶⁴ *vomere taurus*,⁶⁵ *variatis figuris* ⁶⁶ (this last in the story of Peleus and Thetis), *imis medullis*,⁶⁷ *redimita capillos*,⁶⁸ *candida purpureum*,⁶⁹ *teretam versabat pollice fusum* ⁷⁰ (this from the story of Arachne, where a reference to Ariadne is appropriate), *iustitiam fugarat*.⁷¹ All of these recall

⁶⁰ Cat., 64, 142; Ov., *Her.*, II, 25-6.

⁶¹ Ov., *Her.*, II, 75-6.

⁶² Ov., *Trist.*, I, 8, 35.

⁶³ Ov., *Am.*, II, 11, 1-2; Cat., 64, 1-2, cf. 15.

⁶⁴ Ov., *Her.*, XVII, 5; Cat., 64, 12.

⁶⁵ Ov., *Fast.*, II, 295; Cat., 64, 40.

⁶⁶ Ov., *Met.*, XI, 241; Cat., 64, 50.

⁶⁷ Ov., *Trist.*, I, 5, 9; Cat., 64, 93.

⁶⁸ Ov., *Am.*, III, 10, 3, cf. *Her.*, IX, 63; Cat., 64, 193.

⁶⁹ Ov., *Met.*, X, 596; Cat., 64, 308.

⁷⁰ Ov., *Met.*, VI, 22; Cat., 64, 313-14; see Ehwald, *ad loc.*

⁷¹ Ov., *Fast.*, I, 249; Cat., 64, 398.

phrases in Catullus; most of them are slight; some may be coincidental; not more than one or two are deliberate. The only substantial debt which it remains to note is that the description of the Iron Age at the beginning of the *Metamorphoses* is a typically Ovidian expansion of the similar passage at the end of the *Peleus and Thetis*.⁷²

4

In the other longer poems Catullus influenced Ovid most significantly in his portrayal of Laodamia. She forms an elaborate *exemplum* in his letter to Manlius. The thirteenth of the *Heroides* certainly appears to be based on Catullus, though, as with Ariadne, the portrayal is altogether gentler in Ovid, and, as Palmer remarks, free from the overwhelming passion which Catullus gives her.⁷³ Antonius Volscus stated that Ovid's source was Pacuvius, but no one knows the authority for his assertion.⁷⁴ In one of the *Amores* the echo of Catullus is unmistakable:

et comes extincto Laodamia viro

coming from

docta est amisso Laodamia viro.⁷⁵

Elsewhere in Ovid *madere genas*⁷⁶ and *scabra rubigine*⁷⁷ may be echoes of this poem; they may however be coincidental. More significant is the allusion to the first (and unfinished) section of the poem in the *Tristia*. There Ovid, in his Scythian gloom, wrote

non hic librorum, per quos inviter alarque
copia.

He is implying that Rome is his real home, as Catullus had written

nam, quod scriptorum non magna est copia apud me,
hoc fit, quod Romae vivimus.⁷⁸

⁷² Ov., *Met.*, I, 127 ff.; Cat. 64, 397 ff.

⁷³ A. Palmer, *Ovid's Heroides*, p. xviii.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 401.

⁷⁵ Cat., 68, 80; Ov., *Am.*, II, 18, 38.

⁷⁶ Cat., 68, 56; Ov., *A. A.*, III, 378.

⁷⁷ Cat., 68, 151; Ov., *Pont.*, I, 1, 71; cf. Verg., *G.*, I, 495.

⁷⁸ Cat., 68, 33; Ov., *Trist.*, III, 14, 37.

The Lock of Berenice, as we have seen, left its mark on the story of Scylla and Nisus, but otherwise influenced Ovid very little. This is itself significant, as it was perhaps Catullus' most elaborate essay in elegiacs, and it shows that Ovid was not interested in Catullus' metrical technique. Some people have supposed that the mood and tone of *Amores*, II, 15 comes from the *Lock*, but I am dubious. *Tardus Bootes* provided him with an acceptable epithet;⁷⁹ the Homeric original is not quite the same.⁸⁰ *Cura medullas* may come from there, but the combination of words is a likely one.⁸¹ Similarly in the 65th poem, we cannot make much of the recurrence of *ore rubor*.⁸² More curious still is the fact that the *Attis* had next to no impact upon Ovid; with his morbid attachment to the pathology of love one might have expected otherwise. But Ovid is a reflective poet, and the spirit of the *Attis* with its breathless onrush was not for him; I have scarcely noted a single echo of it, and not one of which I feel certain.

It is otherwise with the two marriage-hymns, which offer one notable borrowing. Catullus compared the untouched virgin to a garden-flower:

multi illum pueri, multae optavere puellae:
idem cum tenui carptus defloruit ungui,
nulli illum pueri, nullae optavere puellae.

In that stanza the image of the flower changes to the image of the girl. In telling the story of Narcissus, Ovid uses the same words:

multi illum pueri, multae cupiere puellae:
sed fuit in tenera tam diva superbia forma:
nulli illum iuvenes, nullae tetigere puellae.

The parallelism is obvious: the young man will turn into a flower. But it is noteworthy that Ovid considerably lightens the verses: he varies the words, he avoids a harsh elision, and introduces an additional dactyl.⁸³ There is a certain bitterness in a

⁷⁹ Cat., 66, 67; Ov., *Met.*, II, 177; cf. *Fast.*, III, 405.

⁸⁰ Hom., *Od.*, V, 272.

⁸¹ Cat., 66, 23; Ov., *Am.*, II, 19, 43.

⁸² Cat., 65, 24; Ov., *Trist.*, IV, 3, 70.

⁸³ Cat., 62, 42-4; Ov., *Met.*, III, 353-5; see W. Kroll, *Studien zum Verständnis der rom. Literatur* (1924), p. 170.

further reminiscence of this poem. The young men reply that an unmarried girl is like an unfruitful vine, and Ovid alludes to the words in speaking of the infertility of Tomi.⁸⁴

5

Finally we turn to the lyrical poems. Here we might expect to find a negligible connection, for Ovid used quite a different medium, though again we should remember that Ovid wrote hendecasyllabics which we have lost.⁸⁵ In fact there are a whole host of reminiscences, emphasizing again that Ovid went to Catullus for his moods not his metres. First we notice how Ovid takes his defence for the intemperance of his poetry from Catullus, who had written:

nam castum esse decet pium poetam
ipsum, versiculos nihil necesse est.⁸⁶

Ovid uses the same defence:

crede mihi, mores distant a carmine nostro;
vita verecunda est, Musa iocosa mihi.⁸⁷

As always, Ovid's lines are exquisitely pointed, but their derivation is clear.

The most substantial instance of Ovid's indebtedness to the lyrics is seen in his account of his journey to Tomi, which is based with gloomy irony on Catullus' account of his journey from the East.⁸⁸ This has been meticulously analysed by Munro, and by others since, and does not call for much comment here.⁸⁹ We may note that the bold use of nominative and infinitive, with which Catullus starts, was much affected by Ovid.⁹⁰ Catullus' opening lines are:

⁸⁴ Cat., 62, 50; Ov., *Pont.*, I, 3, 51.

⁸⁵ Quint., *Inst. Or.*, XII, 10, 75; cf. (perhaps) Mart., II, 41, 1-2.

⁸⁶ Cat., 16, 5-6.

⁸⁷ Ov., *Trist.*, II, 353-4.

⁸⁸ Cat., 4; Ov., *Trist.*, I, 10.

⁸⁹ H. A. J. Munro, *Criticisms and Elucidations of Catullus*, pp. 9 ff.; O. Weinreich, *Stud. z. Mart.*, pp. 154 ff.; U. von Wilamowitz, *Hellenistische Dichtung*, II, pp. 295 ff.; G. Jachmann in *Gnomon*, I (1925), pp. 200-14; Hoppe, in *Ph. Woch.* (1939), pp. 1139 ff.

⁹⁰ E. g. *Met.*, XIII, 141.

phasellus ille quem videtis, hospites,
ait fuisse navium celerrimus,
neque ullius natantis impetum trabis
nequisse praeterire, sive palmulis
opus foret volare sive linteo.

In Ovid's hands this becomes:

est mihi sitque, precor, flavae tutela Minervae,
navis, et a picta casside nomen habet.
sive opus est velis, minimam bene currit ad auram,
sive opus est remo, remige carpit iter.
nec comites volucris contenta est vincere cursu,
occupat egressas quamlibet ante rates.

Munro is clearly right when he says that Ovid "shews himself here too 'nimium amator ingenii sui' and pushes to hyperbole the simple thought of Catullus." Ovid starts the story of his ship at Cenchreae, echoing the language in which Catullus links his with Cytorus,⁹¹ and goes on to allude to Catullus' *tot per impotentia freta*.⁹² Catullus' words *erum tulisse* become in Ovid

hac dominum tenus est illa secuta suum.⁹³

Ovid refers to the idea of sacrifice to the gods of the shore, and concludes with a prayer to the Tyndaridae.⁹⁴ There are substantial differences between the poems: for one thing, Catullus' voyage is completed, Ovid's is not. Ovid has a long catalogue of cities, from which Catullus for all his Alexandrianism is relatively free. Ovid is much more mannered than Catullus, and for once we are bound to say even that Catullus' poem is technically superior.

A different kind of debt is seen in the poem on the dead parrot.⁹⁵ Epitaphs on dead animals are not uncommon in Greek, and the Anthology contains some twenty-eight.⁹⁶ Catullus' poem on the death of Lesbia's sparrow is, however, not an epitaph, but a personal lyric arising out of the situation.⁹⁷ It was one

⁹¹ Cat., 4, 13-15; Ov., *Trist.*, I, 10, 9.

⁹² Cat., 4, 18; Ov., *Trist.*, I, 10, 11-12.

⁹³ Cat., 4, 19; Ov., *Trist.*, I, 10, 22.

⁹⁴ Cat., 4, 25-7; Ov., *Trist.*, I, 10, 45 ff.

⁹⁵ Ov., *Am.*, II, 6.

⁹⁶ *Anth. Pal.*, VII, 189-216.

⁹⁷ Cat., 3.

of his most famous poems in antiquity, as later, and Ovid saw the potentialities of the idea for a poem of wit. He parodied a funeral elegy, the bidding to the mourners (1-16), the regrets (17-24), the outburst against the powers of darkness, and list of those who could better have been spared (25-42), the deathbed scene (43-8), the hopes of a blessed life beyond the grave (49-58) and the final committal (59-62). The whole thing is amusing and utterly unfeeling. He has taken nothing from Catullus except the idea.⁹⁸ (He takes the directness of his opening from the previous poem of Catullus.) The contrast between the two poems can well be seen in comparing Catullus' tender

qui nunc it per iter tenebricosum
illuc unde negant redire quemquam

with Ovid's conceit:

ossa tegit tumulus, tumulus pro corpore parvus,
quo lapis exiguus par sibi carmen habet.⁹⁹

The contrast in length between the poems is also noteworthy. Ovid is amusing, but he draws out his humour to the point of tediousness.

Ovid, as the poet of love, however consciously and whimsically, was interested in Catullus' expressions of love. Catullus' fifth poem begins:

vivamus, mea Lesbia, atque amemus
rumoresque senum severiorum
omnes unius aestimemus assis.

Ovid transfers the thought to Byblis:

iura senes norint, et quid liceatque nefasque
fasque sint inquirant, legumque examina servant;
conveniens Venus est annis temeraria nostris.¹⁰⁰

Allegations of incest were made against Clodia, and that makes this particular borrowing all the more pointed. It is interesting to find a not dissimilar sentiment in Ovid's "Controversium": *tu hoc optinebis, ut terminos quos adprobaveris custodiant, ut nihil faciant nisi considerate, nihil promittant nisi ut tu vis*

⁹⁸ Unless Ov., *Am.*, II, 6, 39 comes from Cat., 3, 13-14.

⁹⁹ Cat., 3, 11-12; Ov., *Am.*, II, 6, 59-60.

¹⁰⁰ Cat., 5, 1-3; Ov., *Met.*, IX, 551-3.

*facturi, omnia verba ratione et fide ponderent? senes sic amant.*¹⁰¹
Catullus continues:

soles occidere et redire possunt:
nobis cum semel occidit brevis lux,
nox est perpetua una dormienda.

The thought is a commonplace, but at the beginning of the next book of the *Metamorphoses* Ovid uses it in contrasting the inevitability of extinction with the power of love.¹⁰² Catullus' eighth poem is a poem of unhappy love; it belongs to the "odi et amo" cycle. We have already seen how Ovid elaborates this mood. Here it is enough to notice that he had studied it in the lyrics as well as the elegiacs, and took the words *perfer et obdura* (plainly the right reading) from the poem of Catullus, adapting them from iambic to hexameter by inserting *et*.¹⁰³ It has been suggested in the same poem that

vidi ego quum foribus lassus prodiret amator,
invalidum referens emeritumque latus

comes from Catullus:

cur? non tam latera ecfututa pandas.¹⁰⁴

This is much less certain, but the general derivation of the poem from Catullus leaves it possible. Ovid was certainly familiar with the sixth poem; as Ellis pointed out, the lines

pulvinusque peraeque et hic et ille
attritus, tremulique quassa lecti
argutatio inambulatioque

suggested to him the lines

cur pressus prior est interiorque torus

and

spondaque lasciva mobilitate tremat¹⁰⁵

and from this poem also he took the vivid *viduas noctes*.¹⁰⁶

The *Remedium Amoris* contains what may be one substantial

¹⁰¹ Sen., *Contr.*, II, 2, 9-11.

¹⁰² Cat., 5, 4-6; Ov., *Met.*, X, 25-35.

¹⁰³ Cat., 8, 11; Ov., *Am.*, III, 11, 7.

¹⁰⁴ Cat., 6, 13; Ov., *Am.*, III, 11, 13-14.

¹⁰⁵ Cat., 6, 9-11; Ov., *Am.*, III, 14, 26 and 32.

¹⁰⁶ Cat., 6, 6; Ov., *Her.*, XIX, 69.

allusion to Catullus. Catullus completed the Sapphic version which he wrote for his Lesbia with a verse directed to himself:

otium, Catulle, tibi molestum est:
otio exultas nimiumque gestis.
otium et reges prius et beatas
perdidit urbes.

If *otium* causes a man to fall in love, then to remove *otium* is the antidote to the plague, and Ovid says so:

otia si tollas, periire Cupidinis arcus. . . .
tam Venus otium amat; qui finem quaeris amoris,
cedit amor rebus: res age; tutus eris.¹⁰⁷

This would appear to be a direct and singularly happy reference.

The others are mostly less substantial. For the sake of completeness we may note the use of *charta* in the sense of "book,"¹⁰⁸ the *novem continuas fututiones*,¹⁰⁹ and the possible echo of the forty-second poem in the *Ars Amatoria*.¹¹⁰ In the thirtieth poem Catullus has

idem nunc retrahis te ac tua dicta omnia factaque
ventos irrita ferre ac nebulas aerias sinis.

The familiar line in the *Tristia*:

cunctane aequoreos abierunt irrita ventos

more probably echoes Catullus' Ariadne, but in the *Ars Amatoria*

et iubet Aeolios irrita ferre Notos

recalls this passage.¹¹¹ Catullus 35:

quamvis candida milies puella
euntem revocet manusque collo
ambas iniciens roget morari

seems to be the source of some lines in the *Amores*:

implicuitque suos circum mea colla lacertos;
et, quae me perdunt, oscula mille dedit,

¹⁰⁷ Cat., 51, 13-16; Ov., *Rem. Am.*, 139-44.

¹⁰⁸ Cat., 1, 6; Ov., *Trist.*, III, 1, 4.

¹⁰⁹ Cat., 32, 7; Ov., *Am.*, III, 7, 26.

¹¹⁰ Cat., 42; Ov., *A. A.*, III, 447-50.

¹¹¹ Cat., 30, 9-10; 64, 142; Ov., *Trist.*, I, 8, 35; *A. A.*, I, 633.

where *mille* is the tell-tale word.¹¹² In Catullus 46

ad claras Asiae volemus urbes

gave Ovid

te duce magnificas Asiae perspeximus urbes.¹¹³

Indeed, the whole of this account of his journey to the East merits comparison with Catullus. Finally we may recall Catullus' comparison of the number of Lesbia's kisses to the sands of the desert or stars of the sky. This is a commonplace which extends back to Homer, and it is sufficient to note that such comparisons recur in Ovid, generally of his own sufferings.¹¹⁴

I do not know that we gain very much fresh insight from these reminiscences. Taken as a whole they show a very thorough acquaintance on the part of Ovid with Catullus' lyric poetry, a familiarity which extends through all periods of his writing career. There is one big difference between the two poets which emerges. It is true that Catullus was not afraid to echo the Greeks, Homer or Sappho or the Alexandrians. But he is writing generally out of his own experiences, and his literary learning fuses with that experience to give it expression. With Ovid one feels that the experience is lacking, and that he is content to play with giving expression to the experiences of others. Catullus takes phrases from the Greeks to express his own emotions. Ovid takes emotions from Catullus to dress in his own phrases.

6

The general contrast between the poets is clear. It is not, as has sometimes been suggested, that Ovid is a poet of polish and Catullus is not; few Latin poems are more carefully burnished than the *Peleus and Thetis*. Nor should we forget that it is Catullus, not Ovid, who receives the name *doctus*. The contrast lies elsewhere. It is partly that Catullus, on the whole, writes out of his own experience, and Ovid, on the whole, does not; partly that Ovid seeks point, wit, and rhetorical elaboration—he is post-Pollio, a product of the *recitationes*.

¹¹² Cat., 35, 7-9; Ov., *Am.*, II, 18, 9-10.

¹¹³ Cat., 46, 6; Ov., *Pont.*, II, 10, 21.

¹¹⁴ Cat., 7, 3; Hom., *Il.*, IX, 385; Ov., *Trist.*, I, 5, 47; IV, 1, 55; V, 1, 31, etc.

This contrast is far-reaching and makes Ovid's considerable and detailed knowledge of Catullus suprising. With this knowledge, he tends to avoid direct verbal allusions. Where he uses them it is generally to make a point, to link his Medea with Catullus' Ariadne, his Narcissus with Catullus' flower, his Byblis with the incestuous Clodia, his remedy for love with Catullus' unhappiness in love. What he sought in Catullus was the range of experience to form the subject-matter of his own detached comment. He could scarcely have found a better source, and we remain amazed that anyone could so deeply assimilate Catullus' matter while retaining so little of his directness of approach.

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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON GREEK HISTORICAL NARRATIVE FROM 400 TO 1 B. C.

A STUDY IN THE EFFECT OF OUTLOOK AND ENVIRONMENT ON STYLE.

The purpose of this paper is to examine certain stylistic features as they occur in the narratives of four historians, and to consider whether the relative frequency of these features can be accounted for by reference to their different attitudes to the philosophy of historiography or to style, or to their different environment. The historians chosen are Xenophon, Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who span the period: they also approached their individual tasks in different ways, and therefore afford a more promising field for speculation of the kind proposed than writers who had a similar approach to their subject, or who were writing at the same time.

The study is a statistical one, and the figures are obtained from twenty-eight passages of each author, each passage being five Teubner pages in length. In the case of Xenophon, equal lengths of the *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* make up the twenty-eight pages. Dionysius' History of Rome down to the first Punic War, the *Antiquitates Romanae*, is the work from which his figures are taken. With Diodorus and Polybius there can, of course, be no confusion, since each has left us but one work containing historical narrative.

It will be interesting to begin by examining some of the aspects of style with which ancient critics were preoccupied: especially so, because Dionysius, the last of our chosen historians, was also a literary critic who was renowned at Rome in his own time and respected by posterity for his work in helping to revive Atticism. He intended the *Antiquitates Romanae* to serve as a model for those who wished to join his crusade, and a corrective to the dullness and the "Asiatic" excesses of some of the Hellenistic writers who preceded him. It will therefore be instructive to see some of the ways in which his style differs from those of authors writing in the same genre, but who are less self-consciously preoccupied with style than he is.

One of the most important aspects of style to ancient critics was "composition" (*σύνθεσις*), which means both the arrangement of clauses within a sentence and of words within a clause. In the latter sense such considerations as the avoidance of hiatus, the use of word-play, or attention to rhythmic effect and the need for emphasising certain words in order to convey the desired meaning more forcefully were taken into account.

The commonest figure of speech which was employed to emphasise words or to achieve rhythmic effect was hyperbaton. In this study the disturbance of words from their natural or expected order is considered to constitute hyperbaton, but the transposition of whole clauses from their logical order, which Longinus includes in his definition of hyperbaton,¹ is not regarded as such by the present writer.

By far the most frequent type of hyperbaton so defined is that of a substantive separated from the adjective which describes it, or from a possessive genitive, e. g.

πυρὰν ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις κατεσκεύασεν ὑπερμεγέθη
(Diod. Sic., II, 27, 2).
πλείστοις ἀπέβαλε τῶν ἐπιβάτων (idem, XVI, 5, 5).

The majority of hyperbata of this type seem to have arisen from a desire to emphasise the adjective: hence the large number of instances of adjectives of size or quantity which are separated from their nouns. A different purpose seems to underlie the separation of the article from its noun, as in the following example:

οἷς ἡ τῆς πόλεως ἀνέκειτο προστασία (Dion. Hal., II, 8).

The effect here produced, as Denniston has shown,² is that of unification, forcing the reader to take in the whole clause at once.

The separation of a verb in the passive voice from its agent, as in the following example:

τοῦτο δ' αὖ οὕτω τρεφόμενον ἐλάθθεν αὐτῷ τὸ στράτευμα
(Xenophon, *Anab.*, I, 1, 9),

is considered to constitute hyperbaton (this example also illus-

¹ Ch. 22. But the term was used very loosely in antiquity: some rhetoricians even regarded parenthesis and tmesis as forms of hyperbaton.

² *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford, 1952), pp. 52-3.

trating "interlaced" hyperbaton³). So also are occasional instances of adverbs separated from the verbs which they modify, e. g.

πολυτελῶς δ' αὐτὴν ὁρῶντες ὠχυρωμένην
(Diodorus, XIII, 88, 1).

And finally, ἔξω and ἐγγύς, when used as prepositions, are sometimes separated from the nouns which they govern, the verb intervening, e. g.

ἔξω ὄντες τῶν βελῶν (Xenophon, *Anab.*, V, 2, 26),
ἐγγύς ἐγένοντο τοῦ χωρίου (*ibid.*, V, 4, 16).

Here admittedly the order involving hyperbaton is scarcely less "natural" than that in which the noun follows closely upon its preposition, because ἔξω and ἐγγύς contain an adverbial force which attracts them to the verb rather than to the noun.

In all instances of these types of hyperbaton, from which the following statistics are derived, some stylistic purpose, chiefly that of emphasis, seems to be present. The differences which the figures show will therefore have some relevance to the present discussion:

Xenophon: 136; Polybius: 228; Diodorus: 185; Dionysius: 377.

The frequency of hyperbaton in the narrative of Dionysius is mentioned by Ek,⁴ but its full extent is strikingly shown by comparison with its occurrence in the other three historians. It may be concluded that Dionysius pays greater attention to emphatic word-order than they do, in keeping with the stylistic standard which he has set himself.

The balancing of clauses was another aspect of style to which ancient writers paid special attention,⁵ even to the extent of having equal numbers of syllables (*παρίσσωσις*). The use of antithesis was one of the common ways of balancing clauses. The μέν . . . δέ construction was one of the most widely used forms of antithesis. Now though it is possible that at one time

³ Denniston, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-5.

⁴ "Eine Stiltendenz in der römischen Archäologie des Dionys von Halikarnass," *Eranos*, XLIII (1945), pp. 198-214.

⁵ See Aristotle, *Rhet.*, III, 9, 7-9.

a contextual contrast between the two clauses was required, by the time of Xenophon and the Attic orators $\mu\epsilon\nu$. . . $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ clauses were very frequently used purely for purposes of balance, and a contrast in the subject-matter was thought to be unnecessary. Being an Atticist did not make Dionysius an uncritical admirer of all that the Attic historians and orators wrote. In *De Isocrate*, 13, he describes that orator as

. . . τῶν σχημάτων τὸ μερακιῶδες περὶ τὰς ἐντιθέσεις καὶ παρῴσεις καὶ παρομοιώσεις κατατριβόμενον.

Such a criticism as this is of interest, because it shows Dionysius' awareness of an unsalutary trend creeping into Attic style even in its heyday; and we are led to wonder whether or not he avoids the excessive use of $\mu\epsilon\nu$. . . $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ antithesis in his "model history." A comparison of $\mu\epsilon\nu$. . . $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ clausal antithesis in the *Antiquitates Romanae* with its occurrence in our other historians will be even more instructive than such a comparison between Dionysius and Isocrates, because our authors were not, so far as we know, exceptional in their partiality for it. Let the figures speak for themselves:

Xenophon: 261; Polybius: 274; Diodorus: 291; Dionysius: 196.

It is exciting to see Dionysius fulfilling our expectations, but the figures also show a chronological increase in $\mu\epsilon\nu$. . . $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ up to his time, which suggests that Dionysius was arresting a process which had begun in the time of Isocrates and was still operating in his own day.

The picture of our authors' behaviour in the balancing of clauses may be enlarged by examining their use of correspondence. The total occurrences of the corresponsive particles $\tau\epsilon$. . . $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$, $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$. . . $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$, $\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon$. . . $\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon$, $\mu\acute{\eta}\tau\epsilon$. . . $\mu\acute{\eta}\tau\epsilon$, and $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\epsilon$. . . $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\epsilon$ are as follows:

Xenophon: 83; Polybius: 45; Diodorus: 33; Dionysius: 158.

After showing such commendable restraint in his use of $\mu\epsilon\nu$. . . $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ antithesis, Dionysius outstrips the others to a disproportionate degree in his use of correspondence. Being faced with the same need to balance his clauses as other Greek writers, he is prevented by his stylistic scruples from using one of the means of achieving

balance as much as he might have done: as a result of which he is forced to employ correspondence, the alternative balancing method to antithesis, to a very marked degree, thus imposing on himself a stylistic peculiarity not very different from that which he criticises in Isocrates.

So far our interest has been focussed chiefly on the behaviour of Dionysius as a stylist in relation to his precepts as a critic. The other historians come more into the picture when our attention is turned to the use of particles whose function is to establish a relation in context, or continuity, between one clause or sentence and the next. The most important of these are γάρ, μὲν οὖν, διό, and διόπερ.

The relationship of the frequency of γάρ to a writer's mode of thought has been called to notice by Denniston,⁶ and his thesis that writers employ γάρ less when their mode of thought is more complex or highly developed is especially relevant to historiography, because it is in that genre more than in most others that the relationship between cause and effect has to be established.

Polybius takes some pains to explain to his readers the difference between original and immediate causes,⁷ and criticises other historians in several places for their lack of scientific method (he earned the nickname of ἐπιτίμαιος for his particular severity towards the historian Timaeus). He may therefore be expected to show a grasp of an even more fundamental principle of scientific historiography: the narration of events in their logical order of cause preceding effect. Diodorus Siculus is a very much less scientific historian than Polybius: the enormous scope of his project, which was nothing less than the narration of the histories of all the peoples of the known world in a continuous account, must have rendered minute enquiries into underlying causes and attendant circumstances impossible in a single life-span. The very title of the work—Βιβλιοθήκη Ἱστορική—suggests a compilation rather than a critical and original account, though it would be doing Diodorus less than justice to regard his history as a collection, without recasting, of different sources.⁸ The

⁶ *The Greek Particles* (Oxford, 1954), p. 58.

⁷ III, 6.

⁸ J. Palm, in his study, *Über Sprache und Stil des Diodoros von*

recording of events as they occurred was thus his main purpose, and when reasons for them suggested themselves to him, they were usually recorded as afterthoughts.

Xenophon's conception of the purpose of history was also far removed from that of Polybius. There is little evidence that he set himself any rigid standards of objectivity: indeed, in the case of the *Anabasis* there are quite strong reasons for believing that his purpose in writing was purely one of self-justification;⁹ and much discussion has centred around the question of the extent to which the *Hellenica* is pro-Spartan and more concerned with the fortunes of leading personalities than with events and their causes.¹⁰ He is thus nearer to Diodorus than to Polybius in his attitude to his task. Dionysius, on the other hand, must have had Thucydides in mind when he stressed in his introduction the need for history to have permanent value;¹¹ and being aware, like Polybius, of the greatness of the state whose fortunes he had chosen to write about, he felt that nothing but the highest standards of historical and literary scholarship would suffice to do them justice.

The explanatory force of γάρ is usually stronger when it occurs "internally," i. e. not in the initial clause of a sentence, and the figures for internal γάρ are as follows:

Xenophon: 106; Polybius: 54; Diodorus: 116; Dionysius: 43.

The figures are seen to correspond roughly with the authors' calibre as critical and objective writers of history, so here is another example of the effect of attitude on style. The four historians differ little, however, in their use of "initial" γάρ (γάρ in the first clause), except that Xenophon, perhaps because of his preference for μὲν γάρ, uses it less than the other three.

Sizilien (Lund, 1955), has shown that Diodorus almost always rewrote and altered the phraseology of his sources in order to achieve a unified and personal style. Diodorus seems to be claiming this himself when, in I, 5, 2, he writes contemptuously of τοὺς διασκευάζειν εἰλωθότας τὰς βιβλους.

⁹ See especially A. Gwynne, "Xenophon and Sophocles," *C. R.*, 1929, pp. 38 ff.

¹⁰ See the discussion in E. Delebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xenophon* (Paris, Klincksieck, 1957), ch. VI.

¹¹ I, 1, 2.

But the explanatory force of initial γάρ is usually considerably weaker than that of internal γάρ, and is sometimes difficult to detect at all.

Occurrences of μὲν οὖν, διό, and διόπερ are hardly less revealing, though for different reasons. These particles may be termed "relational," because their function is to try to establish a link in context between two sentences. The following numbers were found in the passages examined:

	Xenophon	Polybius	Diodorus	Dionysius
μὲν οὖν	28	58	53	37
διό	0	24	13	0
διόπερ	0	11	37	0

The division into the two Hellenistic writers on the one hand and Xenophon and Dionysius on the other leads us to account for the differences purely by considerations of style. Διὸ and διόπερ belong to the *Kanzleisprache* or official language (an ancient equivalent to our modern legal jargon), which became a characteristic of all Hellenistic writing, whether literary or not. The desire to achieve continuity which gave rise to the widespread use of words like διό and διόπερ was also derived from the didactic purpose behind much Hellenistic literature, which was, in its turn, derived from the rise of scholarship at Rhodes, Pergamum, Alexandria, and elsewhere. But stylistically the effect was unpleasing, for instead of trying to construct well-balanced and elaborately conceived periods, thus establishing natural relationships within a highly organised framework, as the Attic orators had done, Hellenistic writers merely juxtaposed their ideas and tried to create an illusion of overall unity and continuity by using particles like διό and διόπερ.

Dionysius' complete lack of διό and διόπερ is an example of the form taken by his style through his repudiation of Hellenistic standards. Its absence from the narrative of Xenophon is a purely chronological matter, for Palm¹² says that διό and διόπερ occur in quantity for the first time in Aristotle's *Atheniensium Respublica*. Polybius and Diodorus are merely following the normal usage of their time, unperturbed by the needs of good style like most of their contemporaries.

μὲν οὖν is a favourite transitional particle in Attic prose,¹³

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 50.

¹³ Denniston, *Greek Particles*, pp. 471-2.

used especially at the beginning of paragraphs. Its occurrence in Dionysius and Xenophon is therefore to be expected. The Hellenistic writers found it as useful as *διό* and *διόπερ* for supplying their need for continuity, so it is not surprising that they use *μὲν οὖν* even more than Xenophon and Dionysius.

The reader of Dionysius' works on literary criticism is often faced with uncertainty as to what some of the terms he uses mean. Abstract nouns denoting qualities are particularly difficult to understand and define, and some of his technical terms could mean several things to the modern reader. But when he says, in *De Compositione Verborum*, 4:

τοιούτας συντάξεις κατέλιπον οἷας οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει μέχρι κορωνίδος
διελθεῖν· Φύλαρχον λέγω καὶ Δοῦριν καὶ Πολύβιον,

we can be on fairly sure ground that the fault of which he is accusing Polybius is of a graver and more fundamental nature than any one of the isolated details of style which have been discussed so far, though no doubt Polybius' behaviour in regard to them contributes to Dionysius' overall impression. *συντάξεις* is perhaps best translated as "structures," and there is something about Polybius' structures which makes it agony, at least for a sensitive reader like Dionysius, to follow them to their conclusions. For the modern reader, who is less able with confidence to rely on "feeling" than the ancient critic, the most reliable means of discovering the meaning of such judgments as that quoted above is to consider in what individual usages Polybius differs from other historians.

The most striking of Polybius' individual traits is his frequent employment of the articular infinitive.¹⁴ Typical of the kind of work he makes it do is the very common use of *ἄμα* with the dative of the articular infinitive, followed sometimes by several subordinate clauses dependent on it.¹⁵ The effect of such a construction is one of artificial and uneasy suspense arising from the absence of action in the form of a finite verb: an Attic writer would probably have used *ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα* to express the same meaning. Moreover in most cases it is impossible to justify the use of articular infinitives, governed by prepositions and forming

¹⁴ See E. Hewlett, "On the Articular Infinitive in Polybius," *A. J. P.*, XI (1890), pp. 267-90 and 440-82.

¹⁵ For example, in II, 50, 10-12.

subordinate clauses as in the above instance, on grounds of superior convenience or clarity.

This peculiarity in Polybius' style may have been one of the factors which produced the effect felt by Dionysius; but because Dionysius' judgments derive from feeling rather than from analytical examination, specific reference to such an isolated trait is not to be expected from him. Lack of attention to emphatic word-order, one aspect of which has been considered already, may have contributed to Dionysius' discomfort. An examination of other aspects of word order may provide further clarification.

Emphasis may be achieved in a number of ways, but the commonest way is to place the word or phrase which it is required to emphasise in an unexpected position. This happens when hyperbaton is used, but it also happens, frequently with more striking effect, when the basic parts of the clause are placed in an abnormal order. The normal position for the Subject is at the beginning; but it must also be remembered that the beginning is usually the most emphatic position, so that when the normal order of Subject followed by Verb is reversed, the effect may be the emphasis of either or both at the expense of the rest of the clause. For the present purpose, however, the fact that emphasis is achieved through Verb-Subject order is all that is important, and an examination of the occurrences of Verb-Subject order in the four historians may throw further and stronger light on their behaviour in the matter of emphatic word-order.

The following percentages represent the fraction of main clauses with VS order over the total number of main clauses in which the subject is expressed (i. e. clauses in which the subject is "in the verb" do not come into the reckoning):

Xenophon: 22.3; Polybius: 13.7; Diodorus: 11.7; Dionysius: 18.4.

The figures bear a relationship, in the case of Dionysius and the two Hellenistic historians, to the writers' stylistic tendencies already described: Dionysius pays much more attention to this type of emphasis than they do. Of greater interest, however, is Xenophon's partiality for VS order: perhaps this is one of the things which gives his narrative the quality of liveliness which

for most of the time distinguishes it from that of the others, and which is the natural consequence of the autobiographical nature of much of his historical writing.

The figures also suggest that VS order was probably an unconscious means of achieving an effect, unlike hyperbaton, which was often used deliberately to achieve rhythmic effect: the use of VS order was such a natural thing that writers did not think about it as they did about the more artificial devices. If this were not so we might expect to find VS order used more frequently by Dionysius.

An examination of the order of the Verb in relation to the Object is likely to contribute less in a search for significant stylistic differences, because it is not clear whether there is a normal order of Verb and Object. The net result of much research on the subject has been a belief in the impossibility of reaching a universally valid conclusion.¹⁶ But because Greek students are usually taught that the order of the parts of a Greek sentence resembles that of English and French rather than that of Latin and German, the instances of the order OV will be considered as a fraction of the total number of instances of clauses in which there are objects to the verbs, and in the following figures are expressed as percentages:

Xenophon: 47.8; Polybius: 35.9; Diodorus: 49.0; Dionysius: 54.3.

As before, the percentages are for main clauses only: in subordinate clauses the proportion remains roughly the same except in the case of Dionysius, whose percentage rises slightly. It is, of course, Dionysius' behaviour that is the most interesting feature of these figures, because he is the only one who has a predominance of OV order over VO order. Remembering that Dionysius was living at Rome and presumably reading and hearing Latin while he was writing the *Antiquitates*, it is tempting to attribute to his Roman environment his tendency, which these figures reflect, to place the verb towards the end, after the subject and object. Polybius' striking preference for the order SVO is difficult to relate to anything else about him, unless it be pointed out that it shows a general tendency to regard the

¹⁶ See the discussion by H. Frisk, *Studien zur griechischen Wortstellung* (Gothenburg, 1933), pp. 1-33.

verb as the element in the sentence least requiring emphasis (the beginning and the end, in that order, being the positions of greatest emphasis).¹⁷ This greater interest in nouns than in verbs may in turn be related to Polybius' remarkable partiality for the articular infinitive forming a clause. The impression of stodginess and immobility produced by this type of construction has already been remarked upon, and this impression may be enhanced, if unconsciously, by his preference for placing the verb in an unemphatic position.

The final part of this study is concerned with clausal structure. Two aspects of clausal structure are involved: the amount of subordination employed, and the types of subordinate clauses used. Then follows a survey of some of the remarks of ancient rhetoricians on the stylistic effect of different types of clausal structure, and lastly the question will be considered of whether there is any relationship between their judgments concerning the distinguishing qualities of Xenophon's style and the statistics for the occurrence of the stylistic features which they consider to produce those qualities. The same historians and the same passages will be compared with Xenophon as before, since nowhere do the rhetoricians say that different types of structure produced different qualities at different periods; and comparison of some kind with authors writing in the same genre is clearly necessary for Xenophon's statistics to have any significance.

The extent of subordination may be found by comparing the numbers of main clauses with the numbers of subordinate clauses in each author. In the following pairs of figures, the upper represent main clauses and the lower subordinate clauses:

Xenophon:	$\frac{2085}{4048}$	Polybius:	$\frac{1192}{3438}$	Diodorus:	$\frac{1424}{3017}$	Dionysius:	$\frac{1158}{3861}$
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It is obvious that the figures for either type of clause have no significance when considered by themselves, because one of the factors which determines the numbers of both main and subordinate clauses is simply the length of those clauses, and this is decided by the number of words which they contain and has

¹⁷ See A. Carnoy, *Manuel de la linguistique grecque* (Louvain, 1924), pp. 384-5.

nothing to do with clausal structure in its present terms of reference.

Xenophon is seen to use more main clauses and proportionately fewer subordinate clauses than the others, though there is little difference between him and Diodorus in their proportion of subordinate clauses. Without further comment for the present, a closer scrutiny of the subordinate clauses is the next step. Of the subordinate clauses the following percentages are participial:

Xenophon: 37.3	Polybius: 44.4	Diodorus: 47.6	Dionysius: 44.7
$\left(\frac{1509}{4048}\right)$	$\left(\frac{1526}{3438}\right)$	$\left(\frac{1436}{3017}\right)$	$\left(\frac{1720}{3861}\right)$

and the following are genitive or accusative absolute constructions:

Xenophon: 4.4	Polybius: 7.9	Diodorus: 16.0	Dionysius: 7.4
$\left(\frac{178}{4048}\right)$	$\left(\frac{272}{3438}\right)$	$\left(\frac{333}{3017}\right)$	$\left(\frac{286}{3861}\right)$

Xenophon clearly uses participial and absolute constructions less than the others. His amount of infinitives forming subordinate clauses, together with those of the other authors, are as follows:

Xenophon: 21.8	Polybius: 28.6	Diodorus: 21.6	Dionysius: 23.1
$\left(\frac{886}{4048}\right)$	$\left(\frac{992}{3438}\right)$	$\left(\frac{662}{3017}\right)$	$\left(\frac{890}{3861}\right)$

These latter figures are important only in so far as they establish Xenophon as the greatest user of finite verbs, both in main clauses and in subordinate clauses.

So much for the facts. Turning to the views of ancient rhetoricians on their effect, the first point to be made is that subordination did not mean the same to them as it does to us. The word *ὑποτακτικός* is the nearest Greek equivalent to "subordinate," but in grammar *ὁ ὑποτακτικός* means the subjunctive mood, and a *ὑποτακτικός σύνδεσμος* is a conjunction which governs the subjunctive mood. What we call "subordinating conjunctions" were classified by Greek grammarians according to their particular meanings (e. g. *ἵνα* and *ὅπως* were called *αἰτιολογικοὶ σύνδεσμοι*¹⁸), but no distinction was made between them and

¹⁸ G. Uhlig: *Appendix Artis Dionysii Thracis Recensitae*, pp. 14-15.

co-ordinating conjunctions as such, and the notion that one clause "depends" on another because its meaning is incomplete on its own does not seem to have interested them in its own right. What was important to them was the structural use made of the fact that clauses were of unequal value. Aristotle's classification¹⁹ of the two basic types of structure illustrates this attitude, for though we are justified in assuming that there will be more subordinate clauses in his periodic style (λέξεις κατεστραμμένη) than in his loose or concatenated style (λέξεις εἰρομένη), this is not the distinction which Aristotle is making. His classification reflects the fact that all Greek literature was written with an eye to being read aloud. Consequently the kind of questions which critics asked were: "Does the author succeed in putting his point clearly to his audience, or in arousing their sympathy or their emotions generally?" These and similar considerations were their concern; closer analysis involving grammatical subtleties was outside their scope, and the example from Dionysius Thrax given above shows that even the grammarians were as concerned with the practical application of their researches as with the purely descriptive function of grammar.

Thus Hermogenes writes of two opposite effects which writers strive to achieve, that of "suspense" (περιβολή) and that of "clarity" (καθαρότης). In one passage he explains their distinguishing characteristics:²⁰ he says that καθαρός λόγος is achieved by the statement of bare facts, excluding all accessory details, for these are the ingredients of περιβολή, which is the opposite of καθαρότης. A little further on²¹ he tells us that the outward form (σχῆμα) which the two effects take are ὀρθότης in the case of καθαρότης, and πλαγιασμός in the case of περιβολή.

It can be shown fairly convincingly that ὀρθότης and πλαγιασμός implied to Hermogenes the use of specific constructions, in fact those involved in the last set of statistics. πλαγιασμός is discussed very thoroughly by Gildersleeve,²² and he concludes that it means by eminence the use of the genitive absolute, but

¹⁹ *Rhet.*, III, 9.

²⁰ *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. Spengel (Leipzig, Teubner, 1853-6), II, pp. 275-6.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 277-8.

²² *A. J. P.*, IX (1888), pp. 140-3 (being a section of a paper entitled "The Stylistic Effect of the Greek Participle").

includes all uses of the participle forming a clause. His arguments are entirely convincing, and he is able to show that the "peribletic" effect, with its accompanying loss of clarity, arises through the participles holding up the flow of the main idea by introducing accessory ideas inserted between the subject and its verb. The genitive absolute is naturally more peribletic than the other participial constructions (indeed, the original meaning of *πλαγιασμός* "the use of oblique cases," was probably intended for it alone); but all participial constructions were capable of creating *περιβολή* and hence came to be regarded as forms of *πλαγιασμός*.

Ὁρθότης means the use of the nominative case with a finite verb. This is implied by Hermogenes in his explanation of the difference between *καθαρότης* and *περιβολή* discussed on p. 370. An anonymous rhetorician²³ writing *Περὶ Σχημάτων* describes a *σχῆμα κατ' ὀρθότητα* as *δι' εὐθείας προαγόμενον*, and shows by the example he gives that *ὀρθότης* can include subordinate clauses provided that these contain nominative cases and finite verbs. (This exemplifies very well the difference between the ancient and the modern attitudes to subordination.) Then Aristides places beyond doubt the distinction between *ὀρθότης* and *πλαγιασμός* when he quotes the second sentence of Xenophon's *Anabasis*:²⁴

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡσθένει Δαρεῖος καὶ ὑπώπτει τοῦ βίου τελευτήν, ἐβούλετό
οἱ τὼ παῖδε ἄμφω παρῆναι

as an example of *ἀφέλεια* ("smoothness" literally, "simplicity" when used in connection with style), a quality which is closely associated with *καθαρότης* by Hermogenes.²⁵ He says that the sentence as it stands, with its *ὀρθοῦντα νοήματα*, has the effect of immediacy or pungency (*δριμύτης*), whereas *πλαγιασμός* would not produce this effect. He goes on to explain that the version using *τὸ πλαγιάσαι* would have been *ἀσθενῶν δὲ Δαρεῖος . . .*, etc. So *ὀρθότης* clearly implies the use of finite verbs, whether they be in main or subordinate clauses.

The Aristides passage quoted above leads to the dénouement. The passage is part of a chapter *Περὶ ἀφελείας*, in which the author most frequently quoted as an exemplar of this quality is

²³ Spengel, III, p. 120.

²⁴ Spengel, II, p. 530.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

Xenophon. His opinion is supported by Hermogenes, who describes Xenophon's σχήματα as ἀφελῆ καὶ καθαρὰ,²⁶ and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who declares that Xenophon is καθαρὸς τοῖς ὀνόμασι²⁷ and that his λέξις is ἀφελής.²⁸

It now only remains to draw attention to the relationship between Xenophon's use of participles compared with that of the other three historians and the way in which rhetoricians and critics describe his style: the link between the statistics and ancient opinion of his style being the form, in grammatical terms, which his type of style (ἀφελής, καθαρός) was considered by the rhetoricians to take. Xenophon uses fewer genitive absolute and participial constructions generally than the others, and thus may be said to employ less πλαγιασμός and to achieve a lesser degree of περιβολή. He uses more main clauses and more finite verbs in his subordinate clauses, the characteristics which connote ὀρθότης and result in καθαρότης and ἀφέλεια. And these are the qualities for which Xenophon is noted by the same rhetoricians.

Ancient critics did not arrive at their judgments by the use of statistics, and yet these judgments, in the case of one author at least, are supported by statistical examination of the features which they were mentally, and probably unconsciously, taking into account in their reading. The knowledge of this relationship between statistics and ancient judgments on style could enable us to make a "scientific guess" at what ancient critics may have thought about the styles of writers who are not mentioned in any of their extant works. Such knowledge, which in some cases would tell us something new about an author's standing in the ancient world, is not without value; especially so in view of the ample evidence that the historian won favour with his public more by virtue of his good style than by his veracity or care in discovering motives beneath events.

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²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 356.

²⁷ *Epistola ad Gnaeum Pompeium*, 4 and *Veterum Historiorum Censura*, III, 2.

²⁸ *Ars Rhetorica*, II, 9.

PATTERNS IN HORATIAN LYRIC.

In the last twenty-five years the exploration of images has given us valuable insights into the structure and meaning of poetry. It is the aim of the present essay to show how this technique might be combined with the more traditional methods of criticism in interpreting a group of Horace's lyric poems.¹ Before turning to the odes which we are to examine it may be well to state very briefly the criteria which, it seems, ought to govern the newer mode of analysis, because if it is given free rein it may carry the critic to some very bizarre conclusions.

First of all we must be sure of our text. It would be unwise, for instance, to use the reading *urit* in *Carm.*, I, 4, 8 as evidence of warm red imagery. Or, to take a less simple case, consider *Carm.*, I, 25. In line 10 the phrase *in solo levis angiportu* means "ignored in a deserted alley." But does the picture of something light being blown by the wind in a deserted alley not also prepare us for the later identification of Lydia with withered leaves? If this is accepted we have a new reason for preferring *Euro* to *Hebro* in line 20. But we cannot turn round and argue in the other direction, i. e. from the doubtful reading to the image in stanza three, unless we think that *Euro* has been established on other grounds.

After making sure of his text the critic must be able to prove that his images are actually there. It has recently been argued that since the trees in *Carm.*, I, 9, 2 f. are drooping under the snow they must be evergreens, and therefore the stanza contains a green image as well as a white one.² But this, surely, is sub-

¹ Among recent works on the structure of the Horatian ode mention should be made of H. L. Tracy, "Thought Sequence in the Ode," *Phoenix*, V (1951); F. Heinemann, "Die Einheit der horazischen Ode," *Mus. Helv.*, IX (1952); N. E. Collinge, "Form and Content in the Horatian Lyric," *C.P.*, L (1955); H. C. Toll, "Unity in the Odes of Horace," *Phoenix*, IX (1955), and, of course, Eduard Fraenkel's great work *Horace*.

² M. P. Cunningham, *C.P.*, LII (1957), p. 101 and M. G. Shields, *Phoenix*, XII (1958), pp. 166 f. Both of these are perceptive articles and I would only differ from them in points of detail.

stituting clairvoyance for analysis. Or again in stanza three of the same poem A. Y. Campbell apparently saw a reference to the gales of the spring equinox,³ but there is nothing to support this in the Latin.

Thirdly we should view with suspicion any theory which seeks to reverse a poem's literal meaning. I do not think that the suggestions made below are open to this charge since, if accepted, they are quite compatible with the traditional interpretations. Let me give a preliminary example. In the centre of *Carm.*, I, 11 (the Leuconoe ode) we find these lines:

ut melius quidquid erit pati,
seu pluris hiemes seu tribuit Iuppiter ultimam
quae nunc oppositis debilitat pumicibus mare
Tyrrhenum.

It is hardly enough simply to say that this passage gives the poem a winter setting. Surely the storms have a deeper significance. Do they not represent the sinister side of life (pain, trouble, the approach of death) and its effect upon the mind? Symbolism of this kind can be found in several of the odes, and probably most readers recognize it here. But perhaps it may be permissible to go a step further. Listen to those three choriambic words coming one after the other—*oppositis*, *debilitat*, *pumicibus*. Sound and sense combine to suggest "the tired waves, vainly breaking"; so it looks as if the line is concerned not only with anxiety but with *futile* anxiety, and does this not bring us back to Leuconoe and her horoscope? The incessant beating of wave on rock appears to be nature's analogue to all attempts at precognition. Drawing on another passage,⁴ we may say that efforts to foretell the future are like efforts to restore the dead. In each case the object is *nefas*, which involves not only impiety but also a senseless waste of time and energy. If this interpretation is accepted it does not require us to abandon any of our previous opinions about the poem's meaning.

Fourthly to avoid giving an un-Horatian reading of an ode we should compare our interpretations with Horace's work as a whole. No doubt every author writes occasional passages which

³ A. Y. Campbell, *Horace. A New Interpretation*, p. 225: "The third stanza itself implies a transition from winter to spring."

⁴ *Carm.*, I, 24, 20. Cf. *Carm.*, I, 11, 1.

are out of character, but a new theory depending solely on this concession will arouse misgivings.⁵

Fifthly one should beware of any proposal which is contradicted by Roman linguistic usage or Roman habits of thought. In the third strophe of *Carm.*, I, 9 it has been maintained that *veteres omni* stand for age and death and therefore we ought to supply the notion of *iuvenes* with *cupressi*, making *them* represent youth and life.⁶ But since when has the cypress, that funereal tree, become a symbol of life?

Lastly there is the question of relevance and importance. Theories which would survive all the previous tests might yet be disregarded on grounds of triviality. It is quite true, for instance, that *Carm.*, I, 9 opens in daylight and ends in dusk, but is this fact significant? Does it add in any way to our appreciation of the poem? Or let us imagine a scholar commenting on the phrase *domus exilis Plutonia* in *Carm.*, I, 4, 17. He writes: "By aural association *exilis* reminds us that Hades is the land of exile; cf. *aeternum exilium* in *Carm.*, II, 3, 27 f." This would hardly be seized on by future editors. He might have done better had he written: "It is a paradox that Pluto/Dis should have a poor house; cf. the antithesis in 13 and 14, the words *o beate Sesti* (14), and *Epist.*, I, 6, 45 f." At this point the value of an interpretation becomes a matter of statistics. It is rather like a joke. If you have a pet story, and you find that everyone you tell it to says "Oh yes, I see the point all right but I don't find it at all amusing," then you will have to admit that for the world at large the joke is a failure. The same applies to the sort of case we are considering. If the other tests yield no result, and the theory depends for its validity on the question of relevance and importance, then it seems that the only index we have is the verdict of scholars taken over an adequate period.

The acceptance of these criteria, especially the fourth and fifth, does not commit us to a narrow historicism. We need not imagine that a poem is some sort of concrete entity of which we could give a final and definitive account if only we had the necessary evidence. Certain aspects of the *Odes* eluded even the best-informed and most sympathetic of Horace's friends; simi-

⁵ See p. 389 below.

⁶ Cunningham, *loc. cit.*; Shields, *loc. cit.*, p. 169.

larly a modern scholar, whatever new insights he may obtain, cannot hope to see all the features apparent to Maecenas. A poem will not be located. The most a critic can do in any age is to describe the area in which it moves.

The idea of intention has been avoided as far as possible in this discussion, since I felt that the question was at present in such a state that it could not be introduced without upsetting whatever proportion the essay might have.⁷ Perhaps, however, this much may be said. While an author's intention cannot be regarded as a reliable criterion of value, it is often a necessary concept for the interpretation of his work. Distinctions have to be drawn between levels of meaning within a single poem, between simpler and more complex types of verse, and between one author and another. Among great writers Horace is relatively straightforward, yet his poems are not all equally explicit, and his intention is not always ascertainable or relevant. In a short ode like *Carm.*, I, 11 the message is stated quite plainly, and wherever there is a message (e.g. in all protreptic and didactic poetry) we may inquire about a poet's intention. But it is useless to ask whether Horace intended or was aware of the function fulfilled by the image of the wintry sea. On points like this it is the poem itself which concerns us, not the author's conscious purpose.

After this rather ponderous introduction let us turn to *Carm.*, II, 14:

*Eheu fugaces, Postume, Postume,
labuntur anni. . . .*

There is a danger that long familiarity may have blunted our response to these fine, melancholy words. Perhaps it may help us to recover their original freshness if we remember that Horace was not the sort of writer to use *eheu* as an empty flourish, and that the repetition of a person's name is without parallel in his work. The stanza is given its momentum by *labuntur anni*, a phrase which announces at once the poem's main, and indeed its only theme, namely the shortness of human life. This, you may say, is admirably direct, but how is Horace to maintain our

⁷ For the issues involved see *The Verbal Icon* by Wimsatt and Beardsley, chapter 1; *Theory of Literature* by Wellek and Warren, pp. 34 f. and 148 f.; and the article on Intention by Coomaraswamy in *The American Bookman*, I (1944).

interest in this dreary topic for another six stanzas without introducing some new thematic material? Well, first of all he has given the poem a definite but yet varied structure. It falls on inspection into two sets of three stanzas, the whole being rounded off by a moral epilogue; but whereas the first three stanzas consist of a single sentence, the other three are self-contained. Again, within the second group, the first strophe speaks of Mars, the Adriatic, and the south wind; the next of Cocytus, the Danaids, and Sisyphus; the third of earth, home, and wife, but in this last case the triadic structure is varied by bringing in the trees on the doomed man's estate. The two main groups are linked by the gerundives *enaviganda*, *visendus*, and *linquenda*, and more especially by the two glimpses of Tartarus—each in the centre of its own group.

This leads on to the second way in which Horace maintains our interest, that is by constantly switching our attention from this world to the next. A rough analysis shows that we are above ground down to 6, in Hades between 6 and 12, on earth again until 16, back in Hades till 20, and then on earth once more until our final disappearance in 24. Putting it more picturesquely we might say that "the poet's eye in a fine frenzy rolling doth glance from hell to earth, from earth to hell."

The last stanza, as already remarked, is a kind of satiric epilogue. Postumus is now supposed to have left the scene, and his heir has taken over. Obeying the Horatian maxim that all heirs are greedy, the newcomer helps himself generously to the dead man's wine—a picture of such horror that Postumus must have issued immediate invitations to a party.

But we shall not fully understand the power of this ode until we realise that it involves a profound paradox. Viewed *sub specie aeternitatis* man is a creature dependent on the fruits of the earth, exposed to the chances of war and the elements, and subject to the dominion of death. From such a standpoint the *rex* is seen to be at one with the *colonus*. In temporal terms this identity becomes clear at the final moment when piety, nobility, wealth, and power count for nothing. Yet when all the trappings have been stripped off and man is seen in his basic condition of wretched insignificance, he still remains heroic. Horace does not say this, but his poetry does. Leaving aside the testimony of rhythm and word-music let us consider simply the Homeric

and Aeschylean echoes. In the opening stanzas death is *indomitus* and *illacrimabilis*, epithets which recall Homer's ἀδάμαστος (*Il.*, IX, 158) and ἀδάκρυτος (*Il.*, I, 415; *Od.*, XXIV, 61). Geryon is *ter amplius* just as he is τρισώματος in Aeschylus (*Ag.*, 870). The reference to Sisyphus in stanza five can, of course, be traced to the eleventh book of the *Odyssey* (line 593), but I wonder whether the significance of another passage has been fully appreciated. *Sisyphus Aeolides* echoes Σίσυφος Αἰολίδης in *Iliad*, VI, 154—a line which forms part of Glaucus' speech to Diomedes beginning with those famous words on human transience:

οἷη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.

Just three lines earlier Diomedes has concluded his address with the challenge:

εἰ δέ τίς ἐσσι βροτῶν οἱ ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδουσιν,
ἄσσον ἔθ', ὥς κεν θᾶσσον ὀλέθρου πείραθ' ἵκηται,

part of which appears in Horace's ode as *quicumque terrae munere vescimur*.

There are also some verbal ironies which should not be missed. Thus *enaviganda* does not have the sense of escape as it does in Cic., *Tusc.*, IV, 33 (the only previous instance recorded) but of completion as in the Greek ἐκπερᾶν; *frustra* . . . *metuemus* does not mean that everything will turn out happily, but rather the reverse; *longi* is an understatement for *aeterni*; stanza six has a grim jest about the cypress tree; and *brevem*, which means both "short-lived" and "in possession for a short period," diminishes the significance of *dominus*. These touches prepare us for the ironic epilogue, and in that final strophe the proud wine which has been so carefully preserved takes over the qualities and fate of its former owner.

Tensions like these often elude the skimmer with his stock responses and also the student who is using the poem as a means of learning Latin. They exist, nevertheless, and they contribute to the larger paradox which turns a melancholy poem with rather commonplace ideas into a great affirmation of life. A writer may say, like Horace, that human beings are weak and ephemeral; he may go as far as Sophocles and cry that never to have lived is best; but if he is a true poet he will be refuted out of his own mouth.

It has already been pointed out that *cheu fugaces* has a single undeviating theme, but we still have to illustrate how this singleness is enforced by the unity of the poem's images. This unity is found in the notion of wetness. The years glide by like a stream, Pluto is not merely grim but tearless (*illacrimabilis* has no parallel), he is also not just king of Hades in general but of the *river* which we all must cross. War appears as a blood-stained ogre and is followed by the Adriatic sea with its breakers.⁸ In the next stanza hell is again symbolised by a river, and here we are reminded that the river of tearless Pluto is the river of wailing.⁹ The first people we meet in the underworld are the daughters of Danaus—no doubt carrying their pitchers of water, and the last sound we hear in the poem is the splash of wine on a marble floor.¹⁰ To say that all these images were intended to represent flux or menace or some other central idea would be a naive over-simplification, as well as being demonstrably wrong. What I am suggesting is that they are all related at a level below their surface meanings, just as trees which are quite separate above ground may form a complicated nexus with their roots.

From a poem with a linear theme (which may be indicated thus →) we turn to an ode which is thematically more complex, namely *Carm.*, I, 4:

Solvitur acris hiems grata vice veris et Favoni
trahuntque siccās machinae carinas.

Solvitur acris hiems. Again the main images appear in the opening words, but this time there are three of them, and instead of existing independently each one forms part of an antithesis. Let us take them one by one. First of all *solvitur*. Here is the image of liberation; the year is opening up, ships are being launched, men and animals are going out into fields which are

⁸ For the sea's hostility see e.g. *Carm.*, I, 3, and for a contrast with romantic ideas cf. W. H. Auden, *The Enchafed Flood*, 18-22.

⁹ Stanzas 4 and 5 are contrasted not only by their Roman and Greek imagery but also by their different orders of time. War, sea, and wind suggest hurried motion, whereas Cocytus, meandering with its sluggish stream, can afford to take things slowly; and the tasks of the damned will not soon be finished.

¹⁰ These images were noticed by C. Dahl, *C. P.*, XLVIII (1953), p. 240. His view of *Aeolides*, however, will hardly do.

free from snow. "Now is the time to bind one's head with myrtle or with flowers born from the open earth." The expression *terrae solutae* recalling *solvitur* in line one completes the image of liberation. But already, unnoticed, the opposite theme of constraint has entered. At first in *iunctaeque Nymphis Gratiae* and *caput impedire myrto* it forms part of the spring celebrations, but soon it acquires the meaning of restriction (*vetat* in 15), and finally that of captivity (*iam te premet nox*, etc.). Death as a prison house is not new to us; we have already met it in II, 14 (*compescit unda*) and we shall come across it again in *Carm.*, IV, 7.

Then we have cold and warmth. The keen winter gives way to spring with its mild breezes, the ploughman leaves his fire, the fields are no longer frozen, and glowing Vulcan attends the forges of the Cyclopes. But when pale death knocks, you will forget Lycidas, now so warmly regarded by the young men and soon to kindle love amongst the girls. The third pair of opposites is white and green. Spring moves over the white fields, garlands of green myrtle are to be put on, flowers are in bloom, leaves are on the trees (*umbrosis lucis*),¹¹ but pale death will come.

Such are the ode's dominant images. Clearly they form a more complex pattern than the one presented by II, 14. Instead of a straight line we find an arc of the year's cycle, and this is related to the cycle of life. Winter and death are cold, white, and imprisoned; spring and youth are warm, green, and free. But again the images are not always in unison with the surface meaning. Sometimes they move contrapuntally, as when the fire's warmth is associated with winter (3), and when in 6 and 9 the binding motive appears in the context of youth and spring. These threads draw the work together at a level where it cannot be paraphrased. As a final example we may notice the way in which at the turning point of the poem the drumming of death's foot takes up the beat of the nymphs' dance—the position of *pulsat pede* (13) corresponds exactly to that of *quatiunt pede* (7). Yet in a sense neither the annual nor the biological cycle is complete in itself. Each supplements the other. Thus the arc of winter to spring is rounded off by the arc of youth to death:

¹¹ If *umbrosis lucis* be rejected as a green image it will at least be allowed to stand as a contrast to the frosty fields.



A further development of this cyclic design can be seen in the famous ode *diffugere nives* (IV, 7). Once again spring has arrived. The snow has fled, grass and foliage are returning, rivers are subsiding, and the spirits of spring come out to dance in the mild air. Theme, metre, and green/white imagery recall I, 4. But suddenly the mood changes:

immortalia ne speres monet annus et alium .
quae rapit hora diem.

So human life is in some way related to the course of the year. To show just how, the poet makes a fresh start and this time runs through the entire cycle of the seasons:

. frigora mitescunt zephyris, ver proterit aestas
interitura simul
pomifer autumnus fruges effuderit et mox
bruma recurrit iners.

Few lines illustrate better the particular genius of the Latin language. Form and content fuse to bring before us the ruthless speed of the revolving seasons. The hour snatches away the day, summer tramples on spring, winter hurries back again. In all these points man's life corresponds to the phases of the year. We note especially *bruma iners*—the "dead" mid-winter—and also the verbs *decidimus* and *occideris* which remind us that human bodies, no less than heavenly ones, move towards their setting. Conversely the phenomena of nature behave like human beings—*rapit, proterit, recurrit*.

Yet the correspondence is, after all, incomplete simply because the human cycle is not repeated. The rest of the poem is taken up with this melancholy reflection, and it is here that the differences between I, 4 and IV, 7 are most clearly seen. In the earlier ode the knock of death does not come until two-thirds of the way through, and in the closing lines the poet manages to regain something of his former cheerfulness—*quo calet inventus nunc omnis et mox virgines tepebunt*. These words take us back to the bright and brittle society of Hellenistic Greece with its *συμπόσια*

and its παιδικὸς ἔρως; and the final effect is not unlike the end of that charming piece of pastoral the *Copa*:

pone merum et talos, pereat qui crastina curat.
Mors aurem vellens "vivite" ait, "venio."

But there is no such relief at the end of *diffugere nives*. We are left in a land without colour and without warmth, and all hope of escape is dashed by the remorseless *non restituet . . . neque liberat . . . nec valet abrumpere*—words which sound like forlorn echoes of *redeunt, recurrit, and reparant*. So here death is once more a prison house—a dark prison house inhabited by shadows. Reprieve is unthinkable, because there is no appeal against the verdict of Minos.

cum semel occideris et de te splendida Minos
fecerit arbitria

—the awful splendour of the last judgment contained in six words. It is partly a matter of sound and rhythm, in that *de te* prepares us for the great, tolling line which follows:

non, Torquate, genus, non te facundia, non te;

it is partly an appeal to the quasi-biblical picture of Minos:

Διὸς ἀγλαὸν υἱόν,
χρύσειον σκήπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν,
ἦμενον,¹²

but most of the line's power undoubtedly resides in *splendida*, and *splendida arbitria* is an expression which English cannot translate. "August," "stately," and "imposing" are worthy efforts, but they prevent the metaphor from shining out as it does in the Latin, intensifying the gloom of the "infernal darkness."


The sombre *gravitas* of the concluding section is strengthened by the names of Aeneas, Tullus, and Ancus, and by the aristocratic qualities of *genus*, *facundia*, and *pietas*.¹³ It also seems fitting that the final touch of poignancy in this ode (so Lucretian in matter, so un-Lucretian in tone)¹⁴ should be achieved by a reference to the ineffectuality of love.

¹² *Odys.*, XI, 568 ff.

¹³ Cf. Fraenkel, *Horace*, pp. 420 f.

¹⁴ Cf. *De Rerum Natura*, III, 1025 ff.

The themes of the poem may be represented thus :



The arc from winter to spring was drawn in 1-6, then the whole cycle followed in 9-12.

Looking back over the last two poems we notice that their cyclic themes are indicated by the word *vices*. *Carm.*, I, 4 has *solvitur acris hiems grata vice veris*, and IV, 7 has *mutat terra vices*. The same sign appears in lines 7 and 8 of the thirteenth epode: *deus haec fortasse benigna/reducet in sedem vice*. In the epode, however, the cycles or oscillations are rather different. Instead of the arc from winter to spring we have an arc from stormy to sunny weather. Also we find that a motive which was only touched on in the poems previously mentioned is here given an important position. I mean the change from anxiety to cheerfulness. In the last verse of II, 14 the heir at least has the sense to enjoy what he owns; in I, 4 anxieties about the future are futile—*vitae summa brevis spem nos vetat incohare longam* (15). The thought crops up again in IV, 7, 19-20:

cuncta manus avidas fugient heredis amico
quae dederis animo.

I have always been a little puzzled by these lines. The *carpe diem* motive is not sufficiently developed, and so the invitation sounds half-hearted. The tone is also rather discordant. It is one thing to conclude a poem with a whole stanza of satire like *absumet heres* (II, 14), but quite another to introduce a greedy *captator* and then relapse at once into profound melancholy. I suppose we must just remember that Horace was rarely content to describe a scene or create a mood without somehow relating it to the sphere of human activity.

In *Epode* 13 we have no such problems. The change from anxiety to cheerfulness is an integral part of the work and forms the third arc in the poem's pattern along with storm-to-calm and youth-to-death. But to abstract and isolate the figures in

this way is a crude over-simplification. To see how they are interwoven we must turn to the poem itself:

Horrida tempestas caelum contraxit et imbres
nivesque deducunt Iovem. . . .

On first reading these graphic lines we accept them as a vivid picture of a stormy winter's day. The first intimation of complexity comes in 4 and 5:

dumque virent genua
et decet, obducta solvatur fronte senectus.

The phrase *virent genua* does not suggest only vigour (Horace could easily have written *vigent*); no, recalling as it does Theocritus' γόνυ χλωρόν,¹⁵ it implies a green contrast to the white snow and hints at a relationship between human beings and the world of nature. However, the full significance of *virent genua* does not become apparent until later in the poem. What about the next sentence—*obducta solvatur fronte senectus*? As soon as we see it we are back at the opening lines. Of course! Now we realise why we found those images so striking; for while *frontem contrahere* and *supercilium deducere* are quite straightforward expressions for frowning, it is highly metaphorical to say *caelum contrahere* or *Iovem deducere*. As examples of the more usual idiom we may quote *Serm.*, II, 2, 125: *explicuit vino contractae seria frontis*, and *Quint.*, XI, 3, 79: *ira enim contractis (superciliis), tristitia deductis, hilaritas remissis ostenditur*. But one would search long before finding a parallel to *caelum contrahere* or *Iovem deducere*.¹⁶

Well then, in spite of the depressing weather, moodiness, moroseness, and despair are to be cast off. But Horace does not say "moodiness, moroseness, and despair"; he says *senectus*. And so the gloom of the snow-storm is brought into direct association with old age, and both are contrasted with the freshness and gaiety of youth.

cetera mitte loqui: deus haec fortasse benigna
reducet in sedem vice.

¹⁵ Theoc., 14, 70.

¹⁶ The instances quoted by Orelli from Vergil and Lucretius are not analogous, and Δία κατάγουσιν (cited by Gow, p. xl and Page, p. 487 from Anacreon 6) is a conjecture based on this passage.

Both *cetera* and *haec* should be interpreted in a general way as including the bad weather as well as personal anxieties. But what of *reducet in sedem*? Here is another interesting expression which must mean "will set at rest again." The only parallel adduced by the editors is the phrase of Augustus quoted by Suetonius: *rem publicam sistere in sua sede liceat*.¹⁷ But *sistere* is not at all so striking as *reducere*. Again, having noted the peculiarity, let us read on. "Now is the time to put on scented ointment" *et fide Cyllenea levare diris pectora sollicitudinibus*. The epithet *Cyllenea* paves the way both by its metre and its meaning for the poem's Homeric conclusion. And in this final section—that is Chiron's address to the πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς—we find the fulfilment of the phrase *virent genua* with all its ancient associations of swiftness and vital power.¹⁸

There are other links as well between the Homeric and Roman parts of the poem. Leaving aside the common element of wine and song, which is the main point of the *exemplum*, one notices the name of Assaracus, who was not only Tros' father and hence an ancestor of the Trojans, but also the great-grandfather of Aeneas. Or, to take another example, Horace says to his companion¹⁹ "Achilles was *invictus* and *dea natus*, but even he was doomed; so why do you fret yourself? Much better to make the most of what you have." Thus the old Homeric idea of *κάτθανε καὶ Πάτροκλος* becomes grafted on to the Horatian idea of *carpe diem*. There has been much debate about the cold streams of Scamander and the gliding Simois. Horace may have been alluding to the cool source of the Scamander as mentioned in *Iliad*, XXII, 151 f., or he may have had in mind the μάχη παραποτάμιος in book XXI (see Heinze's note). But in any case it is worth noting that *frigidus* and *lubricus* have sinister overtones which are not inappropriate to the land of death; and this is further underlined by the use of *manere*, which reminds us of uses such as *omnes una manet nox*.²⁰

The fates, then, have snapped off Achilles' return (*reditum rupere*), *nec mater domum caerulea te revehet*. "Nor will your mother bring you home." When we read these words do we not

¹⁷ Suet., *Aug.*, 28.

¹⁸ Cf. Onians, *Origins of European Thought*, general index under *knees*.


¹⁹ That is if one person is addressed throughout. See Housman, *C. R.*, XXXVII (1923), p. 104.

²⁰ *Carm.*, I, 28, 15.

hear an echo of *reducet in sedem* (8)? For "she will bring you home" is just what *reducet in sedem* would normally have meant. This connection brings the poem's meaning into sharper focus; for although sunny weather will come back, and good spirits will revive, there is no return from "that undiscovered country."

The next line (17) repeats the advice of 6 and 9, and *levato* is a clear reminiscence of *levare* (10), which itself goes back to *solvatur* (5). Finally, one's troubles are to be dispelled by wine and song—*deformis aegrimoniae dulcibus alloquiis*. It is not too much to say that the imagery of the entire poem is summed up in these words. For "ugly anxiety" (a very unusual phrase) links up with *senectus* and its gloomy face (5), which in turn is associated with the overcast sky, and ultimately with the coldness of death itself. Whereas *dulcibus alloquiis* "those sweet beguilers" represent wine and music, which are appropriate to the boy Achilles, to the youthful Horace and his companion, and to all young people with gay spirits and energetic bodies.²¹

Having identified a triple pattern in *Epod.* 13, which takes the following form:



we may now be in a better position to examine the structure of *Carm.*, I, 9. The Soracte ode has received more attention than any of the pieces so far mentioned. The first English scholar to appreciate its symbolic nature was, I believe, L. P. Wilkinson,²² and since his book appeared there have been articles by M. P. Cunningham in *Classical Philology*,²³ by Miss Toll and M. G. Shields in *Phoenix*,²⁴ and a review by F. O. Copley in the

²¹ Other threads in this pattern are *deformis hiems*, Juv., 4, 58; Sen., *Apoc.*, 2; Sil. It., III, 489; *deformis senex*, Lucil., 331; *senes ac deformes*, Cic., *Verr.*, II, 5, 64; *deformis caeli facies*, Luc., IV, 105; *inde senilis hiems tremulo venit horrida passu*, Ov., *Met.*, XV, 212; *non ille . . . te negleget horridus*, Hor., *Carm.*, III, 21, 10; *campus . . . erat deformis atque horridus*, Cic., *Verr.*, II, 3, 47. In Horace's *Odes* we have not fully read the first line until we have completed the poem.

²² *Horace and his Lyric Poetry*, pp. 130 ff.

²³ *C. P.*, LII (1957).

²⁴ *Phoenix*, IX (1955) and XII (1958).

American Journal of Philology.²⁵ What I should like to do is to give a brief outline of the poem and then go on to discuss some of its more controversial points.

Outside it is winter. Soracte is covered with snow. Trees droop under their burden, and rivers are frozen. From this frosty scene we move indoors to the warmth of a fire, wine, and good company. Forget your worries, says Horace, and make the most of life while you're young—*donec virenti canities abest morosa* (17). The contrast of white and green shows that Horace is again associating human life with the world of nature, and this at once suggests a more general contrast between the opening and the end of the poem. The winter scene remains as real as ever, but it has taken on symbolic overtones. The white snow, the trees' burden, and the frozen rivers contain similar implications to those of *bruma iners* in IV, 7; whereas the closing stanzas, with their references to outdoor activities, point rather to the spring or summer. This contrast is perhaps a little awkward, but it has brought Horace more censure than he deserves. People have complained that the ode is spoilt by having a winter opening and a spring conclusion, especially when the two scenes are made to appear contemporary by the reiterated *nunc* in 18 and 21. But this is unfair, because although the primary significance of stanza one is that of winter, the primary significance of the closing stanzas is not spring, but youth. The two *nunc*'s mean "now while you're young," not "now while it's spring." This is made perfectly clear by the *puer* of 16 and by the *donec* clause which follows it. The construction exactly resembles *dumque virent genua* in *Epod.* 13.

White/green, cold/warm, stillness/movement. These and a few other antitheses which do not really matter fit naturally into the larger patterns of winter/spring and youth/age. For L. P. Wilkinson these two sets of images are enough to interpret the poem, but I feel that he is not taking full account of the third stanza:

Permitte divis cetera, qui simul
stravere ventos aequare fervido

²⁵ *A. J. P.*, LXVII (1946). The approaches of Copley and Wilkinson are not in competition. However I do not think that the rise and fall in the structure of *Carm.*, I, 9 are quite as regular as Copley supposes.

deproeliantis nec cypressi
nec veteres agitantur orni.

These lines cannot form part of the Soracte scene. They are set on the sea coast and contain a picture of wild movement, whereas Soracte dominates a frozen landscape. Moreover, the Latin construction forbids us to assume either that the storm has immediately preceded the frosty scene²⁶ or that the two scenes are simultaneous.²⁷ The only possible view is that Horace is stating a general truth about the power of the gods.²⁸ This was perceived by Heinze and Wilkinson, but neither of them has explained the stanza's function quite satisfactorily. Heinze simply says that the power of the gods is most strikingly displayed in the quelling of storms, while Wilkinson maintains that the storm is the storm of life and the calm the calm of death. Now when Horace says *permitte divis cetera* he implies that things will eventually take a turn for the better and that the balance of nature will be restored.²⁹ We may compare II, 9, 1-8 (*non semper imbres . . .*), II, 10, 15-20 (*informis hiemes reducit Iuppiter, idem summovet . . .*), I, 7, 15-17 (*albus ut obscuro deterget nubila caelo saepe Notus . . .*), and a less confident version in *Epod.* 13, 7 (*cetera mitte loqui, deus haec fortasse benigna reducet in sedem vice*). Well then, are we to imagine Horace as saying "Don't worry, things will eventually take a turn for the better, you'll soon be dead"? Of course that won't do, but perhaps it is possible to guess at what led Wilkinson astray. Throughout his analysis of the Soracte ode Wilkinson was acutely conscious of its symbolic affinities with Housman's *On Wenlock Edge*. In fact he quotes the final verse in support of his argument:

The gale it plies the saplings double,
it blows so hard 'twill soon be gone,

²⁶ This seems to be Pasquali's view, cf. *Orazio Livico*, p. 82.

²⁷ Page, for instance, supplies *nunc* with *deproeliantis*.

²⁸ Examples of this construction are given in Gildersleeve's *Grammar*, § 567.

²⁹ Cf. Archilochus, 67a (Diehl) beginning *θυμέ, θυμ'* and ending *γίγνωσκε δ' ολος ρυσμός ανθρώπους ἔχει* (See Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, pp. 125 f.). Cf. also Uhland's *Frühlingsglaube*:

Nun, armes Herze, sei nicht bang!
Nun muss sich alles, alles wenden.

to-day the Roman and his trouble:
are ashes under Uricon.

As in Horace, the threads of humanity and nature are interwoven, but Wilkinson may have overlooked the difference in mood between the two poems. Horace never draws this kind of bleak comfort from the prospect of death, and to introduce such a notion into the Soracte ode would surely destroy its spirit, for it is above all else a happy composition.

Nevertheless Housman's poem does point the way to a more satisfactory solution of our problem. You remember the opening verse:

On Wenlock Edge the wood's in trouble,
his forest fleece the Wrekin heaves,
the wind it plies the saplings double,
and thick on Severn snow the leaves.

The wood's in trouble—*silvae laborantes*? Quite possibly. And does this not lead us straight to the section we are discussing—*nec cupressi nec veteres agitantur orni*? The winds struggle over the turbulent sea (*aequore fervido*), and when they are laid low, the cypress and ash trees are no longer disturbed. *Fervidus* suggests violent emotion, and this appears to be the first known instance of its application to the sea.³⁰ As for *agitantur*, the metaphorical sense can be illustrated from Horace, *Epist.*, I, 18, 98, where he is speaking of tranquillity:

num te semper inops agitet vexetque cupido,
num pavor et rerum mediocriter utilium spes.

So at its metaphorical level this verse would seem to deal with the change from turbulent anxiety to calm cheerfulness.³¹


The seasons and the weather are beyond human control. Some greater power, whether it be the gods or the rhythm of nature, will see to it that winter does not last for ever. We should therefore ignore the snow and make things as comfortable as possible within. A similar rhythm governs our national and personal affairs. Dangers pass, troubles recede. Meanwhile we should

³⁰ Isid., *Orig.*, XIII, 18, 2: *freta dicta ait Varro quasi fervida* is slightly misleading; what Varro says is *dictum fretum ab similitudine ferventis aquae* (*L. L.*, VII, 22).

³¹ As Pasquali says, "Spesso a Orazio, allorchè egli pensa a un' anima torbida e tempestosa, appare l'immagine del mare" (*op. cit.*, p. 82).

turn away from all that is grim and depressing, and think only of those things which make the moment happy. For to-day is a gift which Fortune will not offer again.³²

So it turns out that *Carm.*, I, 9 has four main pairs of antitheses: winter/spring, age/youth, storm/calm, anxiety/cheerfulness.



Putting the submerged or metaphorical themes in brackets we get a scheme like this:

- 1) Winter (age, anxiety).
- 2) Winter, cheerfulness (youth).
- 3) Storm, calm (anxiety, cheerfulness).
- 4) Anxiety, cheerfulness, youth.
- 5) Age, anxiety, youth, cheerfulness (winter, spring).
- 6) Youth, cheerfulness (spring).

The third stanza has always been something of a problem. Leaving aside the question of its interpretation, we may perhaps hazard a guess at its function in the Ode. In I, 7 Horace says "the wind does not always bring rain-storms, you too should relax from time to time"; in I, 26 the winds carry the poet's fear away while he remains calm; in *Epod.* 13 the storm outside will eventually cease, so Horace's friend should also forget his troubles. In I, 9, therefore, Horace may have felt that he needed a scene of confused motion in the world of nature to set against the inner calm which he was recommending. Such movement was not to be found in the frozen landscape of Soracte, so it had to be introduced in a verse of its own. Whether this whole business was deliberate or not it is impossible to say.

Two other points before leaving this ode. In the article already referred to M. G. Shields compares the opening stanza with the introduction to a Christian parable like "consider the lilies." There would seem to be two main difficulties here. First

³² Cf. *Carm.*, III, 8, 27; also *Epod.*, 13, 4, where the *dies* is, as it were, the vehicle of the *occasio*. As for *lucro appone*, we should avoid translating "Put down on the side of gain" (Page). The ancients did not have the bilateral system of bookkeeping. See B. R. Rees, *C. R.*, VIII (1958).

I cannot see a parallel between "consider the lilies" and "consider Soracte." The lilies represent a model of tranquillity for neurotic and ulcerated mortals like ourselves, but Soracte and its environs do not reflect any such admirable quality. They stand rather for age and anxiety, as we have just seen. True, the scene has a certain icy beauty, but it is not a calm or a comfortable one. The woods are bowed beneath their burden, the rivers are caught in the sharp grip of frost, and one is glad to get indoors to the warmth of the fire. Secondly it was unusual for Soracte to be covered in snow, and it was this event which provided the occasion for the ode; the lilies, however, were part of the normal landscape, and were brought in to illustrate the religious message. Here is a slight but definite contrast in emphasis.

This leads on to the other point, namely the question of the poem's "reality." First of all does the opening stanza represent an actual experience? Orelli says no. After referring to the fragment of Alcaeus he concludes *qua ex imitatione ipsa equidem colligo totum argumentum esse fictitium ac liberæ φαντασίας ludum*. In other words, since Alcaeus has spoken of a bad day it means that when Horace does the same he must be romancing. Apart altogether from the question of logical sequence, the great editor might have noticed that in Alcaeus there is no mountain and in Horace there is no rain. Yet there is something in what Orelli says. We must distinguish between the poem's dramatic setting and the place where it was written. While the scene in stanza two is authentic in the sense that its outlines are true to life, it is not being enacted at the moment of composition. We can scarcely visualise Horace sitting, tablet on knee, while the party goes on around him—not all lyric writers have the same detachment and facility as Mr. Cole Porter. Furthermore, since Roman houses faced inwards, Horace was not inviting Thaliarchus to look at Soracte through the window. The whole winter landscape—mountain, trees, and rivers—was to be seen by the eye of the imagination. The snow was there all right, but it was not visible from where Horace was writing or from where the party was supposed to be.

A few years ago a new question was opened in a stimulating article by Bagnani.³³ His point may be summarized as follows:

³³ *Phoenix*, VIII (1954).

if the living-room of a Roman house had no chimney, how are we to explain *ligna super foco*? You can burn charcoal without a chimney, but what about logs? This is certainly a nice problem, and I am not so rash as to challenge Bagnani on a point of archaeology. However, a student of literature can always turn for aid to the *Thesaurus*. There he will find that Vollmer has listed twenty-five or thirty passages which show that in the humbler country houses at any rate wood was burnt on the hearth.³⁴ We will let the metaphysicians decide at what stage a log becomes a branch, but the pieces, whatever we call them, must have been reasonably small. They were certainly dry and well seasoned, and no doubt they were sometimes treated in the way recommended by Cato in his *De Agri Cultura*.³⁵ Nevertheless, smoke and soot could not be avoided, as several of the passages show.³⁶ The question, then, is whether wood was burned in the sort of house that Horace had in mind. If the archaeologists eventually prove that the burning of wood was confined to the peasants' dwelling-houses, then we shall have to suppose that *ligna super foco* is being used in a figurative sense. But this does not affect the points made in the previous paragraph. I would contend, therefore, that the opening stanza refers to an actual period of frost, that the poem was written during or shortly after the period described, and that the party scene is a piece of realistic drama.

This paper has tried, amongst other things, to illustrate how the investigation of a poem's imagery can give its meaning a new dimension. We cannot expect the method to yield equally fruitful results in the case of every poet. Yet it seems that even with a writer like Horace, whose work is of a relatively plain texture, the technique can be usefully combined with the more traditional means of interpretation.³⁷

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³⁴ E. g. Varro, *R. R.*, I, 15; II, 10; Lucil., 966; Hor., *Epod.*, 2, 43; *Moretum*, 37; Ov., *Past.*, IV, 510; *Medic.*, 16.

³⁵ *De Ag.*, 130. Cf. Forbes, *Stud. in Ancient Technology*, VI, p. 14.

³⁶ E. g. Verg., *Georg.*, I, 175; Ov., *Pont.*, I, 3, 34; Verg., *Ecl.*, 7, 49; Mart., II, 90, 7; Colum., XI, 3, 60.

³⁷ Professors G. Bagnani, D. F. S. Thomson, and L. E. Woodbury were kind enough to discuss certain questions which arose during the writing of this paper. They are not responsible for its defects.

PLATO'S HYPOTHESIS AND THE UPWARD PATH.

Richard Robinson, in his stimulating and searching book on *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, has a section entitled "Hypothesizing a Higher Hypothesis."¹ Like other recent scholars, he takes it for granted that in Plato's scheme of hypothetical reasoning as developed in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, the more general hypothesis, the hypothesis bordering more closely upon the ἀννπόθετον, is the higher hypothesis. That is to say, in a deductive system, as the Latin base of the term indicates, the premises are thought of as located higher than the conclusions. In this, Robinson follows not only what he conceives to be Plato's own hints, but also the usage of Aristotle: "By 'upward' I mean the ascent to the more universal, by 'downward' the descent to the more particular."² In this footnote on terminology, Aristotle is talking about κατηγορίαι, predicates in syllogistic reasoning. It might at first be supposed that ἄνω and κάτω are references to the purely formal structure of the syllogism itself rather than to the structure of the reality signified by the terms of the syllogism.³ But other passages make sufficiently clear that the reference is indeed to higher and lower Being.⁴ For Aristotle, the movement of the syllogism is downward because we demonstrate certain conclusions from certain assumptions—often, paradoxically, called κείμενα—of a more universal character. τὸ ἄνωθεν is a regular term for the superordinate genus.⁵ In his discussion of Plato, also, τὰ ἄνω and τὰ κάτω always refer to genus and species.⁶ It is not surprising, therefore, that Aristotle's

¹ R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*² (Oxford, 1953), p. 136, ch. 9, § 4.

² *Anal. Post.* 82a23, tr. G. R. G. Mure: λέγω δ' ἄνω μὲν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον, κάτω δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος.

³ See especially *Anal. Prior.* 65b23: τοῦτο γὰρ ἐγχαρῆ γενέσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω λαμβάνοντι τὸ συνεχές. . . .

⁴ Cf. the passage just preceding the footnote on terminology, *Anal. Post.* 81b38: ἄρα ἐνδέχεται ἀρξαμένῳ ἀπὸ τοιούτου δὲ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχει ἐτέρῳ ἀλλ' ἄλλο ἐκείνῳ, ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω εἰς ἄπειρον ἵεναι, θάτερον δὲ ἀρξάμενον . . . δὲ αὐτὸ μὲν ἄλλου, ἐκείνου δὲ μηδὲν κατηγορεῖται, ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐνδέχεται εἰς ἄπειρον ἵεναι.

⁵ *Anal. Post.* 97a33.

⁶ *Met.* 992a18.

logical terminology is generally thought to be based on Plato's. The facts, however, do not entirely bear out this view. In this paper I shall attempt to show that Aristotle's logical terminology, ontologically conditioned or determined as it obviously is, contrasts with that of Plato, who, on the whole, with perhaps one or two exceptions, was very careful not to introduce unwarranted ontological perspectives into matters of logic.⁷

To begin with, it will be convenient to note the implications of Platonic diaeresis. It is true that this operation of Platonic dialectic is not the same as the logical progress from premise to inference. Genus and species are ontological rather than logical terms. And yet it may be assumed that if Plato's logic anticipated the Aristotelian distinction between the higher and the lower, the same topographical perspective should also be apparent in the area studied by diaeresis. It will be all the more striking, then, if we can show that diaeresis does not make provision for a vertical hierarchy of Being, or, at least, that Plato's discussion does not suggest that such a hierarchy is reflected in the diaeretic procedure so as to shape it in its image.

Modern discussions of Plato's analysis via division and collection often refer to higher or superordinate and lower or subordinate γένη. μέγιστα γένη is sometimes rendered as "highest forms."⁸ And elegant stemmata are devised, spreading from the top of the page to the bottom, to reproduce the upward or downward movement of the dialectical process. But if we look closely at the relevant passages, both at those where Plato practices the technique of division and collection, and at those in which he states his method, we find that the directional implications of the process are either indifferent or horizontal. That is to say, to the extent that Plato conceives the diaeretic procedure as moving, it moves on one plane or level.

Here is a listing of the principal passages in question, with the key words, the topographical orientation implied, and occasional further comment.

⁷ I wish to thank Professors J. B. Skemp, D. J. Allan, L. Edelstein, and G. Vlastos for reading the manuscript and suggesting various improvements. My gratitude should not, however, imply that they approve the thesis of this paper.

⁸ C. Ritter, "Platons Logik," *Philologus*, LXXV (1919), pp. 1 ff., and *passim*.

Phaedrus 265D-266C: diaeresis operates by dividing the entity to be analyzed into a left (ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τεμνόμενος) and a right part (εἰς τὰ ἐν δεξιᾷ). Orientation: not vertical. Hence such terms as "sub-form" and "infima species" should be eliminated from the discussion of diaeresis passages.

Sophist 253: analysis consists of showing which γένη associate with one another and which do not (... ποῖα ... συμφωνεῖ ... ποῖα ... οὐ δέχεται) and which γένη have another "stretched through" them (διατεταμένην) so as to contain them (περιεχομένης). Orientation: indifferent.⁹

Politicus 262A-263B: analysis should operate by cutting through the middle (διὰ μέσον . . . ἵεναι τέμνοντας). Orientation: inconclusive.

Politicus 268C: analysis involves disengaging the item to be isolated from connected and related γένη "poured around" it (περικεχυμένους αὐτῷ). Orientation: indifferent.

Politicus 275E: the choice of the proper inclusive concept will allow us to "wrap up" (περικαλύπτειν) one species along with the others with which it constitutes a genus. Orientation: indifferent.

Politicus 285A-C: analysis requires orderly procedure, especially the grouping of separate elements into the one comprehensive genus to which they belong (τὰ οἰκεία ... ἔρξας ... περιβάλλεται). Orientation: indifferent.

Philebus 16D-18D: the analogy of grammatical and musical analysis shows that philosophical analysis must interpose various stages between the conception of the one and the conception of the infinite number containing the one (μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντός ... ἐνοῦσαν). Orientation: indifferent.

Sophist 265E-266A: In a progressive division of a γένος into 2, 4, 8, etc., parts, the division is made alternately by drawing a vertical line (κατὰ πλάτος) and a horizontal line (κατὰ μήκος). Orientation: indifferent.

Sophist 235 B-C: the sophist is pictured as caught in an

⁹ That "subsumption" is regularly visualized by Plato as containment appears also from such passages as *Gorgias* 464A ff., and *Theaet.* 206D4: . . . εἰς ταῦτόν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ [sc. τῷ στοιχείῳ] εἴπερ. . . .

enclosure which contains, as the area to be investigated, the art of image-making. If we divide this area, and descend into it (*καταβάντας*), we may either find our quarry right away, or we may have to do some further dividing until we find him in the place where he lies hidden (*δύηται*; cf. *καταπέφηνεν*, 236D3).—The imagery is taken from the method of flushing out game, and though the situation is not completely clear—why should one division, i. e., one flushing, not uncover whatever is to be found?—the terms *καταβάντας*, i. e., proceed deep into the woods, and *δύηται*, i. e., cower, should not be regarded as evidence for a vertical arrangement of classification. See also below, note 20. In the sequel, when Plato gives up the hunting imagery, there is no further mention of *καταβαίνειν*.

Other references could be added, but the result would be the same, namely that logical implication is regarded by Plato not as subsumption but either as containment—that is to say the genus envelops the species—or as division—that is, the species constitutes the right or left half of the genus. The movement experienced in the transition from genus to species or, in the case of collection, from species to genus is not in a single instance characterized as a descent from or an ascent to the genus.

One possible answer to this would be that the *εἶδη* may not be organized in a vertical hierarchy, but that the Ideas of Plato's middle dialogues are, and that such terms as *ὑπόθεσις*, *ἀρχή*, and *ἐπαγωγή*, with their well-known connotations, speak palpably for a vertical perspective. *ἐπαγωγή* may be dispensed with out of hand. Even Robinson, who insists that Plato practices *ἐπαγωγή*, admits that he is not aware of it as a logical procedure, and has in fact no term for it. Does Plato use induction? The boundary line separating induction from analogy is of course tenuous. But "all that business about cobblers and cleaners and cooks and doctors," as Callicles calls it, suggests that when Plato refers to practical reality, he appeals to some sort of intuition rather than the powers of reasoning. However that may be, Plato does not use the term *ἐπαγωγή*, and that relieves us of the need to discuss it.

As for *ὑπόθεσις* and its near-equivalent *ἀρχή*, the situation is very complex. Robinson himself has done much to shed light on the obscure standing of hypothesis in Plato. According to him, the case is the reverse of that obtaining in the matter of

induction: "Plato discussed but rarely used the hypothetical method." Since, therefore, we have Plato's methodology but little of his application, obscurities and even inconsistencies in the former leave matters somewhat doubtful. This much, however, is clear. A hypothesis is something posited—cf. Aristotle's *κείμενον*—as a preliminary assumption, as a basis¹⁰ for further logical operations which may either analyze the assumption itself or depend on it for the analysis of other assumptions. Normally the latter is the case, i. e., the hypothesis is a premise rather than a demonstrand.¹¹ Broadly speaking, then, "hypothesizing is positing with a view to future action." Often the assumption which forms the point of departure for further investigation is a *κοινὸν ἀξιώμενον*, a statement tacitly assumed to be true by all.

The important question which now arises is this: does the *ὑπό*-part of the word *ὑπόθεσις* signify that this basic assumption is conceived of as lying under and thus supporting the logical edifice constructed from it? Let us call this the U- (= under) perspective, to contrast with the A- (= above) perspective whereby the assumption is conceived of as lying above the conclusion. Now, on the face of it, it would seem likely that the *ὑπό* points to a U-perspective. But according to Robinson and most Platonists that cannot be, for a hypothesis to be useful must refer to a higher reality than the propositions deduced from it. Hence Plato's hypothesis, like Aristotle's premise, and equally paradoxically so, must be pictured as vaulting above the conclusions and deductions which are suspended below it.

To render this unlikely notion palatable, Robinson undertakes, in the wake of Burnet,¹² to demonstrate that the first sense of hypothesis was intellectual, not architectural or physical in any way.¹³ His reasoning is that if the word had ever "borne some such sense as 'physical foundation,' Plato would hardly have written the phrase *ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνουτο* (*Phd.* 101D); for it would have carried the absurd suggestion of 'placing as base whatever base seemed best of those above'!" As we shall see later, Robinson's interpretation of the *Phaedo* passage, though commonly accepted, is not

¹⁰ The word is Robinson's, p. 95.

¹¹ Robinson, p. 112.

¹² J. Burnet, ed., *Plato's Euthyphro*, etc. (Oxford, 1924), p. 51.

¹³ Robinson, pp. 68 and 98.

the only possible one. At *Republic* 511B, where Plato does understand hypothesis in the sense of a physical stepping stone—*ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς* . . .—Burnet and Robinson suspect a pun. But even granted that Plato is speaking humorously here, the passage proves that he felt the *ὑπό*-part of the term strongly enough to allow his conception of logical procedure, at this point, to be guided by it or at least to make allowance for it.

Though there is no uncontested case of Plato using *ὑπόθεσις* in the sense of "foundation," other writers supply us with the required supplementary information. Closest to that of Plato is, perhaps, the usage of the Hippocratic writers. For instance, the writer *On Ancient Medicine* (chs. 1; 13; 15) uses *ὑπόθεσις* to refer to one of the opposites—*τὸ θερμόν* and *τὸ ψυχρόν*, etc.—alleged to determine health, as well as to the assumption of the operation of such an opposite. The spatial perspective is not entirely clear, but it cannot be doubted that these opposites should be ranged closely with the Empedoclean *ῥιζώματα*, and as *ῥιζώματα* they would of course realize their *ὑπό*-function to the fullest.

Other writers who capitalize on the *ὑπό*-force of the word *ὑπόθεσις* are Aeschines (3, 76) and Polybius (XV, 35, 2). But our clearest evidence for the dynamic implications of *ὑπόθεσις* occurs in a popular text, and a simile, to boot. Demosthenes, II, 10, 5: "Just as the foundations of a house and a ship and other such structures must be very strong, so the *ἀρχαί* and *ὑποθέσεις* of actions ought to be true and just." Here there can be no doubt; a hypothesis is analogous to the foundation of a house, not to its roof. And this, I suggest, was the natural significance of the word *ὑπόθεσις*, before its meaning was obscured in a manner to be described directly: a foundation upon which to erect a superstructure of some sort, a broad basis on which things of lesser extent but greater concreteness are supported.¹⁴

¹⁴ It may be asked how the notion of "dependence" is naturally expressed in Greek. The word "dependence" itself, of course, betrays an A-perspective; here the more solid or more substantial matter is pictured at the top. In Greek also this perspective is utilized for the notion of dependence and vital connexion, chiefly through the verb *ἀπράω* and its compounds *ἀναπράω* and *ἐξαπράω*. Herodotus, for example, uses them frequently in this sense. But more or less the same conception may be expressed via the verb *κείμαι* in combination with the preposition

Logical progression, therefore, naturally leads from the hypothesis below to the inferences above. But there is another way of looking at logical progression. It may be pictured as leading forward horizontally from the start to the finish of a sentence or argument. This perspective is well illustrated by the usage of Xenophon, *Memor.*, IV, 6, 13: ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανῆγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον ὧδε. . . . The understanding is that the hypothesis, the subject or foundation of the discussion, had been voiced, or should have been voiced, at the beginning of the conversation. A "getting down to fundamentals" is, therefore, a "going back" to the beginning. Here the horizontal advance of the discussion has imposed its stamp on the topography of ὑπόθεσις. In most cases it is a relatively simple matter to distinguish between this perspective and the perspective which mirrors the structural concept outlined above.

After these few preliminary remarks, we must now turn to some of the passages in which Plato exemplifies his understanding of ὑπόθεσις. Again our list is representative rather than exhaustive. As before, I shall state the references, cite crucial words, and indicate the contribution of the passage to the subject under discussion. The actual word ὑπόθεσις does not occur in all of the passages cited. Sometimes ἀρχή takes its place, sometimes there is no technical term to be found. Not all of the passages describe what we would term a logical procedure. But the process envisaged is always the same: the movement from general assumption to specific conclusion. It is this movement which according to the usual interpretation should be a movement ἄνωθεν κάτω.

Gorgias 454C2 ff.: . . . ἵνα . . . σὺ τὰ σπαντοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν . . . περαίνῃς. The perspective is undetermined.

Charm. 171D2-3: . . . ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπετιθέμεθα Perspective undetermined.

Protag. 339D2-4: . . . πρῶτον . . . ὑπέθετο . . . , ὀλίγον δὲ . . . εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθόν. . . . Perspective horizontal.

Crito 48E5 and 49D6: ἀρχή and ἀρχομαι are used of the hypothesis (here not so called) from which further statements

ἐν; and there the perspective is the opposite. Thus the linguistic data bearing on the notion of "dependence" are inconclusive on the score of perspective.

are inferred. ἀρχή is seen as the beginning of a ὁδός. Perspective undetermined.

Cratylus 428D5-8: δεῖ ... θαμὰ μεταστρέφεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα, καὶ πειρᾶσθαι ... βλέπειν ἅμα πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω. "Looking backward" refers to revising prior agreements, "looking forward" to inferring or deducing results. Perspective horizontal.

Cratylus 436D4-7: δεῖ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ... τὸν πολλὸν λόγον εἶναι καὶ τὴν πολλὴν σκέψιν εἶτε ὀρθῶς εἶτε μὴ ὑπόκειται· ἐκείνης δὲ ἐξετασθείσης ἱκανῶς, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνῃ ἐπόμενα. Perspective undetermined.

Meno 86E3 ff.: ... ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι, εἶτε διδασκὸν ἔστιν εἶτε ὁπωσοῦν. In this interesting passage which features a number of hypotheses in action, with the result that all of them are either demonstrated or refuted or both, the perspective is undetermined throughout.

Parm. 128D5-6: ... ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἔστιν, ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἱκανῶς ἐπεξίει. Perspective undetermined.

Parm. 135E9-136A2: ... μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι.... Perspective undetermined.¹⁵

Timaeus 61D3-4: ὑποθετέον δὲ πρότερον θάτερα, τὰ δ' ὑποτεθέντα ἐπάνημεν αἰθῆς. Perspective probably horizontal.

Timaeus 53D4-7: ταύτην δὲ πυρὸς ἀρχὴν ... ὑποτιθέμεθα κατὰ τὸν μετ' ἀνάγκης εἰκότα λόγον πορευόμενοι. τὰς δ' ἔτι τούτων ἀρχὰς ἄνωθεν θεὸς οἶδεν.... This last sentence poses a problem on which neither Taylor nor Cornford comments. The question is whether ἄνωθεν goes with the preceding words, and is to be construed with ἔτι, or whether τὰς δ' ἔτι τούτων ἀρχάς forms a self-contained unit, as Archer-Hind certainly understood it, in which case ἄνωθεν

¹⁵ In this passage, ὑπόθεσις has come to mean little more than πρότασις; this becomes clear from the fact that in the sequel the various hypotheses are εἰ-clauses.—Robinson, pp. 278-80, indicates the ways in which hypothesis in the *Parmenides* differs from the hypothetical method in the *Republic*. One difference on which he comments, with apparent surprise: "There is almost no trace in the *Parm.* of the upward path of the *Rep.*" Incorrect; there is no trace whatever. Furthermore, as we shall see later, there probably is no upward path in the *Republic* either.

signifies the position from which the god exercises his knowledge. If the latter interpretation is adopted, as I suspect it should be, ἄνωθεν . . . οἶδε would be parallel to such an expression as *Theaet.* 175D3 βλέπων . . . ἄνωθεν. Translators who have favored the former interpretation have usually ended up blunting the force of ἄνωθεν and substituting innocuous terms like "remote" or "principal."—Hence, probably, perspective undetermined.

Laws 812A4-5: κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, ὃ ξένε, ξμοιγε οὐ φαινόμεθα ἐκτὸς πορεύεσθαι τῶν ὑποτεθέντων λόγων. . . . Perspective undetermined.

Phaedo 100A3-101E3: ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτη γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος . . . ἃ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα. . . . 101D3: εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐφ' ἧς ἂν . . . ἔως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαιο. . . . ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἔως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις. . . . We should note that this last passage, as so many others dealing with hypothesis, employs a verb of motion or progression, in this case ὀρμάω and ὀρμάομαι. The usual sense of the word is "to move forward," in a horizontal direction. The direction may occasionally be vertical; but in that case it is likely to be upward rather than downward, for the simple reason that the word denotes willed rather than automatic motion. And yet in this passage ὀρμάομαι has been interpreted as downward motion, the reason being that hypothesis in the *Phaedo* is clearly associated with the Ideas, and the Ideas are highest. However, the argument is not from Ideas to sensibles and back but, according to Socrates, from Ideas to Ideas; and there is no evidence to indicate, at least in this passage, that one Idea is higher than another. Thus the more comprehensive or basic hypothesis should not be pictured as lying above a hypothesis entailed by it or generated by it. Plato avoids the use of such a phrase as ἐκ δύο ὑποθέσεων ἡρτηται¹⁶ or a similar verb of suspension in connexion with the hypothesis method. But we can go further than that, and suggest that in the *Phaedo* Plato seems to conceive of the premise as lying below the conclusion, that is to say, that Plato adopts the U-perspective. This emerges from

¹⁶ Olympiod. in *Phaed.* 188, line 3, Norvin.

the words: ἀλλήν αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἦτις τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο. . . .¹⁷

Plato's language here points to the notion of an inverted pyramid, with the more comprehensive hypothesis lying at the bottom, and the ὀρμηθέντα radiating upward from each hypothesis. τὰ ἀνωθεν is merely another way of saying τὰ ὀρμηθέντα. We translate as follows: "placing below hypothesis X another hypothesis Y which would seem to be the best (hypothesis) of the (propositions) above it," that is, which would account best for X and other statements on the same level. Usually the genitive τῶν ἀνωθεν is explained as a partitive genitive. It is, however, equally possible to take it as an objective genitive, referring to the conclusions generated by the premise. Cf. the Aristotelian parallel given above, note 17. The word βελτίστη in the sense of "most effective" may seem unusual, but the functional connotation of ἀγαθός is well known. The phrase as it stands may appear awkward, but the stylistic difficulties seem to me less decisive than the difficulties of interpretation which result from the traditional assumption of a "higher hypothesis." To imply, as one would have to on the old assumption, that there are many hypotheses of a more universal character, any of which might be relevant to the argument, is to render the method itself almost unworkable. The plural τῶν makes better sense if it can be supposed to refer to the several conclusions inferrable from a particular premise chosen with the assistance of common sense and synoptic experience.¹⁸

Theaet. 156A3-5: ἀρχὴ δέ, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἡ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἡρτῆται, ἥδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν. . . . This, at long last, is an unmistakable instance of the A-perspec-

¹⁷ The combination of ὑπόθεσις or ἀρχή with the genitive, so familiar in ontological contexts (example: *Timaeus* 53D4, as above), recurs in Aristotle's terminology: *Met.* 1013a16: τῶν ἀποδείξεων αἱ ὑποθέσεις. Compare also 1013b20 and *Phys.* 195a18: αἱ ὑποθέσεις τοῦ συμπεράσματος, where however *αἰτία* is understood.

¹⁸ R. S. Bluck, in *Phronesis*, II (1957), p. 26, asks what Plato could have meant by the "higher" hypothesis that is to be substituted for the hypothesis that turned out to be unsatisfactory. He believes that Plato is here thinking of the Form of the Good, i.e. the teleological cause. He shrugs off the stubborn fact that Socrates had announced he was going to undertake a δεύτερος πλοῦς. On rejecting the translation "higher hypothesis" the difficulty resolves itself.

tive, characterized by the use of the verb ἀπράω (cf. above, note 14). The proposition "motion is all" is here said to be the premise from which all earlier arguments are "suspended," as a piece of metal is suspended from another piece of metal that is magnetized (*Ion* 533E2), or as the human world is suspended from the world of the gods (*Laws* 631B8), or as certain kinds of human behavior are suspended from, i. e., dominated by, certain physical, psychological or moral causes (*Laws* 782D11; 884A5). It may, of course, be objected that ἀπράω does not always or necessarily indicate vertical dependence. Yet the presumption, as in the passages in the *Laws*, is in favor of influence from above, from the inscrutable realm of Hesiodic or Euripidean forces controlling man. In the *Theaetetus* passage various statements are felt to be quite literally suspended from a superior premise, perhaps by analogy with the notion of the fluxists that "motion rules supreme." It should be mentioned that in this particular case the premise is one with which Plato would not agree; that, in fact, it is the sort of physical or meteorological assumption which Socrates occasionally makes fun of by regarding it as 'meteoric' itself (*Republic* 489C6). May we say that it is this which caused Plato to use the verb ἀπράω in the present case, in order to underscore the insubstantiality and perhaps the topsy-turvy quality of the proposition contained in the premise? But whatever the reason, the passage does give us one instance in which an ἀρχή (not a ὑπόθεσις!) is said to be located higher than the propositions derived from it.

If we now draw the balance of the passages we have discussed, it appears that most of them do not tell us anything about the direction of the activity prompted by hypothesis. Two, perhaps three, instances favor the horizontal perspective; here the eye focusses on the progress of the operation rather than on the mutual relations between the terms of the operation. One passage speaks for the U-perspective; here the etymological meaning of ὑπόθεσις seems to rise more fully to the consciousness. And finally there is one tolerably clear piece of evidence for the A-perspective.

It now remains to investigate some passages from the *Republic*, particularly from the section containing the allegory of the Cave and the diagram of the Divided Line. These passages have been reserved for the final part of our discussion because they

appear, at first glance, to occasion the greatest difficulty. It is only natural, given the perspectival connotations of Cave and Line, that the Platonic distinction between "up" and "down" should here find its most marked expression. We should, however, remember that this perspective refers to the distinction between levels of reality, or rather between reality and the various kinds of non-real, and to the distinction between the correlate mental activities, such as knowledge and belief. The method of hypothetical reasoning, on the other hand, functions on only one level of mental activity, and is concerned with only one level of reality, viz. the Ideas (511C1-2), whether these Ideas be visualized in their pure state, as in dialectic, or less purely, as in mathematics and other sciences (510B4 ff.).

First, a preliminary passage, *Rep.* 437A6-9: ... ὑποθέμενοι ... εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προϊόμεν, ὁμολογήσαντες, εἰν ποτε ἄλλη φανή ταῦτα ἢ αὐτήν, πάντα ἡμῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τούτου συμβαίνοντα λελυμένα ἔσεσθαι. In this concise description of argument on the basis of postulates, the perspective is horizontal, or at best undetermined. What makes the passage important is the fact that the quotations to be studied directly refer by and large to just such reasoning as is contemplated here, in language very similar to the terms used here.

Rep. 533C7-D3: ... ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη αὐτὴ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἵνα βεβαιώσῃται, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορωρυγμένον ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω.... The perspective of the operation itself is undetermined. The effect of the operation is to turn the mind upward from the swamp of Becoming to the exalted status of Reality. Analogously, the activity of dialectic is seen to lie at the top of the hierarchy of sciences, 534E2-4: ... δοκεῖ ... ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἄλλο τούτου μάθημα ἀνωτέρω ὁρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεται....¹⁹

Rep. 510B5-9: ... ψυχὴ ζῆτεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένη ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν τελευτήν, τὸ δ' αὖ ἕτερον—τὸ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον—ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα ... τὴν μέθοδον ποιομένην. Perspec-

¹⁹ F. M. Cornford's translation of *Rep.* 510B4 ff. and 533C7 ff. freely interpolates "up" and "down" (cf. also his "highest" for μέγιστον, 505A2), instead of reproducing the inconclusive perspective of the text. H. D. P. Lee has managed to do this admirably.

tive undetermined. ἀρχή and τελευτή, πορεύεσθαι and μέθοδον ποιείσθαι are relative opposites but not absolutely fixed topographically. Cf. 510D1-3: ἐκ τούτων ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν . . . ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὐδ' ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμήσωσι.

Rep. 511A3-7: . . . ὑποθέσει δ' ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι . . . οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἰούσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν, εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν. . . . For this analysis of non-dialectic hypothetical argument, cf. above, 510B5-9. There is, however, one difference between this statement and other statements we have discussed: ἀρχή is now distinguished from ὑπόθεσις; it is equated with the ἀνυπόθετον. Mathematical demonstration is contrasted with the genuine dialectical method which leads to the ἀνυπόθετον and which is outlined in 511B3 ff. Mathematical reasoning functions on the second highest level of mental activity. Compared with pure dialectic, it is a swamp which does not permit a man to get his head free. That is to say, in the hierarchy of the sciences mathematics is so far below dialectic that it might as well be thought to be located in the quagmire of belief. There is no transfer or transition possible between mathematical and dialectical reasoning. "To get above the (mathematical) hypotheses" is tantamount to entering an entirely different arena of logical endeavor.

Rep. 511B5-8: τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, ὅλον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰὼν . . . πάλιν αὖ . . . ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίῃ. . . . The key expressions are: . . . ἐπὶ τὴν . . . ἀρχὴν ἰὼν . . . ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίῃ. Cf. 511C8-9: . . . διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν. The mental activity described is that of dialectic, as contrasted with that of mathematics and the inferior sciences. It is difficult to decide whether the words, and especially the prepositions employed in the compound verbs, refer to a vertical or a horizontal perspective. The horizontal or "progress of argument" significance of ἀνὰ- and κατὰ-compounds is well known and has already been instanced.²⁰ τελευτή refers to the end of the

²⁰ Cf. ἐπανήγεν, Xenophon, *Memor.*, IV, 6, 13, cited above, p. 399; also the use of ἐπ' ἀνέρχομαι and ἐπ' ἀνέμι, Plato, *Parm.* 142B1-2, and the parallel use of ἀνω and κάτω to refer to the limits of the race course, Plato, *Rep.* 613B11-12. Cf. further O. Becker, *Das Bild des Weges*,

supreme deductive argument, just as ἀρχή refers to its beginning, or to the end of the ensuing synthesis. What complicates the situation is the image, probably humorous, of the stepping stones which seem to indicate an "up" and "down" orientation. And yet, if that were Plato's conscious intention, he might well have spoken of higher and lower hypotheses, or he might have detailed the location of the ἀρχή vis-à-vis the other "steps" in the logical process. This he does not do. For the rest, the language does not differ significantly from the language of the other passages in the *Republic* which we have discussed. The best we can say, therefore, is that for one moment there is promise of a vertical perspective coming out into the open, only to be silenced immediately by what is probably a vague assumption of horizontal procedure. Whether the vertical perspective lurking under the surface would have been a U-perspective, as is suggested by the image of the stepping stones, or an A-perspective, as the alternative meaning of the prepositions may indicate, is impossible to say. But this very uncertainty should help to drive home the point that Plato is not in this context interested in establishing an unambiguous vertical perspective.

To repeat, when Plato, in his analysis of the Divided Line and Cave, talks about hypothesis, ἀρχή, τελευτή, etc., his language is usually non-committal on the score of perspective. Where he does speak of "up" and "down" he is ranking scientific hypotheses in the second highest division, below those of dialectic. Once, 511B5 ff., the ontological and epistemological context does, on one interpretation, seem to color the logical perspective, and he appears to believe that those hypotheses which bring a man closer to the ἀνυπόθετον are seen as higher than more mediate hypotheses. But we have shown that the language *need* not carry this meaning, and that the similar phrasing of other passages speaks against the adoption of this interpretation.

In only one of all the passages we have studied, *Theaet.* 156A3-5, does Plato speak as if certain propositions based on a universal premise were thought of as suspended below it. But there Plato is not arguing in his own person or giving rules for a tidy logical procedure, but exposing and transfixing the mistaken assumptions of Protagoras and the fluxists. Nevertheless,

Hermes Einzelschriften, IV (1937), index, s. v. καταβαίω, and *LSJ*, s. v. ἀνέρχομαι, II. 2.

this passage, in combination with *Phaedo* 101D3 ff. (U-perspective) and *Rep.* 511B5-8 (inconclusive perspective), serves to confirm our suspicion that Plato's logical terminology is not shaped by a consistent (and irrelevant) metaphysical topography. We conclude, therefore, that the evidence for Plato systematically regarding the argument by hypothesis as leading downward from premise to inference is nil. It may be wondered why Plato was misunderstood so soon, notably by Aristotle. One explanation may be that Plato provides few examples of the technique in action. Another may be that Plato's followers regarded him as a metaphysician first and last, and could not separate his logic from his ontology. The problem calls for a close investigation.

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THE ROLE OF THE BOW IN THE *PHILOCTETES* OF SOPHOCLES.

Perhaps no play of Sophocles has received more attention from recent critics or been more violently distorted by them than the *Philoctetes*. The great difficulty of the play is found in the reversal of decision which Heracles as *deus ex machina* orders and which is accepted so readily by the previously adamant Philoctetes. Kitto remarks that Heracles "so badly needs something exciting to say," and rejecting his own earlier treatment Kitto concludes that Sophocles here "superimposes an ideal ending on the real one, in such a way that the one does not annul or even obscure the other, but each retains its own validity."¹ Linforth, too, is very sympathetic with Philoctetes' point of view and concludes: "The wound in his foot can be healed, but the wound in his soul is beyond cure."² Kirkwood thinks that Neoptolemus is transformed "to complete sympathy with the uncompromising virtue of Philoctetes."³

No! Both the wound in the body and the wound in the soul must be cured, and it is only when they are cured that we can speak without qualification of the virtue of Philoctetes, for virtue depends on rational choice. Philoctetes' determination to sacrifice health and glory to vengeance is irrational and perverse. Neoptolemus, it is true, comes to pity Philoctetes, but he never thinks that Philoctetes has made the correct choice. There can be no dichotomy, furthermore, between the ideal and

¹ Kitto, *Form and Meaning in Drama* (London, 1956), pp. 133, 137. M. Imhof in his review of this book (*Gnomon*, XXIX [1957], p. 591) views this treatment of the *Philoctetes* "zwiespältig und misslungen."

Cf. S. M. Adams, who says of Philoctetes' refusal: "This is an adequate answer, on the human plane." "The typical Sophoclean central figure has kept his strong determination; only the direct command of heaven overcomes it with the overriding claim of piety" (*Sophocles the Playwright, Phoenix*, Supplement III [Toronto, 1957], pp. 158, 159).

² Ivan M. Linforth, "Philoctetes: The Play and the Man" (*Univ. of California Publ. in Class. Philology*, XV, 3 [1956]), pp. 95-156, especially p. 156.

³ G. M. Kirkwood, *A Study of Sophoclean Drama* (Ithaca, 1958), p. 39. Cf. Kitto, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

the real ending or the divine and the human ending. Especially for the Greeks, the divine is an extension of the human. The real or human solution must coincide with the ideal or divine one—and it does!

The *Philoctetes* of Euripides, produced in 431 B.C., seems to have presented a stirring dramatic conflict finally resolved in favor of patriotism.⁴ His *Philoctetes* seems to have been persuaded by ordinary human argument.⁵ It is not likely that Euripides' argumentation could have been greatly improved upon. Sophocles, therefore, must invent a different ending.

The *Philoctetes* of Sophocles was produced at an even more crucial hour for Athens, and the issues here presented remind one immediately of Thucydides' famous description of the deterioration of character during the war (III, 82-3 Crawley): "Revenge . . . was held of more account than self-preservation." ". . . success by treachery won . . . the palm of superior intelligence." "The ancient simplicity into which honor so largely entered was laughed down and disappeared. . . ." Here in these descriptions stand *Philoctetes*, *Odysseus*, and *Neoptolemus*, and, in general, the whole fearfully complex problem of the priority of obligations, never more crucial than at Athens in 409 B.C. Sophocles is certainly concerned with the portrayal of the characters of these three men, but of course he is much more profoundly concerned with the political and moral problems involved.

Sophocles has shown no sympathy whatever for the unprincipled politician *Odysseus*. This is obvious throughout the play but especially in the first scene where *Odysseus* uses so many offensive words (*σόφισμα, ἐκκλέψεις, κλοπὴς, κακά*). *Odysseus* is depicted as politicians are and always will be. In fairness Sophocles might have allowed him more explicitly to say that honesty survives only when one's antagonist shows some respect for it. *Odysseus* may claim to serve the purpose of *Zeus* (*Phil.* 990), but he is painted in such black colors that he cannot

⁴ Evidence on the development and ending of Euripides' play is very slight. The assumptions that I have made seem to me plausible, but of course they cannot be proved correct. On the three plays in general, and especially on the ending of Euripides' play, see John S. Kieffer, "*Philoctetes and Arete*," *C.P.*, XXXVII (1942), pp. 38-50.

⁵ See Apollodorus, *Epitome*, V, 8; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.*, 52.

represent any divinity for whom Sophocles had genuine respect. The reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the *Philoctetes* is not that the gods choose strange helpmates but rather that such unscrupulous leaders, even when they adopt a just cause, retard rather than advance the interests of society.⁶

For *Philoctetes* Sophocles certainly shows a most kindly sympathy, and the great appeal of the play is in no small measure due to this. But no Greek spectator could have approved of *Philoctetes'* rugged refusal of *engagement*, a refusal which so enthralls modern critics—and André Gide. The Greek spectator must immediately have thought of Achilles in the *Iliad* and especially of the great and deliberately verbose speech by which Nestor fires Patroclus to action while Achilles stands inactive and sees his friends die. Sophocles has made this analogy unmistakable by having *Philoctetes* lay the blame for his plight not upon the Greeks—his attitude towards Greeks in general is friendly—but specifically and time and time again upon the Atreidae and Odysseus.⁷ The continual repetition of this point must be significant in the play. *Philoctetes'* complaint, like that of Achilles, is one against individuals. We know very clearly from the character of Odysseus in the *Ajax* where Sophocles stands when patriotism combines with enlightened self-interest against the feuding of individuals. Sophocles did not approve of *Philoctetes'* decision.

Sophocles obviously, then, views the individual as the prime and determinant element of the state. Indeed no one has ever championed the inalienable rights and dignity of the individual more eloquently. Still, the individual is viewed as an element of a larger whole and not as an independent creation: he cannot renounce his obligations to his fellow men however grossly mistreated he may have been.

Besides this evidence from the *Iliad* and the *Ajax*, there is definite indication in the play itself that the stubborn refusal of *Philoctetes* to accept the embassy of Neoptolemus is not virtuous. This embassy, of course, would have been much more appealing

⁶ Some critics think otherwise. Georges Méautis (*Sophocle: Essai sur le héros tragique* [Paris, 1957], p. 97) states: ". . . Ulysse, les Atrides ont été les instruments inconscients d'une volonté plus haute."

⁷ *Phil.* 264, 314, 406, 791 ff., 872, 1023, 1285-6, 1356-7, 1384, 1390; cf. 321, 361, 372, 389, 585-6.

to Philoctetes if Odysseus had not been sent. But Sophocles retains Odysseus, desiring to present "*les trois morales*" in their most powerful forms and to force his three characters to their utmost extremes. Thus he gives Philoctetes' case its strongest conceivable support. Even so, the chorus tell Philoctetes that he has made the wrong choice and that he alone will be responsible for his fate (1095-1100). Neoptolemus, too, insists that Philoctetes has become wild (*ἡγρώσαι* 1321) and is refusing the proffered favors of the gods (1374). Neoptolemus finally agrees to take Philoctetes home not because he thinks this the right course, but merely because he is pressed so hard on a point of personal honor.

There is other and even stronger evidence, usually overlooked by modern critics,⁸ who have normally found only three *morales* in the play. Actually there is a fourth, more powerful than any of the others: the bow of Heracles. This bow is the conspicuous center of attention from the first entrance of Philoctetes. It is the objective symbol of Heracles. And who is this god? This is the type of question which Grube asked in his brilliant study of the *Bacchae*, and his eloquent answer solved the riddle.⁹ It is a question which we must always ask when a god appears in Greek tragedy.

Who is Heracles? The answer was obvious to every Greek spectator and is obvious to us. Suffice it here to cite the parabasis of the *Wasps* (1043) where Aristophanes boasts of being the Heracleian champion who attacked the horrid monster of the Pnyx:

τοιόνδ' εὐρόντες ἀλεξίκακον τῆς χώρας τῆσδε καθατήν.¹⁰

In the *Peace* Aristophanes repeats this boast and adds that he deserves gratitude for freeing the Athenian state of such tyranny.

⁸ Gilbert Norwood (*Greek Tragedy*² [London, 1928], pp. 164-5) is a notable exception, pointing out that the bow of Heracles is the rightful instrument of well-doing and that it was for such a reason that Philoctetes received it. See also Cedric H. Whitman, *Sophocles: a Study of Heroic Humanism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), p. 182.

⁹ G. M. A. Grube, "Dionysus in the *Bacchae*, *T. A. P. A.*, LXVI (1935), pp. 53-4.

¹⁰ Note the epithet *ἀλεξίκακος*, a frequent epithet of Heracles, as of Apollo (and other gods). On Heracles in general, see Marcel Simon, *Hercule et le Christianisme* (Paris, 1955), p. 108.

He boasts also that he is the champion of the theater who has made comedy safe from braggart gluttons and whining slaves.

Heracles made civilization possible by achieving man's mastery over the beast and civilized man's superiority over the barbarian. He freed Prometheus, father of the arts, he slew the centaurs, wild monsters who refused their birthright to become men. His most magnificent weapon in all this was the bow, divine in its origin. This bow, Apollo's gift to Heracles, symbolizes man's intelligence brought into action to guarantee man's domination of the earth. This significance accounts for the prominence of the bow in the action and in the text of the *Philoctetes*. Forms of the word τόξον/*a* occur some twenty-four times in the text, and there are numerous occurrences of ὄπλα, ἰός, βέλος. The imagery of archery, too, occurs, especially "to miss the mark" (ἀμαρτάνω, ἐξαμαρτάνω).¹¹ The divine nature of the weapons is brought out repeatedly.

The bow plays a major role in the dramatic action, and at the first production it must have been obvious that Philoctetes' present use of this magnificent weapon is a little ridiculous: the weapon of cultured man is here being used on a desert island to shoot "small fry" for one poor individual disabled in solitude and destined—inevitably—to be whole only when he again becomes an active participant in society. The use to which Philoctetes proposes to devote the bow near the end of the play—the slaying of the Greeks who may seek to punish him and Neoptolemus for their sulking—this use must have appeared to the original audience as nothing short of an outrageous reversal of the proper use of Apollo's gift to Heracles διὰ τὴν ἀπερίην¹² and Heracles' gift to Philoctetes for "noble deeds," that is, for doing what must be done when others refuse to act.¹³

Heracles is something more than the champion of civilized society. A Stoic long before Zeno, he is a deification of *engagement*. If his simple but splendid lines at the end of the play do not excite us, then we have lost even from our imagination the thrill of heroic ambition and accomplishment.¹⁴ Heracles' speech

¹¹ *Phil.* 231, 1249; 95, 1012, 1224.

¹² Diodorus Siculus, IV, 14, 3.

¹³ Sophocles, *Phil.* 670.

¹⁴ Kitto, *op. cit.*, p. 105, says: "Nowhere in the whole of Sophocles is there a speech less impressive than this one which he wrote for Heracles."

opens on the note of labor (reinforced by *figura etymologica* 1419), he cites his *areté* and challenges Philoctetes to great accomplishment through similar labor and by means of the bow (1427, 1432, 1440). Hope of victory was not dead at Athens in 409 B. C., and every intelligent Athenian knew that victory depended on ranking patriotism above—far above—parties and personal grievances. What Alcibiades had done and what had been done to him constituted an unmistakable example.¹⁵

What is needed to convert the uncompromising Philoctetes of Sophocles is the same thing that is needed in the *Iliad* to convert Achilles: a profoundly moving emotional experience. In reference to Achilles' accepting ransom for the body of Hector, Cedric Whitman in his brilliant treatment of Achilles remarks: "In only two lines, with no argument whatsoever, Achilles gives up the whole thing."¹⁶ And again: "The god in such scenes is the clear moment of insight and decision. . . ."¹⁷ Somewhat similar is Kitto's view of Sophocles' conception of the gods: "They symbolise his conception of an unchanging framework of Law which permeates human life as it does the physical universe. . . ."¹⁸ It is true that earlier in the *Philoctetes* (1326) Neoptolemus says that the sufferings of the hero were all in accordance with divine plan. But this type of consolation is common in every age and is here no sound evidence that Sophocles believed in any supernatural direction of man's life. Indeed the Greek words here are vague (*ἐκ θείας τύχης*) and need hardly mean more than what has actually happened. In general the characters of Sophocles exhibit the bewilderingly varied beliefs found in the Greek life of which he wrote. Sophocles' profound lack of prejudice on matters divine is one of the reasons for his eternal appeal.

¹⁵ Cf. Thucydides, VI, 89-92.

¹⁶ Cedric H. Whitman, *Homer and the Homeric Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p. 347, n. 113.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

¹⁸ Kitto, "The Idea of God in Aeschylus and Sophocles," in *La Notion du Divin* (*Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique*, I [Geneva, 1952]), p. 179. G. M. Kirkwood (*op. cit.*, p. 275) in reference to Ajax points out that Athena is just as ready to be cruel to her supposed favorite Odysseus. "To both men she is stern and impersonal." It follows, in the opinion of the present writer, that this Athena is inexorable and no longer an anthropomorphic divinity.

THE PRIESTESS, ERITHA.

PY Eb297

i-je-re-ja e-ke-ge e-u-ke-to-ge e-to-ni-jo e-ke-e te-o
ko-to-no-o-ko-de ko-to-na-o ke-ke-me-na-o o-na-ta e-ke-e
 WHEAT 3 DM 9 QT 3

It may be asserted that of all the tablets in the Mycenaean script that the soil of Greece has so far given up, none excels Eb297 from Pylos (Ventris and Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek* [Cambridge, 1956], pp. 256-7) in general interest, whether linguistic, literary, or historical. So it deserves further consideration than it has already received, which may lead to a clearer conception of its meaning than the halting and uncertain readings current at present. In any case, its unique character must be recognised, as a literary composition whose balanced clauses, positional emphasis, and developed syntax would not disgrace the Attic of a millennium later.

First, as regards its form. It constitutes a rhythmic couplet, only slightly disguised by the syllabic script; the rhythm is the trochaic tetrameter catalectic, the rhythm which Aeschylus and Aristophanes perfected in Attic, which came via the New Comedy into the Latin of Plautus and spoke almost the last word of Latin poetry in the *Pervigilium*; it was still living a century ago, when Tennyson wrote "In the spring a young man's fancy," Longfellow bade us "Tell me not in mournful numbers," and Mark Twain penned his threnody "Willie had a purple monkey." Whether it is still alive I know not; perhaps the modern Muse lacks strength to tackle a fifteen-syllable line; but on any showing it must count as one of the oldest and most vigorous forms of rhythmic language.

In the example before us, the rhythm shows certain primitive weaknesses; it allows anacrusis in the first line, it is doubtful about elision, and it seems to disregard the dialysis at the fourth foot; this, however, is uncertain, owing to our ignorance of the quantity of two important vowels. So I jump the centuries and transliterate the text into the Attic alphabet; the maturity of the language is shown by the fact that it goes almost letter for letter; and I mark the scansion as follows:—

$\begin{array}{c} \iota\epsilon|\rho\epsilon\iota' \quad \acute{\epsilon}|\chi\epsilon\iota \tau\epsilon \quad | \quad \epsilon\upsilon\chi\epsilon|\tau\alpha\iota \tau' \acute{\epsilon}|\tau\omega\nu\iota|o\nu \quad \acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon|\epsilon\nu \quad \theta\epsilon|\varphi \\ \kappa\tau\omicron\iota\nu\omicron\omicron|\chi\varphi \delta\epsilon \quad | \quad \kappa\tau\omicron\iota\nu\alpha|\omega\nu \quad \kappa\epsilon|\kappa\epsilon\iota\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha|\omega\nu \delta'|\nu\alpha\tau' \acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon|\epsilon\nu \end{array}$

(If the second syllable of *etonijo* or *kekemenao* should prove to be short, then the foot containing it would be a tribrach, with hiatus at the dialysis of the former line, i. e. $\epsilon\upsilon\chi\epsilon|\tau\alpha\iota \tau\epsilon \quad | \quad \acute{\epsilon}\tau\omega\nu\iota|o\nu$ and $\kappa\epsilon|\kappa\epsilon\iota\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha|\omega\nu$.)

This scheme of scansion has been rejected by a critic, on the ground that with a little manipulation any prose passage may be made to fit some kind of scansion. I agree, having in my school-days spent some time in extracting hexameters from the text of Livy; but I still maintain that the chance of finding two consecutive lines, forming a complete "epigram" in what was intended to be prose, is incredibly remote. And whatever our opinions about the metrical nature of the text may be, we must admit that the scribe had no doubt that it constituted a metrical couplet. At the end of the first line he stopped and went back to the left-hand side of the tablet to continue the second line, instead of filling his space solid, as did the other scribe who copied the passage.

The practice of recording land-ownership in verse is illustrated by Myres (*Who were the Greeks?* [Berkeley, 1930], pp. 301-2) from places as far apart as New Zealand and Iceland, and the reason for it is stated, namely that verse is easier to remember and harder to falsify than prose.

I take it then that the priestess, being conservative by profession, instead of letting the scribe register her estate in his dry officialese, insisted on following the immemorial, pre-Achaean fashion of avowing in verse her title to the land that she held.

Before I proceed to interpret the lines, I must enunciate two linguistic postulates that I have found necessary; if they are granted, the text translates itself without trouble; if not, it rests with the objector to find an alternative rendering which gives equally good sense.

We were taught in our youth that the dative was the case of advantage or disadvantage; in Latin this ambivalent use is so far normal that an editor preparing a school edition of Horace, when he came to *Adimam cantare severis* might spare a line for comment on the use of the infinitive, but would waste no words on the dative. In Greek, this use of the dative to denote loss as well as profit, to mean "take from" as well as "give to,"

faded out early, leaving only a few examples, all with the verb δέχομαι. I quote from Homer Θέμωσι δὲ δέκτο δέπας (Il., XXII, 871), δέξατό οἱ σκήπτρον (Il., II, 185), and οἱ δέξατο χάλκεον ἔγχος (Od., V, 282); the Aristophanic οὐκ ἂν πριάμην τῷδε, "I wouldn't buy from him" may be a colloquial survival of an archaism, or it may be felt as a locative, "at his shop." From the tablets I quote: (i) PY Pn 30, *odekasato akosota*, δέξατο ἀξότης, "the valuer(?) recovered," followed by three names, apparently in the dative; (ii) PY Cn4 is a list of names, likewise in the dative, headed by the word *opero* "deficit" or "due from"; the numbers are small, ranging from four to twenty-two, and I take them to mean shortages in the various flocks, for which the shepherds are responsible; (iii) in the Pylos Eo tablets the usual formula is *eke paro* with the dative, "he holds from" and in the Eb tablets *paro damo* "from the Deme." Now, in the development of prepositional usage with nouns, the preposition did not in any sense "govern" the case, but was attached, for greater clarity, to a case usage previously existing. Hence, *eke paro* with the dative, a usage which later Greek altered to *παρά* with the genitive, attests an archaic *eke* with the dative, meaning "holds from." Instances of this do occur, and are not to be dismissed merely as blunders. Eo276.2 reads *ekege onato ru-83-e*, without *paro*; possibly the omission was due to a wish to keep the entry in one line, but it shows that the dative with *eke* was intelligible without *paro*. Eo247.3 reads *eke onato aitijoqe*, where the scribe has first written the name in the genitive and altered it to the dative; he was not guilty of a solecism but was merely amending the grammatical form of his sentence. So in Ep704.2, *uwamija teojo doera onato ekege ijereja kera*, where Ventris and Chadwick (*Documents*, p. 253) comment "one might have expected *pa-ro i-je-re-ja* 'from the priestess.'"

The tablet Ep301 contains a list of twelve names, the first five of which are noted as holding an *onato* of public land "from the deme." After a blank space follow seven other names each followed by the formula *ekege kekemena kotona kotonooko*, which is usually taken to mean "he holds a communal plot, being himself a plot-owner." To this interpretation I raise several objections. In the first place, it is not customary in these records to enter leaseholds and the holding of *κτῶναι* on the same tablet, except in the prescribed order seen in the En and Eo tablets;

first the name of the holder of a *kotona*, with its assessment, then the names of leaseholders who hold fractions of the *kotona* with the assessment of each. (Possibly the granting of a lease absolved the holder of a *kotona* from payment of a proportionate amount of the total assessment.) Secondly, if whole *κτοιναι* and the leases of such fractions are to be listed together the obvious order would be to put the whole *κτοιναι* first, and the smaller leaseholds after. Thirdly, there should be an obvious difference in size between a whole *kotona* and a leasehold of part of one, which would be reflected in the assessments. Not all the assessments of these twelve entries survive, but the average of the three surviving of the first set, which are stated to be leases, and that of the four of the second set, which are usually read as holdings of a whole *kotona*, is exactly the same, namely DM 4 QT 3, a usual size for a lease, but too small for a *kotona*. Obviously, *all* the entries refer to leases. Fourthly, the phrase *eke paro damo* in the first five entries is exactly balanced by the phrase *ekeqe kotonooko*; the holdings are leases in both cases, but granted by a different authority. Fifthly, if in line 6, for example, "Pikreus holds a communal plot," it is tautological to add, in the nominative case, *kotonooko* "being a plot-holder"; of course he is; and although clay is cheap, storage space is restricted, and the scribes do not waste words. Lastly, private holders of public plots form a special class of men performing quasi-public services, shepherds and swineherds, oxherds and bee-keepers; possibly they might all be described as *δημιόεργοι*.

My interpretation, then, of Ep301 is that it is a list of leases of portions of public land (*kekemena kotona* is in the genitive case all through; the lease of a whole *kotona* seems inconceivable); the first five recipients get their grants *paro damo*, the other seven from an official called the *Ktoinouchos*, which might be rendered "Estates Manager," who had the day-to-day oversight of public lands and was empowered to grant leases of them when the Council of the Deme was not in session. (I regard the *damokoro* of Ta711 as the later Demagoras, "he who convenes the Deme." The Deme had authority over local affairs, but had to be summoned, like the *Comitia* at Rome, by a competent officer.) But naturally this Estates Manager could not grant himself a lease, so *aitioqo*, holding that office, had to get his lease *paro damo*. Whether the same disability applies to all the other four of the first group

is not clear; there might well be other considerations. In Eb846, as in Ep301.2, *aitijogo* holds an *onato paro damo kotonooko*, and since there is no room for two datives in the syntax, *kotonooko* must be a nominative; *wanatajo* in Eb369 and *adamiao* in Eb747 are in exactly the same position; but there is nothing in the other mention of *atuko* (En609.5) to suggest that he held the office, and the legal position of *tataro* in Eo224.7 is obscure.

Would five "Estates Managers" be too many for the kingdom of Pylos to carry? I venture to think not. Each of the nine cities which lay to the west of the Messenian Divide was probably a deme, with its own constitution, and there were others, possibly more than nine, on the eastern side of the country. The only question that arises is how far afield did the records stored at Pylos extend?

This, then, is my second postulate, that the word *kotonooko* did not mean any "man who held a *kotona*" as at Athens *κληροῦχος* meant any "holder of a *κληρος*." It would seem that the verb *ἐχω* suffered a slight change of meaning between 1200 B. C. and historical times. In earlier days it seems to mean "control, have power over, direct and protect," and this meaning appears in names: *watuoko* (Ea136) "he who controls the city"; in titles: *πολιοῦχος* with much the same meaning; and in offices: *ἐνοῦχος*; that is to say, *ἐχει* was not the same as *κέκτηται*.

In further support of my view, I would point out that nowhere in the texts is the word *kotonooko* demonstrably plural, although the holders of a *ktoina* were a numerous body, and might well have been spoken of collectively. Yet where the plural sense is required we find, not a plural form of *kotonooko*, but various equivalents; Sn64.9 says *kotona ekote*, "*οἱ κτοινὰς ἔχοντες*"; Be995 says *kotonewe*, and Eb 901 *kotoneta*.

So, my two postulates being, as I hope, granted, I proceed to translate, with a running comment, the texts relating to the estate of the priestess.

"The priestess both holds and avows holding an *etonion* from her deity." To deny the correlation of the repeated *qe* is to fly in the face of the Greek language; when the second part of the formula was dropped, the first *qe* remained attached to *eke* until it was finally recognised as meaningless—legal formulae die hard—and dropped also. The verb *euketo* "*εὔχεται*" is im-

portant; it has been taken to be merely a verb of saying, and construed with an accusative and infinitive, but *εἶχόμεαι* means, "I make an important statement about myself" (hence the middle voice) and is followed not by an accusative and infinitive but by a bare "prolate" infinitive. If the infinitive started by being the dative case of a verbal noun, its effect would be something like "I make avowal as regards having." It is no part of the priestess' duties to make a statement about the holdings of other persons, and if it had been, she would not have used the verb *εἶχόμεαι*. The last word *teo* can hardly be any case but the dative, and its meaning with *ekee* can only be "by favour of, at the hands of, from" the deity.

In the second line *de* is also important; one feels that the priestess would have slipped *men* into her first line, if the word had existed in her day; *de* points a contrast, but between what or whom? Not between the priestess and another subject, nor between her *etonion*—whatever form of holding that was—and the leaseholds; only one estate was in question, as is shown by the fact that there is only one assessment; the contrast then must be between *teo* and *kotonooko*, a somewhat scornful contrast between what she holds by the grace of heaven and what by the laws of man. So the translation runs: "Whereas from a (or "the") *ktoinouchos* she avows holding leases of public lands."

The position is clear. She claims that she holds her estate by an immemorial tenure "going back to a god." The officials of the Land Survey cannot recognise such a tenure, unknown to Achaean Law; so they regularise matters by issuing her a form of lease, covering her estate, which happens to extend over two or more of the regular land divisions. She accepts their ruling, so long as it does not disturb her possession, and the battle is drawn, with the honours on the side of the priestess.

Then comes the filing clerk, who has to reduce a wilderness of dockets to an intelligible uniformity, and his version is given in Ep704.5-6; I take this to be a recension of Eb297, since only on this supposition can the divergencies be explained; and the revision runs:

e-ri-ta i-je-re-ja e-ke e-u-ke-to-ge e-to-ni-jo e-ke-e te-o
da-mo-de-mi pa-si ko-to-na-o ke-ke-me-na-o o-na-to e-ke-e
to-so pe-mo WHEAT 3 DM 9

The two texts obviously refer to the same holding, because the assessment is the same, except that here a fraction is omitted—"a rod or two makes no difference in a holding of this size" (we can almost hear his muttered comments), "but the estate has no name; it must have a name; every estate has a name; how else can we index it?"; so he digs out the name of the priestess which she had omitted, as being of no consequence; or perhaps it revealed a somewhat lowly origin. The insertion of the name makes hash of the scansion, but this scribe has no ear for verse, though a keen eye for the saving of clay; he writes straight on after the end of the metrical line—the scribe of Eb had carefully observed it—to the edge of the tablet; *eke euketoqe*: "we omit *qe* after *eke* now"; and he goes back beyond the *kotonooko* to the higher authority, the *damo*, opposing its remarks ("But the deme says that she holds . . .") to the avowal of the priestess, with no doubt in his mind where legality lay, but giving us, incidentally, our earliest example of the accusative and infinitive.

So I offer my interpretation, feeling that if it is wrong in details my main contention holds, that Eb297 should be considered not as a mere book-keeping entry, but as a literary composition, and all its balances and contrasts be given full weight in its interpretation.

Farewell, then, to the priestess Eritha, and our thanks to her for a lesson in the rudiments of the language and literature of Greece.

WALTER F. WITTON.

REVIEWS.

T(HOMAS) B(ENTRAM) L(ONSDALE) WEBSTER. *From Mycenae to Homer. A Study in Early Greek Literature and Art.* London, Methuen, 1958. Pp. xvi + 312; pls. with 38 figs.; folding map. 30s. (about \$4.20).

Though modest in size and in tone, this book is a pioneer synthesis of wide scope. The price is low, and the author has generously stipulated that all royalties are to go to the Ventris Memorial Fund. Webster's scholarly preparation was unusual. His numerous books include two synthetic works on the culture—especially the pottery and the literature—of the Classical period. For twenty-five years he has taught Homer, and the new book reflects a thorough knowledge of the lines. At London, moreover, throughout its course (i. e. since Feb. 1954), he has participated actively in the Institute of Classical Studies' famous Minoan Linear B (now 'Mycenaean'?) Seminar, and thus has had the most favorable opportunity in the world to absorb the new knowledge, including everything from bibliography to ideas. *MtH* (if that is the best abbreviation) deserves a hearty welcome and a careful examination.

Related Works. At a time when much is being published, it is useful to know precisely when books are written. *MtH* has Acknowledgements (p. xiii) dated October 1957; the volume was published 8 August 1958. C. H. Whitman's *Homer and the Heroic Tradition*, which will certainly be compared with it in several respects (the only review of Whitman which has appeared at this writing, with an admirable discussion of the Homeric problem, in *The Times Literary Supplement*, No. 2976 [13 Mar. 1959], pp. 137-8, mentions Webster as related), was published earlier in 1958, the Preface having been signed in August 1957. The two books were written in complete independence of each other. To both, M. Ventris-J. Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek* (1956) was available. Webster does not mention the most important paper since Parry, viz. Albert Bates Lord, "Homer's Originality: Oral Dictated Texts," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIV (1953, published summer 1954), pp. 124-34. This paper, stimulated by C. M. Bowra's *Heroic Poetry*, was apparently too late for Bowra's *Homer and his Fore-runners* (*infra*) who, however, on pp. 9-13 discussed the (Lord's) theory that the poems were dictated. A theory of dictation had been mentioned by others, e. g. R. Carpenter, *A. J. A.*, XXXVII (1933), p. 29.

Because Webster's *MtH* is weak in its use of comparative evidence, relying more on Bowra's *Tradition and Design in the Iliad* (1930; corrected reprint 1950) than on Bowra's later works, Sir Maurice's series should be listed:

"The Comparative Study of Homer," *A. J. A.*, LIV (1950), pp. 184-192.

Systematic; still the most useful summary.

Heroic Poetry (London, Macmillan, 1952). Pp. x + 590.

A survey by topics, wonderful in scope and so extensive that its mere size has doubtless been an obstacle to its assimilation.

"Homer and his Forerunners," A. Lang Lecture, 16 Feb. 1955 (published autumn 1955; Edinburgh, Nelson).

Though mentioned only once and only for the Bellerophon story (p. 67, n. 2), the lecture covers much the same ground as *MtH*, with one large exception: Geometric art is omitted. Webster is one of two persons thanked for giving help. I do not know the facts, but it is as if Bowra's lecture prompted Webster's book. The lecture may not be final in every sentence, but it is, I think, so sound and sensible as a whole that *MtH* cannot be considered without reference to it.

"The Meaning of a Heroic Age," Earl Grey Lecture 37, Newcastle upon Tyne, 9 May 1957.

This exciting lecture has less direct bearing on *MtH*, but is important as an historical (not so much a literary) study of its subject.

MtH as a Whole. In a sense, *MtH* is an attempt to fit the Linear B discoveries and other recent findings into something like their entire literary setting. But the book contains comparatively little of the tablets themselves. The real focus is Homer, and the (lost) poetry that led up to Homer. The art, literature, myth, and religion of the whole period, from the Shaft Graves to the writing-down of the Homeric epics, with the present knowledge of Linear B added, and the relevant political considerations, are considered with an eye to the development of poetry. Amazing in its variety and erudition, the chief value of the book lies in its collection of these diverse materials. The theorizing about the materials, though often (I think) erroneous, is never merely thin and aesthetic, and hardly ever leaves the data themselves out of sight. For this reason, viz. because it has a substratum of solid content, the book is somehow better than the average quality of all its parts.

The matter is packed in tight, but the treatment is broad, receptive, generous, above all bold: in essence an attempt to bring everything to bear, and to make everything possible out of what is given. The final result may be symbolized at the start by noting that the two scholars praised as brilliant are G. Murray (p. 159) and M. Parry (p. 287); whereas actually the spirit of Murray pervades the book, Parry is insufficiently understood. The weakness of the book is certainly its theorizing. There is little arguing this way and that; the numerous intuitions are not founded deep and buttressed against all assailants. Any review, especially any positivistic, detailed review, is bound to be largely critical. And yet it may well be that progress in these studies will come eventually in part from the gathering of great bodies of evidence such as we have here, and also from such conjectures as can be made. Not only does the book hold so much content that no review can do it justice, but it also

embodies a generosity of spirit which will be wholly lost (I fear) in a critical review.

The eight chapters will be considered in the following sections.

Ch. 1, "Records of Society in the Second Millennium." The main point is "that the rich, elaborate, and highly centralized Mycenaean civilization was much more akin to contemporary Near Eastern kingdoms than to the city states of archaic and classical Greece" (p. 23). This thesis, already put forward but with the greatest hesitancy in *Docs.*, p. 106, is briefly sketched in *MtH* by paragraphs chiefly on the position of the King, on grades of society, tenure of land, labor, taxes, herding, military operations, and religion, as they are taken to be revealed by the Linear B tablets. The institutions are compared to those of Ugarit, Alalakh—Al Mina, Boghazköy, and Mari. Without subscribing to any of the particulars, M. I. Finley would accept the general position, while pointing out formidable difficulties on both sides (*Ec. Hist. Rev.*, X [1957/8], pp. 128-41). Non-specialists can only adopt a wait-see position.

The *wanax* in Pylos is declared to be "in some sense divine" because in Classical Greek the word *ἄναξ* is used only for gods, and because in Homer kings are called Zeus-born, etc. Further, the King's land is called *temenos* in the tablets, and in Greek more than 500 years later the word applied only to land sacred to gods and heroes. But at Pylos the Commander of the Army (*lawagetas*) also has a *temenos*: so he too is declared to be divine (p. 11)—which is hard to conceive, unless he were the heir apparent, as J. Chadwick once suggested (*Manchester Guardian*, reprint, June 1954, p. 6; cf. *Docs.*, p. 120). If one were to reason backward as does Webster, on the basis say of the word *ἐκκλησία*, from Christian to Classical times, it could be "proved" that the Athenian assembly was a religious gathering, Athens a theocracy, and one shudders to think what else. The conception of rulers as "in some sense divine" is no simple and easy matter, as long study of ruler cult in Hellenistic and Roman times has shown; and the history of the doctrine of the divine rights of (modern) kings is no less involved and difficult. Nothing in the Linear B tablets has been cited as bearing out any such notions. Certainly in Homer, if his evidence is relevant, Agamemnon and the other *basileis* are not treated (except in stock epithets) as belonging in any real sense among the more-than-human beings who make up the polytheism; indeed one of the fundamental bases of the *Iliad* is the great and awful gulf between the gods and all men. Divine *sanction* for rulers is another matter, and with it other personal relations. The problems have been studied by J. Puhvel, *Minoica* (*Fest. J. Sundwall*), pp. 327-33.—*The Sacral Kingship*, ed. R. Pettazzoni (1959: VIII Internal. Cong. Hist. Rel.: Suppl. to *Numen*, IV), I have not seen.

Not always but often Webster tends in this chapter to maximize (if that is the correct modern word). He would like to believe, as of course we all should, that in Mycenaean times poetry and laws were written down: such writings may have been stored elsewhere (he omits to state where, but it would have to be in some

sort of building as yet undiscovered by excavators); or else they wrote on papyrus or parchment, which perished. The unsuitability of Linear B for Greek verse has been stressed, too late apparently for this book, by R. Carpenter in *Phoenix*, XI (1957), p. 59. As to laws, Webster suggests that the verb κρίνειν means in Classical Greek "to judge" because the King *selected* "an applicable ruling from among the recorded rulings" (p. 26).

This by itself would not be a fair sample. Set against it p. 23: in contrast with the writings from Ugarit and Alalakh, the Linear B tablets, he says, show no word for scribe, no apparent pride in writings. "It is tempting to argue that writing itself was not regarded so highly as in the East." But the suggestion (*ibid.*) that heralds were the scribes hardly agrees with what is known of heralds later. They were often very important persons; so far as I know, they were never scribes.

Ch. 2, "*Mycenaean Art in its Setting*" first emphasizes its international character. If it is clear that Minoan-Mycenaean art, despite numerous borrowings and loans, remained very much itself, no harm is done by the term "international." On the other hand, Webster takes many scenes from Minoan as well as Mycenaean objects, and allows Classical Greek interpretations full sway. Essentially the effort is to recognize in these deities, myths, and other matter known to us from the Linear B tablets, from Homer, and even from the Classical period. Some of the suggestions are simple, easy, and dubious. A bearded face between two goats on a gem from Phaistos (p. 50 and fig. 12) is taken to be "an ancestor of the classical [Dionysia] satyr." The assumptions are that Phaistos is somehow connected with Greece; that goats and satyrs were related at this early time, although nothing else in Crete suggests it, and the fact is that the beard is the face's sole attribute; it is assumed also that the face is a mask, although no mask except the quite different flattened gold death masks from Mycenae are known in the Bronze Age; finally, and equally dubiously, that the name Dionysus on the tablet XaO6 (cf. *Docs.*, p. 127) does belong to the god.

On the other hand, now that we have the names of many deities, the impulse to go beyond Nilsson and to identify figures in scenes is a natural and proper impulse, however difficult to fulfil. Fig. 10 shows three women all alike except that one is seated: the seated one is identified as Demeter, the other two as worshippers, and two very small figures are also worshippers, although one is merely picking fruit. A small and imperfect figure high on the edge is taken to be Athena, but she receives no attention. Fig. 13 shows four large women in various arm-waving postures. These are all identified as mortals, dancing, hence maenads; but one additional, tiny figure, also on the edge, is a goddess. However subjective or even unnatural such readings may seem, I suppose little else can be done. But surely restraint is needed. The Divine King reappears, divinely protected by griffins and lions; in some instances "the lion may be the King himself" (p. 32). On the Sarcophagus from Hagia Triada the dead man is stated to be a Mycenaean, not a Minoan, and a King; the offerings made to his figure show that he is receiving divine honors

(p. 35). Be this as it may, the tendency to find Mainland Greek ideas in the Sarcophagus scenes is meritorious; as will be shown elsewhere, it can be supported by substantial considerations. There is a whole page, 34, in criticism of Persson. Bull-jumping is re-examined (pp. 55-6) with connections traced to several myths involving bulls. Siege scenes are inevitably ancestors of the Trojan saga (p. 61). Although we do not have one single identified syllable of it, five types of Mycenaean poetry are described (pp. 62-3).

Ch. 3 deals with "*Eastern Poetry and Mycenaean Poetry*." Webster distinguishes, rightly no doubt, an earlier period of borrowing, viz. the Mycenaean, and a later period, Homer's; and he specifies routes by which the stories reached Greece. For cultural borrowings of other kinds there appears to be linguistic evidence: the place-name Byblos came into Greek before 1200 (Albright), and the Linear B tablets have the words for gold, chiton, lion, cummin, and cyperus (p. 66), all borrowed from Semitic. The known Eastern writings which come in question are listed (p. 68): they are declared to be 'courtly' in character (pp. 70-1), hence correct personal titles are insisted upon. Other features are a tendency to make numbers large, and to cap one large figure by a still larger one (C. H. Gordon, p. 75). There was a "courtly" fondness for repetitions of formal phrases (pp. 75-6). There may not be here a characterization of just what sort of thing is involved, but the results appear to be precisely what transmission from one oral poet to another regularly produces. Writing itself is not mentioned in the poetry (pp. 73-4), but something is known of scribes, and it is a matter of no small interest (*infra*) that sometimes at least the poets dictated (pp. 76-8).

Thus far Webster's account appears to be an excellent summary of the facts. I cannot judge directly, much less follow him in the study of content, where many scholars have uncovered stories and details of stories which they allege to be extensive borrowings that lasted to reappear in Homer. It might be wished, however, that thought had been given to still wider possibilities. Surely the Greeks had stories of their own, dating from a very remote past. So doubtless did the people among whom they settled. Such folk-tales perhaps appear more in the *Odyssey* than in the *Iliad*. Without accepting details about the bearson tales, we can hardly rule out the general proposition R. Carpenter has recently summarized (*Folk-tale, Fiction and Saga*, pp. 3-4; index s. v. oral), viz. that a stock of folk-tales, of very ancient date and no assignable authorship, existed everywhere and could be drawn upon at will by bards remote from each other in time and place. Webster appears not to have considered any of this. The Oriental parallels alleged to be sources are sometimes persuasive, but more often it would seem that life itself, aided by imagination, might have produced long since a stock of tales and episodes much closer, in substance and in origin, to what finally was embodied in Homeric poetry.—Other good things by C. M. Bowra are cited many times, *Heroic Poetry* never, although it is the grand work on comparative materials and ought to be the main reliance for anyone attempting to suggest the nature of lost epics.

Ch. 4, "Mycenaean Poetry," is 45 pages of effort to make statements about poetry which *qua* poetry is all but totally lost. The headings of three Linear B tablets *can* be scanned (p. 92), but they are mere orders and give little help. Whether Eastern metres were adopted is doubtful, since they are governed by stress rather than quantity. The age of the Greek hexameter is unknown; Bowra does (*Homer and his Forerunners*, pp. 33-6), Webster oddly does not, suppose it to be Mycenaean (p. 92). Archaeology gives a little external help. Fragments of two lyres were found in the tomb at Menidi, and it is reasonable to assume that they were for the use of the owner, who also had a boar's-tusk helmet: hence he is referred to as a "warrior poet." A fresco at Pylos shows a skirted lyre-player (fig. 9) who is not unlike the one on the Hagia Triada sarcophagus, which also has a player of flutes. Of course people also are shown singing. That is all the direct evidence about Mycenaean poetry. In Ventris-Chadwick, *Docs.*, Index, there is nothing on poets, poetry, metre, music, musical instrument, lyre, verse, bard, rhapsode (but Mrs. E. T. Vermeule calls attention to a conjecture, dubious and properly not indexed, "musicians" in No. 12: but as she says, pa-ke-te-ja-o-qe is more likely "carpenters"). If we had only the Linear B tablets to go by, we should never suspect that there was any Mycenaean poetry. The argument is negative, but the tablets do mention a goodly range of occupations and objects, and prominence is claimed by Webster for poets. If five men's names end with an expression for "fame," that hardly tells anything about poetry.

Apart from vague and general matter, there is nothing left except inferences backward from Homer. It is in the nature of epic poetry that singer learning from singer will occasionally learn not only plots but also phrases. This is true not least of Homeric epic. The whole elaborate repertory of formulae for including names was surely not all the invention of Homer alone: Parry thought none of it was. Many other phrases too he may have learned from predecessors, and it is certainly right to attempt, as Webster and others have done, to identify such phrases in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Some of the suggestions, in the purely verbal realm, starting from the work of M. Leumann, are exceedingly interesting (pp. 94-7). Archaeology is perhaps more dangerous: e.g. "whether archers survived is extremely doubtful" (p. 100). It is true that, although the making of a good compound bow, Odysseus' for instance, requires skill of a high order, so that *if* such skill survived through the Dark Ages, it must have been uncommon, still arrowheads survive from that period, and Geometric art shows bowmen. The craft was certainly never lost; for war and for hunting the needs were incessant. Only one bow has survived from all of Greek and Roman Antiquity, and it comes from Mesopotamia very late. F. E. Brown's publication is a model (*Seminarium Kondakovianum*, IX [1937], pp. 1-10), and recently W. E. McLeod has treated excellently an Egyptian bow, of which there are several (*A. J. A.*, LIV [1958], pp. 397-401). To argue from an absence of remains of bows and arrows during the eleventh and tenth centuries (pp. 104-5) is surely an uncritical use of the *argumentum ex silentio*.

Other archaeological topics are discussed, however, more carefully, and there are convenient summaries about swords, shields, armor, burials. These can be kept separate from the attempts to link particular objects to particular heroes, e. g. Hector to a body-shield (p. 92). Notoriously epic poetry mingles in one scene men who actually lived generations apart, and it brings together historic events of quite separate dates. To infer that because Hector is mentioned once retreating with a tall shield knocking (as anyone's would) against neck and ankles (*Il.*, VI, 117 f.), therefore a warrior named Hector actually did once retreat with a body-shield knocking against neck and ankles—this in a poem set down at least 500 years later—is an exercise of pure faith (p. 92). Again, "Ajax is dated by his body shield" (p. 115). Possibly: but corroboration is needed, and is not forthcoming. The name Ajax seems to occur on Linear B tablets, along with many Homeric names, on which Webster produces interesting data (pp. 114 ff.; 288): and it is notable that real research has here bred some, though too little, caution. Having worked with prosopographical materials in periods where a degree of certainty is attainable, I can only say that to imagine that these names were generally given, because already (indeed almost instantly) they were famous in poetry, seems very dubious. The least plausible are Antenor, Hector, Priam, and Tros. But then Bowra is perfectly clear and convincing: "It is quite likely that poets before Homer, needing a Trojan hero, invented Hector and gave him an appropriate name" (*Homer and his Forerunners*, p. 26). Can we not add two queries: Do parents ever name sons for enemy heroes? Are these particular names not a proof, rather, that at Pylos *fin. s. XIII* none of the names in question was thought of as belonging to prominent enemies?

Ch. 9 is a summary. Of the other eight, detailed, Chapters, 1-4 are devoted to the Bronze Age, chiefly the Age of Mycenae, the time of Linear B. We have now examined some of their contents. In the realm of the mind, where these Chapters are mostly seated, i. e. in poetry, myth, and religion, nearly everything is conjectural. The second half of the book, Chs. 5-8, though concerned with an Age devoid of writing (unless near the end) and properly called Dark, from *ca.* 1100 to *ca.* 750 (Webster's date for Homer), is still full of conjecture, but nevertheless the period provides more substance for an account like *MtH*. Partly this is due, but not wholly, to the fact that epic poetry developed in this period, and that the two documents which overshadow all else were written down sometime near the end, or at the end, or after the end, of the period. But there is much else beside the epics.

Ch. 5, "The Collapse of the Mycenaean Civilization and the Ionian Migration," deals first with the archaeological evidences of destruction: Thebes; then the rest; after them, some remains show continuity at Pylos, Mycenae, Ithaca, Iolcos (?), [add Menidi?], and at several cult sites (pp. 136-9), as well as at Athens proper (p. 140). In recent studies, Webster's among them, an attempt has been made to make Athens startlingly prominent, in Webster chiefly as a center for transferring refugees to colonies, and for

fine pottery (*infra*); going further, Whitman chiefly for pottery and, more logically than Webster, for the actual formation of the epics. Most scholars will find it hard, I think, to swallow the various major and minor theories involved. The bolder and more "brilliant" the theory, the more painstaking and sober its defense ought to be.—My impression is that eventually Attica will be shown to have been eminent in some respects, though I see now no proved close relation of these respects to epic.

Meantime, loose thought clutters the scene. In the Dark Age, for instance, an internal governmental change takes place: the Divine King loses his Divinity (pp. 142-4). Here again there is learning, but insufficient (e.g. about Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 3); there is facile neatness (Wanax was King, Lawagetas was Polemarch); there is credulity (ten-year Archons); and there are other unrealistic statements. Better is the more general account on p. 156. On p. 155 the rise of the polis means "the development of a new type of city surrounded by walls and centred on the Agora instead of the Acropolis." A few ring-walls are as early as the Sixth Century; most are Fifth Century or later (R. L. Scranton, *Greek Walls*, pp. 158-86). The fact that the excavated Agora in Athens apparently does not go back much if any beyond Solon has to be circumvented by reference to "traces of an earlier Agora nearer the Acropolis." The "traces" consist solely of one reference, in Harpocration (s.v. Πάνδημος Ἀφροδίτη). R. E. Wycherley, who places it last among all the testimonia about the Agora (*Agora Excavations*, III, no. 731; see also no. 553), remarks that all details are entirely conjectural. Until remains have been identified, it is better to regard the very existence of the "Old Agora" as dubious.

Ch. 6, "*Poetry between Mycenae and Homer*" is an attempt to discern traditions in poetry, and to distinguish types and subject-matters of poetry. Once again the general impression is of great learning boldly used. The range of topics is wide; linguistic (notably Aeolic, pp. 160-2), archaeological (cremation, weapons, scenes on vases), literary (catalogues, Hesiod, *Cypria*, the introduction of the Phoenician alphabet).

In all these fields, different students may have different notions about what constitutes truth, but truth is not always merely a subjective matter. Take for example a simple problem in the metal of epic weapons. "Miss Lorimer has shown," Webster states with approval (p. 166; correct reference: *Homer and the Monuments*, 271, not 267), "that a number of blows which sever whole limbs can only have been delivered with an iron sword, and, therefore, must be additions to Bronze Age fighting." Let it be freely granted that Homeric audiences contained many experts in butchery: the carving of sacrificial victims was a subject of great interest. Let it be granted also, though merely for argument (since experiments adequate to show what could be done with good heavy bronze weapons by experts striking in the frenzy of combat have certainly not been performed, nor does Miss Lorimer claim so), that the blows in question would be known to be exceedingly difficult. Does this prove that the weapons must have been iron, so that the inci-

dents in question can have been narrated only after iron weapons came into use? Or is it not one among countless illustrations of the fact that by their very nature epics are full of difficult and impossible—"epic"—feats? If a horse was heard to talk, must we infer that the art of ventriloquism was well advanced?

As has been hinted *supra*, it goes almost without saying that *MtH* leans toward the optimistic, yes-saying side of all the questions, (1) Were there writing and records throughout the Dark Ages?—though not for epic poets, p. 183; cf. also pp. 272-3. (2) Was the Phoenician alphabet adopted as early as the ninth century (by implication ca. 850 B. C.: p. 183)? (3) Was the *Iliad* written down in the eighth century (ca. 750 B. C.: pp. xvi, 273)?

(1) In favor of those who see these things cheerfully, there is always Cyprus to give comfort, though Bowra had already noted that for verse the syllabary is no better than Linear B (*Homer and his Forerunners*, p. 8).

(2) Consciously or not, Webster seems to have put the adoption of the Phoenician alphabet a full century before the first preserved writing, so as to give time for familiarity with writing to develop before the writing-down of epics. This reasoning surely accords with probabilities. It is hard to imagine that within any short time of the first learning to write, anyone would undertake to write out an epic. The impulse to write out oral epic is not at first a natural impulse: the poet himself does not feel it, and only an unusually thoughtful and energetic literate auditor will conceive the notion of undertaking so heavy a task. A. B. Lord, who has had as much experience as any living person of what is involved, has urged with me that the physical obstacles are formidable. Leisure and capital would be required; a large supply of papyrus would be needed for 15,000 lines, together with pens and ink—materials not easily and quickly obtained for the first time. Carpenter allowed some fifty years (ca. 725–ca. 675) between the first Greek writing of Phoenician letters and the writing of the *Iliad*. Webster would allow a century. A duration of some such order is clearly probable.

Without discussion, however, Webster puts the adoption of the Phoenician alphabet a full century before *any* surviving writing (ca. 850–ca. 750). Nearly 30 years have now elapsed since Carpenter was first impressed by the strength of the argument from silence, and that argument is now stronger than ever. Numerous excavations have turned up tens of thousands of sherds. The excavation of the shrine on the summit of Mt. Hymettus, for instance, yielded 130 baskets of sherds, from some of which hundreds of vases have been reconstituted; yet only 98 + inscriptions were found; all are brief, many are only a few letters; all betray inexperience—and none is dated within the eighth century. They are not the first writing in Attica, but it is incredible that when they were written, writing had been practiced for more than 150 years. The earliest forms of letters are still those on the Dipylon oenochoe, and it is dated by R. S. Young, on the basis of careful study of Geometric and Subgeometric pottery, at the end of the eighth century (*Hesperia*, Suppl. II, p. 71). This dating has been neglected occasionally, but I think never refuted. Young himself is now willing to put his Phrygian inscriptions in the eighth century (*A. J. A.*, LXII [1958],

p. 153)—whatever Phrygia may prove about the Greeks—and the Ischia bowl is probably dated correctly before, though not long before, 700 (*Rend. Linc.*, X [1955], pp. 215-34). The compulsion, therefore, of the facts viewed candidly is to allow dates slightly earlier than hitherto, but still to put the writing down of the *Iliad* in the first half of the Seventh Century, and even at that the chances are against the first decade or two.

Straining the possibilities to the utmost, so as to date the adoption of the alphabet as early as *ca.* 750, and the earliest surviving inscriptions (the Dipylon vase, the Ischia bowl, the Phrygian inscriptions, and perhaps a few others) a couple of decades later, we might conjecture that Homer's scribe set to work on the *Iliad*, under Homer's dictation, within the eighth century. If some potent reason compelled, this would be the chronology. But there is no such reason. On the contrary, the compulsion is the other way.

If now we cast loose from *MtH* and attempt in crude outline a different sketch of the events, the principal features will be as follows. In the Mycenaean period there was epic: evidence, almost all peoples have it. The themes, as usual, were doubtless various; whether Troy was among them is extremely unlikely: evidence, it was a recent war, and epic more usually draws on remote events (Bowra, *A. J. A.*, LIV [1950], p. 185). Whether epic continues to flourish in the late stages of a civilization may or may not be doubtful. In any case the story of Troy was merely handed down with other traditions. In the Dark Age, epic may have survived, or revived, or begun again, in a few spots, but it was doubtless pitiful stuff: evidence (which Webster, holding a view which in its extreme form was that of A. J. B. Wace, would by no means accept), all other arts declined, because the economic margin was gone, skills were soon lost, the world was fragmented; there was little wealth and leisure. The growth of epic was at first slow, presumably, then at the end rapid. In the Eighth Century interest revived in the personages of the Trojan period: evidence cited, *MtH*, pp. 137-8, 179-80. Behind Homer there were generations—for a guess, a half-dozen generations—of skilled singers, perhaps more; a great treasure of knowledge (catalogues and all they involve are one item) and of skills (formulae are the obvious item) lay ready for him, and the art had become highly sophisticated. Equally crucial for Homer was the tremendous inspiration of the post-Geometric stage of the Renaissance. Full of the new excitement, and stirred also by the possibilities of writing which his scribe opened up for him, Homer composed (by dictation) in the Seventh Century, which was the ideal moment for epic: in another two or three generations, say by about 600 B. C., the inroads of literacy, as it became widespread (evidence: law-codes), caused oral epic to decline, until in the Fifth Century it petered out.¹

¹ The foregoing, and the rest of the present review, were written before the publication of D. L. Page, *History and the Homeric Iliad* (Univ. California, 1959); his Ch. VI is the only part which I think might lead to changes. Review forthcoming in *A. J. P.*, LXXXII (1961).—Just before the final proof, another very important book, Albert B. Lord's *The Singer of Tales* (Harvard, 1960) has been published. Review forthcoming in *C. W.*, LIV (1960/1).

Ch. 7, "Protogeometric and Geometric Art," is not a summary of other arguments, but is a full-length new and independent study. The object is to reveal the mind of Athens in the years *ca.* 1100 to *ca.* 750 B. C., and hence finally the mind of Homer. The material of the chapter is the decoration on vases, and the tone is exuberant. Again it must be emphasized that the directness, the up-to-the-minute learning, the scope (the mind of Athens throughout 350 years!), and even the generosity of treatment, all give lasting values to these pages, in spite of what are, I think, large errors. The aesthetic analysis of the decoration in *MtH* will not cease to be stimulating, and much of it, by itself, is doubtless correct.

In the first place, it is not a fault, I suppose, to have selected one art and not another. We possess a fair amount of Geometric sculpture. Being three-dimensional, and made of more costly materials, sculpture would usually be considered a better index of mentality than pottery. Geometric sculpture is gaunt. It contrasts with the detailed elaboration of Homeric epic. Nevertheless the surviving sculpture is all rather petty: they could fire huge vases but they could only hammer out small bronzes. Webster, indeed, who claims that pottery was a major art then (*and* later: a topic to study), could well claim that sculpture was a minor art. Even so, the direct Homeric references to rich metalwork have no relation whatever to Geometric sculpture, but rather to the rich orientalizing work of the Phoenicians. When scenes with human figures are referred to, they are scenes far beyond the powers of any Geometric artist. In short, whatever secrets of the earlier Greek mind are wrapped up in Geometric vase painting, Homeric poetry does not reflect directly the old-time Geometric, but rather the Renaissance of the Sixth Century. It was from the Phoenicians, and it was as an early part of the Renaissance, that these epic depictions are said to come, just as literacy itself came. By the time the Homeric epics were written down, the free depiction of figures—a skill not unrelated to literacy—was known in many of its astonishing possibilities.

This is not the place to take up the analysis of Geometric design. It should be done. The extreme view would be that, except in some vague sense, as an embodiment of orderliness, it has nothing to do with Homer.

Ch. 8, "Homer and his Immediate Predecessors," is one quarter of the book in length, and is subdivided.

Ch. 8.1, on "Late Elements in the Iliad and the Odyssey," is concerned to keep the epics back in the Eighth Century. Evidence is adduced from language, quotation, and illustration (p. 211); but all of it seems to me ambivalent. If Polyphemus is shown on a vase being blinded by Odysseus and his crew, does that prove the vase painter is consciously illustrating *Od. 9*? It could be, but instead it could show that Homer included a story already popular. Even the loincloth plays a part, although it is emphasized that 'the aristocratic world' would know there had been a change at the Olympian games (to complete nakedness, 720 B. C.: p. 216). From hoplite armor hoplite tactics are inferred as a simultaneous development (pp. 214-15). But hoplite tactics were revolutionary. They de-

pended on drill and discipline. If the history of warfare suggests anything, it suggests a long development. It seems moreover that Homer is familiar with hoplite tactics (pp. 216-20). The hoplite line is first pictured on Protocorinthian vases.

Ch. 8. 2, "Function and Distribution of Similes," is of considerable interest; much of it seems to me very good, and there is a tabulation on pp. 230-1. Ch. 8. 3, "Typical Scenes and Special Narratives," deals with e. g. the Doloneia—rightly (I think) accepting it. Ch. 8. 4, "Composition of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*," also includes a tabulation, on pp. 265-7, listing the instances of narrative preparation for future action in both epics. Here too there is much of interest, and one can only deplore the fact that it is written without benefit of Lord's dictation theory. The theory of dictation has an advantage which has not been stressed, but relates to much in *MtH* (e. g. p. 183). Dictated poetry can be of any length. A really good poet, dictating, will naturally put in everything he can, elaborating the whole as he never could in reciting. Hence all the worry about the relation of length of epic to occasion of recitation can be forgotten. There is no longer any need to imagine occasions when the whole *Iliad* or *Odyssey* was recited. Ch. 8. 5, "Performance," is therefore a useless search for festivals. Ch. 8. 6, "Relation of the *Iliad* to the *Odyssey*," assigns both to one author. All the way to the end there is useful learning somewhat askew: e. g., after the statistics have been given, the statement, "If a word occurs only once in one poem, there is no reason why it should occur at all in the other" (p. 277).

Mechanical. The style is not balanced by the arrangement, but instead the paragraphs are long and except for the last one, the chapters are long, unbroken. The table of Contents has adequate sub-headings, but no pages against them. A Chronological Table (pp. xv-xvi) conveniently orders some of the material: note that H. T., nowhere explained, = Hagia Triada.

As a whole, the format is neat, and the printing is extraordinary: I have not noticed a single misprint. For some reason book manufacture lags behind other technical advances: the covers curl. Although some of the plates are lucid, the gems are all too small, and many details which are hard to imagine in Webster's verbal interpretations (Ch. 2) are invisible on the plates. Black backgrounds still persist. The plates have helpful page-references, but the captions are not in the Index. The footnotes are actually footnotes. They contain a wide range of very recent bibliography—a valuable feature of the book—and are indexed. Author's initials, suppressed in the notes, can be found, most of them, in the Index; under H, fourth entry, add a (new) second initial G.; seventh entry, add two middle initials M. A.; eighth entry from end, for R. read L.

Index. About the principles which guided the making of the Index we are told nothing. It ought not to need saying that in a work which will long be consulted for its materials, the Index should be reliable. I have checked *only* the proper names in A., and systematically *only* in three spots, with the following result (I give this

list partly to show the astonishing range of the book). Add Abantes 152; Abarbaree 117; Achaeans 252—there is no entry Achaean or Achaeans—; (Achilles: I here enclose in parentheses entries which are present but need to be added to) 250, 251; Acropolis 155, 156—there is no entry Acropolis—; acropolis, Chios, 157; (Aeneas) 159; (Agamemnon) 159, 251, 253; Aipu 119; (Ajax) 253; Akamas 253; Akastos 142; (Aktorione) 175, fig. 25b; Aleuadai 156; Amphigeneia 119; (Amphiklos) 152; anax 146, 156; Andraimon 151; Androklos 154; Andropompos 142, 151; Anios 251; Ankaios 156; (Apollo) 62, 63, 252; Aradippo 53, fig. 17; (archers) 100; (archons) 153; (Argonauts) 159; Argives—no entry—152; (Ariadne) 52; (Arktinos) 144; (Artemis) 60; Asera 161; (Asine) 56; Asterios 146; Astypalaia 146; (Athena) 60; (Athens) 52, 153, 158, 164; Attica 151, 159, 160. So long a list derived from so few pages is its own commentary. There were no fixed and rational principles for inclusion or exclusion. For proper names, at least, an Index should be complete. Other items are fewer and doubtless worse: there is an entry "helmets" but all are jumbled together, and 253 is lacking: there is no entry "boar's-tusk helmet" (253), or "boar" (57), or "hunt, boar" (57). Of the actual entries, most appear to be accurate; Ikmalios is on 111 not 110, Scheria the same; under Hagia Triada for 62 read 63, and add 286; caption under Figs. 25ab for 289 read 288. But for passages in Homer—the real focus of the volume—there are almost three columns. A few random checkings seem to show that here adequacy is achieved.

On the spine of the volume, between the title and the author's name, a chariot is embossed in gold. The drawing is taken from the Agora Aktorione-Molione jug. Presumably this jug was not chosen to provide the image for the spine because the jug was felt to be important, but it so happens that it is the vase most similar in shape to the inscribed Dipylon Vase, and according to Young, it helps to assure the post-700 date of the latter (fig. 25ab; photograph actual size, bibliography, description in R. S. Young, *Hesp.*, Suppl. II, pp. 68-70; discussion with comparative evidence, A. D. Fraser, *A. J. A.*, XLIV [1940], pp. 457-63). On the spine of *MtH* we see chariot, horse, and driver. The image as rendered reproduces the stiff archaic niceness of the original as a whole, yet the modern draughtsman (not the author, who is an expert student of vases) has failed to understand and follow the original in one particular, with the result that the chariot has no front (or rail), and the driver stands in a wildly precarious position, with nothing to support him. It would be easy to say that here is one piece of Geometric art which does really symbolize a book; easy and unfair, for it is a book loaded with content. Instead let the image serve as a caution for all of us—readers, critics, and author—to make our vehicle as safe as possible before we attempt any part of the exciting but perilous journey from Mycenae to Homer.

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- B. A. VAN GRONINGEN. *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque. Procédés et réalisations.* Amsterdam, N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij, 1958. Pp. 394. (*Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen*, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel LXV, No. 2.)

In a reaction to the *disiecta membra* treatment of early Greek literature, a treatment largely emanating from Homeric analytic criticism, Professor Van Groningen began a series of valuable studies, such as "Éléments inorganiques dans la composition de l'*Illiade* et de l'*Odyssée*," *R. E. H.*, V (1935), pp. 3-24, and *Paratactische Compositie in de Oudste Grieksche Literatuur* (Amsterdam, 1937). In these he showed there is a difference in literary methods of composition and in the conception of unity in the period prior to and after the fifth century when the concept of organic unity, such as we find in the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle, found such articulation and had such a pervasive influence that the physiognomy of early Greek literature has been obscured. The present study develops more maturely the fresh insights of the earlier studies. It gives a more systematic treatment, analysis, and illustration of the methods of composition used by pre-fifth century literature to organize its material into a unity. The aim of this study is to produce a *Poetics* for that kind of literature which Aristotle characterized as *λέξις εἰρημένη* but whose *σύστασις πραγμάτων* he left undeveloped. Because of its more comprehensive grasp of the problem of non-Aristotelian unity in archaic literature this study has much interest for scholars who, already tired of the scissors and paste kind of criticism, are ready to study the devices of unification in the poetic process. This study is free from aesthetic assumptions and has a down to earth approach to the syntax of unity. After the introduction, which is noteworthy for its grasp of the problems of composition in archaic Greek literature, the study is divided into two parts: 1) the methods of literary composition (*procédés*) and 2) the manner in which these methods are used (*réalisations*) by all writers in the period, outside of Homer and Herodotus who are omitted for the obvious reason that each of them would require a book by itself.

In the introduction the sound thesis is stated that there is a close relationship between the form and the mentality of the writer and until we grasp the mentality of the pre-classical period its literature seems odd and strange to the modern mind. The problem of unity is best understood if we imagine a situation where there are two extremes and an intermediate area. At one extreme we have a completely inorganic work where the parts do not work toward a common end. This is called *zero unity* and does not deserve the name of literature. At the other extreme is the perfect organic unity set forth by Aristotle, though its origins lie in the fifth century. The area in between these extremes constitutes the wide range exhibited by archaic literature. It is not a literature without unity but its unity is marked by digressions, by a centrifugal tendency of the parts. The whole is subject to contraction or expansion; the hierarchy of the parts is often fragile and their arrangement depends on

chance associations now lost to us but once present in the rapport between the author and his audience. There are many foci of interests in the pattern and often it is impossible to formulate an exact title. There are various degrees of tension between unity and the autonomous. There is a unifying tendency present but it does not predominate. The degree of unity often depends on the material. Some narrative material has an inherent unity and success in composition merely depends on not adding the superfluous. Then there are cases where unity does not pre-exist in the material, where the writer must make a real effort to unify recalcitrant material. The third kind of material is literature improvised on inspiration, most damaging to unity, where emotion and irrational factors determine the structure. Thus unity is easier of achievement in narrative works where chronology and events act as the armature core for the creative process. It is also more prevalent in works where logic dominates (cf. Euclid), where the writer goes from cause to effect or vice versa. The genre of literature in which it is most difficult to achieve unity is one where lyrical emotion predominates. Yet the Greek craftsmen of the pre-classical period were conscious of literature as an artifice. The existence in their work of artifices which bind the material is witness to their conscious awareness of compositional unity. Their consciousness of it, however, did not reach a conceptual stage of literary criticism until the fifth century but it is ever present in their work with varying degrees of success.

The first part of this work gives a detailed enumeration and illustration of the methods which the writers use to bind their work. In chapter 1 we have an account of collections of closely related material, written or memorized, such as epic cycles from which the poet selected a portion for recitation; collections of logographers with their *τόποι*; the Hippocratic corpus. The authors of these collections chose the elements but neglected to arrange them; each piece is contiguous to the next but not tied to it. Thus collections of homogeneous material constitute a primitive effort at unity. Chapter 2 deals with the Greek particles which not only tie sentence to sentence but section to section, some of the particles being capable of looking forward or backward. The illustrations given make us more aware of the need to study particles as links in unifying sections of a work. They contribute in divers ways in transforming a collection into a chain. The creation of a chain by itself does not produce unity which is the result of order, hierarchy, internal tension, and true progress but the creation of a chain through particles is in itself an established literary device aimed at unity. Since a chain by itself, where all parts are equal, does not make for unity, one of the ways to achieve a hierarchy of elements is to insert an interpolation in a previous part. These digressions are introduced and terminated by *Ringkomposition*, a device studied recently in detail by Van Otterlo. Chapter 4 gives a study of digressions in archaic literature which are often to be explained by the momentary interests of the writer and his audience. Another factor in breaking away from chain progression and achieving hierarchy of parts is transposition which interrupts the chronological order and puts the reader at the vantage point. Eminent uses of this dramatic device are the flashback and

foreshadowing whose role in Homer leads to the overthrow of chronology by the *medias res* technique. When a collection or a chain lacks unity, the prologue can play a unifying role by giving a view of the whole. The study of the prologue in early Greek literature shows it to be a unique device in capturing the listener's attention. In contrast, the epilogue scarcely plays any role for the writer ends when there is nothing left to say. Though there is an element known as *σφραγίς* in the nome of Terpander there is no formal epilogue in our surviving literature to balance the prologue. In the few instances of surviving epilogues they merely repeat the prologue. There are some few instances, as in Tyrtaeus (9 Diehl), Euclid, and Hippocrates, where a work is framed by a prologue and an epilogue. Chapter 8 adds a significant contribution to our knowledge of the role which repetitions play in tying together the parts of a work and contributing variety to the whole. The final chapter in the first section of the book deals with the interlaced order of composition such as is found in Solon's *Elegy on the Muses* where Van Groningen sees a remarkably interlaced order of the three themes of the poem (a b c). Missing from the devices is one where imagery or symbolism play a role in unifying the parts. Though most evident in the drama (cf. Goheen's *The Imagery of Sophocles' Antigone* and Murray's *The Motif of Io in Aeschylus' Suppliants*), Whitman has showed that fire is a repeated symbol unifying the *Iliad* (cf. *Homer and the Heroic Tradition*, Chapter VII).

The second part of this study shows how these devices are embodied in the surviving works of literature. The various genres in archaic literature are examined, their structural patterns analyzed, and the methods of unification shown. From the epic are chosen the Lay of Aphrodite by Demodocus (θ 266-366), the Hymns to Aphrodite, to Demeter, and Apollo. The artifices used to join the disparate parts of Hesiod's poems and the *The Shield of Heracles* are examined. Of the elegists Theognis' collection is analyzed in detail and selected examples are chosen from the other elegists. There are selected poems from the solo and choral lyric, with a chapter devoted to an analysis of eight odes from Pindar. Of the Presocratics Empedocles receives a separate chapter while examples are selected from the remaining Presocratics. There are chapters on the Sophists, on the Rhetoricians and Orators and on the Hippocratic corpus. Van Groningen's procedure is to give a structural analysis of a poem or treatise, summarize the chief views of past scholarship, and then give his own interpretation in terms of the devices for unification. Whether one agrees in full, in part, or not at all with his efforts to show the varying degrees of unity inherent in each work, the detailed structural analysis of this large body of literature within the confines of one volume is destined to make it a valuable handbook for consultation. Especially it has timely interest for our generation which is interested in literary patterns. In this book one will find as strong a case as has ever been made for unity. The grounds for it in some cases are too close to *zero unity* for comfort but arguments are marshalled from the mentality of the author, the recalcitrance of material dealt with, the birth of new genres with resulting changes in mentality, factors involved in

recitation which are no longer discernible by us, and evidence for the imprint of epigoni in the existing manuscripts.

In this study Van Groningen has deliberately avoided the word *paratactic* used in his previous study. The reason is that the word, as used, means a non-organic form of composition in which part follows part without any one general idea dominating the whole. In this study the word unity is consistently used and merely a chronological criterion, the fifth century, is used to differentiate it from the Aristotelian use of the word. This causes difficulties, for there results a confusion in the word unity. Partial unity is not the same as organic unity. There is a difference between the Aristotelian unity characterized by a tightly strung tension of the parts, by subordination to hierarchy and the unity of archaic literature which is more often than not a chain, a parataxis loosely linked by the devices illustrated. There may be skill in binding the parts but Hesiod's *Works and Days*, Theognis, the *Hymn to Apollo*, even many of the choral lyrics such as the *Partheneion* are mere approximations to unity. Consequently the term unity, in so far as it subsumes Aristotelian and pre-Aristotelian unity, is semantically misleading. Nor is a chronological division the proper solution for, as Van Groningen admits, there is often less unity in works composed in the fifth century than in some literature of the archaic period. We still find diptych and triptych patterns in the drama and we are still at a loss to see what really binds *The Trojan Women* together. Perhaps the phrase "paratactical unity" should have been used as the salient characteristic of archaic literature, a term which most adequately fits the intermediate area between zero unity and organic unity. If organic unity is retained, then some analogy to biology is called for where we witness higher and lower forms of organisms. In this case the account should be one of evolution toward Aristotelian unity rather than one so sharply contrasted as in this study.

Unity must also be related to the problem of listening orally to a work as against reading it. Tycho von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff has pointed out in *Die dramatische Technik des Sophokles* that there is difference in the experience of a listener and a reader; a playwright concentrates on effects of individual scenes on the spectator rather than on the coherence of the whole which is more readily perceived by the reader of the play. This is not to deny a compatibility of the two in the same way as a judge listens to the oral presentation of a case but reserves final judgment after he has read the record. But is there any evidence prior to the fifth century that this was the case with the audiences of archaic literature? Consequently the question arises if the quest for unity in literature presented orally is not really a factor most inherent in a reading experience, particularly that of the *irritabile genus* of critics. The unity may be present, but it reminds me of an answer given to me by an oral bard in Crete who, when asked how in oral improvisation he knew he came to the end of the fifteen syllable iambic line, replied, "I don't count syllables, the melody of the line tells me when to stop." To change artistic instincts into concepts of literary analysis is the root of much of our troubles in truly apprehending the form of Greek literature.

The problem of unity in much of archaic literature is furthermore connected with factors at work in oral compositions, for much of archaic literature is the product of rhapsodes. As we now know, oral composition consists in joining formulae to create a narrative chain. We also know that early Greek literature was especially characterized by stitching together traditional material, what Hesiod calls *δαίψαντες ἀοιδῆν* (frg. 265), which I would interpret not merely as stitching formulae but thematic material as well. Parataxis in early Greek literature was born out of a poetic process which stitches existing material. The instinct to use the given, as Wade-Gery aptly puts it (*Essays in Greek History*, p. 29) "is not laziness but a form of *αἰδώς*, a respect for the given as such." Particularly is this true in the rhapsode whose art is *ad hoc*. Such a manner of composition inevitably leads to the chain arrangement of material, to oral variants, to interpolations, to digressions, to repetitions. Many of the devices singled out in this study are merely the devices of oral poetry to stitch the traditional material. The chain method is the oral method to which the audiences were accustomed. Because this material was well known to the audiences the prologue merely tells what theme from the traditional material is selected for recitation; familiarity with the material also does away with the need of a finale, hence the absence of a crescendo or epilogue. Though later literature was composed with the written word the bardic tradition left its structural influence upon it. Consequently the account of the form of archaic literature is intimately connected with oral literature and its *Fortleben*. The problem for the historian of Greek literature is not the extent to which archaic literature approximates Aristotelian unity but to try to explain its form in terms of factors at work in oral composition. The form of early Greek literature will be brought into sharper focus if we approach its study with a more intimate understanding of the oral process of composition, its relation to tradition and to the living context of recitation before an audience. To judge it otherwise is to play a literary game of higher criticism which, though of interest to us, has little relevance to the historical origins of form in early Greek literature. Grateful as we are to this study for the facts about the structural analysis of this literature the most probable explanation for them has not been sought in the right direction.

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JULES LABARBE. *La loi navale de Thémistocle*. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1957. Pp. 238. 750 fr. (*Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège*, CXLIII.)

The Introduction states first the purpose of the book: to solve the problems posed by Themistocles' naval law and thus to cast light upon Athenian circumstances in the decade 490-480 B. C. It then lists the ancient passages referring to the monies (100 talents)

derived from the new workings of the silver-mines and the ships (100 or 200) constructed therewith; each passage is translated.

Part I, *La nature, les arrière-plans et les conséquences de la loi navale*, is divided into four chapters, of which the first, *Les revenus des mines d'argent et le nombre des navires en cause*, attacks the fundamental problem: was the revenue from the new vein 100 or 200 talents (no ancient writer actually specifies 200) and were 100 (Aristotle, Plutarch, and others) or 200 (Herodotus) ships constructed?

LaBarbe argues that the already established mines, whose revenues were normally distributed, lay at Laureium (the name is used in a narrow sense geographically) and produced 100 talents a year; that new deposits were worked at Maroneia, to the west of Laureium, from which 100 talents were appropriated. Thus Plutarch could report 100 talents from Laureium and Aristotle 100 from Maroneia; but Herodotus, who knew that 200 ships had been built, writes of Laureium, thinking of the term in the broadest possible topographical sense. Later authors mentioned one or the other of the two revenues, hence the divergence in the tradition. In fact, two motions were passed, assigning 100 talents from each of Laureium and Maroneia to the construction of a navy of 200 vessels.

Chapter II, *Les baux miniers et les répartitions ὀρχιδόν*, is an effort to prove that the leases were let for a period of three years (484/3-482/1) and anticipated a revenue of 200 talents. Under normal circumstances one third of the sum would have been available annually for distribution. LaBarbe, with some manuscripts, reads ὀρχιδόν rather than ὀρχηδόν in Herodotus, VII, 144, 1 and interprets the word as meaning all males who had reached legal puberty (the end of the sixteenth year). If each was to receive ten drachmai, there must have been 40,000 males of legal puberty. Rather dangerously, he follows Seltman in the belief that the well-known ten-drachmai and two-drachmai pieces were struck in the middle of the decade (484/3) to facilitate the expected distribution.

In Chapter III, *L'ostracisme d'Aristide et les autres repères chronologiques*, LaBarbe builds his chronology, to some aspects of which reference has been made above. The naval programme, according to him, was decided upon in 483/2.

LaBarbe now, in Chapter IV, *L'oracle du "mur de bois" et la formation progressive de la flotte athénienne*, computes that, before the new construction, the fleet had numbered 50 warships, that the squadron ready to oppose Xerxes totalled 271; that, since 200 vessels were eventually produced by Themistocles' decrees of 483, some 15-20 were launched in 480 and paid for by the proceeds (66⅔ talents) of a new mining contract. The balance of the money, about 48 talents, was distributed, at eight drachmai a man, to the forces before the battle of Salamis (36,000 men).

The second part of the book, *Les distributions d'argent dans le contexte démographique des années 510-479 avant J.-C.*, is a study, in a series of notes, of the total number of Athenian men of military age in the early decades of the fifth century (36,000 in 500 B. C., 48,000 in 480). Every piece of demographic evidence is employed: 5000 klerouchs lived on Salamis; those who had gone to Lemnos and Imbros ceased to be citizens but 4000 citizens went as klerouchs

to Chalcis. LaBarbe takes Herodotus' three myriads (V, 97, 2) of Athenians (in 499/8) as a firm 30,000: the figure originated with Aristagoras, who had obtained it by enquiry during his visit to the city and reported in Ionia the largest possible number, including the klerouchs. This questionable thesis is based on too many assumptions.

La Barbe now examines the numbers at Marathon, the conflict with Aegina, the trireme's complement (200 men), the Athenians at Artemisium, Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale. He sums up under the heading, "La population citoyenne d'Athènes à l'époque des guerres médiques."

Four satisfactory indices bring the book to a close: Index analytique, Index grec et latin, Index des noms propres, Index des sources anciennes.

LaBarbe is learned and ingenious, so much so, in fact, that his book is not an easy one to read. The argument depends heavily on statistical calculations, especially in Part II, and one cannot suppress scepticism concerning the precision of his computations and results. This observation has already been made in two critical reviews, by Cadoux (*J.H.S.*, LXXIX [1959], pp. 184-5) and, forcibly, by Harrison (*C.R.*, LXXIII [1959], pp. 153-4); I need not repeat their comments, with which I find myself in agreement.

As I read the book I had the impression that LaBarbe makes little effort to assess the relative values of his sources; Justin, Herodotus, Plutarch, Aristotle, Aeschylus, Nepos, Andocides seem to be given equal authority. So on pp. 93-5, with the notes, LaBarbe, although aware of Andocides' reputation, defends his knowledge and exposition of the history of the Persian wars.

Certain textual interpretations are not beyond question. See, for example, the manner in which *δισμυρίων* (Herodotus has and LaBarbe wants *τριμυρίων*), in a fragment of Aristodemus, is dealt with (p. 184, note 1). The text of Aelian, *Var. Hist.*, VI, 1, is accepted, but LaBarbe does not fully comprehend the difficulty offered by *τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν* in conjunction with the true nature of a klerouchy; in assigning "the remaining land" to the natives he is at some pains to provide them with soil to till. But the Athenians confiscated only the so-called "Hippobatos" land, the best, perhaps, but not the only arable territory at Chalcis.

LaBarbe associates (pp. 73-5) the first distribution of revenue from Laureium (in the narrow sense) with the *διαψηφισμός* that followed the downfall of tyranny (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 13, 5); none but the pure should share the profits and Isagoras and Cleisthenes agreed for political reasons. But Aristotle makes it clear that the *διαψηφισμός* was a political move, directed by the conservatives against those of impure descent (*οἱ τῷ γένει μὴ καθαροί*, the descendants of Solon's immigrants). It is precarious indeed to date the distribution by the *διαψηφισμός* and then to ascribe the latter to the greed of the demos.

This is not the only example of a tendency to strain the evidence. Elsewhere (p. 42 with note 2) it is suggested (after Bengtson) that, in appropriating mining revenues for naval construction and (after the invasion of 479 B. C.) in hastening the building of walls, Themistocles was influenced by the example of Thasos: but Themistocles'

policy regarding fortification originated in his archonship (493/2), a few years before the Thasian experience. Again, on p. 76 we are asked to believe that the distribution of revenue at Athens was annual because it had been annual in Siphnos (and so we must accept Nepos' testimony as possessing "fondement historique").

In a discussion of the dates of the archonships of Hypsiechides and Calliades (pp. 91-3, especially note 3 commencing on p. 91), LaBarbe obtains *precise* Julian dates for the beginning of the Attic year and the battle of Thermopylae; apart from other assumptions, he equates the bouletic year and that of the archon ("l'année administrative bouletique et archontique"), which makes nonsense of the chronological testimony of fifth-century inscriptions.

The editorial work has been well done. "*Archons*" is misspelled in note 2, p. 73; a letter has been dropped out in line 15, p. 88; in line 23 of p. 210 the figure 28.1 ought to be indicated as a percentage.

This book is comprehensive in its treatment of the opening decades of the fifth century and LaBarbe's grasp of the bibliography, ancient and modern, is impressive. Yet I find the book disturbing. The reason, I think, is that its author believes all the problems to be capable of solution; he is never content to return a verdict of "not proven." Add to this his fascination with figures and statistics, his insistence upon precision, and his habit of marching confidently beyond the limits of the evidence, and the result is a book that must be read with the greatest of caution.

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SOPHIE TRENKNER. *The Greek Novella in the Classical Period.* Cambridge University Press, 1958. Pp. xv + 191. \$5.50.

This book, which the authoress, most unhappily, did not live to see in print, was begun over twenty years ago and is the result of much painstaking research in the fields of literary history and of folklore. It makes an important advance in our knowledge of the subject and will be useful as an informative, well documented work of reference for students of the folktale in antiquity. It is not a complete repertory of story-motifs by any means, nor is it intended to be such; but from it, nevertheless, one may learn much that is not generally known or recognized concerning the practice of story-telling in ancient Greece, and the variety and abundance of stories that were known through oral circulation.

By 'novella' Miss Trenkner understands a short story told primarily for its own sake as entertainment, in contrast to myths and legends, which aim to inform us of historical truths, and to the fable, which is a story told summarily for the purpose of illustrating an idea. The realistic framework of facts deemed possible in human experience divides the novella, moreover, from the *Märchen*, which exploits what is marvellous or supernatural, and which is, in the author's own words, "the primitive form of all romantic narrative

which aims at bringing about an atmosphere of . . . elevation and beauty." On the other hand, what is called a novella may be either ideal and romantic, in respect to its tone and substance, like the *Märchen*, or tragic, or, on the other hand, it may be unmoral and essentially comic or picaresque, like many of the tales inserted by Apuleius in his *Metamorphoses*. These two fundamental types of story, the ideal or serious on the one hand, and the comic or jesting type on the other (which Miss Trenkner labels with the somewhat inadequate and partially misleading term 'realistic'), are, as she rightly insists (cf. p. 168), both primitive forms, which have been put forth separately at all times. Neither is a derivative of the other; although the substance of a story may be so potentially neutral as to lend itself to exploitation as either jest or *Ernst*.

Miss Trenkner's work has two aims, as explained in the Introduction. The first is to reconstruct the novella of the Attic period, which was oral and left no literary monument behind it, from the traces of it which are found in fifth-and-fourth-century literature. Chapters 2-7 on pp. 14-162 are given to this subject. The second aim is to reconsider the theory of the 'Ionian novella' as formulated by certain scholars, chiefly Wilamowitz, Hausrath, and Aly, in the light of the evidence which has been assembled for the Attic novella, "bearing in mind the fundamental distinction of realistic and idealistic narrative forms." This matter, and some others bearing upon the literary history of the novella as a form, are dealt with in chapters 1, 8, and 9, on pp. 1-13 and 163-86. It is necessary to take a broad view of the relation between folklore and literature generally in antiquity, in order to estimate the value of what Miss Trenkner and others have to say about the nature and 'development' of narrative forms.

It is often assumed, but erroneously, I think—and Miss Trenkner's book provides a good corrective for that misapprehension—that the Greeks, and other peoples who dwelt around the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and in Sicily in ancient times, were acquainted with very few genuine folktales, as compared with the number and variety of such tales that circulated among the Hindus or among other peoples both East and West in the Middle Ages. This illusion has arisen from the fact that ancient literature, especially Greek and Roman, unlike the less disciplined literatures of the Middle Ages and of Buddhist India, had no use for story-telling except under very special and limited conditions. As a matter of literary and intellectual propriety it excluded on principle, or reduced to summary outline or brief mention, as matter subordinated to an historical, philosophic, or scientific context, much story-lore of all kinds which in later ages was enlarged, combined with other motifs, dramatically prolonged, and exploited on its own account, as fictional entertainment. What was known to the ancient Greeks in the way of folktale through the medium of oral communication on the one hand, and what they chose to admit into their economically restricted and historically, intellectually, or poetically oriented literature on the other, are two very different things. The wealth of story-lore that blossomed forth into books in the early Middle Ages both in the East and in the West, as in the *Arabian Nights* and the *Gesta*

Romanorum, is not due to the importation of new narrative materials from India or abroad so much as to the extension along its own lines into literature, with a new and more popular orientation, of narrative materials that had always been cultivated orally in the same regions.¹

Back of all Greek literature and mythology there lay a broad substratum of primitive folklore, which was, undoubtedly, as rich in respect to the variety of its story-motifs and combinations of motifs as that of any other time and place of which we have knowledge. This is something that lies simply in the nature of things. Nothing in our written documents speaks against it, and much therein, together with the analogy of all that we know about folklore in other parts of the world, speaks positively for it. Stories were told for their own sake as entertainment—with no special meaning, about nameless or type-characters, what they did or said once upon a time somewhere—both before and after their patterns of narrative were used in the shaping of myths and historical legends, or of fables and proverbs intended to convey an idea metaphorically. The classical civilization molded much of this primitive narrative substance into forms which had meaning in terms of history or religion, or which served to illustrate a philosophical principle of some kind; but the rest of it, though always ready at hand in oral circulation, as story for story's sake, was excluded from literature except in so far as it was briefly mentioned or furnished material for comedy or for jesting of some kind. Before they came to be told in brief, summary fashion for the purpose of illustrating an idea metaphorically, many Aesopic fables were animal-stories told at length for their own dramatic interest; and the same fables in medieval literature and modern oral folklore, after being released from the grip of classical form, have relapsed once more into their primitive epic form and environment, where they are told at length and dramatically as *fabulae extravagantes* or animal epics, without any didactic or historical orientation. Likewise pure fairy tales, such as that about Gyges and his ring of invisibility, which Plato uses to illustrate a philosophical point, could make their entrance into Greek literature, other than comedy, only after they had been cast into the form of historical legends or myths. Even the story of Cupid and Psyche, which purports to be nothing more than a Milesian tale told by an old woman in a robbers' cave to amuse a young girl, has been shaped part-way into a myth about the gods and had probably been used as a religious allegory before Apuleius told it. Fairy-tale witches, who destroy children or sometimes eat them and later disgorge them, are summed up for classical literature in the mythical person of Lamia, said to have been a daughter of Poseidon and queen of Libya, who was once a beautiful woman but was persecuted by Hera, because Zeus had made love to her, and thereafter became ugly and preyed upon others' children. The fairy-tale of the clever little man who outwits the cannibal giant was told for amusement about other characters, or unnamed characters, both before and after it was incorporated into the classical myth about Odysseus and Polyph-

¹ For a fuller exposition of this subject see pp. 7-27 of the reviewer's "Origin of the Book of Sindbad," in *Fabula*, III (1959).

mus; and the same holds true for the substance of many another popular tale, which was used in the making of a Greek myth.

The abundance of folktales of all kinds that circulated orally in ancient Greece, and their identity as such, is seldom realized because they are almost never written out on their own account as stories of entertainment. Instead, they have been transformed, curtailed, depressed, or slanted, to a greater or a less degree, in the process of being adapted to the uses and orientation of almost every literary form except one of their own, to which, strictly speaking, they never attained. In order to envisage these folktales in their preliterate form and to realize their currency in the ancient world, it is necessary to excavate their remains from the formal literature in which they are embedded or implied, or briefly mentioned, and to reconstruct them, as well as may be, on the analogy of their counterparts in the folklore of other times and places. For the numerous *Märchen* hidden within their literary veins the Old Comedy has been profitably mined by Zielinski,² the Greek proverbs by Crusius;³ the Aesopic fables and Greek mythology by Wienert,⁴ H. J. Rose,⁵ W. R. Halliday,⁶ and many others in the course of commenting upon particular myths or fables. The Ionic novelle which are told as historical legends by Herodotus have been dealt with by W. Aly in his well-known book on the folktales of that author; and, in the book under review, Miss Trenkner has given us for the first time a comprehensive survey of the same kind of folktales which are imbedded, or their existence implied, in the Attic literature of the fifth and fourth centuries.

In an interesting and well-documented introductory chapter (pp. 14-22) Miss Trenker discusses the practice of story-telling in Attica in the classical period with reference to the social occasions which fostered it and the worldly, individualistic, and smartly-unmoral cultural outlook of the times, born of sophism, which qualified the stories told and extended their range and variety. This instructive survey of story-telling in general is followed by five very interesting chapters dealing concretely with the novelle of which use is made, or which are implied, in historiography, in Euripidean tragedy, in Old Comedy, in Middle and New Comedy, and in Rhetoric respectively; and, at the beginning of the next chapter, on the theory of the Ionic origin of the novella (ch. viii), a detailed summary is given of the varied themes which made up the repertoire of the Athenian novella. The great majority of the story-motifs represented by this material, if not all of them, are recorded in Thompson's *Motif Index*; but in that work, which is based so extensively (and necessarily) upon the large collections of stories made in medieval and modern times, the documentation for a story in ancient literature is often missing and

² T. Zielinski, *Die Märchenkomödie in Athen* (St. Petersburg, 1885).

³ O. Crusius, "Märchenreminiscenzen in antiken Sprichwort," in *Versammlung deut. Philologen und Schulmänner* (Dessau, 1884).

⁴ W. Wienert, *Die Typen der Griechisch-römischen Fabel* (Helsinki, 1925 [FF. Com. No. 56]).

⁵ *Handbook of Greek Mythology*, pp. 286-304.

⁶ *Greek and Roman Folklore* (New York, 1927), chap. iii, and *Indo-European Folktales and Greek Legend* (Cambridge, 1933).

thereby assumed to be non-existent. A motif-index of the folktales used, told, or referred to throughout Greek and Roman literature, if keyed to Thompson's *Index*, would show that many narrative themes, which are commonly known or cited only from medieval sources, have their counterparts in ancient lore. In their ancient setting these story-patterns are often overlooked or unrecognized by folklorists, because they are not presented outright as stories, but as parts of or implicit in other literary forms, such as drama, myths, or local legends, and because the texts in which they are found are so widely scattered and often obscure. For this reason the materials assembled and discussed by Miss Trenkner are peculiarly useful and instructive from the standpoint of the folklorist, to whom they open up a new vista.

The so-called "Ionian theory of the novella," which Miss Trenkner discusses and successfully refutes in ch. viii, considers the Greek novella to be a literary genre in its own right, which was created by the Ionians with an historical orientation, and later developed in Hellenistic times by such writers as Aristides of Miletus, Petronius, and Apuleius. Thus Aly declares (*R.-E.*, XVII, col. 1178) that "Aristides' work must have differed from the old Ionian novella in one respect: his stories, in all probability, were no longer bound up with great historical names . . . they were brought down to a middle-class milieu"; and Wilamowitz observes (*Aristot. u. Athen*, II, p. 32) that "our scanty evidence does not allow us to see whether the decisive step (in the history of the Milesian novella), that is, the abandonment of mythological names, was made by Aristides; at any rate this took place soon after, otherwise Petronius' Woman of Ephesus would have the name of a princess of the seventh or sixth century."

Now Miss Trenkner's refutation of this theory is well reasoned and this reviewer agrees with her conclusion; but she seems to be guided rather by an instinctive feeling for the realities of literary history than by a clearly conceived theory of how this literature evolves; and her argumentation is somewhat clouded by an implicit acceptance of the genealogical concept of 'development' within the novella itself as a literary form, which vitiates the theory that she attacks. The basic fallacy underlying that theory consists in viewing the novella as an independent literary form, whose later manifestations are lineally descended, by a traditional, perpendicular line of descent, on biological analogy, from the earliest ones. Unlike the Greek romance, the novella in antiquity was never an independent form standing by itself; but, like the Aesopic fable before Phaedrus, it appears always in a context of some kind, and it is the nature and orientation of that context, itself an independent form, which determines what the novella will be in any one time or place and its morphology. The history of what we call novella cannot be deduced from a comparative study of its parts or conventions in a chronological frame of reference. The forces that determine its shape are exerted from a horizontal direction, issuing partly from concepts of literary propriety which are relatively timeless and valid for more than one genre, and partly, and more immediately, from the governing context, to which it is subordinated. If the larger independent form,

within which the novella appears, happens to be one of the fundamentally *comic* genres (stage comedy, mime, satire, parody, Aesopic fable, or any kind of writing that is recognized as playful or jesting by nature), then the novella will derive, from the larger context in which it stands, not from the age or region in which it is written, the comic license of telling the story about patently fictitious characters who are either unnamed or have made-up type names, such as Margites, Bdelycleon, or Trygaeus, or mock-heroic names such as Agamemnon or Socrates, and who are represented as moving about in the contemporary world of the author himself. This convention belongs as much to literature in the classical and preclassical ages, when that literature happens to be comic, as it does to literature in late Hellenistic times. It is not, as the proponents of the 'Ionian theory' have assumed, the result of evolution, whether social, cultural, or literary. The comic protagonist is always, except in mythological parody, a Tom, Dick, or Harry of to-day; and it is to the well recognized proprieties of comic literature in the large, and not specifically to 'realism' (as Miss Trenkner seems to reckon it), that he owes his contemporaneity, his fictitious character, his namelessness, or his descriptive name, his individuality or peculiarity—individuals are essentially comic in classical literature—and his realism. For this reason it is better to speak of the 'comic,' rather than of the 'realistic' novella in contradistinction to the ideal or romantic. The latter, which may be at times quite 'realistic' in the ordinary sense of this word, derives its conventions from the ideal or serious literary genres, wherein (as in epic, tragedy, lyric poetry other than personal, historiography, and scientific, informative, or epideictic prose), stories are told only about presumably historical characters, however mythical or remote these may be from the standpoint of reality. What makes the characters of the Ionic novella high born, or bound up with great historical names and places, and with events of the past, is not the age or the place in which they are written, but the requirements of the historiographical context in which they stand and to which they are subordinated. The novella in Herodotus, as in Livy or Plutarch, is presented only as *history*, not as story on its own account, however much the writer may exploit, as contraband, the dramatic or epic possibilities of the narrative. The latest of the Greek historiographers are no more likely to introduce a story about an unnamed widow of Ephesus just for the fun of it than is Herodotus. To do so in such a context would be highly impertinent in any age. And, conversely, the unnamed widow of Ephesus in Petronius is not a princess of the sixth or seventh century for the same reason that Lysistrata in Aristophanes is not such, nor Margites a figure of saga. Petronius is not writing in the historiographical tradition, but in that of comedy broadly so defined. Between the novella in Ionian historiography and the novella in the comic books of Petronius and Apuleius there is no traditional or causal connection and no development from one to the other.

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MASON HAMMOND. *The Antonine Monarchy*. Pp. xi + 527.
(*Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome*,
XIX, 1959.)

In a previous work, *The Augustan Principate* (1933), Professor Hammond surveyed the constitutional development of the Roman Empire from Augustus to Nero. His main purpose was to describe first the emperor's position and powers, phase by phase, and secondly the other elements in the state; but the volume had also a thesis. Hammond's view, which not everyone has accepted, was that Augustus felt himself to be an agent for the Senate and Roman people. Only in subsequent reigns did this posture come to be dropped as the *princeps* turned into an autocrat.

The present volume is a companion piece, which has been in process for over twenty years. The descriptive purpose is again present and determines the general plan of the book. The several aspects of the developed monarchy are taken up in an order roughly parallel to that of the *Principate*—the powers and titles of the ruler; the place of the Senate, magistrates, and people; then the fields and operative forces of legislation, jurisprudence, jurisdiction, and administration. Now, however, the place of the army is before rather than after the republican vestiges; and everywhere the focus is on the ruler. Local government and provincial administration receive only passing notice.

As a descriptive work the *Antonine Monarchy* will long be useful. Temporally it covers on most aspects the period from Vespasian to Severus Alexander. Topically it embraces all which lies between political history and administrative evolution on the one side and political theory on the other; Hammond's survey is basically a static summary of the factual situation. No one will accept all the author's decisions on the innumerable minor problems in his path (especially in the concept of the *imperium*) or will follow him in his distrust of general forces like *auctoritas* (see p. 218); but his point of view is generally sober and is buttressed by very extensive notes. These occupy more space than the text and furnish a detailed, sometimes repetitious survey of the evidence and of modern studies down to the past few years.

If we take the work on the basis of the author's intentions, some criticisms must temper praise. In citing modern studies there is a trifle too much tendency to rely on Mommsen, Hirschfeld, and their contemporaries; evaluation of the ancient evidence is not always as firm as historical canons would require. Material appears in the text which, from the accompanying note, is rather clearly most doubtful (e. g., p. 139 and p. 160, n. 93). Any one working on the period must make up his mind about the validity of the Augustan History. Hammond sometimes qualifies his use of this material; at other points argues that simple repetition of the same statement in different lives improves its credibility (p. 27); and often uses rationalistic analysis to save as much as possible (pp. 379-80). It might have been desirable either to omit casual comments on material outside the field of constitutional history or to interlock such matters

more clearly with the account. The reader will have to check page citations, names of authors, and other matters carefully, for the type-setting has not been impeccable. Although the author's net is wide, I have missed the use of some works, such as de Robertis' *Diritto associativo romano dai collegi della repubblica alle corporazioni del Basso Impero* (1938); Brunt's paper on pay in the Roman army, *P. B. S. R.*, XVII (1950); or Jones' essay on the *aerarium* and *fiscus*, *J. R. S.*, XL (1950), though this latter is included in the full bibliography.

The principal defect, however, of the present study is that it has an abundance of description but no explicit theses. The position of the ruler has developed majestically, inexorably, toward open dominance. The process is countered by no one and regretted by few, least of all Hammond, who quotes Gibbon's endorsement of the era. All that remains, evidently, is to analyze the new structure.

But there are real problems in the second-century monarchy, on which one would appreciate the opinion of a scholar who knows so well the facts. When does open monarchy begin? Hammond's introductory remarks lead us to expect some consideration of temporal development; but in succeeding chapters there is no clear-cut sense of flow and change. Now our attention is directed to Domitian; now to Trajan, who is thought by Hammond to have considered himself "a supreme benefactor of mankind and destined for immortality" (p. 211); now to Hadrian (p. 389). The reader of the present work will be ill prepared to understand what happened next in the Roman world or to comprehend how the monarchy linked onto the Julio-Claudian era.

What were the forces which led to open absolutism? Were there any elements in opposition? These may be matters of political history in the main, but they bear directly on constitutional developments; Hammond takes up the opposition only cursorily (pp. 248-9, 272-3).

If the Augustan principate were the *res publica restituta*, is it possible to avoid concluding of the monarchy, as of Caesar's rule, *nihil esse rem publicam, appellationem modo, sine corpore ac specie* (Suet., *Iul.*, 77)? By the second century, it might well be argued, Rome no longer was governed by principles which we might properly call constitutional; "l'auctoritas inaugurait le régime de la personnalité," observed Béranger, *Recherches sur l'aspect idéologique du Principat*, p. 131. Hammond evidently would not agree, inasmuch as he has undertaken the present study. Still, he nowhere argues the problem and has a semi-apologetic air in calling Claudius (p. 205) or Trajan (p. 210) "constitutional" in quotation marks; on pp. 38-9 he accepts Ulpian's principle (*Dig.*, I, 4, 1), *quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem*. A great range of very serious problems opens up in this matter, including the repository in which constitutional powers may be said to have lain, the sources of monarchial rights, and the degree to which the emperor's surveillance of individuals (cf. *S. H. A.*, *Hadr.*, 11, 4) may be termed compatible with human rights. Ethical valuation, to be sure, seems in recent years to be rejected in political philosophy.

In dealing with the senatorial aristocracy of the second century,

Hammond is rather harsh and implicitly criticizes its attention to its own estates and to exercising local control (e. g., p. 451). The rise and extent of such attitudes are not fully discussed, which is a pity; here we have a factor which must be taken seriously into account if we are to explain how the majestic monarchy of the Antonines could decline in practical effectiveness.

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Samothrace. Excavations Conducted by the Institute of Fine Arts of New York University, Karl Lehmann, Editor. Vol. I: The Ancient Literary Sources, edited and translated by NAPHTALI LEWIS. New York, Pantheon Books, 1959; copyright 1958. Pp. xvi + 148; 2 pls. \$7.50. (*Bollingen Series*, LX, 1.)

The publication of *Samothrace* I is an event welcome in itself, and comes as a harbinger of other volumes to appear shortly. Of the nine volumes now projected, II and IV, each in two parts, are promised for 1960, and volume III is to follow soon after. The series will conclude with a volume on the History and Religion of the Sanctuary of the Great Gods, which will interest many to whom the archaeological details are of less concern. It will be eagerly awaited.

Meanwhile, we can be thankful for a volume of much intrinsic interest, and of fundamental importance to students of the Samothracian cult. Here we have, conveniently assembled and arranged, all that survives of what the ancient authors, over a period of some two thousand years, had to say about the island of Samothrace, its legends, and its famous sanctuary. Considering its fame, we may perhaps be surprised at how little there is, but it is largely in the light of these pages that the archaeological finds must be interpreted.

The *testimonia*, 241 in number, are arranged in twelve chapters (several of which are further subdivided), and these in turn are grouped to form three major sections: Physical and Economic Geography, Legend and History, and Religion. This arrangement, while dictated by practical considerations, is not altogether free of drawbacks. Chronology suffers most, inevitably. Even though the texts of each chapter or sub-heading are, in general, put in chronological sequence, a consecutive perusal of the book somewhat giddily jerks the reader back and forth through time. To be sure the Index of Sources (arranged alphabetically) gives the century of each author, but it would be helpful to have this information in the text as well. It is not every reader who will know, off-hand, just where to date Apollonius Sophista or the Scholia A on the *Iliad*. Those who wish to read the texts in chronological order will find a useful listing (of the religious texts only) in Bengt Hemberg's indispensable work *Die Kabiren* (Uppsala, 1950), pp. 49-51.

The great difficulty in any schematic arrangement is the proper location of the texts. On the whole this has been skilfully done,

and four indices and generous cross-references are provided to facilitate use of the collection. Though some continuous texts have been broken up and the parts distributed, these are clearly keyed to one another, and the reader is in any case warned that the major excerpts should always be read in context. A few passages might, perhaps, have been differently placed, but only once is the arrangement open to serious question. If one wishes to know which ancient authors wrote separate works about Samothrace, Chapter VII ("Lost Works on Samothrace") is misleadingly incomplete. It is not enough to refer the reader to the Index of Ancient Authors and Works Cited, since this includes also those authors who merely refer to the island, and in any case authors and works are there indexed in separate lists. What we need in Chapter VII is a list of relevant passages placed elsewhere, e.g. no. 37 (for Aristotle's *Constitution of Samothrace*), and no. 186 (for Callistratus' *History of Samothrace*). And on no. 136, a lexicographical entry on the historian Idomeneus, we might expect a cross-reference to nos. 70 and 70a, where his work is cited.

It is interesting to see what the texts do and do not reveal. The geographical passages (nos. 1-30) tell us little more than the location of the island and that it was famous for onions and the plant *peucedanum*. More than a thousand years of history, from the Persian Wars on, are reflected in fewer than forty entries (nos. 94-131b), and over half of these refer to Perseus and the events of 172-168 B. C. It is only too obvious that the island had little economic or political importance apart from the sanctuary, its treasures, and the right of asylum.

It is, in any case, the religious aspect that interests us most, and here the texts are fortunately more numerous. The four chapters of Section 3 (nos. 140-241), on the cult and its traditions, account for nearly half of the total space assigned to texts, and an earlier chapter, on the early legends of the island (Chap. IV, nos. 31-77), contains some material that is closely related. Read quickly they are, of course, like the literary evidence for other mystery cults, disappointingly vague and imprecise, but they can be made to yield much, as Hemberg's careful analysis has shown. When all the evidence of inscriptions and of the excavations has been made available and fully assessed, we shall no doubt be even better able to utilize these texts to the full.

An Appendix (pp. 115-17) contains the five passages from Francesco Piacenza's *L'Egeo redivivo* (Modena, 1688), where he cites as his authority for statements on Samothrace a certain Nicostratus, otherwise unknown. Though Lewis does not definitely commit himself, it seems on the whole easier to accept Nicostratus as an authentic, but forgotten, Byzantine than to assume a forgery. It is interesting that "Nicostratus" provides the only ancient reference to the famous Nike of Samothrace, which he calls a statue of Cybele.

All the ancient texts are given both in the original Greek or Latin and in translation. Critical and explanatory notes have been kept to the minimum. A bibliography and the four indices complete the work.

The material for the volume was, as is evident, collected with great

care and painstakingly edited. I note only one omission, a passing mention in Diodorus, XXIX, 25 to Perseus' flight to Samothrace in 168 B. C., which is, however, of no importance except, perhaps, for his reference to the gods of the cult as τῶν ἀγνωστότων θεῶν. There are only a few points where one might take issue with the translations. In no. 182 we should reverse "powerful gods, helping gods" to match the Greek (cf. no. 183). In no. 186 the translation given for τὰ ἱερά is "sacred symbols." This is perhaps too specific. In line 9 we have τὰ τε Παλλάδια καὶ τὰ ἱερά; in lines 19-22 τὰ μὲν ἱερά τῶν θεῶν καὶ τὰς τελετάς is contrasted with τὰ δὲ Παλλάδια καὶ τὰς <τῶν> θεῶν εἰκόνας. "Rites" might be a better word to use here, though in fact τὰ ἱερά is, as so often, ambiguous, and in the parallel account from the same author (no. 187) it corresponds to τὰ Παλλάδια καὶ τὰς . . . εἰκόνας of the earlier passage. Whatever the translation, a note would be helpful to the unwary or Greekless reader. On the other hand, the note on no. 229 might better have been omitted. Apollonius' account of the Argonauts' putting in at the island for initiation is not evidence, one way or the other, for the availability of initiation at times other than the festival. This is poetry, not history, and a poet does not bring a Jason to Samothrace only to have him told that he has come at the wrong season and must wait a few months or weeks to be initiated.

Except for one feature the volume has been handsomely, even lavishly, designed and published. The type is large and well leaded, and margins are generous. The Greek font is especially clear and attractive. Yet in most of the notes to the text no effort has been made to justify the margins. As an economy measure this practice may, on occasion, be tolerated, but it seems strangely incongruous and disturbing here. Misprints are few and insignificant: on p. xiii, in the listing of Chapter IV, read "77" for "71"; on p. 96, note to no. 212, "Lucretius 910-11" should read "Lucretius 6. 910-11."

These criticisms, however, concern only details. Taken as a whole, the volume is splendid, and Professor Lewis may well take pride in a useful job well done. To him, as also to Professor Lehmann and the Bollingen Foundation, we may offer sincere thanks and congratulations. An important series has been well begun.

FRANCIS R. WALTON.

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